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PREFACE.

This book of cases is prepared with the idea of assisting the

student in his study of the substantive law of crimes. It is

thought, however, that the topical arrangement made, with an

illustrative case under each topic, may occasionally give the prac-

titioner a leader over some troublesome path of investigation.

Annotations have not been indulged in by the editor. These

are left to the individual instructor, who should, in our judgment,

be given the largest freedom in selecting and presenting cases

similar to those under consideration. No two men teach the same

way, and he does best who teaches well in his own way and

through his personality impresses upon the student the true value

PR EFA C E .

of each idea. Xo ironclad method in legal education can bring

any good to anybody.

In preparing this work we are very much indebted to John "W.

Dwyer. He has revised the manuscript and made many impor-

tant suggestions, and has taken the full responsibility of sending

the work through the press. Without his patient labors this

volume could not have been submitted .
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Jerome C. Kxowltox.

University of Michigan, November 1, 1902.
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CHAPTER I.

DEFINITION AND GENERAL NATUEE OF CRIME.

1. Crime Defined.

State V. O'Brien, S2 N. J. L. 169. (1867).

CASES

Dalrimple, J. :

On the fifteenth day of November, 1865, the defendant was a

switch-tender, in the employ of the New Jersey Railroad and

ON

Transportation Company. His duty was to adjust, and keep

adjusted, the switches of the road at a certain point in the city of

Newark, so that passenger trains running over the road would

continue on the main track thereof, and pass thence to the city of

Elizabeth. He failed to perform such duty, whereby a passenger

CRIMINAL

LAW

train of cars, drawn by a locomotive engine, was unavoidably

diverted from the main track to a side track, and thence thrown

upon the ground. The cars were thrown upon each other with

CHAPTER I.

great force and violence, by means whereof one Henry Gardner,

a, passenger upon the train, was so injured that he died. The

defendant was indicted for manslaughter, and convicted upon trial
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in the Essex Oyer and Terminer. He insisted, and in different

DEFINITION AND GENERAL NATURE OF CRIME.

forms, asked the court to charge the jury, that he could not legally

be convicted, unless his will concurred in his omission of duty;

1.

the court refused so to charge. A rule to show cause why the

CRIME DEFINED.

verdict should not be set aside was granted, and the case certified

into this court for its advisory opinion, as to whether there was

State v. O'Brien, 32 N. J. L. 169.

{1867 ).

any error in the charge of the court below, or in the refusal to

charge, as requested.

1

J. :
On the fifteenth day of November, 1865, the defendant was a
switch-tender, in the employ of the New Jersey Railroad and
Transportation Company. Hi duty was to adjust, and keep
adjusted, the switches of the road at a certain point in the city of
Newark, o that passenger trains running over the road would
continue on the main track thereof, and pass thence to the city of
Elizabeth. He failed to perform such duty, whereby a passenger
train of cars, drawn by a locomotive engine, was unavoidably
diverted from the main track to a side track, and thence thrown
upon the ground. The cars were thrown upon each other with
great force and violence, by mean whereof one Henry Gardner,
a passenger upon the train, wa so injured that he died. The
defendant was indicted for man laughter, and convicted upon trial
in the Essex Oyer and T erminer. He insisted, and in different
form , asked the court to charge the jury, that he could not legally
be convicted, unle s hi will concurred in his omission of duty;
the court refused so to charge. A rule to show cause why the
verdict should not be set a ide was granted, and the case certified
into thi court for it advi ory opinion, a to whether there was
any error in the charg of the court below, or in the refusal to
charge, as rcqu sted.
DALRIMPLE,

1

2

CRIME DEFINED

2 Ckime Defined

The indictment was for the crime of manslaughter. If the de-

fendant's omission of duty was wilful, or in other words, if his

will concurred in his negligence, he was guilty of murder. Intent

to take life, either by an act of omission or commission, distin-

guishes murder from manslaughter. In order to make out against

the defendant the lesser offence of manslaughter, it was not neces-

sary that it should appear that the act of omission was wilful or of

purpose. The court was right in its refusal to charge as requested.

The only other question is, whether there is error in the charge

delivered. The error complained of is, that the jury were in-

structed that a mere act of omission might be so criminal or culpable

as to be the subject of an indictment for manslaughter. Such, we

believe, is the prevailing current of authority. Professor Green-

leaf, in the third volume of his work on evidence, § 129, in treating

of homicide, says: "It may be laid down, that where one, by his

negligence, has contributed to the death of another, he is responsi-

ble. The caution which the law requires in all these cases, is not

the utmost degree which can possibly be used, but such reasonable

care as is used in the like cases, and has been found, by long expe-
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rience, to answer the end." Wharton, in his Treatise on Crim-

inal Law, p. 383, says "There are many cases in which death is

the result of an occurrence, in itself unexpected, but which arose

from negligence or inattention. How far in such cases the agent

of such misfortune is to l)e held responsible, depends upon the

inquiry, whether he was guilty of gross negligence at the time.

Inferences of guilt are not to be drawn from remote causes, and

the degree of caution requisite to bring the case within the limits

of misadventure, must be proportioned to the probability of danger

attending the act immediately conducive to the death." The propo-

sitions so well stated by the eminent writers referred to, we believe

to be entirely sound, and are applicable to the case before us.

The charge, in the respect complained of, was in accordance with

them. It expressly states, that it w^as a question of fact for the

jury to settle, whether the defendant was or was not guilty of

negligence; whether his conduct evinced under the circumstances

such care and diligence as were proportionate to the danger to life

impending. The very definition of crime is an act omitted or

committed in violation of public law. The defendant in this case

omitted his duty under such circumstances as amounted to gross

or culpable or criminal negligence. The court charged the jury.

The indictment was for the crime of manslaughter. If the defendant's omission of duty was wilful, or in other words, if his
will concurred in his negligence, h e was guilty of murder. Intent
to take life, either by an act of omission or commission, distinguishes murder from manslaughter. In order to make out against
the defendant the lesser offence of manslaughter, it was not necessary that it should appear that th e act of omission was wilful or of
purpose. The court was right in its r efusal to charge as requested.
The only other question is, whether ther e is error in the charge
delivered. The error complained of is, that the jury were instructed that a mere act of omission might be so criminal or culpable
as to be the subj ect of an indictment for manslaughter. Such, we
believe, is the prevailing current of authority. Professor Greenleaf, in the third volume of his work on evidence, § 129, in treating
of homicide, says : " It may be laid down, that where one, by his
negligence, has contributed to the death of another, he is responsible. The caution which the law r equires in all these cases, is not
the utmost degree which can possibly be used, but such reasonable
care as is used in the like ca.ses, and has been found, by long experience, t o an swer the end." Wharton, in his Treatise on Criminal Law, p. 382, ays " There are many cases in which death is
the r esult of an occurrence, in it elf unexpect ed, but which arose
from negligence or inattention. H ow far in such cases the agent
of such misfortune is t o be held r esponsible, depends upon the
inquiry, whether he was guilty of gross n egligence at the time.
Infer ences of guilt are not to be drawn from remote causes, and
the degree of caution requisite to bring the case within the limits
of misadventure, must be proportioned t o the probability of danger
attending the act immediately conducive to the death." The propositions so well stated by the eminent writers r eferred t o, we believe
to be entirely sound, and ar e applicable to the case before us.
The charge, in the r espect complained of, was in accordance with
them. It expressly states, that it was a question of fact for the
jury to settle, whether the defendant was or was not guilty of
n egligence; whether his conduct evinced under the circumstances
such care and diligence as were proportionat e to the danger to life
impending. The very definition of crime is an act omitted or
committed in violation of public law. The defendant in this case
omitted his duty under such circumstances as amounted to gross
or culpable or criminal negligence. The court charged the jury

3

Cmr:MONWEA.LTH v. WARRE.i:
Commonwealth v. Wakren 3

that if the defendant, at the time of the accident, was intending

to do his duty, but in a moment of forgetfulness omitted some-

thing which any one of reasonable care would be likely to omit,

he was not guilty. The verdict of guilty finds the question of fact

involved in this proposition against the defendant, and convicts

him of gross negligence. He owed a personal duty not only to

his employers, but to the public. He was found to have been

grossly negligent in the performance of that duty, whereby human

life was sacrificed. His conviction was right, and the court below

should be so advised.

2. Distinction Between Torts and Crimes.

CommonweaWi v. Warren, 6 Mass. 72. (1809.)

An indictment found by the grand jury, at the last April term at

Ipswich, against the defendant, states, that he, being an evil-dis-

posed person, and contriving and intending one Benjamin Adams

that if the defendant, at the time of the accident, wa intending
to do his dut.v, but in a moment of forgetfulne omitted omething which any one of reasonable care would be likely to omit,
he wa not guilty. The verdict of guilty find the que tion of fact
involved in this propo ition again t the defendant, and convicts
him of gros negligence. He owed a per onal duty not only to
his employer, but to the public. He wa found to have been
gro ly negligent in the performance of that duty whereby human
life wa sacrificed. Hi conviction was right, and the court below
hould be so advised.

to deceive, cheat, and defraud, falsely pretended and affirmed to

the said Adams, that his, the defendant's, name was William

Waterman; that he lived in Salem, and there kept a grocery store;

that he wished to purchase, on credit of Adams, fifty pair of shoes,
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giving his own note as security therefor; that Adams, giving credit

to his false pretences and affirmations, sold him the shoes, and

2.

took, as security, the note of the defendant, subscribed by him with

DrsTr cTro

BETWEEN TORTS AND CRIMES.

the name of William Waterman.

Upon conviction, the defendant moved in arrest of judgment,

Commonwealth v. Warren, 6 Mass. 72.

on the ground that the facts charged in the indictment, and of

(1809.)

which he had been found guilty, are a private injury only, and

do not amount to a public ofi'ence.

Story, in support of the motion, cited 2 East's P. C. 819.

Parsons, C. J. :

At common law it is an indictable offence to cheat any man

of his money, goods, or chattels, by using false weights or false

measures; and by the English statute of 33 H. 8, c. 1, passed

before the settlement of this country, and considered here as a part

An indictment found by the grand jury, at the last April term at
Ipswich, against the defendant, states, that he, being an evil-dispo ed person, and contriving and intending one B enjamin Adams
to deceive, cheat, and defraud, fal ely pretended and affirmed to
the said Adams, that his, the defendant's, name was William
lVaterman; that he lived in Salem, and there kept a grocery store;
that he wished to purcha e, on credit of Adams, fifty pair of shoe .
giving his own note as security therefor; that Adams, giving credit
to his false pretences and affirmations, old him the hoes, and
took, as security, the note of the defendant, sub cribed by him with
the name of William Waterman.
Upon conviction, the defendant moved in arrest of judgment,
on the ground that the facts charged in the indictment, and of
which he had been found guilty, are a private injury only, and
do not amount to a public offence.
tory, in support of the motion, cited 2 East's P. C. 819.
PARSO

s,

c. J.:

At common law it i an in lictable offence to cheat any man
of his money, good , or hattel , by u ing fal e w ight or fal e
measure ; and by the Engli h tatute of 33 H. 8, c. 1, pa d
before the settlement of this country, and con id ered here a a part

4

DISTINCTION BETWEEN TORTS AND CRIMES

4 Distinction Between Torts and Crimes

of our common law, cheating by false tokens is made an indictable

offence. The object of the law is, to protect persons who in their

dealings use due diligence and precaution, and not persons who

suffer through their own credulity, carelessness, or negligence. But

aa prudent persons may be overreached by means of false weights,

measures, or tokens, or by a conspirac}^, where two or more per-

sons confederate to cheat, frauds effected in either of these ways

are punishable by indictment. And by an English statute of 30

G. 2, c. 24, which is not in force in this state, the same prosecu-

tion has been extended to cheating by false pretences.

But if a man will give credit to the false affirmation of another,

and thereby suffer himself to be cheated, he may pursue a civil

remedy for the injury, but he cannot prosecute by indictment. (1)

If, therefore, Adams was cheated out of his shoes by the defend-

ant, without using false weights, measures, or tokens, and by no

conspiracy, but only by his credulity in believing the lies of the

defendant, although he may have an action against the defendant

to recover his damages, yet this indictment cannot be maintained,

whatever false pretences the defendant may have wickedly used.
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And it appears that Adams was imposed on by the gross lies

of the defendant. He pretended and affirmed that his name was

William Waterman, and that he was a grocer in good credit in

Salem. Adams, unfortunately believing him, sold and delivered

him the shoes on credit; and when the defendant gave his note as

security, he used his false name.

We see here no conspiracy, for the defendant was alone in the

fraud; and no false tokens to induce a credit; and as for false

weights or measures, there is no pretence. We cannot therefore

consider the facts stated in the indictment (however injurious they

were to Adams) as constituting a public indictable offence. (2)

Judgment arrested.

Bidwell, attorney-general, for the commonwealth.

(i) Vide Hawk. P. C. h. i, c. 71, § 2. — Rex vs. Wheatly, 2 Burr. 1125.

(2) Rex vs. Lara, 6 D. & E. 565.

of our common law, cheating by false tokens is made an indictable
offence. The object of the law is, to protect persons who in their
dealings use due diligence and precaution, and not persons who
suffer through their own credulity, careles ness, or negligence. But
a~ prudent persons may be overreached by means of false weight _,
measures, or tokens, or by a conspiracy, where two or more per.sons confederate to cheat, frauds effected in either of these ways
are punishable by indictment. And by an Engli h statute of 30
G. 2, c. 24, which i not in force in this state, the same prosecution has been extended to cheating by false pretences.
But if a man will give credit to the false affirmation of another,
and thereby suffer himself to be cheated, he may pursue a civil
remedy for the injury, but he cannot prosecute by indictment. ( 1)
If, therefore, Adams was cheated out of his shoe by the defendant, without using false weights, measure , or tokens, and by no
conspiracy, but only by his credulity in believing the lies of the
defendant, although he may have an action against the defendant
to recover his damages, yet this indictment cannot be maintained,
whatever false pretences the defendant may have wickedly used.
And it appears that Adams was imposed on by the gross lies
of the defendant. He pretended and affirmed that his name was
1Vnliam Waterman, and that he was a grocer in good credit in
Salem,. Adams, unfortunately believing him, sold and delivered
him the shoes on credit; and when the defendant gave his note as
security, he used his false name.
\Ye see here no conspiracy, for the defer:.dant was alone in the
fraud; and no false tokens to induce a credit; and as for false
weights or measures, there is no pretence. We cannot therefore
consider the facts stated in the indictment (however injurious they
were to Ada.ms) as constituting a public indictable offence. (2)
Judgment arrested.
Bidwell, attorney-general, for the commonwealth.
(1)
(2)

Vide Hawk. P. C. b. I, c. 71, § 2.-Rex vs. Wheatly, 2 Burr. 1125.
Rex vs. Lara, 6 D. & E. 565.

Henderson v. Commonwealth

HE:NDERSO

v.

5

COMMONWEALTH

Henderson v. Commonicealtli, 8 Grat. (Va.) 708. (1852.)

At the April term 1850 of the Circuit court of Wood county,

the grand jury found an indictment against George W. Hender-

son, for that he did break and enter the close of one Enos Pugh,

situate in the county aforesaid, and at the house of said Enos

Pugh did then and there wickedly, mischievously and maliciously,

Henderson v. C01nmonwealth, 8 Grat. (Va.) 708.

(1852.)

and to the terror and dismay of one Nancy Pugh, wife of said

Enos Pugh, fire a gun in the porch of said house, and then and

there did shoot and kill a dog belonging to said house, without

any legal authority, contrary to the form of the statute in such

cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of

the Commonwealth. On the trial the jury found the defendant

guilty, and assessed his fine at one hundred dollars: whereupon

he moved the Court for a new trial, which motion was overruled ;

and he excepted.

The facts proved upon the trial were as follows: That some

time about the 1st of March, 1850, in the county of Wood the

defendant came to the house of Enos Pugh about eight or nine

o'clock in the morning, and then and there went upon the porch
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of the dwelling house, having his gun on his shoulder and his

shot-pouch about his neck: A part of the family of Enos Pugh

was then in the house. The defendant told Nancy Pugh, wife

of Enos, that he suspected her dogs for worrying and killing his

sheep, and he had come to kill the said dogs. She told him that

she did not believe the said dogs were guilty, and refused to have

them killed, and forbade his doing so; but he disregarding what

she said, took his gun from his shoulder, still standing on the

porch, and shot and killed one of the dogs; and then and there

loaded his gun and shot another of said dogs and wounded him ;

the said dogs then lying in the yard near the said porch : One

of the dogs being a large one and the other a small one, the largo

one being killed. That the smoke of the gun when fired passed

into the dwelling house by the door. Nancy Pugh was much

alarmed by the firing of the gun in the manner in which it was

done; and two of her daughters, members of the family, were also

greatly alarmed, and one of them who was dyspeptic, so mucli

At the April term 1850 of the Circuit court of Wood county,
the grand jury found an indictment again t George W. H enderson, for that he did break and enter the clo e of one Eno Pugh,
ituate in the county afore aid, and at the hou e of aid Eno
Pugh did then and there wickedly, mischievou ly and maliciously,
and to the terror and dismay of one Nancy Pugh, wife of said
Eno Pugh, :fire a gun in the porch of aid hou e, and then and
there did hoot and kill a dog belonging to aid hou e, without
any legal authority, contrary to the form of the tatute in uch
ca e made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of
the ommonwealth. On the trial the jury found the defendant
guilty, and a es ed his fine at one hundred dollars: whereupon
he moved the Court for a new trial, which motion wa overruled;
and he excepted.
The facts proved upon the trial were as follow : That ome
time about the 1 t of March, 1850, in the county of \:\ ood the
defendant came to the hou e of Enos Pugh about eight or nine
o'clock in the morning, and th n and there went upon the porch
of the dwelling hou e, having hi gun on his shoulder and hi
shot-pouch about his neck : A part of the family of Eno Pugh
was then in the house. The defendant told Nancy Pugh, wife
of Eno , that h e u pected h r clog for worrying and killing hi
heep, and he had come to kill the said dog .
he told him that
he did not believe the aid dogs were guilty, and refu eel to have
them killed, and forbade hi doing so; but he disregarding what
he aid~ took his gun from his shoulder, till standing on the
porch and hot and killed one of the log ; and then and there
loaded hi gun and hot another of said dog and wounded him ;
the aid dog then lying in the yard near the aid porch: One
f the clogs being a large one and the other a mall one, the larg
one being killed. That the smoke of the gun when fired pa ~ cl
into the dw Hing hou e by the door. l' ancy Pugh wa mu h
alarmed by the firing of the gun in the mann r in which it wa
don ; and two of h r daughter , m mber of th family, w r al ' O
greatly alarmed, and one of th m who wa ly peptic, . . o mu ·h

6 Distinction Between Torts and Crimes

6
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CTION BETWEEN TORTS A
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so that she became sick in consequence of it, and had to call in

medical assistance. At the time the above transaction took place

there was none of the male portion of said Pugh's family at

home; they being confined in the jail of Wood county, having

been convicted upon accusations made against them by the de-

fendant.

The other facts proved related to the question whether the dogs

shot by the defendant were the same that had worried his sheep.

They were not seen by any one to do it; or to be near the place

where it was done; and the facts relied upon to shew their guilt

were certainly not very conclusive against them; but it is not a

question of much importance in this case.

After the Court had overruled the motion for a new trial tlie

defendant filed errors in arrest of judgment.

1st. That the facts stated in the indictment did not constitute

a penal offence under any statute in force at the time the act was

done.

2d. That they did not constitute an offence at common law.

But the Court overruled the motion to arrest the judgment;
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and rendered a judgment upon the verdict for the Commonwealth.

AYhereupon the defendant applied to this Court for a writ of

error, which was allowed.

LoMAX, J., delivered the opinion of the Court:

It is abundantly clear that the mere breaking and entering the

close of another, though in contemplation of law a trespass com-

mitted vi et armis, is only a civil injury to be redressed by action;

and cannot be treated as a misdemeanor to be vindicated by indict-

ment or public prosecution. But when it is attended by circum-

stances constituting a breach of the peace, such as entering the

dwelling house with offensive weapons, in a manner to cause terror

and alarm to the family and inmates of the house, the trespass

is heightened into a public offence, and becomes the subject of a

criminal prosecution. The case of Bex v. Storr, 3 Burr, E. 1698,

~o

that she became sick in consequence of it, and had to call in
medical assistance. At the time the above transaction took place
there was none of the male portion of said Pugh's family at
home ; they being confined in the jail of Wood county, having
been convicted upon accusations made against them by the defendant.
The other facts proved related to the question whether the dogs
shot by the defendant were the ame that had worried his sheep.
They were not seen by any one to do it ; or to be near the place
where it was done; and the fact relied upon to shew their guilt
were certainly not very conclu ive against them; but it is not a
que tion of much importance in this ca e.
After the Court had overruled the motion for a new trial the
defendant filed errors in arrest of judgment.
1st. That the facts stated in the indictment did not constitute
a penal offence under any statute in force at the time the act wa
done.
2c1. That they did not constitute an offence at common law.
But the Court overruled the motion to arrest the judgment;
and rendered a judgment upon the verdict for the Commonwealth.
Whereupon the defendant applied to this Court for a writ of
error, which was allowed.

and Bex v. Bathurst, which was cited in that case, establish and

illustrate both of these principles. Three of the indictments in

that case were quashed, because they amounted merely to trespass

vi et armis. But as to the fourth indictment, which was for enter-

ing a dwelling house vi et armis, and with strong hand, the objec-

tion to that indictment was given up by the counsel for the defend-

LouAx, J., delivered the opinion of the Court:
It is abundantly clear that the mere breaking and entering the
clo. e of another, though in contemplation of law a trespass committed vi et armis, i only a civil injury to be redressed by action ;
and cannot be treated a a mi demeanor to be vindicated by indictment or public prosecution. But when it is attended by circumstance constituting a breach of the peace, uch as entering the
dwelling house with offensive weapons, in a manner to cau e terror
and alarm to the family and inmates of the house, the trespas
i heightened into a public offence, and becomes the subject of a
criminal prosecution. The ca e of R ex v. Storr, 3 Burr. R. 1698
and Rex v. Bathitrst, which was cited in that ca e, establish and
illustrate both of these principles. Three of the indictments in
that case were quashed, becau e they amounted merely to trespa ~
i:i et armis. But as to the fourth indictment, which was for entering a dwelling house vi et armis, and with strong hand, the objection to that indictment was given up by the coun el for the defend-
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ant, and the prosecution for that offence was sustained, whilst the

three first indictments were ordered by the Court to be quashed.

From what was said in those cases, the circumstance that the

place where the entry is made is a dwelling house, as reason would

suggest, and the peace of those abiding under the sanctity of their

home and the security of their castle, would strongly require, is

a most important circumstance to be taken into consideration in

the aggravation of trespass quai'e clausum f7'egit into a mis-

demeanor; as is also the circumstance that the entry was made

with fire arms or other offensive or dangerous weapons. The facts,

as disclosed in this record for the purpose of sustaining the

motion for a new trial, shew a trespass most aggravated in both

of these circumstances ; as also in the destruction of animals within

the personal and domestic protection of the owners of the dwelling

house, and the alarm and dismay and other evils which the violence

occasioned to the unprotected females of the family. No trespass

could be aggravated beyond the wrongs of a private injury and

swell into the magnitude of a crime against the public peace, if

the facts stated in the record do not amount to a misdemeanor.
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Therefore the motion for a new trial was properly overruled. It

is hardly less clear, that the frame of the indictment, in its

charges of the circumstances accompanying the trespass, is suffi-

cient to maintain the prosecution. Wherefore the errors in arrest

of judgment were also properly overruled. The judgment of the

Circuit court should be affirmed.

3. Settlement Between the Wrong-doer and the Person

Injured.

Fleener v. State, 58 Ark. 98. (1893.)

BuNN, C. J, :

The defendant, A. W. Fleener, was indicted at the October

term, 1892, of the St. Francis circuit court, for the crime of

embezzlement; at the March term, 1893, found guilty, and sen-

tenced to imprisonment in the penitcntiar}^ for the period of one

year. Motions in arrest of judgment, and also for new trial, were

overruled, and appeal taken to this court.

;J; :{: ^ ^ ^:

ant, and the pro ecution for that offence wa u tained, whil t the
three :fir t indictments were ordered by the Court to be qua hcd.
From what was aid in tho e ca e, the circumstance that the
place where the entry i made i a dwelling hou e, a reason would
sugge t, and the peace of tho e abiding under the anctity of their
home and the ecurity of their ca tle, would trongly require, i
a mo t important circum tance to be taken into con ideration in
the aggravation of tre pa
quare clausitrn fregit into a misdemeanor; a i al o the circum tance that the entry wa made
with fire arms or other o:ffen ive or dangerou weapon . The facts,
a di clo ed in thi record for the purpo e of u taining the
motion for a new trial, hew a tre pa most aggravated in both
of the..,e circumstance ; a al o in the de truction of animals within
the per onal and domestic protection of the owners of the dwelling
hou e, and the alarm and dismay and other evil which the violence
occa ioned to the unprotected female of the family. No trespa
could be aggravated beyond the wrong of a private injury and
swell into the magnitude of a crime against the public peace, if
the fact tated in the record do not amount to a misdemeanor.
T herefore the motion for a new trial wa properly overruled. It
is hardly le
clear, that the frame of the indictment, in it
charge of the circum tance accompanying the tre pa , is ufficient to maintain the pro ecution. Wherefore the error in arre t
of judgment were al o properly overruled. The judgment of the
Circuit court hould be affirmed.

The fourth ground of the motion for new trial is a novel one.

The defendant contends that having hired the guaranty company

3.

SETTLEMENT B ETWEEN THE WRO .i: G-DOER AND TUE PER O:N"
INJ RED.

Fleener v .

tate, 58 Ark. 98. (1893.)

B N , . J, :
The defendant, A. W. Fleener, wa indicted at the October
term, 1 92, of the St. Franci circuit court, for the crime of
embezzlement; at the March term 1 93, found guilty, and sentenced to impri onment in the penitentiary for the period of one
year. Motion in arre~t of judgment and al o for new trial, were
overruled, and appeal taken to thi ~ court.

*

*

*

*

~

The fourth groun l of the motion .for n w trial i a novel one.
The d fendant ontend that having hired the o·uaranty compan.'
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8 Consent of Person Injured

to make his bond for the faithful performance of duty to the

Pacific Express Company, and that company having paid the

express company for all losses claimed by it to have been suffered

by reason of defendant's alleged embezzlement, therefore there was

no crime committed; that the express company had no longer any

interest at stake, and even that the state has no interest in the

matter. In this the defendant is mistaken. This is no longer a

controversy between himself and the tv/o companies, or either of

them, and has not been, since he fraudulently appropriated the

money of the express company, if, indeed, he did so appropriate

it. It is now a controversy between the state of Arkansas and

himself, which the state will not permit either one of the said

companies to determine, at present or in the future, nor will the

state acknowledge the validity of any settlement of it, by anything

they both, or either of them, have done in the past.

4. Consent of Person Injured.

Slate V. Burnham, 56 Vt. U5. (ISSJf.)

Indictment for a breach of the peace. Trial by jury, December

term, 1883, Taft J., presiding. Verdict guilty. The evidence for
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the prosecution tended to show that the respondent and one Blox-

ham engaged in a boxing match ; that it was agreed upon three or

to make his bond for the faithful performance of duty to the
Pacific Express Company, and that company having paid the
express company for all losses claimed by it to have been suffered
by reason of defendant's alleged embezzlement, therefore there was
no crime committed; that the express company had no longer any
interest at stake, and even that the state has no interest in the
matter. In this the defendant is mistaken. This is no longer a
controversy between himself and the two companies, or either of
them, and has not been, since he fraudulently appropriated the
money of the express company, if, indeed, he did so appropriate
it. It is now a controversy between the state of Arkansas and
himself, which the state will not permit either one of the said
companies to determine, at present or in the future, nor will the
state acknowledge the validity of any settlement of it, by anything
they both, or either of them, have done in the past.

four days in advance; that notice of it was given among the

people; that one of the parties had a second and that a referee to

superintend the encounter was chosen; that the Queensberry rules

were to govern the contestants; that a crowd of from twenty-five

to one hundred people were collected upon the fair grounds near

4.

CONSENT OF PERSO

INJURED.

the village, a ring made, and from four to six rounds were fought,

during which the respondent and said Bloxham were engaged in

assaulting and beating each other ; that blood flowed from a wound

State v. Burnham, 56 Vt. 445.

(1884.)

on one of the parties, which the respondent's testimony tended to

show resulted from hitting an old wound on his head ; that bruises

made in the melee remained visible on the face of one of them the

second succeeding day; that the thumb of one of them was

sprained, and one of them knocked down. The respondent's evi-

dence tended to show that he went down to avoid the blows of hi&

adversary. The other facts are stated in the opinion.

Indictment for a breach of the peace. T'r ial by jury, December
term, 1883, Taft J., presiding. Verdict guilty. The evidence for
the prosecution tended to show that the respondent and one Bloxham engaged in a boxing match; that it was agreed upon three or
four days in advance; that notice of it was given among the
people; that one of the parties had a econd and that a referee to
superintend the encounter was chosen; that the Queensberry rules
were to govern the conte tants; that a crowd of from twenty-five
to one hundred people were collected upon the fair grounds near
the village, a Ting made, and from four to six rounds were fought,.
during which the re pondent and said Bloxham were engaged in
assaulting and beating each other; that blood flowed from a wound
on one of the parties, which the Tespondent's testimony tended to
show resulted from hitting an old wound on his head; that bruises
made in the melee remained visible on the face of one of them the
second succeeding day; that the thumb of one of them was
sprained, and one o.f them knocked down. The respondent's evidence tended to show that he went down to avoid the blows of hi ...
adversary. The other facts are stated in the opinion.
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State v. Burnham 9

The opinion of the court was delivered by :

The opinion of the court was delivered by:

Ross, J. :

We have to consider this case as presented by the exceptions.

It is true, as contended by the respondent's counsel, that sparring

or boxing with gloves manufactured for that purpose, as con-

ducted and engaged in in ordinary athletic sports, is not unlawful,

nor a breach of the peace. It may be that such sports, properly

conducted, are both healthful and promotive of physical vigor and

development, and should be encouraged. But such pugilistic

exercise may be abused and carried beyond the limits of healthful

and lawful exercise and sport. It may be so conducted as to

create a breach of the peace. It may even degenerate into a prize

fight. Many of the circumstances detailed in the exceptions, the

agreement to engage in the match, giving notice, having seconds,

a referee, rules, a ring, etc., are not inconsistent with lawful sport,

nor yet with a breach of the peace. Neither is the fact that slight

injuries were inflicted upon the contestants determinative of the

character of the engagement. The court told the jury that if

they found the facts, which the evidence tended to show, proven,
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they would be warranted in returning a verdict of guilty, although

the combatants fought by consent. The court instructed the jury

what would constitute a breach of the peace in a manner satis-

factory to the respondent. He excepted to the charge on the sub-

ject of consent. The court did not withdraw from the jury the

determination of whether what the evidence tended to show, would

constitute a breach of the peace. It left that whole subject to the

determination of the jury, with proper instructions on the subject

of what would constitute a breach of the peace. The only question

reserved was whether the. consent of the combatants would prevent

their acts from being a breach of the peace. Clearly, such consent

would not necessarily give character to their acts and prevent their

becoming a breach of the peace. The conduct — quarreling, chal-

lenging, assaulting, tumultuous and offensive carriage, etc., which

the statute declares to be a breach of the peace — is capable of

being consented to by all the parties guilty of it. Consent, there-

fore, was not at all determinative of whether the respondent and

Bloxham were guilty of a breach of the peace by their acts and

conduct on the occasion complained of. The court were correct

in instructing the jury that their consent to engage in such acts

and conduct was not determinative of the quality of tli-o same in

Ross, J.:
We have to con ider this case as presented by the exceptions.
It is true, as contended by the re pondent's counsel, that sparring
or boxing with gloves manufactured for that purpose, as conducted and engaged in in ordinary athletic sports, is not unlawful,
nor a breach of the peace. It may be that such sports, properly
conducted, are both healthful and promotive of physical vigor and
development, and should be encouraged. But such pugilistic
:xerci e may be abused and carried beyond the limits of healthful
and lawful exercise and sport. It may be o conducted as to
create a breach of the peace. It may even degenerate into a prize
fight. Many of the circumstances detailed in the exceptions, the
agreement to engage in the match, giving notice, having seconds,
a referee, rules, a ring, etc., are not inconsistent with lawful sport,
nor yet with a breach of the peace. Neither is the fact that slight
injuries were inflicted upon the contestants determinative of the
character of the engagement. The court told the jury that if
they found the facts, which the evidence tended to show, proven,
they would be warranted in returning a verdict of guilty, although
the combatants fought by consent. The court instructed the jury
what would constitute a breach of the peace in a manner satisfactory to the respondent. He excepted to the charge on the subject of consent. · The court did not withdraw from the jury the
determination of whether what the evidence tended to show, would
constitute a breach of the peace. It left that whole subject to the
determination of the jury, with proper instructions on the subj ect
of' what would constitute a breach of the peace. The only que tion
re erved was whether the .con ent of the combatants would pr vent
their act from being a br ach of the peace. Clearly, such consent
would not neces arily give character to their act and prevent their
becoming a breach of the peace. The conduct-quarreling, challenging, as aulting, tumultuous and offensive carriage, etc., which
the tatute declares to be a breach of the peace-is capable of
being con ented to by all the parties guilty of it. Consent, th r fore, was not at all determinative of wheth r the r spond nt and
Bloxham were guilty of a breach of th p ace by their act and
onduct on the occasion complained of. Th court wer corr t
in instructing the jury that their con ent to ngaO'e in uch a t
and conduct wa not determinative of the quality of the am in
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10 Entrapment Into Crime

regard to guilt or innocence. Tteir acts and conduct might have

all the elements of a breach of the peace notwithstanding such

consent.

Neither was the respondent entitled to have admitted the

offered evidence to show that such matches were common and

harmless amusements, innocent and proper exercises, practiced in

the universities and colleges in this country. Such evidence was

not at all determinative of, nor helpful in determining, the charac-

ter and quality of the contest between the respondent and Blox-

ham, as conducted by them on the occasion complained of.

Nor was there error in not giving the huge boxing gloves to the

jury to examine. Probably, if it had allowed the jury to make

such examination, it would not have been error. Whether it would

or would not order such examination was largely in the discretion

of the county court. The gloves furnished no criterion by which

to judge of the character of the contest, nor of the manner in

which it was conducted.

The result is that no error is found in the action of the county

court. If the jury, under proper instructions, have given a wrong
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character to the contest and conduct of the respondent, relief

must be sought in some other manner than upon exceptions to

correct rulings of the county court. The result is, that judgment

is rendered that no error is found in the proceedings of the county

court, that the exceptions are overruled, and judgment rendered

on the verdict.

5. Entrapment Into Crime.

State V. Hull, 33 Oreg. 56. (1S98.)

To constitute the crime of larceny, as charged in the indict-

ment, there must be a trespass, that is, a talcing of the property

without the consent of the owner. It is therefore evident that the

crime is not committed when the taking is by the consent, how-

ever morally guilty the taker may be. This is elementary law.

But the difficulty lies in determining when the taking is by the

consent of the owner in cases where he lays a plan to entrap a

suspected thief. Upon this subject Mr. Bishop says: "The cases

of greatest difficulty are those in which one, suspecting crime in

another, lays a plan to entrap him. Consequently, even if there

regard to guilt or innocence. Their acts and conduct might have
all the elements of a breach of the peace notwithstanding such
consent.
Neither was the respondent entitled to have admitted the
offered evidence to show that such matche were common and
harmless amusements, innocent and proper exercises, practiced in
the universities and colleges in this country. Such evidence wa
not at all determinative of, nor helpful in determining, the character and quality of the contest between the respondent and Bloxham, as conducted by them on the occasion complained of.
Nor was there error in not giving the huge boxing gloves to the
jury to examine. Probably, if it had allowed the jury to make
such examination, it would not have been error. Whether it would
or would not order such examination was largely in the discretion
of the county court. The gloves furnished no criterion by which
to judge of the character of the contest, nor of the manner in
which it was conducted.
The result is that no error is found in the action of the co unty
court. If the jury, under proper instructions, have given a wrong
character to the contc t and conduct of the respondent, relief
must be sought in some other manner than upon exceptions to
correct rulings of the county court. The result is, that judgment
is rendered that no error is found in the proceeding of the county
court, that the exceptions are overruled, and judgment rendered
on the verdict.
5.
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State v. !lull, 33 Oreg . 56.

(1898.)

To constitute the crime of larceny, as charged in the indictment, there must be a trespass, that is, a tal\:ing of the property
without the consent of the owner. It is therefore evident that the
crime is not committed when the taking is by the consent, however morally guilty the taker may be. This i elementary law.
But the difficulty lies in determining when the taking is by the
consent of the owner in cases where he lay a plan to entrap a
suspected thief. Upon this subj ect Mr. Bishop says: " The cases
of greatest difficulty are those in which one, suspecting crime in
another, lays a plan to entrap him. Consequently, even if there

State v. Hull 11

ST\..TE

v. H LL

11

is a consent, it is not within the knowledge of him who does the

act. Here we see, from principles already discussed, that, sup-

posing the consent really to exist, and the case be one in which,

on general doctrines, the consent will take away the criminal

quality of the act, there is no legal crime committed, though the

doer of the act did not know of the existence of the circum-

stance which prevented the criminal quality from attaching. But

exposing property, or neglecting to watch it, under expectation

that a thief will take this property, or furnishing any other facili-

ties 'or temptations to such or any other wrongdoer, is not a consent

in law": 1 Bish. Cr. Law (5th ed.), § 263. And in Williams

V. State, 55 Ga. 395, Mr. Justice Bleckley, in his usual clear

and lucid style, puts the law thus: "It seems to be settled law

that traps may be set to catch the guilty, and the business of

trapping has, with the sanction of courts, been carried pretty far.

Opportunity to commit crime may, by design, be rendered the

most complete; and, if the accused embrace it, he will still be

criminal. Property may be left exposed for the express purpose

that a suspected thief may commit himself by stealing it. The
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owner is not bound to take any measures for security. He may

repose upon the law alone, and the law will not inquire into his

motive for trusting it. But can the owner directly, through his

agent, solicit the suspected party to come forward and commit

the criminal act, and then complain of it as a crime, especially

where the agent to whom he has intrusted the conduct of the

transaction puts his own hand into the corpus delicti, and assists

the accused to perform one or more of the acts necessary to con-

stitute the offense? Should not the owner and his agent, after

making everything ready and easy, wait passively, and let the

would-be criminal perpetrate the offense for himself in each and

every essential part of it? It would seem to us that this is the

safer law, as well as the sounder moralit}^, and we think it accords

with the authorities: 2 Leach, 913; 2 East, P. C. c. IG, § 101,

p. 666; 1 Car. & M. 218; Dodge v. Brittain, Meigs, 86; Kemp v.

State, 11 Hump. 320; Stoie v. Covington, 2 Bail. 569. It is diffi-

cult to see how a man may solicit another to commit a crime

upon his property, and, when the act to which ho was invited

has been done, be heard to say that he did not consent to it."

And, again, in Love v. People, 160 111. 508, (43 N. E. 713), Mr.

Justice Phillips savs: "It is safer law and sounder morals to

is a con ent, it i not within the knowledge of him who does the
act. H ere we see, from principles already di cus ed, that, upposing the con ent really to exi t, ancl the case be one in which,
on general doctrine , the con nt will take away the criminal
qualit ' of the a t, ther i no legal crime committed, though the
doer of the act did not know of the exi tence of the circumstance which prevented the criminal quality from attaching. But
expo ing property, or negl cting to watch it, under expectation
that a thief will take thi property, or furni hing any other facilities ·ar temptation to uch or any other wrongdoer, is not a consent
in law' : 1 BU1. Cr. Law (5th ed.),
262. And in Williams
v. tate, 55 Ga. 395, Mr. Justice BLECKLEY, in hi usual clear
and lucid tyle, put the law thu : "It eem to be ettled law
that trap may be et to catch the guilty, and th bu ines.., of
trapping ha , with the sanction of court , been carried pretty far.
Opportunity to commit crime may, by design, be rendered the
mo t complete; and, if the accused embrace it, he will till be
criminal. Property may be left exposed for the express purpose
that a suspected thief may commit himself by stealing it. The
owner is not bound to take any measure for security. He may
repo e upon the law alone, and the law will not inquire into his
motive for trusting it. But can the owner directly, through hi
agent, solicit ihe suspected party to com forward and commit
the criminal act, and then complain of it as a crime, e pecially
where the agent fo whom he has intru ted the conduct of the
transaction put hi own hand into the corp1ts clelicti, and as i t
the accused to perform one or more of the acts nece ary to constitute the o:ffen e? Should not the o·w ner and his agent, after
making everything r eady and easy, wait pa sively, and let the
would-be criminal perpetrate the offen e for himself in each and
every es ential part of it? It would eem to us that this is the
afer law, a well a the . ., ounder morality, and we think it accord·
with the authoritie : 2 Leach, 913; 2 Ea t, P. C. c. 16, § 101,
p. 666; 1 Car. & NL 21 ; Dodge v. Brittain, Meig , 86; ]( emp v.
State, 11 Hump. 320; Sta.te v. Covington, 2 Bail. 569. It is difficult to ee how a man may olicit anoth r to ommit a crim
upon hi property, and, when the act to which he wa invited
ha been don , be h ard to "ay that h did not on ent t it."
And, again, in Love v. People 160 Ill. 50 , (-t3 N. E. 713), Mr.
Ju tice PHILLIP . ays: "It i. . afer law and . oun 1 r moral to

12

XEGLJGENCE OR WRONG OF PERSON

I

JURED

12 Xegligence or Wrong of Person Injured

hold, where one arranges to have a crime committed against his

property or himself, and knows that an attempt is to be made to

encourage others to commit the act by one acting in concert with

such owner, that no crime is thus committed. The owner and

his agent may wait passively for the would-be criminal to per-

petrate the offense, and each and every part of it, for himself,,

but they must not aid, encourage or solicit him that they may

seek to punish."

6. jSTegligence or Wrong of the Person Injured.

Begina v. Swindall et al., 2 Car. & K. 230. (18J^6.)

The prisoners were indicted for the manslaughter of one James

Durose. The second count of the indictment charged the prisoners

hold, where one arrange to have a crime committed against his
property or himself, and know. that an attempt is to be made to
encourage others to commit the act by one acting in concert with
such owner, that no crime is thus committed. The owner and
his agent may wait pa ively for the would-be criminal to perpetrate the offen e, and each and every part of it, for himself,.
but they must not aid, encourage or olicit him that they may
seek to puni h."

with inciting each other to drive their carts and horses at a furious

and dangerous rate along a public road, and with driving their

carts and horses over the deceased at such furious and dangerous

rate, and thereby killing him. The third count charged Swindall

6.

NEGLIGENCE OR WnoNG OF THE PERSON

I

JURED.

with driving his cart over the deceased, and Osborne with being

present, aiding and assisting. The fourth count charged Osborne

Regina

Y.

Swindall et al., 2 Car. & K. 230.

(1 46.)

with driving his cart over the deceased, and Swindall with being
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present, aiding and assisting.

Upon the evidence, it appeared that the prisoners were each

driving a cart and horse, on the evening of the 12th of August,

1845. The first time they were seen that evening was at Dray-

cott toll gate, two miles and a half from the place where the

deceased was run over. Swindall there paid the toll, not only

for that night, but also for having passed with Osborne through

the same gate a day or two before. They then appeared to be

intoxicated. The next place at which they were seen was Tean

bridge, over which they passed at a gallop, the one cart close

behind the other. A person there told them to mind their driv-

ing: this was 990 yards from the place where the deceased was

killed. The next place where they were seen was 47 yards beyond

the place where the deceased was killed. The carts were then

going at a quick trot, one closely following the other. At a turn-

pike gate a quarter of a mile from the place where the deceased was

killed, Swindall, who appeared all along to have been driving the

first cart, told the toll-gate keeper, "We have driven over an old

The pri oner were indicted for the man laughter of one Jame ~
Duro e. The s cond count of the indictment charged the prisoner
with inciting each other to drive their cart and horse at a furiou
and dangerous rate along a public road, and with driving their
carts and hor e over the decea ed at uch furious and dangerou
rate, and thereby killing him. The third count charged Swindall
with driYing hi cart over the decea ed and 0 borne with being
present, aiding and as isting. The fourth count charged Osborne
with driYing hi cart over the decea ed, and Swindall with being
pre ent, aiding and as i ting.
Upon the evidence, it appeared that the pri oners were each
driving a cart and horse, on the evening of the 12th of August,
1845. The fir t time they were een that eYening wa at Draycott toll gate, two mile and a half from the pla ce where the
deceased wa run over.
windall ther e paid the toll, not only
for that night, but al o for having pa ed with 0 borne through
the same gate a day or two before. They then appeared to be
intoxicated. The n ext place at which they were een wa Tean
brid ae, over which they pa ed at a gallop, the one cart clo e
behind the other. A per on there told them to mind their driving: thi wa 990 yards from the place where the deceased wa
killed. The next place where th . ' were . een wa 47 yard beyond
the place wher e the lccea ed wa killed. The cart were then
going at a quick trot, one clo ely following the other. At a turnpike gate a quarter of a mile from the place "·here the deceased wa
killed Swindall, who appeared all along to have been driving the
:fir t cart, told the toll-gate keeper "We have driven over an old
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man"; and desired him to bring a light and look at the name on

the cart; on which Osborne pushed on his cart, and told Swindall

to hold his bother, and they then started off at a quick pace. They

were subsequently seen at two other places, at one of which Swin-

dall said he had sold his concern to Osborne. It appeared that

the carts were loaded with pots from the potteries. The surgeon

l^roved that the deceased had a mark upon his body which would

correspond with the wheel of a cart, and also several other bruises,

and, although he could not say that both carts had passed over

his body, it was possible that both might have done so.

Mr. Greaves, in opening the case to the jury, had submitted

that it was perfectly immaterial in point of law, whether one or

both carts had passed over the deceased. The prisoners were in

company, and had concurred in jointly driving furiously along

the road; that that was an unlawful act, and, as both had joined

in it, each was responsible for the consequences, though they

might arise from the act of the other. It was clear that they were

either partners, master and servant, or at all events companions.

If they had been in the same cart, one holdinig the reins, the
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other the whip, it could not be doubted that they would be both

liable for the consequences; and in effect the case was the same,

for each was driving his own horse at a furious pace, and encourag-

ing the other to do the like.

At the close of the evidence for the prosecution, Allen, Serjt.,

for the prisoners, submitted, that the evidence only proved that

one of the prisoners had run over the deceased, and that the other

was entitled to be acquitted.

Pollock^ C. B. :

I think that that is not so. I think that Mr. Greaves is right

in his law. If two persons are in this way inciting each other to

do an unlawful act, and one of them runs over a man, whether he

be the first or the last he is equally liable; the person who runs

over the man would be a principal in the first degree, and the

other a principal in the second degree.

Allen, Serjt. : The prosecutor, at all events, is bound to elect

upon which count he will proceed.

Pollock, C. B. :

That is not so. I very well recollect that in Beg. v. Goode there

were many modes of death specified, and that it was also alleged

man ; and desired him to bring a light and look at the name on
the cart; on which 0 borne pushed on his cart, and told Swindall
to hold his bother, and they then started off at a quick pace. They
were sub equently seen at two other places, at one of which Swindall aid he had old. his concern to Osborne. It appeared that
the carts were loaded with pot from the potterie . The surgeon
proved that the dee ased had a mark upon his body which would
corre pond with the wheel of a cart, and also everal oth r bruis s,
.and, although he could not say that both carts had passed over
his bod , it wa possible that both might have done o.
Mr. Greaves, in opening the case to the jury, had submitted
that it was perfectly immaterial in point of law, whether one or
both carts had pa sed over the deceased. The prisoners were in
company, and had concurred in jointly driving furiously along
the road; that that was an unlawful act, and, as both had joined
in it, each was responsible for the consequences, though they
might arise from the act of the other. It wa clear that they were
either partners, master and servant, or at all events companions.
If they had been in the same cart, one holdinig the reins, the
other the whip, it could not be doubted that they would be both
liable for the consequence ; and in effect the case was the same,
for each was driving his own horse at a furious pace, and encouraging the other to do the like.
At the close of the evidence for the prosecution, Allen, Serjt.,
for the prisoners, submitted, that the evidence only proved that
one of the prisoners had run over the deceased, and that the other
was entitled to be acquitted.

c. B. :
I think that that is not so. I think that Mr. Greaves is right
in his law. If two persons are in this way inciting each other to
do an unlawful act, and one of them run over a man, whether he
b.e the first or the last he is equally liable; the person who runs
over the man would be a prjncipal in the fir t degree, and the
other a principal in the second degree.
Allen, Serjt.: The pro ecutor, at all event , i bound to elect
upon which count he will proceed.
POLLOCK,

c.

B. :
That is not o. I very well recollect that in Reg. v. Goode there
were many mod of death p cified, and that it wa al o alleged
POLLOCK,
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that the deceased was killed by certain means to the jurors un-

known. When there is no evidence applicable to a particular count,

that count must be abandoned ; but if there is evidence to support

a count, it must be submitted to the jury. In this case the evidence

goes to support all the counts.

Allen, Scrjt., addressed the jury for the prisoners.

Pollock, C. B. (in summing up) :

The prisoners are charged with contributing to the death of

that the deceased wa killed by certain means to the jurors unknown. \Yhen there is no evidence applicable to a particular count,
that ount must be abandoned; but if there is evidence to support
a ount, it must be submitted to the jury. In this case the evidence
go'· to "'upport all the count .
Allen, Scrjt., addressed the jury for the prisoners.

the deceased, by their negligence and improper conduct, and if

they did so, it matters not whether he was deaf, or drunk, or neg-

ligent, or in part contributed to his own death ; for in this consists

a great distinction between civil and criminal proceedings. If

two coaches run against each other, and the drivers of both are to

blame, neither of them has any remedy against the other for dam-

ages. So, in order that one shipowner may recover against another

for any damage done, he must be free from blame : he cannot

recover from the other if he has contributed to his own injury,

however slight the contribution may be. But, in the case of loss

of life, the law takes a totally different view — the converse of that
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proposition is true; for there each party is responsible for any

blame that may ensue, however large the share may be; and so

highly does the law value human life, that it admits of no justifi-

cation wherever life has been lost, and the carelessness or neg-

ligence of any one person has contributed to the death of another

person. Generally, it may be laid down, that, where one by his

negligence has contributed to the death of another, he is responsi-

ble; therefore, you are to sa}^ by your verdict, whether you are of

opinion that the deceased came to his death in consequence of the

negligence of one or both of the prisoners. A distinction has been

taken between the prisoners : it is said that the one who went first

is responsible, but that the second is not. If it is necessary that

both should have run over the deceased, the case is not without

evidence that both did so. But it appears to me that the law, as

stated ])y Mr. Greaves, is perfectly correct. Where two coaches,

totally independent of each other, are proceeding in the ordinary

way along a road, one after the other, and the driver of the first

is guilty of negligence, the driver of the second, who had not the

same means of pulling up, may not be responsible. But when two

persons are driving together, encouraging each other to drive at

POLLOCK, i. B. (in summing up):
The prisoners are charged with contributing to the death of
the deceased, by their negligence and improper conduct, and if
they did so, it matters not whether he was deaf, or drunk, or negligent, or in part contributed to his own death; for in this con ists
a great distinction between civil and criminal proceeding . If
two coaches run again t each other, and the drivers of both are to
blame, neither of them has any remedy against the other for damages. So, in order that one shipo\vner may recover again t another
for any damage done, he mu t be free from blame: he cannot
recover from the other if he has contributed to his own injury,
however slight the contribution may be. But, in the case of loss
of life, the law takes a totally different view-the converse of that
propo ition is true; for there each party i responsible for any
blame that may ensue, however large the share may be; and so
highly does the law value human life, that it admit of no justification wherever life has been lo t, and the carelessnes or negligence of any one person has contrihuted to the death of another
person. Generally, it may be laid down, that, where one by his
negligence has contributed to the death of another, he is re ponsible; therefore, you are to say, by your verdict, whether you are of
opinion that the deceased came to his death in consequence of the
negligence of one or both of the prisoners. A distinction ha been
taken between the prisoners: it is said that the one who went first
is re ponsible, but that the second is not. If it is nece ary that
both should have run over the deceased, the case i not without
evidence that both did so. But it appears to me that the law, as
tated by Mr. Greaves, i perfectly correct. \Vhere two coaches,
totally independent of each other, are proceeding in the ordinary
way along a road, one after the other, and the driver of the first
i guilty of negligence, the driver of the second, who had not the
ame mean of pulling up, may not be responsible. But when two
persons are driving together, encouraging each other to drive at
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a dangerous pace, then, whether the injury is done by the one

driving the first or the second carriage, I am of opinion that in

point of law the other shares the guilt.

Verdict, guilty.

In re Cummins, 16 Colo. J,ol. (1891.)

In June, 1891, petitioner was examined before a justice of the

a dangerou pace, then, whether the injury is done by the one
driving the .first or the econd carriage, I am of opinion that in
point of law the other hare the guilt.
\ erdict, guilty.

peace in and for Las Animas county under four separate and

distinct charges of obtaining money under false pretenses. As a

In re Cummins, 16 Colo. 451.

result of such examinations he was required in each case to give

(1891.)

bond for his appearance at the next succeeding term of the district

court to be held in Las Animas county to answer such charges, or,

upon a failure so to do, to be committed to the common jail of

the county to await the action of the grand jury. The petitioner

failing to furnish bond, warrants of commitment were issued,

upon which he was incarcerated in the county jail. Thereupon

he made application to the Honorable J. C. Gunter, judge of the

Third judicial district, to be discharged upon a writ of habeas

corpus. After a full hearing upon such application the prisoner

was remanded to custody. It appeared, however, from the com-
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plaint, as well as by the evidence, that the money which he had

obtained by the alleged false pretenses was paid him in each

instance by the prosecuting witnesses, respectively, in the further-

ance of an illegal purpose to obtain by fraud valuable coal lands

from the United States. The application is now renewed in this

court.

Hayt, J. :

If two persons conspire together to accomplish an unlawful pur-

pose, and one, by false pretenses, obtains money from the other,

which the latter parts with in furtherance of the illegal purpose,

will a prosecution lie against the former for obtaining the money

under false pretenses? This is the substantial question presented

upon the record. Counsel for petitioner contend that it will not,

while the affirmative is assumed by the attorney general. The

authorities bearing upon the question cannot be reconciled. In

the leading cases of Com. v. Henri/, 22 Pa. St. 253, and McCord

V. People, 46 IST. Y. 470, exactly opposite conclusions were reached

upon facts that are quite similar. In the former case it was?

In June, 1891, petitioner was examined before a ju tice of the
peace in and for La Animas county under four eparate and
di tinct charges of obtaining money under false preten e . A a
result of such examinations he wa required in each ca e to give
hond for his appearance at the next succeeding term of the di trict
court to be held in Las Anima county to an wer such charges, or,
upon a failure so to do, to be committed to the common jail of
the county to await the action of the grand jury. The petitioner
failing to furnish bond, warrants of commitment were is ued,
upon which he wa incarcerated in the county jail. Thereupon
he made application to the Honorable J. C. Gunter, judge of the
Third judicial di trict, to be di charged upon a writ of habea
corpus. After a full hearing upon such application the pri oner
was remanded to custody. It appeared, however, from the complaint, as well as by the evidence, that the money which he had
obtajned by the alleged fal e pretenses was paid him in each
in tance by the pro ecuting witnesses, respectively, in the furtherance of an illegal purpose to obtain by fraud valuable coal land
from the United States. The application is now renewed in thi
court.
HAYT,

J.:

If two persons conspire together to accomplish an unlawful pur-

po e, and one, by false pretense , obtains money from the other,
which the latter parts with in furtherance of the illegal purpose,
will a prosecution lie against the former for obtaining the money
under false preten es? Thi i the sub tantial que tion presented
upon the record. Coun el for petitioner contend that it will not
while the affirmative is a urned by the attorney general. Th
authoritie bearing upon the question cannot be reconciled. In
the leading cases of Com. v. H enry, 22 Pa. St. 253, and McCord
v. People, 46 N. Y. 470, exactly opposite conclusions were reached
upon facts that are quite imilar. In the former case it wa.
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alleged in the indictment that the defendant, intending to defraud

the prosecutor, falsely asserted to him, and also to another person,

who communicated it to him, that he had a legal warrant for the

arrest of the daughter of the prosecutor for an offense punishable

by a fine and imprisonment, and that he threatened to arrest her,

by means of which representation he obtained from the prosecutor

property of the value of $100. The trial court having quashed

the indictment, its judgment was reversed by the supreme court

and the indictment declared sufficient. In the case of McCord

V. People, supra, the indictment charged the defendant with hav-

ing falsely and fraudulently represented that he had a warrant

for one Miller, and that Miller, believing said false representa-

tions, was induced and did deliver to the defendant a gold watch

and diamond ring. In this case it was held that, as the property

had been voluntarily surrendered as an inducement to the officer

to violate the law and disregard his official duties, the indictment

could not be sustained ; the court declaring that the statute against

obtaining money by false pretenses was designed to protect only

those who for an honest purpose are induced by false or fraudulent
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representation to give credit, or part with their property, and not

to protect those who do this for an unworthy or illegal purpose.

The opinion of the court in this case is quite brief, while Peckham,

J., filed an able and exhaustive dissenting opinion. In support

of the majority opinion two cases are cited by the court, viz.,

People V. Williams, 4 Hill, 9 ; Same v. Stetson, 4 Barb. 151. An

examination of the former case shows it to be no authority upon

the question presented here; the decision being simply to the

effect that a false representation, to be within the statute, must

be such as is calculated to mislead persons of ordinary prudence

and caution, — a conclusion not generally accepted elsewhere. 2

Bish. Cr. Law, § 433. In People v. Stetson, supra, it seems, how-

ever, to have been determined that, if the owner in parting with

his property, etc., was himself guilty of a crime, the indictment,

under the statute, could not be sustained; and a similar conclu-

sion was reached in State v. Crowley, 41 Wis. 271, in which case

the information charged a conspiracy on the part of several de-

fendants to defraud the prosecutor of his money, and, the proof

showing that the conspiracy charged was in connection with an

unlawful enterprise, in which the prosecutor and the defendants

were particeps criminis, it Avas held that a conviction was not war-

alleged in the indictment that the defendant, intending to defraud
the pro ecutor, falsely asserted to him, and also to another person,
who communicated it to him, that he had a legal warrant for the
arre t of the daughter of the prosecutor for an offense punishable
by a fine and imprisonment, and that he threatened to arre t her,
by means of which representation he obtained from the prosecutor
property of the value of $100. The trial court having quashed
the indictment, it judgment was reversed by the supreme court
and the indictment declared sufficient. In the case of 111.cCord
v. People, supra, the indictment charged the defendant with having fal ely and fraudulently represented that he had a warrant
for one Miller, and that Miller, believing said false representations, wa induced and did deli' er to the defendant a gold watch
and diamond ring. In this case it was held that, as the property
had been voluntarily surrendered as an inducement to the officer
to violate the law and disregard his official duties, the indictment
could not be sustained; the court declaring that the statute against
obtaining money by false pretenses was designed to protect only
those who for an honest purpose are induced by false or fraudulent
representation to aive credit, or part with their property, and not
to protect those who do this for an unworthy or illegal purpose.
The opinion of the court in this case is quite brief, while Peckham,
J., filed an able and exhau tive dissenting opinion. In support
of the majority opinion two cases are cited by the court, viz.,
People v. Williams, 4 Hill, 9; Same v. Stetson, 4 Barb. 151. An
examination of the former case shows it to be no authority upon
the question pre ented here; the decision being simply to the
effect that a false representation, to be within the statute, must
be such as is calculated to mislead per ons of ordinary prudence
and caution,-a conclusion not generally accepted elsewhere. 2
Bish. Cr. Law, § 433. In People v. Stetson, supra, it seems, however, to have been determined that, if the owner in parting with
his property, etc., was himself guilty of a crime, the indictment,
under the statute, could not be sustained; and a similar conclusion was reached in State v. Crowley, 41 Wis. 271, in which case
the information charged a conspiracy on the part of several defendants to defraud the prosecutor of his money, and, the proof
showing that the conspiracy charged was in connection with an
unlawful enterprise, in which the prosecutor and the defendants
were particeps criminis, it was held that a conviction was not war-
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ranted. It appeared, also, that, had the prosecutor exercised com-

mon prudence and caution, he could not have been misled by the

false pretenses by which he was induced to part with his money.

In opposition to this doctrine, and in line with the Pennsylvania

decision, we find Com. v. Morrill, 8 Cush. 571. Mr. Bishop,

reviewing the different conclusions, says: "Another doctrine sus-

tained in New York is that where, if the false pretenses were true,

the person parting with his goods would be guilty of a crime

therein, or where he actually commits an offense in parting with

them, the indictment for the cheat cannot be maintained. On

the other hand, the Massachusetts court appears to have directly

discarded this doctrine. The point decided was that a defendant

cannot set up, in answer to an indictment of this nature, any

wrongful representation of the person injured concerning the

goods charged to have been obtained through the false pretense.

'Supposing,' said Dewey, J., 'it should appear that (the individual

defrauded) had also violated the statute, that would not justify

the defendants. If the other party had also subjected himself to

a prosecution for a like offense, he also may be punished. This
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would be much better than that both should escape punishment

because each deserved it equally.' And this view accords with

the general spirit of the criminal law, wherein the fault of one

man is not received in excuse for that of another; while the New

York doctrine would introduce a well-known principle of civil

jurisdiction into a system of laws to which it is alien." 2 Bish.

Cr. Law, (7th Ed.) § 469. Finding this conflict in the authori-

ties, we are left free to decide the question propounded solely

upon principle. In our opinion, the conclusion reached by Mr.

Bishop is supported by the better reasons. Tlie primary object

of punishment is the suppression of crime; and, where both the

prosecutor and defendant have violated the law, it is better that

both be punished than that the crime of one should be used to

shield the other. When the plaintiff in a civil action is shown

to have been guilty of a wrong in the particular matter about

which he complains, he cannot ordinarily recover. But there is

little chance to apply this rule to criminal prosecutions conducted

by the state; the person defrauded being at most a prosecuting

witness in the case, and not a party to the proceeding. The lan-

guage of our statute is plain. The false pretenses charged in

this case are embraced within its express terms, and we are not in

2

ranted. It appeared, also, that, had the prosecutor exercised common prudence and caution, he could not have been misled by the
fal e pretenses by which he was induced to part with his money.
In opposition to thi doctrine, and in line with the Pennsylvania
deci ion, we find Com. v. Morrill, 8 Cush. 571. Mr. Bi hop,
reviewing the different conclusions, says : "Another doctrine sustained in New York is that where, if the false pretense were true,
the person parting with his good would be guilty of a crime
therein, or where he actually commits an offen e in parting with
them, the indictment for the cheat cannot be maintained. On
the other hand, the Massachusetts court appears to have directly
discarded this doctrine. The point decided was that a defendant
cannot set up, in answer to an indictment of this nature, any
wrongful representation of the person injured concerning the
goods charged to have been obtained through the false pretense.
'Supposing,' said Dewey, J., 'it should appear that (the individual
defrauded) had also violated the statute, that would not justify
the defendants. If the other party had also ubjected himself to
a prosecution for a like offense, he also may be punished. This
would be much better than that both should escape punishment
because each deserved it equally.' And this view accords with
the general spirit of the criminal law, wherein the fault of one
man is not received in excuse for that of another; while the New
York doctrine would introduce a well-known principle of civil
jurisdiction into a system of laws to which it is alien." 2 Bish.
Cr. Law, (7th Ed.) § 469. Finding this conflict in the authorities, we are left free to decide the question propounded solely
upon principle. In our opinion, the conclusion reached by Mr.
Bishop is supported by the better Teasons. The primary object
of punishment i the suppression of crime; and, where both the
pro ecutor and defendant have violated the law, it is better that
both be punished than that the crime of one should be used to
hield the other. When the plaintiff in a civil action is hown
to have been guilty of a wrong in the particular matter about
which he complain , he cannot ordinarily recover. But there i
little chance to apply thi rul to criminal pro ecutions conducte 1
by the state; the per on defrauded being at most a prosecuting
witne in the case, and not a party to the proceeding. The language of our tatut i plain. The fal e preten es charg d in
thi ca e are embrac cl within its expre term , and we are not in
2
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favor of sanctioning a rule that will permit offenders to escape

b}' sliowing that another should also be punished. The petitioner's

application to be discharged will therefore be denied, and the

prisoner remanded.

Petition denied.

7. Civil and Criminal Proceedings for the Same Wrong,

WiUiams v. Dichenson, 28 Fla. 90. (1891.)

favor of anctioning a rule that will permit offenders to escape·
by howing that another should also be punished. The petitioner's
application to be discharged will therefore be denied, and the
pri oner remanded.
Petition denied.

Taylor, J. :

Edward T. C. Dickenson, the defendant in error, instituted his

action of trespass in the Circuit Court of Jackson county; in the

First Judicial Circuit, on the 23rd day of December, 1886, against

7.

•

CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS FOR THE SAME WRONG.

Daniel W. Williams, the plaintiff in error. The declaration alleg-

1Villianis v. Dickenson, 28 Fla. 90.

ing that Dickenson was the owner and in possession of a certain

(1891.)

frame building in Jackson county, to-wit: a gin house, together

with the fixtures usually belonging to a building in which cotton

is ginned by steam power, consisting of a water tank, one cotton-

press, one steam engine, boiler and machinery, two cotton gins

with feeders and condensers, two gin feeders and condensers, lots

of cotton in the seed and lint, lots of cotton seed, bagging and
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ties, tools, belting, shafting and pulleys, etc. That the defendant

Williams, on or about the 16th day of December, 1886, wilfully

and maliciously contriving and intending to injure the plaintiff,

counseled, hired, caused and obtained one Prior Wheeler to set

on fire and burn the said building, fixtures, goods and chattels,

and by reason of such counseling, hiring, causing and obtaining,

the said Prior Wheeler, on the 16th day of December, 1886, did set

on fire and burn the said gin house, fixtures, goods and chattels

aforesaid, whereby they were burned up and totally consumed;

and by said wrongful acts the plaintiff was greatly damaged by

the loss and consuming of said property. And plaintiff was also

greatly damaged by said wrongful acts, and by reason thereof,

suffered much annoyance and inconvenience and trouble, pain

of mind and body. Damages in the sum of $10,000 was claimed.

To this declaration the defendant pleaded the general issue, said

plea being filed January 25th, 1887. On the 31st day of May,

1887, by leave of the court, the defendant also filed the following

plea in abatement: "Now comes the defendant, and for a plea

J.:
Edward T. C. Dickenson, the defendant in error, instituted his:
action of trespass in the Circuit Court of Jackson county; in the
First Judicial Circuit, on the 23rd day of December, 1886, against
Daniel W. Williams, the plaintiff in error. The declaration alleging that Dickenson was the owner and in possession of a certain
frame building in Jackson county, to-wit: a gin house, togetherwith the fixtures usually belonging to a building in which cotton
is ginned by steam power, consisting of a water tank, one cottonpress, one steam engine, boiler and machinery, two cotton gins
with feeders and condensers, two gin feeders and condensers, lots
of cotton in the seed and lint, lots of cotton seed, bagging and
ties, tools, belting, shafting and pulleys, etc. That the defendant
Williams, on or about the 1Gth day of December, 1886, wilfully
and maliciously contriving and intending to injure the plaintiff,
coun eled, hired, caused and obtained one Prior Wheeler to set
on fire and burn the said building, fixtures, goods and chattels,
and by reason of such counseling, hiring, causing and obtaining,
the said Prior Wheeler, on the 16th day of December, 1886, did set
on fire and burn the said gin house, fixtures, goods and chattels
aforesaid, whereby they were burned up and totally consumed;
and by said wrongful acts the plaintiff was greatly damaged by
the lo s and consuming of said property. And plaintiff was also
greatly damaged by said wrongful acts, and by reason thereof,
suffered much annoyance and inconvenience and trouble, pain
of mind and body. Damages in the sum of $10,000 was claimed.
To this declaration the defendant pleaded the general issue, said
plea being filed January 25th, 1887. On the 31st day of May,
1887, by leave of the court, the defendant also filed the following
plea in abatement: "Now comes the defendant, and for a plea
TAYLOR,
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Williams v. Dickenson 19

in abatement to plaintiff's action says, that the cause of action set

forth in plaintiff's declaration is a tort which amounts to a felony,

and the defendant has been indicted therefor in the Circuit Court

for Jackson county, and said indictment is still pending and no

trial has been had thereof, wherefore defendant prays that said

suit be abated." To this plea in abatement the plaintiff interposed

a demurrer. This demurrer was sustained upon argument, and

exception was taken. On the 28th day of September, 1887, after

leave granted, the plaintiff filed an amendment to his declaration,

whereby a second count was added to the original declaration,

charging the defendant himself with the burning of said prop-

erty. To this amended declaration the defendant pleaded also

the general issue.

The first error assigned is the order sustaining the plaintiff's

demurrer to the defendant's plea in abatement. This plea seeks

to invoke the doctrine held in the English courts, that where a

private individual has been damaged in person or property by

the tortious act of another, which act amounts to a felony, the

matter should be disposed of before the proper criminal tribunal,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:01 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t39z97p86
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

in order that the justice of the country may be first satisfied in

respect to the public offense, before the injured individual can

seek civil redress for the private wrong inflicted upon him. The

redress of the private wrong being postponed until after the public

justice is satisfied. Two reasons for this rule are assigned in

England: First, the party injured is relied upon to take the

place of public prosecutor ; in some cases he has even been required

to employ counsel to prosecute on behalf of the crown, and his

interest in the accomplishment of public justice is kept alive by

postponing the redress of his private grievance; and, second, in

cases of felony, there was a forfeiture to the crown of the felon's

property, and the private individual was not allowed to acquire

priority over the crown in satisfaction of his demands upon the

property of the felon. But in this country this doctrine of the

suspension of the civil remedy in cases of felony has been repu-

diated by the great weight of the American authorities. Under

the system of laws prevailing in the United States the reasons

for this rule are entirely absent. Here we have a public officer

whose duty it is to prosecute all offenders against the State with-

out reliance upon the injured individual; and here we have no

forfeiture of the felon's goods. The civil and the criminal prose-

in abatement to plaintiff's action ay , that the cause of action et
forth in plaintiff's declaration is a tort which amounts to a felony,
and the defendant ha been indicted therefor in the Circuit Court
for Jackson county, and aid indictment is still pending and no
trial has been had thereof, wherefore defendant prays that said
sujt be abated.)) To this plea in abatement the plaintiff interposed
. a demurrer. Thi demurrer was sustained upon argument, and
exception was taken. On the 28th day of September, 1887, after
leave granted, the plaintiff :filed an amendment to hi declaration,
whereby a second count was added to the original declaration 7
charging the defendant himself with the burning of said prop€rty. To this amended declaration the defendant pleaded also
the general issue.
The first error a signed is the order sustaining the plaintiff's
demurrnr to the defendant's plea in abatement. This plea seeks
to invoke the doctrine held in the English courts, that where a
private individual has been damaged in person or property by
the tortious act of another, which act amounts to a felony, the
matter should be di posed of before the proper criminal tribunal,
in order that the justice of the country may be fir t atis:fied in
re pect to the public offense, before the injured individual can
seek civil redress for the private wrong inflicted upon him. The
redre s of the private wrong being postponed until after the public
justice is satisfied. Two rea ons for this rule are assigned in
England: First, the party injured is relied upon to take the
place of public prosecutor; in some cases he has even been required
to employ counsel to prosecute on behalf of the crown, and his
interest in the accomplishment of public justice is kept alive by
po tponing the redress of his private grievance; and, second, in
cases of f lony, there was a forfeiture to the crown of the felon's
property, and the private individual was not allowed to acquire
priority over the crown in satisfaction of his demand upon the
property of the felon. But in this country this doctrine of the
suspen ion of the civil remedy in cases of felony has been repudiated by the great weight of the American authoritie . Under
the system of laws prevailing in the United States the rca ons
for this rule are entirely absent. Here we have a public officer
who e duty it is to prosecute all offenders against th
tate without reliance upon the injured individual; and here we hav no
forfeiture of the felon's good . The civil and the criminal pro e-
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cution may, therefore, go on -pari passu; or the one may precede,

or succeed the other ; or, if the criminal prosecution is never com-

menced at all, the failure to seek public justice is no bar to the

private remedy. Neither is an acquittal or conviction upon the

criminal charge any bar to the civil action. Cooley on Torts, 86

ct seq.; PettingiU v. Bideout, 6 N. H., 454; Blassingame v. Glaves,

6 B. Mon., 38 ; B. & W. R. R. Co. v. Dana, 1 Gray, 83 ; Howk v.

Minnick, 19 Ohio St., 462 ; Neivell v. Cowan, 30 Miss,, 492. The

court below properly sustained the demurrer to the defendant's

plea in abatement.

Boston By. v. Dana, 1 Gray (Mass.), 83. (1854.)

BlGELOW^ J. :

The main objection, raised by the defendant in the present

case, which, if well maintained, is fatal to the plaintiffs' action,

presents an interesting and important question, hitherto unde-

cution may, therefore, go on pa,r i passu.; or the one may precede,
or succeed the other; or, if the criminal prosecution is never commenced at all, the failure to seek public justice is no bar to the
private remedy. Neither is an acquittal or conviction upon the
criminal charge any bar to the civil action. Cooley on Torts, 86
et seq.J· Pettingill v. Rideout, 6 N. H., 454; Blassingame v. Glaves,
6 B. Mon., 38; B. & W. R. R. Co. v. Dana., 1 Gray, 83; Ii owk v.
111inniclc, 19 Ohio . t., 462; Newell v. Cowan, 30 Miss., 492. The
court below properly ustained the demurrer to the defendant's
plea in abatement.

termined by any authoritative judgment in the courts of this

commonwealth.

The plaintiffs seek to recover in an action of assumpsit a large

Boston Ry. v. Dana, 1 Gray (Mass.), 83.

(1854.)

sum of money alleged by them to have been fraudulently abstracted

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:01 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t39z97p86
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

from their ticket office by the defendant, while he was in their

employment as depot-master, having charge of their principal rail-

way station in Boston. In regard to this item of the plaintiffs'

claim, the defendant contended at the trial, and requested the

judge who presided to instruct the jury, that the plaintiffs were

not entitled to recover in this action the money thus taken by the

defendant, because their cause of action, if any they had, was

suspended, until an indictment had been found or complaint made

against the defendant for larceny. This request was refused, and

the jury were instructed, that if the defendant had fraudulently

taken and appropriated the plaintiffs' money in the manner

alleged, and was thereby guilty of larceny, he would be liable in

the present action, although no criminal prosecution had first been

instituted therefor. It is upon the correctness of this instruction

that the first and main question in the case arises.

The doctrine, that all civil remedies in favor of a party injured

by a felony are, as it is said in the earlier authorities, merged

in the higher offence against society and public justice, or, accord-

ing to more recent cases, suspended until after the termination

J.:
The main objection, raised by the defendant in the present
case, which, if well maintained, is fatal to the plaintiffs' action,
presents an interesting and important question, hitherto undetermined by any authoritative judgment in the courts of this
common weal th.
The plaintiffs seek to r<icover in an action of assumpsit a large
sum of money alleged by them to have been fraudulently abstracted
from their ticket office by the defendant, while he was in their
employment a::; depot-master, having charge of their principal railway station in Boston. In regard to thi item of the plaintiffs'
claim, the defendant contended at the trial, and requested the
judge who presided to instruct the jury, that the plaintiffs were
not entitled to recover in this action the money thus taken by the
defendant, because their cause of action, if any they had, was
·uspended, until an indictment had been found or complaint made
against the defendant for larceny. This request was refused, and
the jury were instructed, that if the defendant had fraudulently
taken and appropriated the plaintiffs' money in the manner
alleged, and was thereby guilty of larceny, he would be liable in
the present action, although no criminal prosecution had first been
instituted therefor. It is upon the correctness of this instruction
that the first and main question in the case arises.
'l1he doctrine, that all civil remedies in favor of a party injured
by a felony are, as it is said in the earlier authorities, merged
in the higher offence against society and public justice, or, according to more recent cases, suspended until after the termination
BIGELOW,
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of a criminal prosecution against the offender, is tiie well settled

rule of law in England at this day, and seems to have had its

origin there at a period long anterior to the settlement of this

country by our English ancestors. MarJchain v. Cob, Latch, 144,

and Noy, 82. Dawkes v. Coveneigli, Style, 346. Cooper v.

Witham, 1 Sid. 375, and 1 Lev. 347. Crosby v. Leng, 12 East,

413. White v. SpeUigue, 13 M. & W. 603. 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 5.

But although thus recognized and established as a rule of law

in the parent countr}-, it does not appear to have been, in the

language of our constitution, "adopted, used and approved in

the province, colony or state of Massachusetts Bay, and usually

practiced on in the courts of law." The only recorded trace of

its recognition in this commonwealth is found in a note to the

case of Higgins v. Butcher, Yelv. (Amer. ed.), 90 a, note 2, by

which it appears to have been adopted in a case at nisi prius by

the late Chief Justice Sewall. The opinion of that learned judge,

thus expressed, would certainly be entitled to very great weight,

if it were not for the opinion of this court in Boarclman v. Gore,

15 Mass. 338, in which it is strongly intimated, though not dis-
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tinctly decided, that the rule had never been recognized in this

state, and had no solid foundation, under our laws, in wisdom or

sound policy. Under these circumstances, we feel at liberty to

regard its adoption or rejection as an open question, to be deter-

mined, not so much by authority, as by a consideration of the

origin of the rule, the reasons on which it is founded, and its

adaptation to our system of jurisprudence.

The source, whence the doctrine took its rise in England, is

well known. By the ancient common law, felony was punished

by the death of -the criminal, and the forfeiture of all his lands

and goods to the crown. Inasmuch as an action at law against

a person, whose body could not be taken in execution and whose

property and effects belonged to the king, would be a useless

and fruitless remedy, it was held to be merged in the public

offence. Besides; no such remedy in favor of the citizen could

be allowed without a direct interference with the royal preroga-

tive. Therefore a party injured by a felony could originally obtain

no recompense out of the estate of a felon, nor even the restitu-

tion of his own property, except after a conviction of the offender,

by a proceeding called an appeal of felony, which was long dis-

used, and wholly abolished by St. 59 Geo. 3, c. 46; or under St.

of a criminal pro..,ecution against the offender, is the well ettled
rul of law in England at this day, and eem to have had it
origin there at a period long anterior to the ettlement of thi
country by our Engli h ance. tor . Markham v. Cob, Latch, 1-±-±,
and oy, 82. Dawkes v. Coveneigh, Style, 346. Cooper v.
lr itham, 1 Sicl. 375, and 1 Lev. 2-±7. Crosby v. L eng, 12 East,
-±13. White v. 1 pettigue, 13 I. & W. 603. 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 5.
But although thu recognized and established as a rule of law
in the parent country, it does not appear to have been, in the
language of our con titution, "adopted, u ed and approved in
the province, colony or state of Massachusetts Bay, and usually
practiced on in the courts of law." The only recorded trace of
it recognition in thi commonwealth is found in a note to the
ca..,e of Higgins v. Butcher, Yelv. (Amer. ed.), 90 a, note 2, by
which it appears to have been adopted in a case at nisi prius by
the late Chief Ju tice Sewall. The opinion of that learned judge,
thus expressed, would certainly be entitled to very great weight_,
if it were not for the opinion of this court in Boardman v. Gore,
15 :Ma..,s. 338, in which it is strongly intimated, though not di tinctly decided, that the rule had never been recognized in thi.
state, and had no solid foundation, under our law , in wi dom or
ound policy. Under the e circumstances, we feel at liberty to
regard its adoption or rejection a an open que tion, to be determined, not so much by authority, as by a con ideration of the
origin of the rule, the rea ons on which it i founded, and its
adaptation to our y tern of jurisprudence.
The source, whence the doctrine took its ri e in England, is
w ll known. By the ancient common law, felony wa puni heel
by the death of the criminal, and the forfeiture of all his lands
and good to the crown. Ina much as an action at law again t
a per on, who ~e body could not be taken in exe ution and whose
property and effects belonged to the king, would be a u les ~
and fruitless remedy, it was held to be merged in the public
offence. Beside ; no such remedy in favor of the citizen could
be allowed without a direct interference with the royal prerogative. Therefore a party injured by a felony could originally obtain
no recompen e out of the estate of a felon, nor even the re titution of hi own property, except after a conviction of the off ncler
by a proceeding called an appeal of felony which wa long di u d, and wholly aboli heel by 1 t. 59 Geo. 3, c. -±6; or und r 1 t.
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21, H, 8, c. 11, by which the judges were empowered to grant

writs of restitution, if the felon was convicted on the evidence

of the party injured or of others by his procurement. 2 Car. &

P. 43, note. But these incidents of felony, if they ever existed

in this state, v/ere discontinued at a very early period in our colo-

nial history. Forfeiture of lands or goods, on conviction of crime,

was rarely, if ever, exacted here; and in many cases, deemed in

England to be felonies and punishable with death, a much milder

penalty was inflicted by our laws. Consequently the remedies,

to which a party injured was entitled in cases of felony, were

never introduced into our jurisprudence. No one has ever heard

of an appeal of felony, or a writ of restitution under *S^^. 21 H.

<S, c. 11, in our courts. So far therefore as we know the origin

of the rule and the reasons on which it was founded, it would

seem very clear that it was never adopted here as part of our

€ommon law.

Without regard however to the causes which originated the

doctrine, it has been urged with great force and by high author-

it}', that the rule now rests on public policy; 12 East, 413, 414;
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that the interests of society require, in order to secure the effect-

ual prosecutions of offenders by persons injured, that they should

not be permitted to redress their private wrongs, until public

justice has been first satisfied by the conviction of felons; that

in this way a strong incentive is furnished to the individual to

discharge a public duty, by bringing his private interest in aid

of its performance, which would be wholly lost, if he were allowed

to pursue his remedy before the prosecution and termination of

a criminal proceeding. This argument is doubtless entitled to

great weight in England, where the mode of prosecuting criminal

offences is very different from that adopted with us. It is there

the especial duty of every one, against whose person or property

a crime has been committed, to trace out the offender, and prose-

cute him to conviction. In the discharge of this duty, he is often

compelled to employ counsel; procure an indictment to be drawn

and laid before the grand jury, with the evidence in its support;

and if a bill is found, to see that the case on the part of the

prosecution is properly conducted before the jury of trials. All

this is to be done by the prosecutor at his own cost, unless the

court, after the trial, shall deem reimbursement reasonable. 1

Chit. Crim. Law, 9, 825. The whole system of the administration

21, H. 8, c. 11, by which the judges were empowered to grant
writs of restitution, if the felon was convicted on the evidence
()f the party injured or of others by his procurement. 2 Car. &
P. 43, note. But these incidents of felony, if they ever existed
in this state, were discontinued at a very early period in our colonial history. Forfeiture of lands or goods, on conviction of crime,
was rarely, if ever, exacted here; and in many cases, deemed in
England to be felonies and punishable with death, a much milder
penalty was inflicted by our laws. Consequently the remedies,
to which a party injured was entitled in cases of felony, were
ne'l'er introduced into our jurisprudence. No one has ever heard
of an appeal of felony, or a writ of restitution under St. 21 H .
.S, c. 11, in our courts. So far therefore as we know the origin
·of the rule and the reasons on which it was founded, it would
seem very clear that it was never adopted here as part of our
common law.
Without regard however to the causes which originated the
doctrine, it has been urged with great force and by high authority, that the rule now rests on public policy; 12 East, 413, 414;
that the interests of society require, in order to secur~ the effectual prosecutions of offenders by persons injured, that they should
not be permitted to redress their private wrongs, until public
justice has been first satisfied by the conviction of felons; that
in this way a strong incentive is furnished to the individual to
<lischarge a public duty, by bringing his private interest in aid
-0f its performance, which would be wholly lost, if he were allowed
to pursue his remedy before the prosecution and termination of
a criminal proceeding. This argument is doubtless entitled to
great weight in England, where the mode of prosecuting criminal
-0ffences is very different from that adopted with us. It is there
the especial duty of every one, against whose person or property
a crime has been committed, to trace out the offender, and prosecute him to conviction. In the discharge of this duty, he is often
.compelled to employ counsel; procure an indictment to be drawn
and laid before the grand jury, with the evidence in its !:!Upport;
.and if a bill is found, to see that the case on the part of the
prosecution is properly conducted before the jury of trials. All
this is to be done by the prosecutor at his own cost, unless the
court, after the trial, shall deem reimbursement reasonable. 1
Chit. Crim. Law, 9, 825. The whole ystem of the ~dministration
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of criminal justice in England is thus made to depend very much

upon the vigilance and efforts of private individuals. There is

no public officer, appointed by law in each county, as in this com-

monwealth, to act in behalf of the government in such cases, and

take charge of the prosecution, trial and conviction of offenders

against the laws. It is quite obvious that, to render such a sys-

tem efficacious, it is essential to use means to secure the aid and

cooperation of those injured by the commission of crimes, which

are not requisite with us. It is to this cause, that the rule in ques-

tion, as well as many other legal enactments, designed to en-

force upon individuals the duty of prosecuting offences, owes its

existence in England. But it is hardly possible, under our laws,

that any grave offence of the class designated as felonies can

escape detection and punishment. The officers of the law, whose

province it is to prosecute criminals, require no assistance from

persons injured, other than that which a sense of duty, unaided

by private interest, would naturally prompt.

On the other hand, in the absence of any reasons, founded on
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public policy, requiring the recognition of the rule, the expedi-

ency of its adoption may well be doubted. If a party is com-

pelled to await the determination of a criminal prosecution before

he is permitted to seek his private redress, he certainly has a

strong motive to stifle the prosecution and compound with the

felon. Nor can it contribute to the purity of the administration

of justice, or tend to promote private morality, to suffer a party

to set up and maintain in a court of law a defence founded solely

upon his own criminal act. The right of every citizen, under

our constitution, to obtain justice promptly and without delay,

requires that no one should be delayed in obtaining a remedy for

a private injury, except in a case of the plainest public necessity.

There being no such necessity calling for the adoption of the rule

under consideration, we are of opinion that it ought not to be

engrafted into our jurisprudence.

We are strengthened in this conclusion by the weight of Ameri-

can authority, and by the fact that in some of the states, where

the rule had been established by decisions of the courts, it has

been abrogated by legislative enactments. Pettingill v. Rideout,

6 N. H. 454. Cross v. Gutliery, 2 Eoot, 90, Piscataqua Bank v.

Turnley, 1 Miles, 312. Foster v. Commonivealth, 8 W. & S. T7.

Patton V. Freeman, Coxe, 113. Hephnrn's case. 3 Bland. 114.

of criminal justice in England i thu made to depend very much
upon the vigilance and efforts of private individual . There i
no public officer, appointed by law in each county, as in this commonwealth, to act in behalf of the government in such ca e , and
take charge of the prosecution, trial and conviction of off nder
against the laws. It is quite obvious that, to render such a system efficaciou , it is essential to use means to ecure the aid and
cooperation 0£ tho e injured by the com.mi ion of crime , which
are not requi ite with us. It i to this cause, that the rule in que tion, a" well as many other legal enactments, designed to enforce upon individuals the duty of prosecuting offences, owes it
-existence in England. But it i hardly po ible, under our law ,
that any grave offence of the class designated as felonie can
escape detection and punishment. The officers of the law, whose
_province it is to prosecute criminals, require no assistance from
persons injured, other than that which a sense of duty, unaided
by private interest, would naturally prompt.
On the other hand, in the absence of any reasons, founded on
public policy, requiring the recognition of the rule, the expediency of its adoption may well be doubted. H a party i compelled to await the determination of a criminal prosecution before
he is permitted to seek his private redress, he certainly has a.
strong motive to tifle the prosecution and compound with the
felon. Nor can it contribute to the purity of the admini tration
of justice, or tend to promote private morality, to suffer a party
to set up and maintain in a court of law a defence founded solely
upon his own criminal act. The right of every citizen, under
our constitution, to obtain justice promptly and without delay,
requires that no one hould be delayed in obtaining a remedy for
a private injury, except in a case of the plainest public necessity.
There being no uch necessity calling for the adoption of the rule
under consideration, we are of opinion that it ought not to be
en.grafted into our jurisprudence.
We are strengthened in thi conclusion by the weight of American authority, and by the fact that in some of the states, where
the rule had been e ta blished by deci ion of the court , it ha
been abrogated by legislative enactments. Pettingill v. Rideout,
6 N. H. 454. Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root, 90. Pi cataqua Bank v.
Turnley, 1 Mile , 312. Foster v. Commonwealth, 8 W. &
'.
Patton v. Freeman, Coxe, 11 . H epbw·n' ca. e. 3 Bland. 11-t.

24

ACT J\IusT BE DECLARED A CRIME BY LAW

24 Act Must Be Declared a Crime by Law

Allison V. Farmers' Bank of Virginiaj 6 Eand, 323. White v.

Fort, 3 Hawks, 251. EoUnson v. Culp, 1 Const. Rep. 231. Story

V. Hammond, 4 Ohio, 376. Ballew v. Alexander, 6 Humph., 433.

Blassingame v. Glaves, 6 B. Monr., 38. Eev. Sts. of N". Y. Part.

3, c. 4, § 2. St. of Maine of 1844, c. 102.

8. The Act or Omission Must be Declared a Crime by Law.

CommonweaUh v. Marshall et ah, 11 Pick. (Mass.), 350. (ISSl.)

Allison v. Farmers' Bank of Virginia, 6 Rand, 223. While v.
Fort, 3 Hawks, 251. Robinson v. Culp, 1 Const. Rep. 231. Story
v. Hammond, 4 Ohio, 376. Ballew v. Alexander, 6 Humph., 433.
Blassingame v. Glaves, 6 B. l\fonr., 38. Rev. St . of N. Y. Part.
3, c. -±, § 2. St. of Maine of 1844, c. 102.

At April term 1831 of this Court, in the county of Franklin,

the defendants were indicted for a misdemeanor in disinterring

a dead body on the 20th of February of the same year, contra

formam statuti. The defendants pleaded nolo contendere, and

afterwards moved in arrest of judgment, for the following rea-

sons, 1. because the offence charged in the indictment is therein

stated to have been committed in violation of the statute passed

March 2, 1815, (St. 1814, c. 175,) which was repealed by the

8.

TI-IE ACT OR 01.IISSIO.l

MUST BE DECLARED A CRIME BY LA w.

statute of February 28, 1831, (St. 1830, c. 57,) (1) without any

saving or excepting clause whatever; and 2. because no offence,

now known by the laws of this commonwealth, is therein described.

Shaw^ C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court:

Oommonwea.lth v. Marshall et al., 11 Pick. (Mass.), 350.

(1831.)
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This indictment cannot be maintained, consistently with the

decision of the Court, last year, in the case in this county, of

Conimonivealth v. Cooley, 10 Pick. 37. In that case it was held,

that the statute of 1814 containing a series of provisions in relation

to the whole subject matter of the disinterment of dead bodies,

had superseded and, by necessary implication, repealed the pro-

visions of the common law on the same subject. If it be true, as

contended, that as a general rule the repeal of a repealing law,

revives the preexisting law, it would be difficult to maintain that

such a clause of repeal, in a statute containing a series of pro-

visions, revising the whole subject, and superseding the existing

statute, would revive the preexisting provisions of the common law.

(i) Rev. Stat., c. 130, § 19.

At April term 1831 of thi Court, in the county of Franklin,
the defendant ' were indicted for a mi demeanor in di interring
a dead body on the 20th of February of the ame year, contra
formam statuti. The defendants pleaded nolo contendere, and
afterwards moved in arrest of judgment, for the following rea. ons, 1. becau e the offence charged in the indictment is therein
stated to have been committed in violation of the statute passed
March 2, 1815, (St. 181±, c. 1 t5,) which wa repealed by the
Rtatute of February 23, 1831, (St. 1830, c. 57,) (1) without any
::le.wing or excepting clau e whatever· and 9. becau e no offence
now known by the laws of this commonwealth, is therein described.
SnAw, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court:
Thi indictment cannot be maintained, consi tently with the
decision of the Court, la t year, in the case in this county, of
Commonwealth v. Cooley, 10 Pick. 37. In that case it was held,
that the statute of 181-± containing a eries of provi ions in relation
to the whole ..,ubject matter of the di interment of dead bodies,
had superseded and, by necessary implication, repealed the provision of the common law on the same subject. If it be true, a,
contended, that as a general rule the repeal of a repealing law,
revives the preexisting law, it would be difficult to maintain that
. uch a clause of repeal, in a statute containing a series of provisions, revi ing the whole subj ect, and superseding the existing
statute, would revive the preexi ting provisions of the common law.
(1) Rev. Stat., c. 130, § 19.
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United States v. Hudson 25

But were that point conceded, as contended for, it would not aid

this indictment.

In the case supposed, the common law would not be in force

during the existence of the statute, and if revived by its repeal,

such revival would take effect only from the time of such repeal.

It is clear, that there can be no legal conviction for an offence,

unless the act be contrary to law at the time it is committed ; nor

can there be a judgment, unless the law is in force at the time

of the indictment and judgment. If the law ceases to operate by

its own limitation or by a repeal, at any time before judgment,

no judgment can be given. Hence, it is usual in every repealing

law, to make it operate prospectively only, and to insert a saving

clause, preventing the operation of the repeal, and continuing the

repealed law in force, as to all pending prosecutions, and often as

to all violations of the existing law already committed.

These principles settle the present case. By the statute 1830, c.

57, § 6, that of 181-i was repealed without any saving clause. The

act charged upon the defendants as an offence, was done, after

the passing of the statute of 1814, and before that of 1830. The
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act cannot be punished as an offence at common law, for that was

not in force during the existence of the statute ; nor by the statute

of 1814, because it has been repealed without any saving clause;

nor by the statute of 1830, for the act was done before that statute

was passed. Xo judgment therefore can be rendered against the

defendants, on this indictment. (2) Judgment arrested.

(2) See Commomvealth v. Kimball, 21 Pick. 373; Commonwealth v.

Mott, ibid. 492; Miller's case, 3 Wils. 420; Anon, i Wash. C. C. R. 84;

Rex v. M'Kenzie, Russ. & Ryl. C. C. 429 ; Stoever v. Immell, 1 Watts,

258; Commomvealth v. King, i Wharton, 460; Butler v. Palmer, i

Hill's (N. Y.) R. 324-

9. The Fedeeal Government has no Common Law Ceiminal

Jurisdiction.

United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch (U. S.), 32. (1S12.)

The Court, having taken time to consider, the following opin-

ion was delivered (on the last day of the term, all the judges

being present) by Johnson, J.:

But were that point conceded, a contended for, it would not aid
thi indictment.
In the ca e . . uppo ed, the common law would not be in force
during the exi tence of the tatute, and if revived by it repeal
uch revival would take effect only from the time of uch repeal.
It i clear, that there can be no legal conviction for an offence,
unle the act be contrary to law at the time it i committed · nor
can there be a judgment, unle.., the law i in force at the tim
of the indictment and judgm nt. If the law cea e to operate by
it own limitation or by a r epeal, at any time before judgment_,
no judgment can be given . H ence, it i u ual in every r epealino·
law, to make it operate pro pectively only and to in ert a aYing
clau e, preventing the operation of the repeal and continuing the
repealed law in for~e, a to all pending pro ecution , and often a
to all violation of the exi ting law already committed.
The e principl
ettle the pre ent ca e. By the tatute 1 30 c.
5 , § 6, that of 181-1 wa repealed without any saving clau e. The
act charged upon the defendant a an offence, wa done, after
the pa sing of the tatute of 1 14:, and before that of 1 30. The
act cannot be puni hed a an offence at common law, for that -wanot in force during the existence of the statute; nor by the tatute
of 1 14, becau e it ha been repealed without any .caving clau e ·
nor by the tatute of 1 30, for the act wa done before that tatute
wa pa ed. ~ o judgment therefore can be r endered again t the
def ndant , on this indictment. (2)
J udgment arrested.
(2) See Conwwnwealth v. Kimball, 2I Pick. 373 ; Commonwealth v.
Mott, ibid. 492; J1iller's case, 3 Wil s. 420; Anon. I Wah. C. C.R. 84;
Rex v. ~1' Kenzie, Ru s . & Ry!. C. C. 429; Sto ever v. lmm ell, I \\ atts,
258; Commonwralth v. King, I Wharton, 46o; Butler v. Palmer, I
Hill's (N. Y. ) R. 324.

9. TnE

FEDERAL GovER.i: -nrnNT HAS :N"O
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tates v. Iludson, 7

ranch (U.

.), 32.

(181 ·.)

The •ourt having taken time to con ider th following pinion wa delivered (on the la t day of the rm, all th ju lcr •
being pre ent) by J OIL. SON, J. :
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CmnrnN LA w CRr:M:r.i: AL JURISDICTION

26 No Common Law Criminal Jurisdiction

The only question which this case presents is, whether the Cir-

cuit Courts of the United States can exercise a common law juris-

diction in criminal cases. We state it thus broadly because a

decision on a case of libel will apply to every case in which juris-

'diction is not vested in those Courts by statute.

Although this question is brought up now for the first time to

be decided by this Court, we consider it as having been long since

.settled in public opinion. In no other case for many years has

this jurisdiction been asserted; and the general acquiescence of

legal men shews the prevalence of opinion in favor of the negative

of the proposition.

The course of reasoning which leads to this conclusion is simple,

obvious, and admits of but little illustration. The powers of the

general Government are made up of concessions from the several

states — whatever is not expressly given to the former, the latter

expressly reserve. The judicial power of the United States is a

-constituent part of those concessions — that power is to l)e exer-

cised by Courts organized for the purpose, and brought into exist-

ence by an effort of the legislative power of the Union. Of all
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the Courts which the United States may, under their general

powers, constitute, one only, the Supreme Court, possesses juris-

diction derived immediately from the constitution, and of which

the legislative power cannot deprive it. All other Courts created

by the general Government possess no jurisdiction but what is given

them by the power that creates them, and can be vested with none

but what the power ceded to the general Government will authorize

them to confer.

It is not necessary to inquire whether the general Government,

in any and what extent, possesses the power of conferring on its

Courts a jurisdiction in cases similar to the present; it is enough

that such jurisdiction has not been conferred by any legislative

act, if it does not result to those Courts as a consequence of their

•creation.

And such is the opinion of the majority of this Court : For,

the power which Congress possess to create Courts of inferior

jurisdiction, necessarily implies the power to limit the jurisdiction

•of those Courts to particular objects ; and when a Court is created,

and its operations confined to certain specific objects, with what

propriety can it assume to itself a jurisdiction — much more

extended — in its nature very indefinite — applicable to a great

The only question which this case presents i , whether the Circuit Courts of the United States can exerci e a common law jurisdiction in criminal ca es. We state it thus broadly because a
.decision on a case of libel will apply to every ca e in which juris·diction is not vested in those Courts by statute.
Although this question is brought up now for the first time to
be decided by thi Court, we consider it as having been long since
ettled in public opinion. In no other case for many years has
this jurisdiction been asserted; and the general acquiescence of
legal men shews the prevalence of opinion in favor of the negative
of the proposition.
The course of reasoning which leads to this conclusion is simple,
-0bvious, and admits of but little illustration. The powers of the
.general Government are made up of conces ions from the several
states-whatever is not expres ly given to the former, the latter
.expressly reserve. The judicial power of the nited States is a
-<;on tituent part of those concession -that power is to be exerci ed by Courts organized for the purpose, and brought into exi tence by an effort of the legislative power of the Union. Of all
the Courts which the United States may, under their general
powers, constitute, one only, the Supreme Court, possesses juris.diction derived immediately from the constitution, and of which
the legislative power cannot deprive it. All other Courts created
by the general Government possess no jurisdiction but what is given
them by the power that creates them, and can be vested with none
but what the power ceded to the general Government will authorize
them to confer.
It is not necessary to inquire whether the general Government,
in any and what extent, pos esses the power of conferring on its
Courts a jurisdiction in cases similar to the present; it is enough
that such jurisdiction has not been conferred by any legislative
act, if it does not result to those Court as a consequence of their
creation.
And such is the opinion of the majority of this Court: For,
the power which Congress possess to create Courts of inferior
jurisdiction, necessarily implies the power to limit the jurisdiction
·of those Court to particular object ; and when a Court is created,
-and its operations confined to certain specific objects, with what
.Propriety can it as ume to itself a jurisdiction-much more
..extended-in its nature very indefinite-applicable to a great

UNITED STATES

v. Hunso

2.

United States v. Hudson 2?

variety of subjects varying in every state in the Union — and with

regard to which there exists no definite criterion of distribution

between the District and Circuit Courts of tlie same district ?

The only ground on which it has ever been contended that this

jurisdiction could be maintained is, that, upon the formation of

any political body, an implied power to preserve its own existence

and promote the end and object of its creation, necessarily results

to it. But, without examining how far this consideration is appli-

cable to the peculiar character of our constitution, it may be

remarked that it is a principle by no means peculiar to the com-

mon law. It is coeval, probably, with the first formation of a

limited Government; belongs to a system of universal law, and

may as well support the assumption of many other powers as those

more peculiarly acknowledged by the common law of England.

But if admitted as applicable to the state of things in this

oountrA', the consequence would not result from it which is here

contended for. If it may communicate certain implied powers

to the general Government, it would not follow that the Courts

of that Government are vested with jurisdiction over any par-
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ticular act done by an individual in supposed violation of the

peace and dignity of the sovereign power. The legislative authority

of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment

to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the

■offence.

Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts

of justice from the nature of their institution. But jurisdiction

of crimes against the state is not among those powers. To fine

for contempt — imprison for contumacy — inforce the observance

of order, &c., are powers which cannot be dispensed with in a

Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others:

and so far our Courts no doubt possess powers not immediately

derived from statute; but all exercise of criminal jurisdiction in

common law cases we are of opinion is not within their implied

powers.

variety of subjects varying in every tate in the Union-and with
regard to which there exi t no definite criterion of distribution
between the District and Circuit Court of the same district?
The only ground on which it has ever been contended that this
jurisdiction could be maintained i , that, upon the formation of
any political body, an impli d power to pre erve its own exi tence
and promote the end and object of its creation, necessarily results
to it. But, without examining how far this consideration is applicable to the peculiar character of our constitution, it may be
remarked that it is a principle by no means peculiar to the common law. It is coeval, probably, with the first formation of a
limited Government; belongs to a system of univer al law, and
may as well support the assumption of many other powers as those
more peculiarly acknowledged by the common law of England.
But if admitted as applicable to the state of things in this
country, the consequence would not re ult from it which i here
-contended for. If it may communicate certain implied powers
to the general Government, it would not follow that the Courts
-0f that Government are ve ted with juri diction over any particular act done by an individual in supposed violation of the
peace and dignity of the sovereign power. The legislative authority
-0f the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment
to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the
-0ffence.
Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts
of justice from the nature of their institution. But jurisdiction
of crimes against the state is not among those powers. To fine
for ontempt-imprison for contumacy-inforce the ob ervance
of order, &c., are powers which cannot be dispensed with in a
Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others:
and o far our Courts no doubt possess powers not immediately
derived from statute; but all exerci e of criminal juri diction in
common law cases we are of opinion is not within their implied
powers.

AcTs MALA IN SE . urn AcTS MALA PROIIIBITA

28
28 Acts Mala in Se and Acts Mala Proiiibita

10. Acts Mala in Se and Acts Mala Prohibita.

Commonwealth v. Adams, IH Ma^s. 323. (1873.)

Complaint for assault and battery.

At the trial in the Superior Court, before Bacon, J-, it appeared

that the defendant was driving in a sleigh down Beacon Street,

and was approaching the intersection of Charles Street, when a

team occupied the crossing. The defendant endeavored to pass the

team while driving at a rate prohibited by an ordinance of the city

10.

ACT" :JIALA IN SE AND ACTS MALA PROHIBIT.A..

of Boston. In so doing, he ran against and knocked down a boy

who was crossing Beacon Street. No special intent on the part

of the defendant to injure the boy was shown. The defendant had

Coninicnwealth -v. A_dams, 114 Mass. 323. (1873.)

pleaded guilty to a complaint for fast driving, in violation of the

city ordinance. The Commonwealth asked for a verdict, upon the

ground that the intent to violate the city ordinance supplied the

intent necessary to sustain the charge of assault and battery. The

court so ruled, and thereupon the defendant submitted to a verdict

of guilty, and the judge, at the defendant's request, reported the

case for the determination of this court.

Endicott. J. :
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We are of opinion that the ruling in this case cannot be sus-

tained. It is true that one in the pursuit of an unlawful act may

sometimes be punished for another act done without design and

bv mistake, if the act done was one for which he could have been

punished if done wilfully. But the act, to be unlawful in this

sense, must be an act bad in itself, and done with an evil intent;

and the law has always made this distinction, that if the act the

party was doing was merely malum proliihitum, he shall not be

punishable for the act arising from misfortune or mistake ; but if

malum in se, it is otherwise. 1 Hale P. C. 39. Foster C. L. 259.

Acts mala in se include, in addition to felonies, all breaches of

public order, injuries to person or property, outrages upon public

decency or good morals, and breaches of official duty, when done

CmrPLAINT for as a ult and battery.
At the trial in the Superior Ccmrt, before Bacon, J., it appeared
that the defendant wa driving in a leigh down Beacon Street,
and 1rns approaching the inter ection of Charle Street, when a
team occupied the cros ing. The defendant endeavored to pa the
team while driving at a rate prohibited by an ordinance of the city
of Bo ton. In so doing, he ran again t and knocked down a boy
IYho was cro ocing Beacon Street. N 0 special intent on the part
of the defendant to injure the boy was hown. Th defendant had
pleaded guilty to a complaint for fa t driYing, in -violation of the
city ordinance. The Commonwealth a ked for a ''erdict, upon the
ground that the intent to Yiolate the city ordinance upplied the
intent neces ary to u"tain ihe charge of as ault and battery. The
court so ruled, and thereupon the defendant submitted to a verdict
of guilty, and the judge, at the defendant' request, reported the
c~1s for the determination of this court.
EXDICOTT, .J.:
\Ye are of opinion that the ruling in thi ca e cannot be . uEtainecl. It i hue that one in the pur uit of an unlawful act may
sometimes be punished for another act done without design and
by mi take, if i_he act clone wa., one for which he could have been
punished if done wilfully. But the act, to be unlawful in thi
sense, must be an act bad in iLelf, and done with an evil intent ·
and the law has alway made thi di tinction, that if the act the
party was doing wa merel~· malum prohibitum, he shall not be
puni hable for the act ari. ing from mi fortune or mi take · but if
malum in se, it is otherwi e. 1 Hale P. C. 39. Fo ter . L. 259.
Acts mala in ·e include, in addition to felonies, all breaches of
public order, injuries to person or property, outrage upon public
decency or good morals, and breaches of official duty: when done

ST A.TE

v.

ALLEN

29

State v. Allen 29

wilfully or corruptly. Acts mala prohibita include any matter for-

bidden or commanded by statute, but not otherwise wrong. 3

Greenl. Ev., § 1. It is within the last class that the city ordi-

nance of Boston falls, prohilnting driving more than six miles an

hour in the streets.

Besides, to prove the violation of such an ordinance, it is not

necessary to show that it was done wilfully or corruptly. The

ordinance declares a certain thing to be illegal; it therefore be-

comes illegal to do it, without a wrong motive charged or neces-

sary to be proved; and the court is bound to administer the

penalty, although there is an entire want of design. The King

V. Sainsbury, 4 T. E. 451, 457. It was held in Commonwealth v.

Worcester, 3 Pick. 462, that proof only of the fact that the party

was driving faster than the ordinance allowed was sufficient for

conviction. See Commonwealth v. Farren, 9 Allen, 489 ; Com-

momuealth v. Waite, 11 Allen, 264. It is therefore immaterial

whether a party violates the ordinance wilfully or not. The

offence consists, not in the intent with which the act is done, but

in doing the act prohibited, but not otherwise wrong. It is ob-
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vious, therefore, that the violation of the ordinance does not in

itself supply the intent to do another act which requires a crimi-

nal intent to be proved. The learned judge erred in ruling that

the intent to violate the ordinance in itself supplied the intent to

sustain the charge of assault and battery. Tlie verdict must

therefore be set aside, and a New trial granted.

11. Repentance and Withdrawal From the Act.

State V. Allen, }fl Conn. 121. (1819.)

The motion for a new trial shows, that upon the trial it was

claimed by the State that the accused and one Henry Hamlin, both

of whom were lawfully confined in the State prison, conspired to

escape from such confinement, and to use all means which might

become necessary to effect such escape, even to the taking of the life

of any one who might oppose them, should it become necessary' to

do so in order to overcome such opposition; that in pursuance of

such combination they provided themselves with two loaded revolver

pistols, one a seven-shooter, and the other a four-shooter, and with

wilfully or corruptly. Act mala prohibita include any matter forbidden or commanded by statute, but not otherwi e wrong. 3
Greenl. Ev. ~ 1. It i within the la t cla that the cit3 ordinance of Bo ton fall prohibiting dri ing more than ix mile'" an
hour in the treet .
B e"'ide ~ to prove th violation of uch an ordinance it i not
nece ary to ,_how that it wa done wilfully or corruptly. The
ordinance d clares a certain thing to be ill gal; it therefore become illegal to do it, without a wrong motive charged or nece ~ ary to be proved; and the court i bound to administer the
penalty, although there i an entire want of design. The King
v. i.. ainsbury, -:I: T. R. -±51, 457. It wa h ld in Commonwealth v.
Worceste1·, 3 Pick. -±62, that proof only of the fact that the party
wa driving fa ter than the ordinance allowed wa sufficient for
conviction. See Commonwealth v. Farren, 9 All n -±89; Com1nonwealth v. Waite, 11 Allen, 264. It is therefore immaterial
whether a party violate the ordinance wilfully or not. The
offence consi t ·, not in the intent with which the act is done, but
in doing the act prohibited, but not otherwi e wrong. It is obviou , therefore, that the violation of the ordinance doe not in
itself supply the intent to do another act which requires a criminal intent to be prov d. The learned judge erred in ruling that
the intent to violate the ordinance in it elf upplied the intent to
sustain the charge of a ault and battery. The verdict must
therefore be set aside, and a
New trial granted.

11.

REPENTANCE AND WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ACT.

tate v. Allen, 47 Conn. L.11 . (1879.)
The motion for a new trial how , that upon the trial it wa"
claimed by the State that the accused and one Henry Hamlin, both
of whom were lawfully confined in the tate pri on, conspired to
cape from uch confinement, and to u e all mean which might
become nece ary to eff ct uch escape, even to the taking of the life
of any one who might oppo e them, houlcl it become nece ary to
do o in order to overcome uch opposition; that in pur uancc of
·uch combination they provided them elve with two load d r volv r
pi tols, one a , even- hoot r, and the other a four- hooter and with

30

REPENTANCE .AND WITHDRAW.AL FROM THE A CT

30 Eepentance and Withdrawal from the Act

handcuffs and a gag, and on the evening of September 1st, 1877,.

escaped from their cells and secreted themselves in the hall of the

prison, where they were discovered by Wells Shipman, an armed

night-watchman of the prison, and that thereupon they both fired

at Shipman, who was wounded by one of the shots, and died from

such wound on the next day ; and that after Shipman was wounded

he ran towards the alarm bell, pursued by the accused and Hamlin,

who overtook him, when he sank insensible upon the corridor, and

was then handcuffed and gagged by them; that Allen then went

to his cell about one hundred and fifty feet distant, leaving Hamlin

with Shipman, where he was discovered and fired at by the guard

of the prison, and that thereupon Hamlin went to the cell of Allen ■

and that both then broke into the attic and were taken the next

morning. The State claimed that Shipman was shot before he was

handcuffed.

It was claimed by the defense that if there was any conspiracy

between the accused and Hamlin it was merely to bribe an officer

of the prison to permit them to escape, and that whatever was done

after Shipman discovered the accused and Hamlin, was not in pur-
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suance of any plan or conspiracy ; and that immediately after Ship-

man was handcuffed and gagged Allen abandoned the enterprise

and went to his cell, and that Shipman was afterwards shot by

Hamlin alone.

It was admitted upon the trial that the bullet found in Ship-

man's body fitted the four-shooter and did not fit the seven-shooter,

which was of smaller caliber. The defense claimed that the seven-

shooter was the pistol carried by Allen and that it had not been

discharged, and in support of this claim called as a witness an officer

of the prison, who after testifying that he found the two pistols in

the attic of the prison, upon information given him by Allen of the

place where they were concealed, was inquired of, "Did Allen inform

you as to the condition of the pistol before you found it?" This

question, upon the objection of the State, was excluded, and we

think properly so. The defense claims that the question is not

within the operation of the rule that the accused cannot avail him-

self in evidence of his own declarations, because Allen's knowledge

of the condition of the pistol (assuming that the question related

to the seven-shooter), could not have been acquired unless it was the

one which he carried, and that such knowledge is therefore a fact to

which he was entitled. There would be some force in this claim if

handcuffs and a gag, and on the evening of September 1st, 187'1',
esca pcd from their cells and secreted themselves in the hall of the
pri son, where they were discovered by Wells Shipman, an armed
night-watchman of the prison, and that thereupon they both fired
at Shipman, who was wounded by one of the shots, and died from
uch wound on the next day ; and that after Shipman was wounded
he ran towards the alarm bell, pursued by the accused and Hamlin,,
who overtook him, when he sank insensible upon the corridor, and
was then handcuffed and gagged by them; that Allen then went
to hi cell about one hundred and fifty feet distant, leaving Hamlin
with Shipman, where he was discovered and fired at by the guard
of the prison, and that thereupon Hamlin went to the cell of Allen ,
and that both then broke into the attic and were taken the next
morning. The State claimed that Shipman was shot before he was
handcuffed.
It was claimed by the defense that if there wa any conspiracy
between the accused and Hamlin it wa merely to bribe an officer
of the prison to permit them to escape, and that whatever was done
after Shipman discovered the accused and Hamlin, was not in pursuance of any plan or conspiracy ; and that immediately after Shipman was handcuffe d and gagged Allen abandoned the enterprise
anrl went to his cell, and that Shipman was afterwards shot by
Hamlin alone.
It wa admitted upon the trial that the bullet found in Shipman's body fitted the four- shooter and did not fit the seven-shooter,.
which was of smaller caliber. The defense claimed that the sevenshooter was the pistol carried by Allen and that it had not been
discharged, and in support of this claim called as a witness an officer
of the prison, who after testifying that he found the two pistols in
the attic of the prison, upon information given him by Allen of the
place where they were concealed, was inquired of, " Did Allen inform
you as to the condition of the pistol before you found it?" This
question, upon the objection of the State~ was excluded, and we
think properly ~o . The defense claims that the question is not
within the operation of the rule that the accu eel cannot avail himself in evidence of his own declarations, because Allen's knowledge
of the condition of the pistol (assuming that the question related
to the seven-shooter) , could not have been acquired unless it was the
one which he ca rried, and that such knowledge is therefore a fact to
which he wa s entitled. There would be some force in this claim if
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the assumption of the defense as to Allen's means of knowledge

was well founded, hut it is not. We suppose that by "the condition

of the pistol" is meant its condition as to being loaded or otherwise.

While Allen and Hamlin were together after Shipman was shot and

before they were taken the next morning, each had every oppor-

tunity to know the condition of the other's weapon, and would,

naturally, have been informed as to it.

The objection of the defense to the two warrants of commit-

ment under which Hamlin was imprisoned was properly overruled.

The evidence was admissible and important, in connection with

proof of the combination of Allen and Hamlin to escape, to

characterize such combination as a conspiracy, by showing that

they were lawfully imprisoned, and hence that the combination

was for a criminal purpose, and the existence of the conspiracy

being proved, to show that in its prosecution Hamlin, for whose

acts Allen his co-conspirator was liable, was not striving to liberate

himself from illegal imprisonment, but was criminally attempting

to escape from lawful custody.

The court charged the jury as follows : "If the jury shall find
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that Hamlin and Allen, at some time previous to the homicide,

made up their minds in concert to break the State prison and

escape therefrom at all hazard, and knowing that the enterprise

would be a dangerous one and expose them to be killed by the

armed night watchman of the prison should they be discovered in

making the attempt, wilfully, deliberately and premeditatedly de-

termined to arm themselves with deadly weapons, and kill what-

ever watchman should oppose them in their attempt; and if the

jury should further find that in pursuance of such design they

armed themselves with loaded revolvers to carry their original

purpose into execution, and while engaged in efforts to escape from

the prison were discovered by the watchman Shipman, the de-

ceased, and in the scuffle which ensued he was wilfully killed by

Hamlin or Allen while they were acting in concert and in pur-

suance of their original purpose so to do in just such an emergency

as they now found themselves in^ then Hamlin and Allen are

both guilty of murder in the first degree. And in the opinion

of the court, Allen would be guilty of murder in the first degree,

if, in the state of things just described, he in fact abandoned, just

before the fatal shot was fired by Hamlin, all further attempt to

escape from the prison, and the infliction of further violence upon

the assumption of the defense a to Allen' means of knowledge
was well found d, but it i not. We uppo e that by "the condition
of the pistol" i meant its condition a to being loaded or otherwi e.
While Allen and Hamlin were together after Shipman was shot and
before they were taken the next morning, each had every opportunity to know the condition of the other' weapon, and would,
naturally, have been informed as to it.
The objection of the defense to the two warrants of commitment under which Hamlin was imprisoned was properly overruled.
The evidence wa admissible and important, in connection with
proof of the combination of Allen and Hamlin to escape, to
characterize such combination as a conspiracy, by showing that
they were lawfully imprisoned, and hence that the combination
was for a criminal purpo e, and the existence of the con piracy
being proved, to how that in its prosecution Hamlin, for whose
acts Allen his co-conspirator was liable, was not striving to liberate
him elf from illegal imprisonment, but wa criminally attempting
to e cape from lawful custody.
The court charged the jury as follows: "If the jury shall find
that Hamlin and Allen, at some time previous to the homicide,
made up their minds in concert to break the State prison and
escape therefrom at all hazard, and knowing that the enterprise
would be a dangerous one and expose them to be killed by the
armed night watchman of the prison hould they be discovered in
making the attempt, wilfully, deliberately and premeditatedly c1 termined to arm themselves with deadly weapons, and kill whatever watchman hould oppose them in their attempt; and if the
jury should further find that in pursuance of such design they
armed themselves with loaded revolvers to carry their original
purpose into execution, and while engaged in efforts to escape from
the prison were di covered by the watchman Shipman, the deceased, and in the cuffie which ensued he was wilfully killed bv
Hamlin or Allen while they were acting in concert and in puruance of their original purpo e so to do in ju t uch an emergency
a they now found themselves in, then Hamlin and Allen are
both guilty of murder in the first degree. And in the opinion
of the court, Allen would be guilty of murder in the first degree
if, in the tate of things just described, he in fact abandoned, ju t
before the fatal shot was fired by Hamlin, all further attempt t
escape from the pri on, and the infliction of further viol nee upon
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the person of Shipman, without informing Hamlin by word or

deed that he had so done, and Hamlin, ignorant of the fact, shortly

after fired the fatal shot in pursuance of and in accordance with

the purpose of the parties down to the time of the abandonment."

We do not think that the objection made by the defense to this

part of the charge is well founded. Under such circumstances

Allen's so-called abandonment would be but an operation of the

mind — a secret change of purpose. Doing nothing by word or

deed to inform his co-conspirator of such change of purpose, the

reasonable inference would be that he did not intend to inform

him of it, and thus he would be intentionally encouraging and

stimulating him to the commission of the homicide by his sup-

posed co-operation with him. Such intent not to inform Hamlin

of this change of purpose would, under the circumstances, be

decisive of his guilt.

But the charge proceeds: "In other words, if during the fatal

encounter with deadly weapons, in the state of things just de-

scribed, Allen suddenly abandoned Hamlin, abandoned the enter-

prise and went to his cell, without saying a word to Hamlin to
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the effect that he had abandoned the enterprise, and Hamlin,

supposing that he was still acting with him and that he had gone

to his cell for an instrument to carry on the encounter, fired the

fatal shot, his abandonment under such circumstances would be of

no importance. A man cannot abandon another under such cir-

cumstances and escape the consequences of the aid he has rendered

up to the time of the abandonment."

A majority of the court think that the jury may have been

misled by this part of the charge, and that, therefore, especially

in view of the grave issues involved in the case, a new trial should

be granted.

If Allen did in fact before the homicide withdraw from the

conspiracy, abandon the attempt to escape, ?nd with the knowl-

edge of Hamlin leave and go to his cell, Hamlin's misconstruction

of his purpose in leaving did not necessarily make his conduct of

no importance.

Until the fatal shot there was the "locus -penitentice." To

avail himself of it Allen must indeed have informed Hamlin of

his change of purpose, but such information might be by words

or acts; and if with the intention of notifying Hamlin of his

withdrawal from the conspiracy he did acts which should have

the person of Shipman, with out informing Hamlin by word or
deed that he had so done, and Hamlin, ignorant of the fact, shortly
after fired the fatal shot in pursuance of and in accordance with
the purpose of the parties down to the time of the abandonment."
We do not think that the objection made by the defense to this
part of the charge is well founded . Under such circumstances
Allen's so-called abandonment would be but an operation of the
mind-a secret change of purpose. Doing nothing by word or
deed to inform his co-conspirator of such change of purpose, the
reasonable inference would be that he did not intend to inform
him of it, and thus he would be intentionally encouraging and
stimulating him to the commission of the homicide by his supposed co-operation with him. Such intent not to inform Hamlin
of this change of purpose would, under the circumstances, be
decisive of his guilt.
But the charge proceeds: "In other words, if during the fatal
encounter with deadly weapons, in the state of things just described, Allen suddenly abandoned Hamlin, abandoned the enterprise and went to bis cell, without saying a word to Hamlin to
the effect that he had abandoned the enterprise, and Hamlin,
supposing that he was still acting with him and that be had gone
to his cell for an instrument to carry on the encounter, fired the
fatal hot, his abandonment under such circumstances would be of
no importance. A man cannot abandon another under such circumstances and escape the consequences of the aid he has rendered
up to the time of the abandonment."
A majority of the court think that the jury may have been
misled by this part of the charge, and that, therefore, especially
in view of the grave issues involved in the ca e, a new trial should
be granted.
If Allen djd in fact before the homicide withdraw from the
conspiracy, abandon the attempt to escape, ~nd with the knowledge of Hamlin leave and go to his cell, Hamlin's misconstruction
of his purpose in leaving did not necessarily make his conduct of
no importance.
Until the fatal shot there was the "locus penitentire." To
avail himself of it Allen must indeed have informed Hamlin of
his change of purpose, but such information might be by word
or acts; and if with the intention of notifying Hamlin of hit=i
withdrawal from the conspiracy he did acts which should have
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been effectual for that purpose, but which did not produce upon

the mind of Hamlin the effect which he intended and which they

naturally should have produced, sucli acts were proper for the Jury

to consider in determining the relation of Allen to the crime

which was afterwards committed.

Allen's act of leaving and going to his cell, if he did so, had

some significance in connection with the question of intention

and notice, and was therefore proper for the consideration of the

jury. How much weight was to be given to it would depend upon

circumstances, such as the situation of the parties and the oppor-

tunity for verbal or other notice.

The same observations are perhaps applicable to the charge of

the court in answer to the sixth request for instructions. While

it is clear that the request as made should not have been complied

with, the charge that was given may be open to the implication

that some notice of Allen's abandonment of the conspiracy must

have been given by him to Hamlin beyond that afforded by his act

of leaving.

The answers of the court to the other requests for instructions
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seem to us, in view of the claims of the counsel and the admitted

facts in the case, to be correct and sufficiently explicit.

A new trial is advised.

been effectual for that purpose, but which did not produce upon
the mind of Hamlin the effect which he intended and which they
naturally should have produc a, uch act were proper for the jur,v
to consider in determining the relation of Allen to the crime
which was afterwards commi tte 1.
Allen's act of leaving and going to his cell, if he did so, had
some significance in connection with the question of intention
and notice, and was therefore proper for the consideration of the
jury. How much weight was to be given to it would depend upon
circumstances, such as the situation of the parties and the opportunity for verbal or other notice.
The same observations are perhaps applicable to the charge of
the court in answer to the ixth request for instructions. vVhi] e
it is clear that the request as made should not have been complied
with, the charge that was given may be open to the implication
that some notice of Allen's abandonment of the conspiracy must
h:we been given by him to Hamlin beyond that afforded by his act
·o f leaving.
The answers of the court to the other requests for instructions
seem to us, in view of the claims of the counsel and the admitted.
facts in the case, to be correct and sufficiently explicit.
A new trial is ad vised.

CHAPTER II.

CO?^[DITIONS OF CRIMINALITY.

I. There Must Be Sufficient Age.

Angela v. People, 96 III. 209. (1880.)

Mr. Justice AValker delivered the opinion of the Court:

At the August term, 1878, of the Morgan circuit court, the

grand jury presented an indictment against John Angelo, then

CHAPTER II.

about seventy-eight years of age, and his son, Theodore Angelo,

about eleven years of age, for the murder of Isaac Hammill. A

CONDITIONS OF CRIMINALITY.

trial was had at the following November term of the court, result-

ing in the acquittal of John, on the ground of insanity, and the

conviction of Theodore of manslaughter, and the jury fixed the

I. THERE MUST BE SUFFICIENT AGE.

term of his imprisonment in the penitentiary at six years. A

motion for a new trial by Theodore was entered, but overruled by

Angelo v. People, 96 Ill. 209. {1880.)

the court, and he was sentenced to the Reform School for four

years ; and he prosecutes error, and brings the record to this court,

and urges a reversal, on several grounds.

The statute has provided, by section 282 of the Criminal Code,

that a person shall be considered of sound mind who is neither an

idiot nor lunatic, nor affected with insanity, and who has arrived
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at the age of fourteen, or before that age if such person knows the

distinction between good and evil. The 283d section provides that

an infant under ten years of age shall not be found guilty of any

crime or misdemeanor.

In Great Britain the lowest possible period fixed by law at

which an infant could be convicted for a crime, was seven, whilst

our .statute has fixed the period at ten years. In both countries

fourteen is the period after which the law presumes capacity, with-

out proof of knowledge of good and evil,

Blackstone, Vol. 4, p. 23, says: "Under seven years of age,

indeed, an infant can not be guilty of felony ; for then a felonious

discretion is almost an impossibility in nature." He further says

that convictions have been had of infants between seven and four-

teen; — "But in all such cases the evidence of that malice which

34

Mr. JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court:
At the August term, 1878, of the Morgan circuit court, the
grand jury presented an indictment against John Angelo, then
about seventy-eight years of age, and his son, Theodore Angelo,
about eleven yea rs of age, for the murder of Isaac Hammill. A
trial was had at the following November term of the court, resulting in the acquittal of John, on the ground of insanity, and the
conviction of Theodore of manslaughter, and the jury fixed the·
term of his imprisonment in the penitentiary at six years. A
motion for a new trial by Theodore was entered, but overruled by
the court, and he was sentenced to the Reform School for four
years; and he prosecutes error, and brings the record to this court,
and luges a rever al, on several grounds.
The statute has provided, by section 282 of the Criminal Code,
that a person shall be considered of sound mind who is neither an
idiot nor lunaLic, nor affected with insanity, and who has arrived
at the age of fourteen, or before that age if such person knows the
distinctjon between good and evil. The 283d section provides that
an infant und er ten years of age shall not be found guilty of any
crime or misdemeanor.
Jn Great Britain the lowest po sible period :fixed by law at
which 8n infant could be convicted for a crime, was seven, whilst
our Rtatute has fixed the period at ten years. In both countries
fourteen is the period after which the law presumes capacity, without proof of knowledge of good and evil,
Blackstone, Vol. 4, p. 23, says: "Under seven years of age,
jnd"ed, an infant can not be guilty of felony; for then a felonious
di cretion is almost an impossibility in nature." He further says
thGt convictions have been had of infants between seven and fourteen ;-"But in all such cases the evidence of that malice which
34

AxGELO V. People 35

KGELO V. PEOPLE

is to supply age ought to be strong and clear beyond all doubt And

contradiction."

In Broom's Legal Max., pp. 232-3, it is said: "With regard

to persons of immature years, the rule is, that no infant within

the age of seven years can be guilty of felony, or be punished

for any capital offence; for, within that age, an infant is by

presumption of law doli incapax, and can not be endowed with

any discretion, and against this presumption no averment shall be

received. This legal incapacity, however, ceases when the infant

attains the age of fourteen years, after which period his acts be-

come subject to the same rule of construction as those of any other

person."

''Between the ages of seven and fourteen years an infant is

deemed ■prima facie to be doli incapax; but in this case the maxim

applies, malitia supplet cetatem — malice (which is here used in its

legal sense, and means the doing of a wrongful act intentionally,

without just cause or excuse) supplies the want of mature years.

Accordingly, at the age above mentioned, the ordinary legal pre-

sumption may be rebutted by strong and pregnant evidence of mis-
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chievous discretion; for the capacity of doing ill or contracting

guilt is not so much measured by years and days as by the strength

of the delinquent's understanding and judgment. In all such cases,

however, the evidence of malice ought to be strong, and clear

beyond all doubt and contradiction." See Archbold's Crim. Plead,

pp. 11 and 12, where the same rule is announced. Nor are we

aware of any opposing authority.

There is uncontradicted evidence in the record that plaintiff

in error was little more than eleven years of age when the homi-

cide was committed. This evidence was not contradicted, but was

virtually conceded by the eighth instruction asked and given for

the People. If this was true, and the evidence tended to prove it,

the rule required evidence strong and clear beyond all doubt and

contradiction, that he was capable of discerning between good and

evil; and the legal presumption being that he was incapable of

committing the crime, for want of such knowledge, it devolved

on the People to make the strong and clear proof of capacity,

before they could be entitled to a conviction. This record may be

searched in vain to find any such proof. There was no witness

examined on that question, nor did any one refer to it. There is

simply evidence as to his age. For aught that appears, he may

is to supply age ought to be strong and clear beyond all doubt and
contradiction. '
In Broom's Legal Max., pp. 232-3, it is said: "With regard
to per ans of immature year , the rule is, that no infant within
the age of seven years can be guilty of felony, or be punished
for any capital offence; for, within that ag , an infant is by
presumption of law doli incapax~ and can not be endowed with
any discretion, and against this presumption no averment shall be
received. This legal incapacity, however, ceases when the infant
attains the age of fourteen years, after which period hi. acts become subject to the same rule of construction as those of any other
person."
"Between the ages of seven and fourteen years an infant is
deemed prima j'acie to be doli incapax ~· but in this case the maxim
applies, malitia supplet a?tatem-malice (which is here used in it..
legal serrse, and means the doing of a wrongful act intentionally,
without just cause or excuse) supplies the want of mature years.
Accordingly, at the age above mentioned, the ordinary legal presumption may be rebutted by strong and pregnant evidence of mischievous discretion; for the capacity of doing ill or contracting
guilt is not so much measured by years and clays as by the strength
of the delinquent's understanding and judgment. In all such ca es,
however, the evidence of malice ought to be strong, and clear
beyond all doubt and contradiction." See Archbold's Crim. Plead.
pp. 11 and 12, where the same rule is announced. Nor are we
aw:ue of any opposing authority.
There is uncontraclicted evidence in the r ecord that plaintiff
]n error was little more than eleven years of age when the homicide was committed. This evidence was not contradicted, but was
virtually conceded by the eighth in truction a keel and given for
the People. If this was true, and the evidence tended to prove it,
the rule required evidence trong and clear beyond all doubt and
contradiction, that he was capable of discerning between good and
evil; and the legal presumption being that he wa incapable of
committing the crime, for want of such knowledge, it devolved
on the People to make the strong and clear proof of capacity,
before they could be entitled to a conviction. This record may b
earched in vain to :find any u h proof. There was no witne s
xamined on that question, nor did any one r f r to it. There i
simply vid nee a to his age. For aught that app ar , h may
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have been dull, weak, and wholly incapable of knowing good from

evil. It does not appear, from even the circumstances in evidence,

that he may not have been mentally weak for his age, or that he

may not have even approached idiocy.

The law j)resumes that he lacked mental capacity at his age,

and that i:)resumption lias not been overcome by the requisite

proof, or, in fact, any proof. The court below should, therefore,

have granted a new trial, and erred in refusing it.

Again, the jury were not clearly and fully instructed on this

question. Several instructions given for the People omitted this

rule, when they should have been qualified by informing the jury

that proof, and clear proof, of capacity must be given. In such a

case the mere announcement of the rule in general terms, as was

done in the eighth of the People's instructions, w^as not sufficient.

The jury may have been misled by the instructions that should

have been qualified.

It is to be regretted that counsel who assisted the prosecuting

attorney referred, as he did in his argument to the jury, to the

fact that plaintiff in error was not placed on the stand as a wit-
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ness, as one of the reasons why he should be convicted. It is true,

that when stopped by the court, he said it was inadvertently done,

and the jury were directed by the court to disregard that portion

of his argument. Notwithstanding what he said, and the direc-

tion of the court to disregard it, who can know what effect it may

have had on the jury in forming their verdict? Such comments

are prohibited by the statute, and it is strange that any attorney

should so far forget the rights of the accused, and his professional

dut3% for a moment, even in the heat of discussion ; but he said it

was inadvertent, and we are loth to believe that any attorney

would intentionally act so unfairly and unprofessionally. We can

not conceive that any member of the bar could deliberately seek

Ijy such means to wrongfully procure a conviction and the execu-

tion of a fellow being, when his highest professional duty to his

client only requires him to see that there is a fair trial according

to the law and the evidence. Where such things are done, whether

intentionally or inadvertently, it may make an impression on the

minds of the jur}^ that nothing can remove. And who can say

that this inadvertence may not have produced the verdict of

guilty ?

We think plaintiff in error has not had a fair trial and the

have been dull, weak, and wholly incapable of knowing good frorn
evil. It does not appear, frorn even the circurn tance in evidence,
that he rnay not have been mentally weak for his age, or that he
may not have even approached idiocy.
The law presume that he lacked mental capacity at hi age,
and that pre urnption ha not been overcome by the requisite
proof, or, in fa ct, any proof. The court below should, therefore,
have granted i new trial, and erred in refu ing it.
Again, the jury were not clearly and fully instructed on this
question. SeYeral instructions given for the People omitted thi
rule, when they hould have been qualifi cl by informing the jury
that proof~ and clear proof, of capacity rnu t be given. In such a
ca e the mere announcement of the rule in general terms, as was
done in the eighth of the People' in tructions, was not sufficient.
The jury may have been mi led by the instructions that hould
have been qualified.
It is to be regretted that counsel who a sisted the prosecuting
attorney referred, as he did in his argument to the jury, to the
fact that plaintiff in error was not placed on the stand as a witnes , as one of the reason why he hould be convicted. It is true,
that when stopped by the court, he said it was inadvertently done,
and the jury were directed by the court to di regard that portion
of his argument. Notwithstanding what he said, and the direction of the court to disregard it, who can know what effect it may
have had on the jury in forming their verdict? Such comments
are prohibited by the statute, and it is strange that any attorney
should so far forget the rights of the accused, and his professional
duty, for a moment, even in the heat of di cu sion; but he said it
was inadvertent, and we are loth to believe that any attorney
would intentionally act so unfairly and unprofe sionally. We can
not conceive that any member of the bar could deliberately seek
by such means to wrongfully procure a conviction and the execution of a fellow being, when his highe t profe sional duty to hi
client only requires him to see that there is a fair trial according
to the law and the evidence. Where such thing are done, whether
intentionally or inadvertently, it may make an impres ion on the
rnincl of the jury that nothing can remove. And who can ay
that this inadvertence may not have produced the verdict of
guilty?
We think plaintiff in error has not had a fair trial and the
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judgment of the court below must be reversed and the cause re-

manded.

Judgment reversed.

II. The Person Must Have Acted A^oluntarily.

judgment of the court below mu t be reversed and the cau .. e remanded.
Judgment reversed.

a. Coercion Presumed in Coverture.

Commomvealth v. Munsey, 112 Mass. 287. (1873.)

With regard to the remaining exception, it has been decided

that if a wife, in the absence of her husband, do a criminal act,

even in obedience to his order, her coverture will be no defence.

Commonwealth v. Murphy, 2 Gray, 510. Commonwealth v. Fee-

ney, 13 Allen, 560. Commonwealth v. Gannon, 97 Mass. 547. In

order to make out the defence that she was acting under the

coercion or control of the husband, it must appear that he was

present at the time. Commomvealth v. Butler, 1 Allen, 4. But

in order to establish the fact of his presence, it does not seem to

be necessary to show that the act was done literally in his sight.

If the husband were near enough for the wife to be under his im-

mediate influence and control, though not in the same room, it is

II.

THE P ERSON :MUST HAVE ACTED VOLUNTARILY.

sufficient. Commonwealth v. BurJc, 11 Gray, 437. If he were on
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the premises and near at hand, a momentary absence from the

room, or a momentary turning of his back, might still leave her

a. Co ercio n Presumed in Coverfore.

under his influence. Commonwealth v. Welch, 97 Mass. 593.

The instructions given to the jury may have led them to suppose

Commonwealth v. Muns ey, 1L_, Mass. 287. (1873.)

that there could be no influence and control capable of exonerat-

ing the wife, unless the husband were literally present, and in sight

of the wife. Exceptions sustained.

With regard to the remaining exception, it ha been decided
that if a wife, in the absence of her husband, do a criminal act,
even in obedience to hi order, her coverture will be no defence.
Commonwealth v. Murphy, 2 Gray, 510. Commonwealth v. F eeney, 13 Allen, 560. Commonwealth v . Gannon, 97 Mas . 547. In
order to make out the defence that she was acting under the
coercion or control of the husband, it must appear that he wa.:::
pre,ent at the time. Commonwealth v. Butler, 1 Allen, 4. But
in order to e tabli h the fact of his presence, it does not seem to
be necessary to show that the act was done literally in his sight.
If the hu banJ were near enough for the wife to be under his immediate influence and control though not in the same room, it is
ufficient. Commonwealth v. Burk, 11 Gray, 437. If he were on
the premi e and near at hand, a momentary ab ence from the
room, or a momentary turning of his back, might still leave h er
under hi influence. Comrnonwealth v. Welch, 97 Ma s. 593.
The instructions given to the jury may have led them to suppose
that there could be no influence and control capable of exonerating the wife, unles the hu band were literally present, and in sight
Except,ions sustained.
of the wife.
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h. Persons Under Compulsion.

Arp V. State, 91 Ala. 5. (1893.)

Coleman^ J. :

At the July term, 1892, of the Circuit Court, the defendant was

convicted of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to suffer

death.

On this phase of the evidence the court was asked to give the

b. Persons Under Compulsion.

following charge : "If the jury believe from the evidence that the

defendant killed Pogue under duress, under compulsion from a

necessity, under threats of immediate impending peril to his own

Arp v. State, 97 Ala. 5. (1893.)

life, such as to take away the free agency of the defendant, then

he is not guilty." The court refused this charge, and the refusal is

assigned as error. This brings up for consideration the question,

what is the law when one person, under compulsion or fear of great

bodily harm to himself, takes the life of an innocent person ; and

what is his duty when placed under such circumstances?

The fact that defendant had been in the employment of Burk-

halter is no excuse. The command of a superior to an inferior,

of a parent to a child, of a master to a servant, or of a principal to
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his agent, will not justify a criminal act done in pursuance of

such command. — 1 Bishop, § 355; Eeese v. State, 73 Ala. 18; 4

Blackstone, § 27.

In a learned discussion of the question, to be found in Leading

Criminal Cases, Vol. 1, p. 81, and note on p. 85, by Bennett &

Heard, it is declared that "for certain crimes the wife is responsible

although committed under the compulsion of her husband. Such

are murder," etc. To the same effect is the text in 14 Am. & Eng.

Encyc. of Law, p. 649 ; and this court gave sanction to this rule in

Bihl V. State, 94 Ala. 31 ; 10 So. Eep. 506. In Ohio a contrary

rule prevails in regard to the wife. — Davis v. State, 15 Ohio, 72 ;

45 Amer, Dec. 559. In Arkansas there is a statute specially ex-

empting married women from liability, when "acting under the

threats, commands or coercion of their husbands," but it was held

J.:
At the July term, 1892, of the Circuit Court, the defendant was
convicted of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to suffer
death.
On this phase of the evidence the court was asked to give the
following charge: "If the jury believe from the evidence that the
defendant killed Pogue under duress, under compulsion from a
necessity, under threats of immediate impending peril to his own
life, such as to take away the free agency of the defendant, then
he is not guilty." The court refused this charge, and the refusal is
assigned as error. This brings up for consideration the question,
what is the law when one person, under compulsion or fear of great
bodily harm to himself, takes the life of an innocent person; and
what is his duty when placed under such circumstances?
The fact that defendant had been in the employment of Burkhalter is no excu e. The command of a uperior to an inferior,
of a parent to n child, of a master to a servant, or of a principal to
his agent, will not justify a criminal act done in pursuance of
such command.-1 Biuhop, § 355; Reese v. State, 73 Ala. 18; 4
Blackstone, § 27.
In a learned discussion of the question, to be found in Leading
Criminal Cases, Vol. 1, p. 81, and note on p. 85, by Bennett &
Heard, it is declared that "for certain crime the wife is responsible
although committed under the compulsion of her husband. Such
are murder,'' etc. To the same effect is the text in 14 Am. & Eng.
Encyc. of Law, p. 649; and this court gave sanction to this rule in
Bibb v. State, 94 Ala. 31; 10 So. Rep. 506. In Ohio a contrary
rule prevails in regard to the wife.-Davis v. State, 15 Ohio, 72;
45 Amer. Dec. 559. In Arkansas there is a statute specially exempting married women from liability, when "acting under the
threats, command or coercion of their husbands,'' but it wa held
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under this act there was no presumption in favor of the wife

accused of murder^, and that it was incumbent on her to show that

the crime was done under the influence of such coercion, threats

or commands." — Edwards v. State, 27 Ark. 493, reported in 1

Criminal Law by Green, p. 741.

In the case of Beal v. The State of Ga., 72 Ga. Eep. 200, and

-also. in the case of The People v. Miller, 66 Cal. -468, the question

arose upon the sufficiency of the testimony of a witness to author-

ize a conviction for a felony, it being contended that the witness

was an accomplice. In both cases the witness was under fourteen

years of age. It was held that if the witness acted under threats

and compulsion, he was not an accomplice. The defendants were

convicted in both cases.

In the case of Bex v. Cruichly, 5 C. & P. 133, the defendant

was indicted for breaking a threshing machine. The defendant

was allowed to prove that he was compelled by a mob to go with

them and compelled to hammer the threshing machine, and was

also permitted to prove that he 'ran away at the first opportunity.

In Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, Vol. 1, Ch. 28, Sec. 26, it is
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«aid : "The killing of an innocent person in defense of a man's

self is said to be Justifiable in some special cases, as if two be ship-

wrecked together, and one of them get upon a plank to save himself,

and the other also, having no other means to save his life, get upon

the same plank, and finding it not able to support them both,

thrusts the other from it, whereby he is drowned, it seems that he

who thus preserved his own life at the expense of that other, may

justify the fact by the inevitable necessity of the case."

In 1 Hale's Pleas of the Crown, Ch. VIII, § 50, it is said

"There is to be observed a difference between the times of war,

or public insurrection or rebellion, when a person is under so great

a power, that he can not resist or avoid, the law in some cases

allows an impunity for parties compelled, or drawn by fear of

death to do some acts in themselves capital, which admit no excuse

in time of peace. * * * Now as to times of peace, if a man

be menaced with death, unless he will commit an act of treason,

murder or robber}^ the fear of death doth not excuse him, if he

commit the act; for the law hath provided a sufficient remedy

against such fears by applying himself to the court and officers

of justice for a writ or precept de sccuritate pads. Again, if a

man be desperately assaulted, and in peril of death, and can not

under thi act there "a no pre umption in favor of the wife
accu ed of murder, and that it wa incumbent on her to show that
the crime was done under the influence of uch coercion, threats
or commands."-Edwards v. State, 27 Ark. 493, reported in 1
Criminal Law by Green, p. 7-±1.
In the case of Beal v. Th e State of Ga., 72 Ga. Rep. 200, and
al o in the case of The People v. Miller, 66 Cal. '168, the que tion
arooce upon the ufficiency of the testimony of a witne to authorize a conviction for a felony, it being contended that the witness
was an accomplice. In both cases the witnes was under fourteen
years of age. It was held that if the witnes acted under threat
and compulsion, he wa not an accomplice. The defendant were
convicted in both ca e .
In the case of R ex v. Crutchly, 5 C. & P. 133, the defendant
wa indicted for breaking a thre hing machine. The defendant
was allowed to prove that he was compelled by a mob to go with
them and compelled to hammer the threshing machine, and wa
also permitted to prove that he ·ran away at the :first opportunity.
In Hawkin ' Pleas of the Crown, Vol. 1, Ch. 28, Sec. 26, it is
·said: "The killing of an innoc nt person in defense of a man's
self i aid to be ju ti:fiable in ome special case , as if two be shipwrecked together, and one of them get upon a plank to save him elf,
and the other al o, having no other means to save his life, get upon
the "ame plank, and :finding it not able to upport them both
thru ts the other from it, whereby he is drowned, it seems that he
who thus preserved his own life at the expense of that other, may
justify the fact by the inevitable necessity of the case."
In 1 Hale' Plea of the Crown, Ch. VIII, § 50, it is aid
''There is to be ob erved a difference between the times of war,
or public in urrection or rebellion, wh n a per on is under o great
a power, that he can not re ist or avoid, the law in some ca e ~
allows an impunity for partie compelled, or drawn by fear of
death to do some act in them elves capital, which admit no excu e
in time of peace. * * * Now a to time of peace, if a man
be menaced with death, unle he will commit an act of trea on:
murder or robbery, the fear of d ath doth not xcuse him, if he
commit the act; for the law hath provided a ufficient r medy
again t such fear by applying him elf to the court and offic r
of justice for a writ or precept de securitate pacis.
gain, if a
man be desperately a aulted, an 1 in peril of d ath and can not
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otherwise escape, unless to satisfy his assailant's fury he will kill

an innocent person, the present fear of actual force will not acquit

him of the crime and punishment of murder, if he commit the

act; for he ought rather to die himself than kill an innocent; but

if he can not otherwise save his own life, the law permits him in

his own defense to kill his assailant."

Blackstone, Yol. 4, § 30, declares the law to be, "Though a man

be violently assaulted, and has not other possible means of escap-

ing death, but by killing an innocent person ; this fear and force

shall not acquit him of murder; for he ought rather to die him-

self, than escape by the murder of an innocent."

In Stephen's Commentaries, Vol. 4, Book 6, Ch. 2, pp. 83-4, the

same rule is declared to be the law.

In East's Crown Law, the same general principles are declared

as to cases of treason and rebellion, etc. But on page 294, after

referring to the case of two persons being shipwrecked and getting

on the same plank, proceeds as follows : "Yet, according to Lord

Hale, a man can not even excuse the killing of another who is

innocent, under a threat, however urgent, of losing his own life
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unless he comply. But if the commission of treason may be ex-

tenuated by the fear of present death, and while the party is under

actual compulsion, there seems no reason why this offense may not

be mitigated upon the like consideration of human infirmity. But

if the party might, as Lord Hale, in one place, supposes, have

recourse to the law for his protection against such threats, it will

certainly be no excuse for committing murder."

In Eussell on Crimes, Yol. 1, § 699, it is stated as follows:

"The person committing the crime must be a free agent, and not

subject to actual force at the time the act is done; thus, if A by

force take the arm of B, in which is a weapon and therewith kill

C, A is guilty of murder, but not B. But if it be only a moral

force put upon B, as by threatening him with duress or imprison-

ment or even by an assault to the peril of his life in order to com-

pel him to kill C, it is no legal excuse."

In the case of Begina v. Tyler, reported in 8 Car. & Payne, 618,

Lord Denham, C. J., declares the law as follows : "With regard to

the argument, you have heard, that these prisoners were induced

to join Thom, and to continue with him from a fear of personal

violence to themselves, I am bound to tell you, that where parties,

for such reason, are induced to join a mischievous man, it is not

otherwise escape, unl s to satisfy his a sailant's fury he will kill
an innocent person, the pre ent fear of actual force will not acquit
him of the crime and punishment of murder, if he commit the
act; for he ought rather to die himself than kill an innocent; but
if he can not otherwise save his own life, the law permi L him in
his own defense to kill his assailant."
Blackstone, Vol. 4, § 30, declares the law to be, "Though a man
be violently assaulted, and has not other possible means of e caping death, but by killing an innocent person; this fear and force
shall not acquit him of murder; for he ought rather to die himself, than escape by the murder of an innocent."
In Stephen's Commentaries, Vol. 4, Book 6, Ch. 2, pp. 83-4, the
same rule is declared to be the law.
In Ea t' Crown Law, the same general principles are declared
a to case of trea on and rebellion, etc. But on page 29±, after
referring to the case of two per ons being hipwrecked and getting
on the same plank, proceed as follow : ''Yet, according to Lord
Hale, a man can not even excuse the killing of another who i
innocent, under a threat, however urgent, of losing his own life
unles he comply. But if the commis ion of treason may be extenuated by the fear of pre ent death, and while the party is under
actual compulsion, there seems no rea. on why thi offense may not
be mitigated upon the like con ideration of human infirmity. But
if the party might, as Lord Hale, in one place, supposes, have
recourse to the law for his protection again t such threats, it will
certainly be no excuse for committing murder."
In Ru · ell on Crimes, Vol. 1, § G99, it is . tated as follows:
"The per on committing the crime mu t be a free agent, and not
subject to actual force at the time the act i done; thus, if A by
force take the arm of B, in which is a weapon and therewith kill
C, A is guilty of murder, but not B. But if it be only a moral
force put upon B, a by threatening him with duress or impri onment or even by an a sault to the peril of his life in order to compel him to kill C, it is no legal excu e."
In the case of R egina\". TylerJ reported in 8 Car. & Payne, 61 ,
Lord Denham, C. J., declares the law a ' follows : "With regard to
the argument, you ha1e heard, that the e prisoners were induced
to join Thom, and to continue with him from a fear of per onal
violence to them elves, I am bound to tell you, that where partie ,
for such rea on, are induced to join a mischievous man, it is not
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their fear of violence to themselves which can excuse their conduct

to others. * * * The law is that no man, from a fear of

consequences to himself, has a right to make himself a party com-

mitting mischief on mankind."

In the case of Respuhlicae v. McCarty, 2 Dallas, 86, when the

defendant was on trial for high treason, the court uses this lan-

guage: "It must be remembered that, in the eye of the law,

nothing will excuse the act of joining the enemy but the fear of

immediate death; not the fear of any inferior personal injury,

nor the apprehension of any outrage on property."

The same rule in regard to persons charged with treason as that

stated in Hale's Pleas of the Crown is declared in Hawkins, Vol.

1, Ch. 17, Sec. 28, and note, and both authors hold, that "the

question of the practicability of escape is to be considered, and that

if the person thus acting under compulsion continued in the trea-

sonable acts longer than was necessary, the defense 'pro timore

mortis' will not be available."

This principle finds further support in the case of United States

V. Greiner, tried for treason, reported in 4 Phil. 396, in the fol-
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lowing language : "The only force which excuses on the grounds

of compulsion is force upon the person and present fear of death,

which force and fear must continue during all the time of military

service, and that it is incumbent in such a case upon him who

makes force his defense to show an actual force, and that he quitted

the service as soon as he could."

Wharton's Criminal Law, Vol. 1, § 94, under the head of Per-

sons under Compulsion, says "Compulsion may be viewed in two

aspects : 1. When the immediate agent is physically forced to do

the injury, as when his hand is seized by a person of superior

strength, and is used against his will to strike a blow, in which

case no guilt attaches to the person so coerced. 2. WTien the force

applied is that of authority or fear. Thus, when a person not

intending wrong, is swept along by a party of persons whom he

cannot resist, he is not responsible, if he is compelled to do wrong

by threats on the part of the offenders instantly to kill him, or

to do him grievous bodily harm, if he refuses; but threats of

future injury, or the command of any one not the husband of the

offender, do not excuse any offense. Thus, it is a defense to an

indictment for treason, that the defendant was acting in obedience

to a de facto government, or to such concurring and overbearing

their fear of violence to th m el ve which can ex cu e their conduct
to others. * * * The law is that no man, from a fear of
consequences to himself, ha a right to make himself a party committing mi chief on mankind.'
In the case of Respublicae v. McCarty,, 2 Dallas, 86, when the
defendant wa on trial for high treason, the court uses this language : "It must be remembered that, in the eye of the law,
nothing will excuse the act of joining the enemy but the fear of
immediate death; not the fear of any inferior personal injury,
nor the apprehension of any outrage on property."
The same rule in regard to persons charged with treason as that
stated in Hale's Pleas of the Crown is declared in Hawkins, Vol.
1, Ch. 17, Sec. 28, and note, and both authors hold, that "the
question of the practicability of escape is to be considered, and that
if the person thus acting under compulsion continued in the treasonable acts longer than was necessary, the defense 'pro ti more
mori1~s' wiJl not be available."
This principle finds further support in the case of United States
v. Greiner, tried for treason, reported in 4 Phil. 396, in the following language: "The only force which excuses on the grounds
of compulsion is force upon the person and present fear of death,
which force and fear must continue during all the time of military
~ervi ce, and that it is incumbent in such a case upon him who
makes force his defense to show an actual force, and that he quitted
the service a oon as he could."
Wharton's Criminal Law, Vol. 1, § 94, under the head of Per. . ons under Compulsion, says "Compulsion may be viewed in two
aspects: 1. When the immediate agent is phy ically forced to do
the injury, as when his hand is seized by a per on of uperior
strength, and i used again t his will to trike a blow, in which
case no guilt attache to the person so coerced. 2. When the force
applied i that of authority or fear. Thus, when a per on not
intending wrong, i swept along by a party of persons whom he
cannot resist, he is not re ponsible, if he is compelled to do wrong
by threaL on the part of the offenders in tantly to kill him or
to do him grievou bodily harm, if he refuses; but thr at of
future injury, or the command of any one not the husband of the
offender, do not excuse any offense. Thus, it i a def nsc to an
indictment for treason, that the defendant wa acting in obedience
to a de facto government, or to uch concurring an 1 ovcrb aring
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sense of the community in which he resided as to imperil his life

in case of dissent." In section 1803a of the same author (Whar-

ton), it is said: "No matter what may be the shape compulsion

takes, if it affects the person and he yielded to it bona fide, it is a

legitimate defense."

We have examined the cases cited by Mr. Wharton to sustain

the text^ and find them to be cases of treason, or fear from the

party slain^ and in none of them is there a rule different from

that declared in the common law authorities cited by us.

Bishop on Criminal Law, §§ 346, 347, 348, treats of the rules

of law applicable to acts done under necessity and compulsion.

It is here declared: "That always an act done from compulsion

and necessity is not a crime. To this proposition the law knows

no exception. Whatever it is necessary for a man to do to save his

life, is, in general, to be considered as compelled."

The cases cited to these propositions show the facts to be dif-

ferent from those under consideration. The case referred in 1

I'low. 19, was where the defendant had thrown overboard a part

of his cargo of green wood, during a severe tempest, to save his

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:01 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t39z97p86
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

vessel and the remainder of his cargo. Tlie other, 5 Q. B. 279,

was for the failure to keep up a highway, which the encroachments

of the sea had made impossible; and that of Tate v. The State, 5

Black. 73, was also that of a supervisor of a public highway, and

the others were cases of treason, to which reference has been made.

In section 348, the author cites the rule laid down by Eussell, and

also of Lord Denman, and in 1 East P. C, to which reference has

already been made. In section 845, the same author uses the

following language : "The cases in which a man is clearly justified

in taking another's life to save his own are when the other has

voluntarily placed himself in the wrong. And probably, as we

have seen, it is never the right of one to deprive an innocent third

person of life for the preservation of his own. There are, it would

seem, circumstances in which one is bound even to die for an-

other." Italics are ours — emphasized to call attention to the fact,

that the author is careful to content himself more with a refer-

ence to the authorities, which declare these principles of law than

an adoption of them as his own.

The authorities seem to be conclusive that, at common law,

no man can excuse himself, under the plea of necessity or com-

pulsion for taking the life of an innocent person.

en e of the community in which he resided as to imperil his life
in case of dissent." In ection 1803a of the same author (Wharton), it is said: "No matter what may be the shape compulsion
takes, if it affects the person and he yielded to it bona fide, it is a
legitimate defense."
We have examined the cases cited by Mr. Wharton to sustain
the text, and find them to be cases of treason, or fear from the
party slain) and in none of them is there a rule different from
that declared in the common law authoritie cited by us.
Bishop on Criminal Law, §§ 3-±6, 347, 3-±8, treats of the rules
of law applicable to acts done under necessity and compulsion.
It is here declared: "That always an act done from compul ion
and necessity is not a crime. To thi proposition the law knows
no exception. Whatever it is necessary for a man to do to save his
life, is, in general, to be con iclcred a. compelled."
The cases cited to these propositions show the facts to be different from those under consideration. The case referred in 1
J>low. 19, was where the defendant had thrown overboard a part
of his cargo of green wood, during a severe tempest, to save his
ves. el and the remainder of his cargo. The other, 5 Q. B. 279,
was for the failure to keep up a highway, which the encroachments
of the sea had made impossible; and that of Ta.te v. The State, 5
Black. 73, was also that of a supervisor of a public highway, and
the others were cases of treason, to which reference has been made.
In c:::ection 3-±8, the author cites the rule laid down by Russell, and
also of Lord Denman, and in 1 East P. C., to which reference has
ulready been made. In section 845, the same author uses the
following language: "The cases in which a man is clearly justified
in taking another's life to save his own are when the other has
voluntarily pbced himself in the wrong. And probably, as we
have seen, it i never the right of one to deprive an innocent third
person of life for the preservation of hi own. There are, it would
seem, circumstances in which one is bound even to die for another." Italic are ours-emphasized to call attention to the fact,
that the author is careful to content himself more with a reference to the authorities, which declgre these principles of law than
an adoption of them as his own.
The authorities seem to be conclusive that, at common law,
no man can excuse himself, under the plea of necessity or compulsion for taking the life of an innocent per on.
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Our statute has divided murder into two degrees, and affixed

the punishment for each degree, but in no respect has added to or

taken away any of the ingredients of murder as known at com-

mon law. — Mitchell v. State, 60 Ala. 26; Fields v. State, 52 Ala.

352.

That persons have exposed themselves to imminent peril and

death for their fellow man, and that there are instances, where

innocent persons have submitted to murderous assaults and death

rather than take life is well established, but such self sacrifices

emanated from other motives than the fear of legal punishment.

That the fear of punishment by imprisonment or death at some

future day by due process of law can operate with greater force

to restrain or deter from its violation, than the fear of immediate

death, unlawfully inflicted, is hardly reconcilable with our knowl-

edge and experience with that class of mankind, who are controlled

by no other higher principle than fear of the law. Be this as it

may, there are other principles of law undoubtedly applicable

to the facts of this case, and which we think can not be ignored.

The evidence of the defendant himself show^s that he went to
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Burkhalter's house about nine o'clock of the night of the killing,

and there met Burkhalter and Leith, and that it was there, and at

that time, they told him he must kill Pogue. The evidence is

not clear as to how far it was from Burkhalter's to Pogue's dwell-

ing, where the crime was perpetrated ; but it was sufficient to show

that there was some considerable distance between the places, and

he testifies as they went to Pogue's, they went by the mill and

got the axe, with which he killed him. Under every principle of

law, it was the duty of the defendant to have escaped from Burk-

halter and Leith, after being informed of their intention to compel

him to take the life of Pogue, as much so as it is the duty of

one who had been compelled to take up arms against his own gov-

ernment, if he can do so with reasonable safety, to himself ; or of

one assailed to retreat, before taking the life of his assailant.

Although it may have been true, that at the time he struck the

fatal blow, that he had reason to believe he would be killed by

Burkhalter and Leith, unless ho killed Pogue, yet, if he had the

opportunity, if it was practicable, after being informed at Burk-

halter's house of their intention, he could have made his escape

from them with reasonable safety, and he failed to do so, but

remained with them until the time of the killing, the immediate

Our statute ha divided murder into two degrees, and affixed
the punishment for each degree, but in no re pect has added to or
taken away any of the ingredi nts of murder as known at common law.-Mitchell v. State, 60 Ala. 26; Fields v. State, 52 Ala.
352.
That persons have exposed themselves to imminent peril and
·d eath for their fellow man, and that there are instances, where
innocent persons have submitted to murderous assaults and death
rather than take life is well established, but such self sacrifice
emanated from other motives than the fear of legal punishment.
'T hat the fear of punishment by imprisonment or death at some
future day by due process of law can operate with greater force
to restrain or deter from its violation, than the fear of immediate
death, unlawfully inflicted, is hardly reconcilable with our knowl·edge and experience with that class of mankind, who are controlled
by no other higher principle than fear of th law. Be this as it
·may, there are other principles of law undoubtedly applicable
to the facts of this case, and which we think can not be ignored.
The evidence of the defendant himself shows that he went to
Burkhalter's house about nine o'clock of the night of the killing,
-and there met Burkhalter and Leith, and that it was there, and at
that time, they told him he must kill Pogue. The evidence i::;
not clear as to how far it was from Burkhalter's to Pogue's dwelling, where the crime was perpetrated; but it was sufficient to show
ihat there was some considerable distance between the places, and
he testifies as they went to Pogue's, they went by the mill and
got the axe, with which he killed him. Under every principle of
law, it was the duty of the defendant to have escaped from Burkhalter and Leith, after being inform d of their intention to compel
him to take the life of Pogue, as much so as it is the duty of
-0ne who had been compelled to take up arms against his own government, if he can do o with rea on.al le afety, to himself; or of
·one assailed to r etreat, before taking the life of his assailant.
Although it may have been true, that at the time he struck the
fatal blow, that he had reason to b lieve he wouB be killed by
Burkhalter and Leith, unle s he killed Pogue, y t, if he had the
·opportunity, if it wa practicable, after being informed at Burkhalt r's hou e of their intention, ho could have made hi c cap
from them with rea onable af ty, and he fail d to do o, but
r mained with th m until th tim of th ki llino-, th immediate
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44 Persons Under Compulsion

necessity or compulsion under which he acted at that time would

be no excuse to him. As to whether escape was practicable to

defendant, as we have stated, was a question of fact for the jury.

Tlie charge, numbered 1 and refused by the court, ignored this

principle of law and phase of evidence, and demanded an acquittal

of defendant, if at the time of the killing the compulsion and

coercion operated upon the defendant, and forced him to the com-

mission of the act, notwithstanding he might have avoided the

necessity by escape before that time. We do not hesitate to say

he would have been justifiable in taking the life of Burkhalter

and Leith, if there had been no other way open to enable him to

avoid the necessity of taking the life of an innocent man. The

charge requested was erroneous and misleading, in the respect that

it ignored the law and evidence in these respects.

The second charge requested was properly refused. We sup-

pose the principle asserted is exactly the contrary of that intended.

By the use and position of the negatives the charge is made to

assert that unless there was a present impending necessity to

strike, there could be no murder.
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There is no error in the record.

It appearing that the day appointed for the execution of the

sentence has passed, it is considered and ordered that Friday, the

10th of March next (1893), be and is hereby appointed and speci-

fied for the execution of the sentence of the law pronounced by the

trial court, and the sheriff or his deputy, or the officer acting in his

place, must execute the sentence.

Affirmed.

n cessity or compulsion under which he acted at that time would
be no excuse to him. As to whether escape was practicable to
defendant, as we have stated, was a question of fact for the jury.
The charge, numbered 1 and refused by the court, ignored thi .
principle of law and phase of evidence, and demanded an acquittal
of defendant, if at the time of the killing the compulsion and
coercion operated upon the defendant, and forced him to the commission of the act, notwithstanding he might have avoided the
nece ity by escape before that time. We do not he itate to say
he would have been justifiable in taking the life of Burkhalter
and Leith, if there had been no other way open to enable him to
avoid the neces ity of taking the life of an innocent man. The
charge requested was erroneous and misleading, in the respect that
it ignored the law and evidence in these r e pect .
The second charge requested was properly refused. We suppose the principle asserted is exactly the contrary of that intended.
By the use and position of the negatives the charge is made to
assert that unless there was a present impending necessity tn
strike, there could be no murder.
There is no error in the record.
It appearing that the day appointed for the execution of the
sentence ha passed, it is considered and ordered that Friday, the
10th of farch next (1893), be and is hereby appointed and specified for the execution of the sentence of the law pronounced by the
trial court and the sheriff or his deputy, or the officer acting in his
place, must execute the sentence.
Affirmed.
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III. There Must Be Criminal Intent.

a. General Intent.

HarvicJc v. State, 49 Ark. 5lJf. (1S87.)

III.

THERE

M:

T BE

RIMI .AL

I

"TENT.

COCKRILL^ C. J. :

a. General Int ent.

Harvick was convicted of burglary. The proof showed that he

had entered a barber shop in the night, and carried off five or six

dollars in money and a few cigars, in all less than ten dollars in

value. When discovered in the shop by two acquaintances, he with-

Harvick v.

tate, 49 Ark. 514. (1 8 .)

drew, joined them and handed around the cigars, but said nothing

about the money, and did not explain his presence in the shop.

The next morning, after breakfast, he offered to return the money

to the barber, with whom he was on friendly terms, and then

explained that he had found the shop window open, and upon

looking in had discovered that the safe was open, when he entered

to take charge of the money only to prevent its being stolen. The

barber had missed the money, and thought his safe had been

burglarized, though there was no evidence of violence. He denied

that the money tendered was all that had been taken; Harvick

asserted that it was all he got, but readily assented to the payment
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of the amount claimed by the barber, making in all the amount

above stated.

The only point pressed by the appellant is that the proof does

not show that he entered the shop with the intent to commit a

felony. His conduct when he was called from the shop, and after-

wards, did not impress the jury with the truthfulness of the ex-

planation he gave of his motive for entering the house and carrying

off the money and cigars, and their verdict fixes the conclusion

that he entered with intent to steal.

But one who commits larceny of property of the value of ten

dollars or less, is, under our statute, guilty of a misdemeanor only

(Mansf. Dig., sec. 1627) ; and as the crime of burglary is complete

only when the breaking is done or the entry made with the intent

to commit a felony, the offense is not committed by one who breaks

into or enters a house with intent to commit petit larceny only.

As every larceny was a felony at common law, it was enough then

to show an intent to commit larceny; but when petit larceny is

reduced to a misdemeanor, the breaking or entry with intcxit to

J. :
Harrick wa con-victed of burglary. Th proof hawed that he
had entered a barber shop in the night, and carried off five or ix
dollar in money and a few cigars in all les than ten dollars in
value. When di covered in the hop by two acquaintance , he withdrew joined them and handed around the cigar , but .. aid nothing
a.bout the money, and did not explain hi pre ence in the hop.
The next morning, after breakfa t, he offered to return the money
to the barber, with whom he wa on friendly terms, and then
explained that he had found the hop window open, and upon
looking in had di covered that the afe wa open when he entered
to take charge of the money only to prevent it being tolen. The
barber had mi"sed the money, and thought hi safe had been
burglarized, though there wa no evi lence of violence. He denied
that the money tendered wa all that had been taken; Harvick
a serted that it wa all he got, but readily as ented to the payment
of the amount claimed by the barber, making in all the amount
above stated.
The only point pre ed by the appellant is that the proof doei:;
not show that he entered the shop with the intent to commit a
felony. Hi conduct when he wa called from the hop, and afterwards, did not impress the jury with the truthfulne s of the explanation he gave of hi motive for entering the hou e and carrying
off the money and cigar , and their verdict fixes the conclusion
that he entered with intent to teal.
But one who commits larceny of property of the value of t en
dollar or le , i , under our statute, guilty of a mi elem anor only
(Mansf. Dig., sec. 1627); and a the crime of burglary i complete
only when the breaking i done or the entry made with the intent
to commit a felony, the offen e i not committed by one who break
into or enters a hou e with intent to commit petit larceny only.
A every larceny wa a felony at common law, it was enough th n
to how an intent to commit lar ny; but wh n petit larceny i
r duced t a mi demeanor th breaking or entry with inte...it to
COCKRILL, C.

G

THERE MusT BE

Cnnnx . n

INTENT

40 There Must Be CnmixAL Intent

commit that crime, will not constitute burglary. The precise ques-

tion was ruled in People v. Murray, 8 Cal., 520; see, too, 1 Bish.

Cr. Law, sec. 736; 2 id., sec. 110; 1 Eussell on Crimes, p. 823;

Wharton Cr. Law, sec. 810; Mansf. Dig., sees. 1616, 1618. Section

1619, of Mansfield's Digest, does not affect the question. It cannot

be construed to mean that one who enters a building with intent

to commit a larceny less than a felony, is guilt}' of burglai'y. It

was designed simply to punish the burglar for any felony or larceny

he might actually commit after entering the building, as readily

as though no burglary had been committed. It authorizes a con-

viction of the larceny committed in the building, in addition to,

or independently of the burglary. For the offense of burglary it

retains the elements of the statutory definition — that is, an un-

lawful breaking or entry in the night with intent to commit a

felony. Sec. 1616, supra.

It is argued that the prisoner could not have intended to steal

more than he could find, and that as all the money in the safe

did not amount to ten dollars, he could not have intended to com-

mit a felony.
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But the jury have not specially found that he intended to steal

money alone. He entered, according to their verdict, with the

intent to steal, generally; he was interrupted in the act when

there was more than ten dollars worth of personal j)roperty, such

as cigars, razors, etc., in his reach. It was not necessary, in order

to complete the crime of burglary, that his anterior intent should

have been consummated. Dodd v. State, 33 Ark., 517. Who can

say that it was his intent to confine his operations to the money

in the safe? In point of fact, he did not. He took cigars as well

as money. We may gather the intent from the act done. A man

is presumed to intend what he does, and the jury could have

inferred that, but for the interruption, the prisoner would have

appropriated other property as well.

But if there had been no other property except that taken, the

case would not be altered. The prisoner intended to take all the

money there was in the safe. He testified to that fact upon the

stand. He did not know that it contained less than ten dollars.

His intent was to take more than that sum if he could find it,

hence the intent to commit a felony.

Where an assault upon a person with intent to steal from his

pocket is a criminal offense, it is no answer to the indictment.

( ommit that crime, will not con titute burglary. The precise question was ruled in P eople v. MurrayJ 8 Cal., 520; see, too, 1 Bish.
Cr. Law, sec. 736; 2 id., ec. 110; 1 Russell on Crimes, p. 823;
Wharton Cr. Law, sec. 810; Mansf. Dig., secs. 1616, 1618. Section
1619, of 1\fan :field' s Digest, does not affect the question. It cannot
be construed to mean that one who enters a building with intent
to commit a larceny le s than a felony, is guilty of burglary. It
was designed simply to punish the burglar for any felony or larceny
he might actually commit after ent ring the building, as readily
as though no burglary had been committed. It authorizes a conviction of the larceny committed in the building, in addition to,
or independently of the burglary. For the offense of burglary it
retains the elements of the statutory definition-that is, an unlawful breaking or entry in the night with intent to commit a
f elony. Sec. 1616, supra.
It is argued that the prisoner could not have intended to steal
more than h e could :find, and that as all the money in the safe
did not amount to ten dollars, he could not have intended to commit a f elony.
But the jury ha ve not specially found that h e intended to steal
money alone. H entered, according to their verdict, with the
intent to st eal, generally; he wa interrup ted in the act when
there was more than t en dollar worth of per"onal property such
as cigars, razors, et c., in his reach. It wa n ot n ece ary, in order
to complete the crime of burglary, that his anterior intent should
h ave been con ummated. Dodd v. tak 33 Ark., 51 7. Who can
say that it was his intent to confine his opera t ions to the money
in the safe ? In point of fact, h e did not. H e took cigar s a well
a money. vYe may gather the intent from the act .done. A man
is presumed t o intend what h e does, and the jury could have
inferr ed t hat, bu t fo r the interruption, the p risoner would have
appropriated other property as well.
But if there had been no other property except that taken, the
ca e would not be altered. The pri on er inten ded to take all th e
money ther e was in the afe. H e t estified to that fact upon the.
stand. H e did not know that it contained l es than t en dollars.
His intent was t o take more than that sum if he could find it,
h en ce the intent to commit a felony.
Where an assault upon a person with intent to steal from hi
pocket is a criminal offense, it is no answer to the indictment,

GORDON
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as has been frequently held, that the pocket was empty. 1 Bish.

Cr. Law, sec. 743, et seq.

The same rule was applied in a recent Ohio case, where one

who was indicted for breaking into a building with intent to steal

money which he supposed was in a safe, though in fact the safe

contained no money. A conviction of burglary was sustained.

State V. Beall 37 Ohio St., 108.

In the case of this appellant his acts and declarations show that

he intended to appropriate the contents of the safe, whether much

or little. The unforseen circumstance of the barber's light till,

which alone prevented him from taking more than ten dollars,

tends no more to remove the felonious intent than if he had been

unexpectedly driven away from the fullest coffers by a physical

force which rendered his intent to help himself to great wealth

impossible.

xlflfirmed.

h. Concurrence of Act mid Intent.

Gordon v. State, 52 Ala. 308. (1875.)

Brickell, C. J. :
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This indictment is founded on the fortieth section of the statute,

approved April 22, 1873, entitled '"'An act to regulate elections in

the State of Alabama," which declares : "That any person voting

more than once at any election held in this State, or depositing

as ha been frequentl' held that the pocket wa empt}. 1 Bi h.
Cr. Law sec. 43, et seq.
The ame rule wa applied in a recent Ohio ca e, where one
who ' a indicted for breaking into a building with intent to teal
money which he uppo ed wa in a safe, though in fact the afe
contained no mone;. A conviction of burglary was u tained.
tate v. B eall, 3 Ohio St., 108.
In the a e of thi appellant hi act and declarations how that
he intended to appropriate the content of the afe, whether much
or little. The unfor een circum tance of the barber' light till,
which alone prevented him from taking more than ten dollars
t end no more to remove the feloniou intent than if he had been
unexpectedly driven away from the fulle t coffer by a phy ical
force which rendered hi intent to help him elf to great wealth
impo ible.
Affirmed.

more than one ballot for the same office at such election, or is

guilty of any other kind of illegal or fraudulent voting, shall be

deemed guilty of a felony," etc. Pamph, Acts 1873-3, p. 25, The

b. Concurrence of Act and Int ent.

first count charges that the appellant, not being of the age of

twenty-one years, voted at the last general election in this State.

Gordon v.

The second count is a general accusation of illegal voting, not

tate, 5,., Ala. 308. {1875.)

specifying in what the illegality consisted, whether in a want of

legal qualification, or in voting more than once, or in depositing

more ballots than one, and is not sufficient to support a conviction.

2 Bish. Cr. Pr. § 275. The evidence, as disclosed in the bill of

exceptions, tended only to support the charge contained in the

first count. Two witnesses were examined on the behalf of de-

fendant; one, his mother, and the other an acquaintance who had

known him from his birth, and resided in the same neighborhood,.

c.

J. :
Thi indictment i founded on the fortieth section of the statute
approved April 29, 1 73, entitled 'An act to regulate election in
the tate of Alabama," which declares: "That any person voting
more than once at any election held in thiP State, or depositing
more than one ballot for the same office at uch election, or i
guilty of any other kind of illegal or fraudulent voting, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony,' etc. Pamph. Act 1 2-3, p. 25. The
fir t count charge that the appellant, not being of the age of
twenty-one year , voted at the la t general ele tion in this State.
The second count i a general accu ation of illegal voting, not
pecifying in what the illegality con i ted, whether in a want of
legal qualification or in voting more than once, or in depo iting
more ballot than one, and is not sufficient to upport a conviction.
2 Bi h. Cr. Pr. § 275. The evidence, as di lo ed in the bill of
exceptions, tended only to upport the charge contained in th
fir t count. Two witne ses were xamined on the behalf of defendant; one, hi mother, and the other an acquaintance who ha 1
known him from hi birth, and re ided in th ame neighborhood.
BRICKELL,
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and for a long time a member of the same family with defendant,

and they testified the defendant was of the age of twenty-one

years, in the August preceding the election. That they had fre-

quently told defendant he would be of full age in that month,

and subsequently and before the election told him he was of age.

The court refused to charge the jury that if the defendant, in

reliance on these statements, honestly believed he was of full age

when he voted, he should not be convicted, if the evidence con-

vinced the jury he was not of age.

"All crime exists, primarily, in the mind." A wrongful act and

a wrongful intent must concur, to constitute what the law deems

a crime. When an act denounced by the law is proved to have

been committed, in the absence of countervailing evidence, the

criminal intent is inferred from the commission of the act. The

inference may be, and often is, removed by the attending circum-

stances, showing the absence of a criminal intent. Ignorance of law

is never an excuse, whether a party is charged civilly or criminally.

Ignorance of fact may often be received to absolve a party from

civil or criminal responsibility. On the presumption that every
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one capable of acting for himself knows the law, courts are com-

pelled to proceed. If it should be abandoned, the administration

of justice would be impossible, as every cause would be embarrassed

with the collateral inquiry of the extent of legal knowledge of the

parties seeking to enforce or avoid liability and responsibility.

The criminal intention being of the essence of crime, if the

intent is dependent on a knowledge of particular facts, a want

of such knowledge, not the result of carelessness or negligence,

relieves the act of criminality. An illustration may be found in

the vending of obscene or immoral publications. A knowledge

of the character of such publications is an indispensable ingre-

dient of the offence. From the vending it would be inferable;

but if it appeared the vendor was blind, and in the course of his

trade happened innocently to make the sale, a want of knowl-

edge of the character of the publication would relieve him from

criminal responsibility. A man having in his possession coun-

terfeit coin, or forged bank bills, with intent to put them in

circulation, could not be convicted of crime, if he was ignorant

of their spuriousness. A statute imposed a penalty on the owner

or captain of any steamboat receiving and transporting any col-

ored person, without having particular evidence that such person

and for a long time a member of the ame family with defendant,
and they te ti:fied the defendant wa of the age of twenty-one
year , in the Augu t preceding the election. That they had frequently told defendant he would be of full age in that month,
and subsequently and before the election told him he was of age.
The court refused to charge the jury that if the defendant, in
Teliance on these tatements, honestly believed he was of full age
when h e voted, he should not be convicted, if the evidence convinced the jury he was not of age.
"All crime exi ts, primarily, in the mind." A wrongful act and
a wrongful inttnt must concur, to constitute what the law deems
a crime. When an act denounced by the law is proved to have
been committed, in the absence of countervailing evidence, the
criminal intent is infe rred from the commission of the act. The
inference may be, and often is, removed by the attending circumstances, showing the absence of a criminal intent. Ignorance of law
is never an excuse, whether a party is charged civilly or criminally.
Ignorance of fact may often be received to absolve a party from
civil or criminal r esponsibility. On the presumption that every
one ca pabl of acting for himself knows the law, courts are compelled to proceed. If it should be abandoned, the administration
of ju tice would be impossible, as every cau e would be embarrassed
with the collateral inquiry of the extent of legal knowledge of the
parties seeking to enforce or avoid liability and r esponsibility.
Th e criminal intention being of the essence of crime, if the
intent is dependent on a knowledge of particular facb, a want
of such knowledge, not the r esult of carelessness or negligence,
r elieves the act of criminality. ~ n illustration may be found in
the vending of ob cene or immoral publications. A knowledge
of the character of such publications is an indispensable ingredient of the offence. From the vending it would be inferable;
but if it appeared the vendor was blind, and in the course of his
trade happened innocently to make the sale, a want of knowledge of the character of the publication would relieve him from
criminal r esponsibility. A man ha ving in his possession counterfeit coin, or forged bank bills, with intent to put them in
circulation, could not be convicted of crime, if he was ignorant
of their spuriou ness. A statute imposed a penalty on the owner
or captain of any steamboat receiving and transporting any colored person, without having particular evidence that such per . . on
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was free. The penalty could be inflicted only on the captain or

owner who knowingly transported such person. If the person of

color, without the knowledge or consent of the captain or owner,

entered the boat, concealing himself, and was thus carried away,

the penalty was not incurred. Duncan v. State, 7 Humph. 148.

Illegal voting, when it is supposed to arise from the want of

legal qualifications, is dependent on the voter's knowledge of the

particular facts which make up the qualification. Every man is

bound to know the law requires that every voter shall be a native

born or naturalized citizen of the United States, of the age of

twenty-one years, and have resided in the State six months, and

the count}' in which he ofl^ers to vote, three months next preceding

the election, and must not have been convicted of the offences

mentioned in the Constitution as the disqualification of an elector.

He is bound to exercise reasonable diligence to ascertain the facts

which enter into and form these qualifications. Having exercised

this diligence, if he resided near the boundary line of a county,

and should be informed by those having the means of knowledge

that his residence was within the county, and he, without a
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knowledge of the real facts, honestly acting on this information,

should vote, he could not fairly be charged with illegal voting,

though on a subsequent survey, or on some other evidence, it

should be ascertained his residence was not within the county.

The precise time when a man arrives at the age of twenty-one

years is a fact, knowledge of which he derives necessarily from

his parents, or other relatives or acquaintances having knowl-

edge of the time of his birth. If acting in good faith, on infor-

mation fairly obtained from them under an honest belief that

he had reached the age, he votes, having the other .necessary

qualifications, illegal voting should not be imputed to him. The

intent which makes up the crime cannot be affirmed. Whether

he had the belief that he was a qualified voter, and the informa-

tion was fairly obtained, should be referred to, and determined

by the jury. The whole inquiry should be directed to the voter's

knowledge of facts, and to his diligence in acquiring the requisite

knowledge. If he votes recklessly or carelessly, when the facts

are doubtful or uncertain, his ignorance should not excuse him,

if the real facts show he was not qualified. If ignorant of the

disqualifying fact, and without a want of diligence, under an

honest belief of his right to vote, he should be excused, though

v.
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wa free. The penalty could be inflicted only on the captain or
owner who knowingly transported uch person. If the per on of
color, without the knowledge or consent of the captain or owner.
entered the boat, concealing him elf and wa thu carried awa '
the penalty wa not incurred. Duncan v. tate~ 7 Humph. 14 .
Illegal voting, when it is supposed to arise from the want of
legal qualification , i dependent on the voter' knowledge of the
_particular fact which make up the qualification. Eve!'} man i.·
bound to know the law require that every voter hall be a native
born or naturalized citizen of the United States, of the age of
twenty-one year , and have re ided in the State six month", and
the county in which he offer to vote, three months next preceding
the election and mu t not have been convicted of the offence
mentioned in the Con titution a the disqualification of an elector.
He i bound to exerci e reasonable diligence to ascertain the fact
which enter into and form these qualifications. Having exercised
this diligence, if he resided near the boundary line of a count3 ,
.and should be informed by those having the means of knowledge
that his residence was within the county, and he, without a
knowledge of the real fact , honestly acting on this information
should vote, he could not fairly be charged with illegal voting
though on a subsequent survey, or on some other evidence, it
should be ascertained his residence was not within the county.
The precise time when a man arrives at the age of twenty-one
years is a fact, knowledge of which he derives necessarily from
his parents, or other relatives or acquaintances having knowledge of the time of his birth. If acting in good faith, on inf ormation fairly obtained from them under an honest belief that
he had reached the age, he votes, having the other .nece ary
qualifications, illegal voting should not be imputed to him. The
intent which makes up the crime cannot be affirmed. Whether
he had the belief that he was a qualified voter and the information was fairly obtained, should be referred to, and determined
by the jury. The whole inquiry should be directed to the voter'
knowledge of fact , and to hi diligence in acquiring the requi,jte
knowledge. If he vote reckle ly or careles ly, when the fact ·
are doubtful or uncertain, his ignorance should not excu e him,
if the real facts show he was not qualified. If ignorant of the
disqualifying fact, and without a want of diligence, under an
hone t belief of hi right to vote he hould be excu ed, though
4
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he had not the right. 2 Bish. Cr. Law, §§ 276-279; State v.

Boyett, 10 Ired. 336; McGuire v. State, 7 Humph. 54; Common-

luealth V. Bradford, 9 Met. 268; Commonwealth v. Aglar,

Thatcher's Cr. Cases, 412.

The charge given by the circuit court, and several of the re-

fusals to charge, were according to these views erroneous, and

the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded. The

appellant must remain in custody until discharged by due course

of law.

c. Constructive Intent.

McGehee v. State, 62 Miss. 112. (1885.)

Arnold, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

Appellant was convicted of assault with intent to kill and mur-

h had not the right. 2 Bi h. Cr. Law, §§ 276-279; State v.
Boyett, 10 Irell. 336; McGuire v. Sta.t e, 7 Humph. 54; Commonwealth v. Bradford, 9 Met. 268; Commonwealth v. Aglar_,
Thatcher's Cr. Cases, 412.
The charge given by the circuit court, and several of the refusals to charge, were according to these views erroneous, and
the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded. The
appellant must remain in custody until discharged by due course.
of law.

der Levi Thompson and sentenced to one year's imprisonment in

the penitentiary. At a public gathering about twelve o'clock at

night one George Morris had a difficulty with appellant's brother

and cut and seriously wounded him. Afterward Mon'is started

c. Constructive Intent.

home and appellant followed him, intending, it seems, to avenge

the injury suffered by his brother. It was a very dark night, and

McGehee v. State, 62 Miss. 772. {1885.)
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appellant overtook Levi Thompson in the road, who had started

before him, going in the same direction, and, supposing him to be

George Morris, cut and dangerously wounded him with a knife.

As soon as Thompson was struck he spoke, and appellant desisted

and ran rapidly away. It was so dark that Thompson could not

see or tell who it was that struck him. On the next morning ap-

pellant admitted that he was the person who cut Thompson, and

said he thought he was cutting George Morris ; that he did not in-

tend to cut Thompson and was sorry he had mistaken him for

Morris, and that if it had been Morris he would have cut him to

pieces. Appellant and Thompson were the best of friends and

there had never been any difficulty between them before.

It is urged for appellant that the intent charged was not proved.

Thompson was the only person in reach of appellant at the time

he committed the offense with which he is charged. He intended

to assault that person with a weapon which the jury found to be a

deadly weapon. His blows did not miss the object at which they

were aimed. He may not have intended to kill Thompson, but he

ARNOLD, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
Appellant was convicted of assault with intent to kill and murder Levi Thompson and sentenced to one year's imprisonment in
the penitentiary. At a public gathering about twelve o'clock at
night one George Morris had a difficulty with appellant's brotherand cut and seriously wounded him. Afterward Monis started
home and appellant followed him, intending, it seems, to avenge
the injury suffered by his brother. It was a very dark night, and
appellant overtook Levi T11ompson in the road, who had started
before him, going in the same direction, and, supposing him to be
George Morris, cut and dangerou ly wounded him with a knife.
As soon as Thompson was struck he spoke, and appellant desisted
and ran rapidly away. It was so dark that Thompson could not
see or tell who it was that struck him. On the next morning appellant admitted that he was the person who cut Thompson, and
said he thought he was cutting George Monis; that he did not in. tend to cut Thompson and was sorry he had mistaken him forMorris, and that if it had been Morris he would have cut him to
pieces. Appellant and Thompson were the best of friends and
there had never been any difficulty between them before.
It is urged for appellant that the intent charged was not proved.
Thompson was the only person in reach of appellant at the time
he committed the offense with which he is charged. He intended
to assault that person with a weapon which the jury found to be a
deadly weapon. His blows did not miss the object at which they
were aimed. He may not have intended to kill Thompson, but he
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was properly convicted if he intended to kill the man at whom the

Icnife was directed. The evil and specific intent to strike the form

before him at the time is manifest, and that form proved to be

Thompson. That there was a mistake as to the identity of the

person intended to be injured constitutes no defense. If appellant

did to Thompson what he intended to do to Morris, he is as guilty

under the statute as if no mistake had been made. 2 Whart. Cr.

Law, § 1279; 1 Russ. on Crimes, 1001, 1002 (ninth ed.) ; Regina

V. Smith, 33 Eng. Law and Eq. 567; Regina v. Lynch, 1 Cox C.

C. 361.

And this is not in conflict with the settled doctrine in this State

that on a charge under the statute of assault with a deadly weapon,

with intent to kill and murder a particular person, it is necessary

to prove the specific intent as laid in the indictment. There is no

error in the record.

The judgment is affirmed.

d. Crime Without Intent.

People V. Rohtj, 52 Mich. 577. (188Jf.)

COOLEY, C. J. :

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:01 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t39z97p86
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

The respondent who is keeper of a hotel in the village of Plain-

well, in which there is a bar for the sale of spirituous and malt

liquors, was prosecuted and convicted for not keeping his bar

closed on Sunday, May 6, 1883. The evidence was that on the

wa properly convicted if he intended to kill the man at whom the
knife was directed. The e il and specific intent to strike the form
before him at the time i manife t, and that form proved to be
Thomp on. That there was a mistake a to the identity of the
per on intended to be injured con titute no defense. If appellant
did to Thompson what he intended to do to Morris, be is as guilty
under the statute a if no mi take had been made. 2 Whart. Cr.
Law, § 12 9; 1 Ru . on Crime, 1001, 100'> (ninth ed.); Regina
v. Smith, 33 Eng. Law and Eq. 567; Regina v. Lynch, 1 ox C.
c. 361.
And this is not in conflict with the settled doctrine in this State
that on a charge under the statute of assault with a deadly weapon.
with intent to kill and murder a particular person, it is neces ary
to prove the specific intent as laid in the indictment. There is no
error in the record.
The judgment is affirmed.

morning of that day the clerk of the hotel was in the bar-room

and had a servant with him scrubbing it out when a person came

d. Crime Without ]';'/,tent.

in from the street. He appeared to be known to the clerk, who

told him he did not want him there Sundays. The man said he

wanted some whisky. The clerk told him he must get his whisky

P eople v. Roby, 52 Mich. 577. {1884.)

Saturday night. After some more words between them the clerk

told him if he was going to get the whisky to get it and get out

as soon as he could. He got the whisky, handed pay for it to the

servant, and went off. The respondent was not at the time present.

The clerk testifies that he was somewhere about the house, but he

thought he was not up yet; the servant says he was about there

shortly afterwards. There was no evidence in the case to show

that respondent assented to the opening of the bar on that day,

or expected or desired that it should be opened; neither was there

COOLEY,

c.

J.:

The respondent who i keeper of a hotel in the village of Plainwell, in which there i a bar for the sale of pirituous and malt
liquors, was pro ecuted and convicted for not keeping his bar
closed on Sunday, fay 6, 1883. The evidence was that on the
morning of that day the clerk of the hotel wa in the bar-room
and had a servant with him scrubbing it out when a person came
in from the street. He appeared to be known to the clerk, who
told him be did not want him there Sundays. The man said he
wanted some whi ky. The clerk told him he must get his whisky
Saturday night. After some more words between them the clerk
told him if he wa going to get the whisky to get it and get out
as soon a he could. He got the whisky, handed pay for it to the
servant, and went off. The re pondent was not at the time present.
Tbe clerk testifie that he was omewhere about the house, but he
thought he was not up yet; the servant says he was about there
short] y afterward . There wa no evidence in the case to how
that re pondent as ented to the opening of the bar on that day,
or expected or de ired that it hould be opened; neither wa there
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any evidence to the contrary. He was not a witness on his own

behalf.

The case comes to this Court on writ of error, and the only

question of importance is whether there was any evidence to be

submitted to the jury.

The statute under which the conviction was had provides that

"all saloons, restaurants, bars, in taverns or elsewhere, and all

other places where any of the liquors," etc. "may be sold, or kept

for sale, either at Avholesale or retail, shall be closed on the first

day of the week, commonly called Sunday," etc. How. St. § 2274;

Public Acts, 1881, p. 350.

It will be observed that the requirement that the saloons and

other places mentioned shall be closed is positive. The next sec-

tion of the statute provides that any person who shall violate this,

among other provisions, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,

and shall be punished as therein prescribed. In terms, then, the

penalties of the statute are denounced against the person whose

saloon or other place for the sale of intoxicating drinks is not kept

closed, and no other fact is necessar}^ to complete the offense.
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It is contended, nevertheless, that to constitute an offense under

the section referred to, there must be some evidence tending to

show an intent on the part of the respondent to violate it; and

People V. Parks, 49 Mich., 333, which was a prosecution under

another section of the same statute, is cited as authority. It should

be said of that ease that the facts are not fully given in the report,

and that there was positive evidence in the case to negative the

intent in the respondent that the criminal act should be committed.

But the case is plainly distinguishable from this. The section

under which Parks was prosecuted makes not only the proprietor,

but his clerks, agents, etc., individually liable for the conduct

prohibited, and imposes upon them severally the duty to abstain

from it. The section under which Eoby is prosecuted makes the

crime consist, not in the affirmative act of any person, but in the

negative conduct of failing to keep the saloon, etc., closed.

I agree that as a rule there can be no crime without a criminal

intent; but this is not by any means a universal rule. One may

be guilty of the high crime of manslaughter when his only fault

is gross negligence; and there are many other cases where mere

neglect may be highly criminal. Many statutes which are in the

nature of police regulations, as this is, impose criminal penalties

any evidence to the contrary. Re wa not a witness on his own
behalf.
The case comes to this Court on writ of error, and the only
question of importance is whether there wa any evidence to be
ubmitted to the jury.
The statute under which the con-viction wa had provide that
"all saloons, re taurants, bars, in tavern or el ewhere, and all
other place w11 cre any of the liquor ," etc. "may be sold, or kept
for sale, either at whole ale or r etail, hall be clo ed on the first
day of the week, commonly called Sunday/' etc. How. St. § 2274;
Public Acts, 1881, p. 350.
It will be ohsened that the requirement that the saloons and
other place mentioned shall be closed is po itive. The next section of the statute provide that any person who shall violate thi _,
among other provisions, shall be deemed guilty of a mi demeanor,
and shall be punished a therein prescribed. In terms, then, the
penalties of the statute are denounced again t the person whose
saloon or other place for the sale of intoxicating drinks is not kept
closed, and no other fact is necessary to complete the offense.
It i contended, n evertheles , that to constitute an offense under
the section r eferred to, there must be ome evidence tending to
show an intent on the part of the r e. pondent to violate it; and
People v. Park , 49 :Mich., 333, which wa a pro ecution under
another section of the same statute, i~ cited a ~ authority. It should
be said of that case that the fa ct are not fully given in the report,
and that there was po itive evidence in th ca e to n ega+ive the
intent in the r espondent that the criminal act hould be committed.
But the case is plainly di tinguishable from this. The section
under which P arks was prosecuted make not only the proprietor,
but his clerks, agents, etc., individuallJ liable for the conduct
l)rohibited, and imposes upon them everally the duty to abstain
from it. The section under which Roby is pro ecuted makes the
crime consist, not in th e affirmative act of any person, but in the
i1egative conduct of failing to keep the :iloon, etc., closed.
I agree that as a rule there can be no crime without a criminal
intent; but thi is not by any means a univer al rule. One may
be guilty of the high crime of manslaughter when his only fault
i gross negligence; and there are many other ca es where mere
n eglect may be highly criminal. Many statute which are in the
nature of police regulations, as this i , impo e criminal penaltie
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irrespective of any intent to violate them; the purpose being to

require a degree of diligence for the protection of the public which

shall render violation impossible. Thus, in Massachusetts a person

may be convicted of the crime of selling intoxicating liquor as a

beverage, though he did not know it to be intoxicating; Common-

wealth V. Boynton, 2 Allen, 160; and of the offense of selling

adulterated milk, though he was ignorant of its being adulterated.

Commonwealth v. Farren, 9 Allen, 489; Commonwealth v. Hol-

Irooh, 10 Allen, 200; Commonwealth v. ^Yaite, 11 Allen, 264;

Commonwealth v. Smith, 103 Mass., 444. See State v. Smith,

10 E. I. 258. In Missouri a magistrate may be liable to the pen-

alty for performing the marriage ceremony for minors without

consent of parents or guardians, though he may suppose them to

be of the proper age. Beckham v. Nache, 56 Mo., 546. Where

the killing and sale of a calf under a specified age is prohibited,

there may be a conviction though the party was ignorant of the

animal's age. Commonwealth v. Raymond, 97 Mass., 567. See

The King v. Dixon, 3 M. & S., 11. In State v. Steamboat Co.,

13 Md., 181, a common carrier was held liable to a statutory pen-
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alty for transporting a slave on its steamboat, though the persons

in charge of its business had no knowledge of the fact. A case

determined on the same principle is Queen v. Bishop, 5 Q. B. Div.,

259. If one's business is the sale of liquors, a sale made by his

agent in violation of law is prima facie by his authority ; Common-

wealth V. Nichols, 10 Met., 259 ; and in Illinois the principal is

held liable, though the sale by his agent was in violation of instruc-

tions. NoecJcer v. People, 91 111., 494. In Connecticut it has

been held no defense in a prosecution for selling intoxicating

liquor to a common drunkard that the seller did not know him

to be such. Barnes v. State, 19 Conn., 398. It was held in Faulhs

V. People, 39 Mich., 200, under a former statute, that one should

not be convicted of the offense of selling liquors to a minor who

had reason to believe and did believe he was of age ; but I doubt

if we ought so to hold under the statute of 1881, the purpose of

which very plainly is, as I think, to compel every person who

engages in the sale of intoxicating drinks to keep within the

statute at his peril. There are many cases in which it has been

held under similar statutes that it was no defense that the seller

did not know or suppose the purchaser to be a minor; State v.

Hartfield, 24 Wis., 60; McCutcheon v. People, 69 111., 601; Farmer

irrespective of any intent to violate them; the purpose being to
require a degree of diligence for the protection of the public which
shall render violation impossible. Thus, in Massachusett a person
may be convicted of the crime of selling intoxicating liquor as a
beverage, though he did not know it to be intoxicating; Commonwealth v. Boynton, 2 Allen, 160; and of the offense of selling
adulterated milk, though he was ignorant of its being adulterated.
Commonwealth v. Farren, 9 Allen, 489; Commonwealth v. H olbrook, 10 Allen, 200; Commonwealth v. Waite, 11 Allen, 264;
Commonwealth v. Smith, 103 Mass.J 444. See State v. Smith,
10 R. I. 258. In Missouri a magistrate may be liable to the penalty for performing the marriage ceremony for minors without
consent of parents or guardians, though he may suppose them to
be of the proper age. Beckham v. Nacke, 56 Mo., 546. Where
the killing and sale of a calf under a specified age is prohibited,
there may be a conviction though the party was ignorant of the
animal's age. Commonwea.lth v. Raymond, 97 Mass., 567. See
The King v. Dixon, 3 M. & S., 11. In State v. Steaniboat Co.,
13 Md., 181, a common carrier was held liable to a statutory penalty for transporting a slave on its steamboat, though the persons
in charge of its business had no knowledge of the fact. A case
determined on the same principle is Queen v. Bishop, 5 Q. B. Div.,
259. If one's business is the sale of liquors, a sale made by his
agent in violation of law is prima facie by his authority; Commonwealth v. Nichols, 10 Met., 259; and in Illinois the principal is
held liable, though the sale by his agent was in violation of instructions. Noecker v. People, 91 Ill., 494. In Connecticut jt has
been held no defense in a prosecution for selling intoxicating
liquor to a common drunkard that the seller did not know him
to be such. Barnes v. State, 19 Conn., 398. It was held in Faulks
v. People, 39 Mich., 200, under a former statute, that one should
not be convicted of the offense of selling liquors to a minor who
had reason to believe and did believe he was of age; but I doubt
if we ought so to hold under the statute of 1881, the purpose of
which very plainly is, as I think, to compel every person who
engages in the sale of intoxicating drinks to keep within the
statute at his peril. There are many ca es in which it has been
held under similar statutes that it was no defense that the eller
did not know or suppose the purchaser to b a minor; State v.
Hartfield, 24 Wis., 60; McCutcheon v. People, 69 Ill., 601; Farmer
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V. People, 77 111., 322; Ulrich v. Commonwealtli, 6 Bush., 400;

State V. Cain, 9 W. Va., 559; Commonwealth v. Emmons, 98

Mass., 6; Redmond v. State, 36 Ark., 58; and in Commonwealth

V. Finnegan, 124 Mass., 324, the seller was held liable, though

the minor had deceived him by falsely pretending he was sent for

the liquor by another person. So a person has been held liable

to a penalty for keeping naphtha for sale under an assumed name,

without guilty knowledge ; the statute not making such knowledge

an ingredient of the offense. Commonwealth v. Wentworth, 118

Mass., 441. Other cases might be cited, and there is nothing

anomalous in these. A person may be criminally liable for adul-

tery with a woman he did not know to be married : Fox v. State,

3 Tex. App., 329; or for the carnal knowledge of a female under

ten years of age though he believed her to be older. Queen v.

Prince, L. E. 2, Cr. Cas. 154; State v. Newton, 44 la., 45. And

other similar cases might be instanced.

If intent were necessary to be found I should be of opinion

there was enough in the case to warrant its submission to the

jury. The bar was opened on Sunday by respondent's servants
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and on his business while he was about the premises. The purpose

for which it was opened was immaterial ; the offense was committed

by opening it for cleaning as much as it would have been by open-

ing it for the sale of liquors. Peoi)le v. Waldvogel, 49 Mich., 337.

But the statute requires the proprietor at his peril to keep the bar

closed. The purpose in doing so is that persons shall not be there

within the reach of temptation. This respondent did not keep his

bar closed and he has therefore disobeyed the law. And he has

not only disobeyed the law, but the evil which the law intends to

guard against has resulted; that is to say, there has been, either

with or without his assent, — it is immaterial which, — a sale of

intoxicating liquors to a person who took advantage of the bar

being open to enter it.

I think the circuit court should proceed to judgment.

e. Mistake of Law.

United States v. Anthony, 11 Blatchf. 200. (1873.)

Indictment against Susan B. Anthony for a violation of the act

of congress of May 31, 1870 (16 Stat. 744), which provides "that

if, at any election for representative * * * in the congress

v. People, 77 Ill., 322; Ulrich v. Cornrnonwealth: 6 Bush., 400;
tate v. Cain, 9 W. Va., 559; Cornmonwealth v. Emmons, 98
Mass., 6; Redmond v. State, 36 Ark., 58; and in Commonwealth
v. Finnegan, 124 Mass., 324, the seller was held liable, though
the minor had deceived him by falsely pretending he was sent for
the liquor by another person. So a person has been held liable
to a penalty for keeping naphtha for sale under an assumed name,
without guilty knowledge; the statute not making such knowledge
an ingredient of the offense. Commonwealth v. Wentworth, 118
Mass., 441. Other cases might be cited, and there is nothing
anomalous in these. A person may be criminally liable for adultery with a woman he did not know to be married: Fox v. State,
3 Tex. App., 329; or for the carnal knowledge of a female under
ten years of age though he believed her to be older. Queen v.
Prince, L. R. 2, Cr. Cas. 154; State v. Newton, 4± Ia., 45. And
other similar cases might be instanced.
If intent were necessary to be found I hould be of opinion
there was enough in the case to warrant its submission to the
jury. The bar was opened on Sunday by respondent's servants
and on his business while he was about the premises. The purpose
for which it was opened was immaterial; the offense was committed
by opening it for cleaning as much as it would have been by opening it for the sale of liquors. P eople v. Waldvogel, 49 Mich., 337.
But the statute requires the proprietor at his peril to keep the bar
closed. The purpose in doing so is that persons shall not be there
within the reach of temptation. This respondent did not keep his
bar closed and he has therefore disobeyed the law. And he has
not only disobeyed the law, but the evil which the law intends to
guard against has resulted; that is to say, there has been, either
with or without his assent,-it is immaterial which,-a sale of
intoxicating liquors to a person who took advantage of the bar
being open to enter it.
I think the circuit court should proceed to judgment.
1

e. Mistake of Law.
United States v. Anthony, 11 Bla,tchf. 200. (1873.)

Indictment against Susan B. Anthony for a violation of the act
of congress of May 31, 1870 (16 Stat. 744), which provides "that
if, at any election for representative * * * in the congre
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of the United States, any person shall knowingly * * * vote

without having a lawful right to vote, * * * every such per-

son shall be deemed guilty of a crime, and shall, for such crime,

be liable to prosecution in any court of the United States of com-

petent Jurisdiction, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished

by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment

for a term not exceeding three years, or both, in the discretion of

the court, and shall pay the costs of prosecution."

The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the act was unconstitu-

tional in so far as it prohibited women from voting.

Hunt, J., after considering the constitutional questions involved,

and holding the act valid, said :

The fourteenth amendment gives no right to a woman to vote,

and the voting by Miss Anthony was in violation of law. If she

-0f the United States, any per on hall knowingly * * * vote
without having a lawful right to ate, * * * every such peron shall be deemed guilty of a crime, and shall, for such crime,
be liable to pro...,ecution in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment
for a term not exceeding three years, or both, in the discretion of
the court, and shall pay the costs of prosecution."
The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the act was uncon titutional in o far as it prohibited women from voting.

believed she had a right to vote, and voted in reliance upon that

belief, does that relieve her from the penalty? It is argued that

the knowledge referred to in the act relates to her knowledge of

the illegality of the act, and not to the act of voting; for, it is

said, that she must know that she voted. Two principles apply
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here; First, ignorance of the law excuses no one; second, every

person is presumed to understand and to intend the necessary

effects of his own acts. Miss Anthony knew that she was a woman,

and that the constitution of this State prohibits her from voting.

She intended to violate that provision — intended to test it, perhaps,

but certainly intended to violate it. The necessary effect of her

act was to violate it, and this she is presumed to have intended.

There was no ignorance of any fact, but, all the facts being known,

she undertook to settle a principle in her own person. She takes

the risk, and she cannot escape the consequences. It is said, and

authorities are cited to sustain the position, that there can be no

crime unless there is a culpable intent, and that, to render one

criminally responsible, a vicious will must be present. A commits

a trespass on the land of B, and B, thinking and believing that he

has a right to shoot an intruder upon his premises, kills A on the

spot. Does B's misapprehension of his rights justify his act?

Would a judge be justified in charging the jury that, if satisfied

that B supposed he had a right to shoot A, he was justified, and

they should find a verdict of not guilty? N'o judge would make

such a charge. To constitute a crime, it is true that there must

J., after considering the constitutional questions involved,
.and holding the act valid, said :
The fourteenth amendment gives no right to a woman to vote,
2nd the voting by Miss Anthony was in violation of law. If she
believed she had a right to vote, and voted in reliance upon that
belief, does that relieve her from the penalty? It is argued that
the knowledge referred to in the act relates to her knowledge of
the illegality of the act, and not to the act of voting; for, it is
said, that she must knnw that she voted. Two principles apply
b.ere: First, ignorance of the law excuses no one; second, every
person is presumed to understand and to intend the necessary
effects of his own acts. Miss Anthony knew that she was a woman,
~nd that the constitution of this State prohibits her from voting.
She intended to violate that provision-intended to test it, perhaps,
but certainly intended to violate it. The necessary effect of her
act was to violate it, and this she is presumed to have intended.
There was no ignorance of any fact, but, all the facts being known,
she undertook to settle a principle in her own person. She takes
the risk, and she cannot escape the consequences. It is said, and
authorities are cited to sustain the position, that there can be no
{!rime unless there is a culpable intent, and that, to render one
criminally responsible, a vicious will must be pre ent. A commiL
a trespass on the land of B, and B, thinking and believing that he
has a right to shoot an intruder upon his premises, kills A on th
-spot. Does B' misapprehension of his riahts justify his act?
Would a judge be justified in charging the jury that, if sati fi d
that B supposed he had a right to shoot A, he was justified, an
they should find a verdict of not guilty? No judge would rnak
such a charge. To constitute a crime, it i true that there rnu t
HUNT,
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be a criminal intent, but it is equally true that knowledge of the

facts of the case is always held to supply this intent. An inten-

tional killing bears with it evidence of malice in law. Whoever,

without justifiable cause, intentionally kills his neighbor, is guilty

of a crime. The principle is the same in the case before us, and in

all criminal cases. The precise question now before me has been

several times decided, viz., that one illegally voting was bound and

was assumed to know the law, and that a belief that he had a right

to vote gave no defense, if there was no mistake of fact. Hamilton

V. People, 57 Barb. 625; State v. Boyett, 10 Ired. 336; State v.

Hart, 6 Jones (K. C.) 3S9 ;McGuire v. State, 7 Humph. 54; State

V. Sheeley, 15 Iowa, 404. No system of criminal jurisprudence

can be sustained upon any other principle. Assuming that Miss

Anthony believed she had a right to vote, that fact constitutes no

defense, if, in truth, she had not the right. She voluntarily gave a

vote which was illegal, and thus is subject to the penalty of the

law.

/. Mistalce of Fact.

Squire v. State, Jf6 hid. 459. (1874.)
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BUSKIRK, J.:

This was a prosecution for bigamy. The appellant, upon a plea

of not guilty, was tried by a jury, and found guilty, and, over

motions for a new trial and in arrest, judgment was rendered on

the verdict.

The appellant requested the court to give the following instruc-

be a criminal intent, but it is equally true that knowledge of the
facts of the case is always held to supply this intent. An intentional killing bears with it evidence of malice in law. Whoever,
without justifiable cause, intentionally kills his neighbor, is guilty
of a crime. The principle is the same in the ca e before us, and in
all criminal cases. The precise que tion now before me has been
several times decided, viz., that one illegally voting wa bound and
was assumed to know the law, and that a belief that he had a right
to vote gave no defense, if there was no mistake of fact. Hamilton
v. People, 57 Barb. 625; State v. Boyett, 10 Ired. 336; tate v.
Hart, 6 Jones (N. C.) 389; McGuire v. State, 7 Humph. 54; State
v. Sheeley, 15 Iowa, 404. No y tern of criminal jurisprudence
can be su tained upon any other principle. Assuming that Mis
Anthony believed she had a right to vote, that fact constitutes no
defense, if, in truth, she had not the right. She voluntarily gave a
vote which wa illegal, and thus is ubject to the penalty of the
law.

tion : "That if the jury believe, from all the evidence in the case,

that the defendant married the second time in the honest belief

that his former wife had been divorced from him, they should find

f.

him not guilty"; but the court refused to so charge, and this re-

Mistake of Fact.

fusal was assigned as a reason for a new trial, and is relied upon

Squire v. State, 46 Ind. 459. (1874.)

here to reverse the judgment.

The appellant testified in his own behalf. The substance of his

testimony was that he left the State of New York about two years

ago, and came to this State, where he had resided ever since ; that

he left his wife in the city of Buffalo, in the State of New York,

she refusing to come west with him ; that he came to Washington,

Daviess county, Ind., in July, 1873, where he had ever since re-

J. :
This was a prosecution for bigamy. The appellant, upon a plea
of not guilty, was tried by a jury, and found guilty, and, over
motions for a new trial and in arrest, judgment was rendered on
the verdict.
The appellant reque~tec1 the court to give the following instruction: "That if the jury believe, from all the evidence in the case,
that the defendant married the second time in the honest belief
that his former wife had been divorced from him, they should :find
him not guilty"; but the court refused to o charge, and . this refusal was assigned as a reason for a new trial, and is relied upon
here to reverse the judgment.
The appellant testified in his own behalf. The substance of hi,
te tjmony was that he left the State of New York about two year
ago, and came to this State, where he had resided ever since; that
he left hi wife in the: city of Buffalo, in the State of New York,
she refusing to come west with him; that he came to Washington,
Daviess county, Incl, in July, 1873, where he had ever ince reBUSKIRK,

QUIRE
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sided, and still resides ; that he had not been in the State of New-

York since he left there, two years ago, but he had received letters

from his parents and brothers in the State of iSTew York, informing

him that his wife, Elizabeth, had procured a divorce from him in

said State of Xew York ; and that he had married the said Euth

Summers under the belief that such information was true.

Bishop on Criminal Law, in section 303 (Volume 1, p. 187),

says : "The wrongful intent being the essence of every crime, the

doctrine necessarily follows that, whenever a man is misled without

his own fault or carelessness concerning facts, and, while so misled,

acts as he would be justified in doing were the facts what he be-

lieves them to be, he is legally innocent, the same as he is innocent

morally."

The same author, in his work on Statutory Crimes, in section

355, p, 234, says: "In the cases mentioned in the preceding sec-

tions there is no crime, because, b}^ a rule of the common law, there

can be none where the criminal mind is wanting. But the reason

why it is wanting in these cases is that, either in consequence of a

technical rule or by force of a natural fact, it is impossible the
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criminal mind should exist, since that cannot be for whose existence

there is no capacity. But there may be a capacity for the criminal

intent, while yet no crime is committed, even though the outward

fact of what otherwise were crime transpires. It is so where one

having a mind free from all moral culpability is misled concern-

ing facts. If, in such a case, he honestly believes certain facts to

exist, and, though they do not, acts as he would be legally justified

in acting if what he erroneously believes to be were real, he is jus-

tified in law, the same as he is in morals. The books are full of

illustrations of this doctrine; and the reader perceives that, in

reason, it must govern statutory crimes, the same as crimes at the

common law."

The same author, in section 356, illustrates the above doctrine

as applicable to a prosecution for bigamy, when he says : "But

this exception has no relation to a case in which on independent

information and special grounds, a husband or wife is really be-

lieved to be dead. Suppose, for example, a husband intending to

entrap his wife, goes out ostensibly on a sail with confederates,

and they come back and represent that he is drowned, while he

secretly escapes abroad. She believes the statement, administers

on his effects, and at the end of a year marries. Then he returns

sided, and still reside ; that he had not been in the State of ew
York ince he left there, two years ago, but he had received letter
from his parents and brothers in the State of New York, informing
him that his wife, Elizabeth, had procured a divorce from him in
aid State of New Yark; and that he had married the aid Ruth
Summers under the belief that such information was true.
Bishop on Criminal Law, in ection 303 (Volume 1, p. 18 ) ,
says: "The wrongful intent being the essence of every crime, the
doctrine nece arily follow that, whenever a man i misled without
his own fault or carelessness concerning facts, and, while so misled,
acts as he would be justified in doing were the facts what he believes them to be, he is legally innocent, the ame a he i innocent
morally."
The same author, in hi work on Statutory Crimes, in · ection
355, p. 234, says: "In the case mentioned in the preceding sections there i no crime, because, by a rule of the common law, there
can be none where the criminal mind is wanting. But the rea on
why it is wanting in the e case is that, either in consequence of a
technical rule or by force of a natural fact, it is impossible the
criminal mind should exi t, since that cannot be for whose existence
there is no capacity. But there may be a capacity for the criminal
intent, while yet no crime is committed, even though the outward
fact of what otherwise were crime tran pire . It is so where one
having a mind free from all moral culpability is misled concerning facts. If, in uch a case, he honestly believes certain facts to
exist, and, though they do not, acts as he would be legally justified
in acting if what he erroneou ly believes to be were real, he i ju tified in law, the same as he is in morals. The books are full of
illustrations of thi doctrine; and the reader perceive that, in
rea on, it mu t govern statutory crime , the ame as crime at the
common law."
The ame author, in ection 356, illu trate the above doctrine
as applicable to a prosecution for bigamy, when he ays: "But
thi exception ha no relation to a case in which on independ nt
information and pecial ground , a hu band or wife i really b lieved to be dead.
uppo e, for example, a hu band intending to
ntrap his wife, goes out o ten ibly on a sail with confederate ,
and they come back and repre ent that he is drowned, whil h
ecretly escape abroad. She believes the tatement, admini ter
on hi effect , and at the end of a year marrie . Then he return
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and procures her indictment for polygamy. On a just considera-

tion, the common-law rule, and not the statutory one prevails, and

«he should be acquitted." The same rule would apply to the dis-

solution of the marriage relation by divorce as by death.

We think the court should have charged the jury, if it had been

so asked, that if they believed from the evidence that the defendant

had been informed that his wife had been divorced, and that he had

used due care and made due inquiry to ascertain the truth, and

had, considering all the circumstances, reason to believe, and did

believe, at the time of his second marriage, that his former wife

had been divorced from him, they should find him not guilty.

There was probably no error in refusing the instruction as

asked, as it was based solely upon the belief of the defendant, and

did not require that such belief should be the result of due care

and careful inquiry, and that he should have reasonable grounds to

-entertain such belief.

IV. There Must Be Sufficient Mental Capacity.

a. Insanity.

Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577. (1886.)
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SOMERVILLE, J. :

In this case the defendants have been convicted of the murder

'of Bennett Parsons, by shooting him with a gun, one of the de-

fendants being the wife and the other the daughter of the deceased.

and procures her indictment for polygamy. On a just consideration, the common-law rule, and not the statutory one prevails, and
she should be acquitted." The same rule would apply to the disolution of the marriage relation by divorce as by death.
We think the court should have charged the jury, if it had been
..,o asked, that if they believed from the evidence that the defendant
had been informed that his wife had been divorced, and that he had
used due care and made due inquiry to ascertain the truth, and
had, considering all the circumstances, reason to believe, and did
believe, at the time of his second marriage, that his former wife
had been divorced from him, they should find him not guilty.
There was probably no error in refusing the instructio:i as
asked, as it was based solely upon the belief of the defendant, and
did not require that such belief should be the result of due care
and careful inquiry, and that he should have rea onable grounds to
•entertain such belief.

The defense set up in the trial was the plea of insanity, the

■evidence tending to show that the daughter was an idiot, and the

mother and wife a lunatic, subject to insane delusions, and that

the killing on her part was the offspring and product of those

-delusions.

IV. THERE MUST BE SUFFICIE T MENTAL CAPACITY.

The rulings of the court raise some questions of no less dif-

ficulty than of interest, for, as observed by a distinguished

a. Insanity.

American judge, "of all medico-legal questions, those connected

with insanity are the most difficult and perplexing." Per Dillon,

C. J., in State v. Felter, 35 Iowa 67. It has become of late a

Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577. {1886.)

matter of comment among intelligent men, including the most

advanced thinkers in the medical and legal professions, that the

deliverances of the law courts on this branch of our jurisprudence

SOMERVILLE, J. :
In this case the defendants have been convicted of the murder
·of Bennett Parsons, by shooting him with a gun, one of the defendants being the wife and the other the daughter of the deceased.
'The defense set up in the trial was the plea of insanity, the
·evidence tending to show that the daughter was an idiot, and the
mother and wife a lunatic, subject to insane delusions, and that
the killing on her part was the offspring and product of those
-Oelusions.
The rulings of the court raise some question of no less difficulty than of interest, for, as observed by a distinguished
American judge, "of all medico-legal questions, those connected
with insanity are the most difficult and perplexing." Per DILLON,
C. J., in State v. Felter, 35 Iowa 67. It has become of late a
matter of comment among intelligent men, including the most
:advanced thinkers in the medical and legal professions, that the
deliverances of the law courts on this branch of our jurisprudence
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have not heretofore been at all satisfactory, either in tlie sound-

ness of their theories, or in their practical application. The

earliest English decisions, striving to establish rules and tests on

the subject, including alike the legal rules of criminal and civil

responsibility, and the supposed tests of the existence of the dis-

ease of insanity itself, are now admitted to have been deplorably

erroneous, and, to say nothing of their vacillating character, have

long since been abandoned. The views of the ablest of the old

text writers and sages of the law were equally confused and

uncertain in the treatment of these subjects, and they are now

entirely exploded. Time was in the history of our laws tbat

the veriest lunatic was debarred from pleading his providential

affliction as a defense to his contracts. It was said, in justifica-

tion of so absurd a rule, that no one could be permitted to stultify

himself by pleading his own disability. So great a jurist as Lord

Coke, in his attempted classification of madmen, laid down the

legal rule of criminal responsibility to be that one should "loholly

have lost his memory and understanding"; as to which Mr.

Erskine, when defending Hadfield for shooting the King, in the
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year 1800, justly observed: "'No such madman ever existed in

the world.'' After this great and historical case, the existence of

delusion promised for a while to become the sole test of insanity,

and acting under the duress of such delusion was recognized in

effect as the legal rule of responsibility. Lord Kenyon, after

ordering a verdict of acquittal in that case, declared with emphasis

that there was "no doubt on earth" the law was correctly stated

in the argument of counsel. But, as it was soon discovered that

insanity often existed without delusions, as well as delusions with-

out insanity, this view was also abandoned. Lord Hale had before

declared that the rule of responsibility was measured by the mental

capacity possessed by a child fourteen years of age, and Mr. Justice

Tracy, and other judges, had ventured to decide that, to be non-

punishable for alleged acts of crime, "a man must be totally

deprived of his understanding and memory, so as not to know

what he was doing — no more than an infant, a brute, or a wild

least."— Arnold's case, 16 How. St. Tr. 764. All these rules have

necessarily been discarded in modern times in the light of the

new scientific knowledge acquired by a more thorough study of

the disease of insanity. In BelUngham's Case, decided in 1812,

by Lord Mansfield at the Old Bailey (Coll. on Lun. 630), the test

have not heretofore been at all ati factory, either in the oundness of their theories, or in th ir practical application. The
earlie t Engli h deci ion , striving to establi h rule and test on
the ubject, including alike the legal rule of criminal and civil
respon ibility, and the suppo ed te t of the e:xi tence of the di ease of insanity itself, are now admitted to have been deplorably
erroneous, and, to say nothing of their vacillating character, have
long since been abandoned. The views of the ablest of the old
-text writers and age. of the law were equally confu ed and
uncertain in the treatment of th e ubject , and they are now
entirely exploded. Time was in the history of our law that
the verie t lunatic was debarred from pleading his providential
affiiction a a defense to his contract . It was aid, in justificaiion of o ab urd a rule, that no one could be permitted to stultify
himself by pleading his own disability. So great a jurist as Lord
Coke, in his attempted classification of madmen, laid down the
legal rule of criminal re ponsibility to be that one should "wholly
have lo t his memory and under tanding"; as to which Mr.
Er kine, when defending Hadfield for shooting the King, in the
year 1800, ju tly ob erved: "No uch madman ever e:xisted in
the world.~' After this great and hi torical case, the existence of
delusion promised for a while to become the sole test of insanity,
and acting under the duress of uch delusion was recognized in
effect as the legal rule of respon ibility. Lord Kenyon, after
ordering a verdict of acquittal in that case, declared with emphasi
that there was "no doubt on earth" the law was correctly stated
in the argument of counsel. But, a it was soon discovered that
in anity often exi ted without delusion , as well as delusions without insanity, this view was also abandoned. Lord Hale had before
declared that the rule of responsibility was measured by the mental
capacity pos essed by a child fourteen years of age, and Mr. Ju tice
Tracy, and other ju lges, had ventured to decide that, to be nonpunishable for alleged acts of crime, "a man must be totally
deprived of hi under tanding and memory so a not to know
what he was doing-no more than an infant, a brute, or a wild
bcast."- Arnold's case, 16 How. t. Tr. 764. All the e rule hav
ue-·cssarily been discarded in modern tim s in the light of th'
new scientific knowledge acquired by a more thorough ~ tudy of
th di. a e of in_anity. In B ellingham' Ca. e. d i l cl in 1 l'
by Lord Mansfi lcl at the Old Bail y ( oll. on Lnn. 630), th te t
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was held to consist in a knowledge that murder, the crime there

committed, was "against the laws of God and nature/' thus mean-

ing an ability to distinguish between right and wrong in the

abstract. This rule was not adhered to, but seems to have been

modified so as to make the test rather a knowledge of right and

wrong as applied to the particular act. — Lawson on Insanity, 231,

§ 7 et seq. The great leading case on this subject in England, is

McNaghtens case, decided in 1843 before the English House of

Lords, 10 CI. & F. 200; s. c, 2 Lawson's Cr. Def. 150. It was

decided by the judges in that case, that, in order to entitle the

accused to acquittal, it must be clearly proved that, at the time

of committing the offense, he was laboring under such a defect of

reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and

quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did, not to know that

what he was doing was wrong. This rule is commonly supposed

to have heretofore been adopted by this court, and has been fol-

lowed by the general current of American adjudications. — Boswell

V. The State, 63 Ala. 307; s. c, 35 Amer. Eep. 20; s. c, 2 Law-

son's Cr. Def. 352; McAllister v. State, 17 Ala. 434; Lawson on
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Insanity, 219-221, 231.

In view of these conflicting decisions, and of the new light

thrown on the disease of insanity by the discoveries of modern

psychological medicine, the courts of the country may well hesitate

before blindly following in the unsteady footsteps found upon the

old sandstones of our common law jurisprudence a century ago.

The trial court, with prudent propriety, followed the previous de-

cisions of this court, the correctness of which, as to this subject,

we are now requested to review.

We do not hesitate to say that we re-open the discussion of

this subject with no little reluctance, having long hesitated to

disturb our past decisions on this branch of the law. ISTothing

could induce us to do so except an imperious sense of duty, which

has been excited b}'' a protracted investigation and study, impress-

ing our minds with the conviction that the law of insanity as

declared by the courts on many points, and especially the rule of

criminal accountability, and the assumed tests of disease, to that

extent which confers legal irresponsibility, have not kept pace

with the progress of thought and discovery, in the present ad-

vanced stages of medical science. Though science has led the way,

the courts of England have declined to follow, as shown by their

was held to consist in a knowledge that murder, the crime there
committed, was "against the laws of God and nature," thus meaning an ability to distinguish between right and wrong in the
abstract. This rule was not adhered to, but seems to have been
modified so as to make the test rather a knowledge of right and
wrong as applied to the particular act.-Lawson on In anity, 231,
§ ·( et seq. The great leading case on this subject in England, is
McNaghten's case, decided in 18-13 before the English House of
Lords, 10 Cl. & F. 200; s. c., 2 Lawson's Cr. Def. 150. It was
decided by the judges in that case, that, in order to entitle the
accused to acquittal, it must be clearly proved that, at the time
of committing the offense, be was laboring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did, not to know that
what be was doing was wrong. This rule is commonly supposed
to have heretofore been adopted by thi court, and has been followed by the general current of American adjudications.-Boswell
v. The State, 63 Ala. 307; s. c., 35 Amer. Rep. 20; s. c., 2 Lawson's Cr. Def. 352; McAllister v. State, 17 Ala. 434; Lawson on
Insanity, 219-221, 231.
In view of these conflicting decisions, and of the new light
thrown on the disease of insanity by the discoveries of modern
psychological medicine, the courts of the country may well hesitate
before blindly following in the unsteady foot teps found upon the
old sandstones of our common law juri prudence a century ago.
The trial court, with prudent propriety, followed the previous decisions of this court, the correctness of which, as to this subject,
we are now requested to review.
v\T e do not hesitate to say that we re-open the discu sion of
this subject with no little reluctance, having long hesitated to
disturb our past decision on this branch of the law. Nothing
could induce us to do so except an imperious sense of duty, which
has been excited by a protracted investigation and study, impressing our minds with the conviction that the law of insal).ity as
declared by the courts on many points, and especially the rule of
criminal accountability, and the a sumed tests of disea e to that
extent which confers legal irresponsibility, have not kept pace
with the progress of thought and di covery, in the pre ent advanced stages of medical science. Though science has led the way,
the courts of England have declined to follow, a hown by their
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adherence to the rulings in McNaghten's case, emphasized by the

strange declaration made by the Lord Chancellor of England, in

the House of Lords, on so late a day as March 11, 1862, that "the

introduction of medical opinions and medical theories into this

subject has proceeded upon the vicious principle of considering

insanity as a disease!"

It is not surprising that this state of affairs has elicited from

a learned law writer, who treats of this subject, the humiliating

declaration, that, under the influence of these ancient theories,

^'the memorials of our jurisprudence are written all over with

cases in which those who are now understood to have been in-

sane, have been executed as criminals." — 1 Bish, Cr. Law (7th

Ed.), § 390. There is good re«son, both for this fact, 'and for

the existence of unsatisfactory rules on this subject. In what we

say we do not intend to give countenance to acquittals of criminals,

frequent examples of which have been witnessed in modern times,

based on the doctrine of moral or emotional insanity, unconnected

with mental disease, which is not yet sufficiently supported by

psychology, or recognized by law as an excuse for crime. — BoswelVs
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case, supra; 1 Whar. Cr. Law (9th Ed.), § 43.

In ancient times, lunatics were not regarded as "unfortunate

sufferers from disease, but rather as subjects of demoniacal pos-

session, or as self-made victims of evil passions." They were not

cared for humanely in asylums and hospitals, but were incarcerated

in jails, punished with chains and stripes, and often sentenced to

death by burning or the gibbet. When put on their trial, the issue

before the court then was not as now. If acquitted, they could

only be turned loose on the community to repeat their crimes with-

out molestation or restraint. They could not be committed to

hospitals, as at the present day, to be kept in custody, cared for

by medical attention, and often cured. It was not until the be-

ginning of the present century that the progress of Christian

civilization asserted itself by the exposure of the then existing

barbarities, and that the outcry of philanthropists succeeded in

eliciting an investigation of the British Parliament looking to

their suppression. Up to that period the medical treatment of the

insane is known to have been conducted upon a basis of ignorance,

inhumanity, and empiricism. — Amer. Cyclop., Vol. 9 (1874), title,

Insanity. Being punished for wickedness, rather than treated

for disease, this is not surprising. The exposure of these evils

adherence to the rulings in McNaghten's case, emphasized b. the
trange declaration made by the Lord Chancellor of England, in
the House of Lords, on so late a day as March 11, 1862, that "the
introduction of medical opinion and medical theorie into thi
subject has proceeded upon the vicious principle of considering
insanity as a disease!"
It is not urprising that this state of affair has elicited from
a learned law writer, who treat of this subject, the humiliating
declaration, that, under the influence of these ancient theorie ,
~'the memorialc of our jurisprudence are written all over with
cases in which those who are now understood to have been insane, have been executed as criminals."-1 Bish. Cr. Law ( 7th
Ed.), § 390. There is good ree.son, both for this fact; and for
the existence of unsatisfactory rules on thi subject. In what we
say we do not intend to give countenance to acquittal of criminals,
frequent examples of which have been witnessed in modern times,
based on the doctrine of moral or emotional in anity, unconnected
with mental disease, which is not yet sufficiently supported by
psychology, or recognized by law as an excuse for crime.-Boswell's
case, supra.: 1 Whar. Cr. Law (9th Ed.), § 43.
In ancient times, lunatics were not regarded as "unfortunate
sufferers from disease, but rather as subjects of demoniacal possession, or as self-made victims of evil passions." They were not
cared for humanely in asylums and hospitals, but were incarcerated
in jails, punished with chains and stripes, and often sentenced to
death by burning or the gibbet. When put on their trial, the issue
before the court then was not as now. If acquitted, they could
only be turned loose on the community to repeat their crimes without molestation or restraint. They could not be committed to
hospitals, as at the present day, to be kept in custody, cared for
by medical attention, and often cured. It was not until the beginning of the present century that the progress of Chri tian
civilization a serted itself by the exposure of the then existing
barbaritie , and that the outcry of philanthropist succeeded in
eliciting an investigation of the British Parliament looking to
their suppre ion. Up to that period the medical treatment of the
insane is known to have been conducted upon a basis of ignorance,
inhumanity, and empiricism.-Amer. Cyclop., Vol. 9 (1874), title,
INSANITY.
Being punished for wickednes , rather than treated
:for disease, thi i not surpri ing. The expo ure of the e evils
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not only led to the establishment of that most beneficent of modem

civilized charities — the Hospital and Asylum for the Insane — but

also furnished hitherto unequalled opportunities to the medical

profession of investigating and treating insanity on the pathologi-

cal basis of its being a disease of the mind. Under these new and

more favorable conditions the medical jurisprudence of insanity

has assumed an entirely new phase. The nature and exciting

causes of the disease have been thoroughly studied and more fully

comprehended. The result is that the "right and wrong test," as

it is sometimes called, which, it must be remembered, itself origi-

nated with the medical profession, in the mere dawn of the scientific

knowledge of insanit}^, has been condemned by the great current of

modern medical authorities, who believe it to be "founded on an

ignorant and imperfect view of the disease." Encyc. Brit., Vol. 15

(9th Ed.), title. Insanity.

The question then presented seems to be, whether an old rule

of legal responsibility shall be adhered to, based on theories of

physicians promulgated a hundred years ago, which refuse to

recognize any evidence of insanity, except the single test of mental
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capacity to distinguish right and wrong — or whether the courts

will recognize as a possible fact, if capable of proof by clear and

satisfactory testimony, the doctrine, now alleged by those of the

medical profession who have made insanity a special subject of

investigation, that the old test is wrong, and that there is no single

test by which the existence of the disease, to that degree which

exempts from punishment, can in every case be infallibly detected.

The inquiry must not be unduly obstructed by the doctrine of stare

decisis, for the life of the common law system and the hope of its

permanency consist largely in its power of adaptation to new sci-

entific discoveries, and the requirements of an ever advancing

civilization. There is inherent in it the vital principle of juridical

evolution, which preserves itself by a constant struggle for ap-

proximation to the highest practical wisdom. It is not like the

laws of the Medes and Persians, which could not be changed. In

establishing any new rule, we should strive, however, to have proper

regard for two opposite aspects of the subject, lest, in the words

of Lord Hale, "on one side, there be a kind of inhumanity towards

the defects of human nature ; or, on the other, too great indulgence

to great crimes."

It is everywhere admitted, and as to this there can be no doubt.

not only led to the establishment of that most beneficent of modem
civilized charities-the Hospital and Asylum for the Insane-but
also furnished hitherto unequalled opportunities to the medical
profession of investigating and treating insanity on the pathological basis of its being a disease of the mind. Under these new and
more favorable conditions the medical jurisprudence of insanity
has assumed an entirely new phase. The nature and exciting
causes of the disease have been thoroughly studied and morn fully
comprehended. The result is that the "right and wrong test," as
it is sometimes called, which, it must be remembered, itself originated with the medical profession, in the mere dawn of the scientific
knowledge of insanity, has been condemned by the great current of
modern medical authorities, who believe it to be "founded on an
ignorant and imperfect view of the disease." Encyc. Brit., Vol. 15.
(9th Ed.), title, I rsA.NITY .
The question then presented seems to be, whether an old rule
of legal responsibility shall be adhered to, based on theories of
physicians promulgated a hundred years ago, which refuse to
recognize any evidence of insanity, except the single test of mental
capacity to distinguish right and wrong-or whether the court
will recognize as a possible fact, if capable of proof by clear and
satisfactory testimony, the doctrine, now alleged by those of the
medical profession who have made insanity a special subject of
investigation, that the old test is wrong, and that there is no single
test by which the existence of the disease, to that degree which
exempts from punishment, can in every case be infallibly detected.
The inquiry mu t not be unduly obstructed by the doctrine of stare
decisis, for the life of the common law system and the hope of its
permanency consist largely in its power of adaptation to new scientific discoverie , and the requirements of an ever advancing
civilization. There is inherent in it the vital principle of juridical
evolution, which preserves itself by a constant struggle for approximation to the highest practical wisdom. It is not like the
laws of the Medes and Persians, which could not be changed. In
establishing any new rule, we should strive, however, to have proper
regard for two opposite aspects of the subject, lest, in the words
of Lord Hale, "on one side, there be a kind of inhumanity towards
the defects of human nature; or, on the other, too great indulgence
to great crimes."
It is everywhere admitted, and as to this there can be no doubt,
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that an idiot, lunatic, or other person of diseased mind, who is

afflicted to such extent as not to know whether he is doing right or

■ttTong, is not punishable for any act which he may do while in

that state.

Can the courts justly say, however, that the only test or rule

of responsibility in criminal cases is the power to distinguish right

from wrong, whether in the abstract, or as applied to the particular

case? Or may there not be insane persons, of a diseased brain,,

who, while capable of perceiving the difference between right and

wrong, are, as matter of fact, so far under the duress of such dis-

ease as to destroy the power to choose between right and wrong?

Will the courts assume as a fact, not to be rebutted by any amount

of evidence, or any new discoveries of medical science, that there

is, and can be no such state of the mind as that described by a

writer on psychological medicine, as one "in which the reason has

lost its empire over the passions, and the actions by which they

are manifested, to such a degree that the individual can neither-

repress the former, nor abstain from the latter?" — Dean's Med.

Jur. 497.
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Much confusion can be avoided in the discussion of this subject

by separating the duty of the jury from that of the court in the

trial of a case of this character. The province of the jury is to

determine facts, that of the court to state the law. The rule in

McNaghtens case arrogates to the court, in legal effect, the right

to assert, as matter of law, the following propositions :

(1) That there is but a single test of the existence of that

degree of insanity, such as confers irresponsibility for crime.

(2) That there does not exist any case of such insanity in which

that single test — the capacity to distinguish right from wrong —

does not appear.

(3) That all other evidences of alleged insanity, supposed by

physicians and experts, to indicate a destruction of the freedom

of the human will, and the irresistible duress of one's actions,

do not destroy his mental capacity to entertain a criminal intent..

The whole difficulty, as justly said by the Supreme Judicial

Court of Xew Hampshire, is, that "courts have undertaken to>

declare that to be law which is matter of fact." *'If," observes

the same court, "the tests of insanity are matters of law, the prac-

tice of allowing experts to testify what they are should be dis-

continued ; if they are matters of fact, the judge should no longer-

that an idiot, lunatic or other per on of di eased mind, who i affiided to such extent a not to know whether he i doing right or
wrong, is not punishable for any act which he may do while in
that state.
Can the court ju tly say, however, that the only test or rule
of responsibility in criminal ca es is the power to distinguish right
from wrong, whether in the ab tract, or a applied to the particular
ca e? Or may there not be insane per on , of a di eased brain,.
who, while capable of perceiving the difference between right and
wrong, are, as matter of fact, so far under the duress of such disease as to destroy the power to choose between right and wrong ?
Will the courts assume as a fact, not to be rebutted by any amount
of evidence, or any new discoveries of medical science, that there
is,, :rnd can be no such state of the mind as that de cribed by a
writer on psychological medicine, as one "in which the rea on ha
lo t its empire over the passions, and the actions by which they
are manifested, to such a degree that the individual can neitherrepress the former, nor abstain from the latter ?"-Dean's Med.
Jur. 497.
Much confu ion can be a voided in the discussion of this subject
by separating the duty of the jury from that of the court in the
trial of a case of this character. The province of the jury is to
determine facts, that of the court to state the law. The rule in
McNaghten's case arrogate to the court, in legal effect, the right
to as ert, as matter of law, the following propo itions:
(1) That there is but a single test of the existence of that
degree of insanity, such as confers irresponsibility for crime.
(2) That there does not exist any case of such insanity in which
that single test-the capacity to di tinguish right from wrongdoe not appear.
( 3) That cill other evidences of alleged in anity, supposed by
phy ician and experts, to indicate a destruction of the freedom
of the human will, and the irresistible dure s of one's action",
do not de troy his mental capacity to entertain a criminal intenL
The whole difficulty, as ju tly said by the Supreme Judicial
Court of ew Hampshire, i , that "court have undertaken to.
declare that to be law which is matter of fact." ~'If," observe
the same court, "the te ts of insanity are matter of law, the practice of allowing expert to testify what they are should be di continued; if they are matters of fact, the judge hould no longei:·
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testify without being sworn as a witness, and showing himself

to be qualified to testify as an expert." — State v. Pike, 49 N". H.

399.

We first consider what is the proper legal rule of responsibility

in criminal cases.

No one can deny that there must be two constituent elements

of legal responsibility in the commission of every crime, and no

rule can be just and reasonable which fails to recognize either

of them: (1) Capacity of intellectual discrimination: and (2)

freedom of will. Mr. Wharton, after recognizing this fundamental

and obvious principle, observes: "If there be either incapacity

to distinguish between right and wrong as to the particular act,

or delusion as to the act, or inability to refrain from doing the act,

there is no responsibility." — 1 Whar. Cr. Law (9th Ed.), § 33.

Says Mr. Bishop, in discussing this subject: "There can not be,

and there is not, in any locality, or age, a law punishing men far

what they can not avoid."—! Bish. Cr. Law (7th Ed.), § 383&.

If, therefore, it be true, as matter of fact, that the disease of

insanity can, in its action on the human brain through a shattered
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nervous organization, or in any other mode, so affect the mind as

to subvert the freedom of the will, and thereby destroy the power

of the victim to choose between the right and wrong, although he

perceive it — by which we mean the power of volition to adhere

in action to the right and abstain from the wrong — is such a one

criminally responsible for an act done under the influence of such

controlling disease? We clearly think not, and such, we believe

to be the just, reasonable, and humane rule, towards which all the

modern authorities in this country, legislation in England, and the

laws of other civilized countries of the world, are gradually, but

surely tending, as we shall further on attempt more fully to show.

We next consider the question as to the probable existence of such

a disease, and the test of its presence in a given case.

It will not do for the courts to dogmatically deny the possible

existence of such a disease, or its pathological and psychical effects,

because this is a matter off evidence, not of law, or judicial

cognizance. Its existence, and effect on the mind and conduct of

the patient, is a question of fact to be proved, just as much as the

possible existence of cholera or yellow fever formerly was before

these diseases became the subjects of common knowledge, or the

effects of delirium from fever, or intoxication from opium and

testify without being sworn as a witness, and showing himself
to be qualified to testify as an expert."-State v. Pike, 49 N. H.
399.
We first consider what i the proper legal rule of responsibility

in criminal cases.
No one can deny that there must be two constituent elements
-Of legal responsibility in the commission of every crime, and no
rule can be just and reasonable which fails to recognize either
of them : ( 1) Capacity of intellectual discrimination; and (2)
freedom of will. Mr. Wharton, after recognizing this fundamental
and obvious principle, observes : "If there be either incapacity
to distinguish between right and wrong as to the particular act,
or delusion as to the act, or inability to refrain from doing the act,
there is no responsibility."-1 Whar. Cr. Law (9th Ed.}, § 33.
Says Mr. Bishop, in discussing this subject: "There can not be,
and there is not, in any locality, or age, a law punishing men for
what they can not avoid."-1 Bish. Cr. Law (7th Ed.), § 383b.
If, therefore, it be true, as matter of fact, that the disease of
insanity can, in its action on the human brain through a shattered
nervous organization, or in any other mode, so affect the mind as
to subvert the freedom of the will, and thereby destroy the power
of the victim to choose between the right and wrong, although he
perceive it-by which we mean the power of volition to adhere
in action to the right and abstain from the wrong-is such a one
criminally r esponsible for an act done under the influence of such
controlling disease? We clearly think not, and such, we believe
to be the just, r easonable, and humane rule, towards which all the
modern authorities in this country, legislation in England, and the
laws of other civilized countries ·of the world, are gradually, but
surely t ending, as we shall further on attempt more fully to show.
We next consider the question as to the probable existence of such
a disease, and the test of its presence in a given case.
It will not do for the courts to dogmatically deny the possible
existence of such a disease, or its pathological and psychical effects,
because this is a matter o!f ev~dence, not of law, or judicial
cognizance. Its existence, and effect on the mind and conduct of
the patient, is a question of fact to be proved, just as much as the
possible existence of cholera or yellow fever formerly was before
these diseases became the subjects of common knowledge, or the
effects of delirium from fever, or intoxication from opium and
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alcoholic stimulants would be. The courts could, with just as

much propriety, years ago, have denied the existence of the Coper-

nican system of the universe, the efficacy of steam and electricity

as a motive power, or the possibility of communication in a few

moments between the continents of Europe and America by the

magnetic telegraph, or that of the instantaneous transmission of

the human voice from one distant city to another by the use of

the telephone. These are scientific facts, first discovered by ex-

perts before becoming matters of common knowledge. So, in like

manner, must be every other unknown scientific fact in whatever

profession or department of knowledge. The existence of such

a cerebral disease, as that which we have described, is earnestly

alleged by the superintendents of insane hospitals, and other ex-

perts, who constantly have experimental dealings with the insane,

and they are permitted every day to so testify before juries. The

truth of their testimony — or what is the same thing, the existence

or non-existence of such a disease of the mind — in each particular

case, is necessarily a matter for the determination of the jury from

the evidence.
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So it is equally obvious that the courts, can not, upon any sound

principle, undertake to say what are the invariable or infallible

tests of such disease. The attempt has been repeatedly made, and

has proved a confessed failure in practice. "Such a test," says Mr.

Bishop, "has never been found, not because those who have searched

for it have not been able and diligent, but because it does not exist."

—1 Bish. Cr. Law (7th Ed.), § 381. In this conclusion. Dr. Eay,

in his learned work on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity, fully

concurs — Ray's Med. Jur. Ins. p. 39. The symptoms and causes

of insanity are so variable, and its pathology so complex, that no two

cases may be just alike. "The fact of its existence," says Dr. Eay,

"is never established by any single diagnostic symptom, but by

the whole body of symptoms, no particular one of which is present

in every case."— Eay's Med. Jur. of Ins., § 24. Its exciting causes

being moral, psychical, and physical, are the especial subjects of

specialists' study. What effect may be exerted on the given patient

by age, sex, occupation, the seasons, personal surroundings, heredi-

tary transmission, and other causes, is the subject of evidence based

on investigation, diagnosis, observation, and experiment. Peculiar

opportunities, never before enjoyed in the histor}^ of our race, are

offered in the present age for the ascertainment of these facts, by
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the establishment of asylmns for the custody and treatment of the

insane, which Christian benevolence and statesmanship have sub-

stituted for jails and gibbets. The testimony of these experts —

differ as they may in many doubtful cases — would seem to be the

best which can be obtained, however unsatisfactory it may be in

some respects.

In the present state of our law, under the rule in McNaghtens

case, we are confronted with this practical difficulty, which itself

demonstrates the defects of the rule. The courts in effect charge

the juries, as matter of law, that no such mental disease exists, as

that often testified to by medical writers, superintendents of insane

hospitals, and other experts — that there can be as matter of sci-

entific fact no cerebral defect, congenital or acquired, which de-

stroys the patient's power of self-control — his liberty of will and

action — provided only he retains a mental consciousness of right,

and wrong. The experts are immediately put under oath, and tell

the juries just the contrar}', as matter of evidence; asserting that

no one of ordinary intelligence can spend an hour in the wards

of an insane asylum without discovering such cases, and in fact
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that "the whole management of such asylums presupposes a knowl-

edge of right and wrong on the part of their inmates." — Guy &

F. on Forensic Med. 220. The result in practice, we repeat, is,

that the courts charge one way, and the jury, following an alleged

higher law of humanity, find another, in harmony with the evi-

dence.

In Bucknill on Criminal Lunacy, p. 59, it is asserted as "the

result of observation and experience, that in all lunatics, and in the

most degraded idiots, whenever manifestations of any mental action

can be educed, the feeling of right and wrong may be proved ta

exist."

"With regard to this test," says Dr. Russell Eeynolds, in hi&

work on "The Scientific Value of the Legal Tests of Insanity,"

p. 34 (London, 1872), "I may say, and most emphatically, that it

is utterly untrustworthy, because untrue to the obvious facts of

mture.""

In the learned treatise of Drs. Bucknill and Tuke on "Psycho-

logical Medicine," p. 269 (4th Ed., London, 1879), the legal tests

of responsibility are discussed, and the adherence of the courts

to the right and wrong test is deplored as unfortunate, the true

principle being stated to be "whether, in consequence of congenital

the e tablishment of asylums for the cu tody and treatment of the
insane, which Chri tiau benevolence and statesmanship have subtituted for jails and gibbets. The testimony of these expertsdi:ffer as they may in many doubtful cases-would seem to be the
best which can be obtained, however unsatisfactory it may be in.
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In the present tate of our law, under the rule in McNaghten'scase, we are onfronted with this practical difficulty, which it elf
demonstrates the defects of the rule. The courts in effect charge
the juries, as matter of law, that no such mental disease exist , as.
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no one of ordinary intelligence can pend an hour in the wards.
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that the court · charge one way, and the jury, following an alleged
higher law of humanity, find another, in harmony with the evidence.
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mo t degraded idiot , whenever manifestation of any mental action
can be educed, the feeling of right and wrong may be proved to
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work on "The Scientific Value of the Legal Tests of Insanity,''
p. 3-± (London, 1872) , "I may say, and mo t emphatically: that it
i utterly untru tworthy, becau e untrue to the obvious facts of
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of respon ibility are discussed, and the adherence of the courts
to the right and wrong test is deplored a unfortunate, the true
principle being stated to be "whether, in consequence of congenital
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defect or acquired disease, tlie power of self-control is absent alto-

gether, or is so far wanting as to render the individual irre-

sponsible." It is observed by the authors: "As has again and

again been shown, the unconsciousness of right and wrong is one

thing, and the powerlessness through cerebral defect or disease to

do right is another. To confound them in an asylum would have

the effect of transferring a considerable number of the inmates

thence to the treadmill or the gallows."

Dr. Peter Bryce, Superintendent of the Alabama Insane Hos-

pital for more than a quarter century past, alluding to the moral

and disciplinary treatment to which the insane inmates are sub-

jected, observes: "They are dealt with in this institution, as far

as it is practicable to do so, as rational beings; and it seldom

happens that we meet with an insane person who can not be made

to discern, to some feeble extent, his duties to himself and others,

and his true relations to society." Sixteenth Annual Eep. Ala.

Insane Hosp. (1876), p. 22; Biennial Rep. (1886), pp. 12-18.

Other distinguished writers on the medical jurisprudence of in-

sanity have expressed like views, with comparative unanimity. And
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nowhere do we find the rule more emphatically condemned than

by those who have the practical care and treatment of the insane

in the various lunatic asylums of every civilized country. A notable

instance is found in the following resolution unanimously passed

at the annual meeting of the British Association of Medical Officers

of Asylums and Hospitals for the Insane, held in London, July 14,

1864, where there were present fifty-four medical officers:

''Resolved, That so much of the legal test of the mental condi-

tion of an alleged criminal lunatic as renders him a responsible

agent, because he knows the difference between right and wrong, is

inconsistent with the fact, well known to every member of this

meeting, that the power of distinguishing between right and wrong

exists very frequently in those who are undoubtedly insane, and is

often associated with dangerous and uncontrollable delusions."

Judicial Aspects of Ins. (Ordronaux, 1877), 423-424.

These testimonials as to a scientific fact are recognized by intelli-

gent men in the affairs of every day business, and are constantly

acted on by juries. They can not be silently ignored by judges.

Whether established or not, there is certainly respectable evidence

tending to establish it, and this is all the courts can require.

Nor are the modern law writers silent in their disapproval of

defect or acquired di ea e, the power of self-control i absent altogether, or i so far wanting a to render the individual irreponsible." It is observed by the authors: "As has again and
again been shown, the unconsciou ne s of right and wrong is one
thing, and the powerlessne s through cerebral defect or disea e to
do right is another. To confound them in an asylum would have
the effect of tran ferring a considerable number of the inmates
thence to the treadmill or the gallows."
Dr. Peter Bryce, Superintendent of the Alabama Insane Hospital for more than a quarter century pa t, alluding to the moral
and disciplinary treatment to which the insane inmates are subjected, observes: "They are dealt with in this institution, as far
as it is practicable to do so, as rational beings; and it seldom
happen that we meet with an insane person who can not be made
to discern, to some feeble extent, his duties to himself and others,
and his true relations to society." Sixteenth Annual Rep. Ala.
Insane Hosp. (1876), p. 22; Biennial Rep. (188G), pp. 12-18.
Other distinguished writers on the medical jurisprudence of insanity have expressed like views, with comparative unanimity. And
nowhere do we find the rule more emphatically condemned than
by those who have the practical care and treatment of the insane
in the various lunatic a ylums of every civilized country. A notable
instance is found in the following resolution unanimously pas ed
at the annual meeting of the British As ociation of Medical Officers
of Asylums and Ho pitals for the Insane, held in London, July 14,
1864, where there were present fifty-four medical officers:
"ResolvedJ That o much of the legal test of the mental condition of an all ged criminal lunatic a renders him a respon ible
agent, because he know the difference between right and wrong, is
incon istent with the fact, well known to every member of this
meeting, that the power of di tingui hing between right and wrong
exist very frequently in tho e who are undoubtedly insane, and i
often associated with dangerous and uncontrollable delusions."
Judicial Aspects of Ins. ( Ordronaux, 1877), 423-424.
These testimonial a to a cientific fact are recognized by intelligent men in the affair of every day busine s, and are constantly
acted on by juries. They can not be silently ignored by judges.
Whether e tablished or not, there is certainly respectable evidence
tending to e tablish it, and this is all the court can require.
Nor are the modern law writers ilent in their di approval of
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the alleged test under discussion. It meets with the criticism or

condemnation of the most respectable and advanced in thought

among them, the tendency being to incorporate in the legal rule

of responsibility "not only the Icnowledge of good and evil, but the

l^ower to choose the one, and refrain from the other." Browne's

Med. Jur. of Insanity, § 13 et seq., § 18 ; Eay's Med. Jur. §§ 16-19 ;

Whart. & Stilles' Med. Jur., § 59; 1 Whart. Cr. Law (9th Ed.),

§§ 33, 43, 45; 1 Bish. Cr. Law (7th. Ed.), § 386 et seq.; Judicial

Aspects of Insanity (Ordronaux), 419; 1 Green. Ev., § 372; 1

Steph. Hist. Cr. Law, § 168; Amer. Law Eev., Vol. 4 (1869-70),

236 et seq.

The following practicable suggestion is made in the able treatise

of Balfour Browne above alluded to : "In a case of alleged in-

sanity, then," he says, "if the individual suffering from enfeeble-

ment of intellect, delusion, or any other form of mental aberra-

tion, was looked upon as, to the extent of this delusion, under the

influence of duress (the dire duress of disease), and in so. far

incapacitated to choose the good and eschew the evil, in so far, it

seems to us," he continues, "would the requirements of the law
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be fulfilled; and in that way it would afford an opening, by the

evidence of experts, for the proof of the amount of self-duress in

each individual case, and thus alone can the criterion of law and

the criterion of the inductive science of medical psychology he

made to coincide." Med. Jur. of Ins. (Browne), § 18.

This, in our judgment, is the practical solution of the difficulty

before us, as it preserves to the courts and the juries, respectively,

a harmonious field for the full assertion of their time honored

functions.

So great, it may be added, are the embarrassments growing

out of the old rule, as expounded by the judges in the House

of English Lords, that, in March, 1874, a bill was brought before

the House of Commons, supposed to have been drafted by the

learned counsel for the Queen, Mr. Fitzjames Stephen, which

introduced into the old rule the new element of an absence of the

power of self-control, produced by diseases affecting the mind,

and this proposed alteration of the law was cordially recommended

by the late Chief Justice Cockburn, his only objection being that

the principle was proposed to be limited to the case of homicide.

—1 Whart. Cr. Law (9th Ed.), § 45, p. 66, notel; Browne's Med.

Jur. of Insan., § 10, note 1.

the alleged test under di cus ion. It meets with the criticism or
condemnation of the most respectable and advanced in thought
among them, the tendency being to incorporate in the legal rule
of responsibility "not only the knowledge of good and evil, but the
JJOwer to choo r; the one, and refrain from the other." Browne'
l\fod. Jur. of Insanity, § 13 et seq.J § 18; Ray' :Med. Jur. §§ 16-19;
'Whart. & Stilles' 1\fod. Jur., § 59; 1 Whart. Cr. Law (9th Ed.) ,
§~ 33, 43, 45; 1 Bish. Cr. Law (1th. Ed.), § 386 et seq.J· Judicial
Aspects of Insanity ( Ordronaux), 419; 1 Green. Ev., § 372; 1
'Steph. Hist. Cr. Law, ~ 168; Amer. Law Rev., Vol. 4 ( 1869-70),
236 et seq.
The following practicable suggestion is made in the able treatise
of Balfour Browne above alluded to: "In a case of alleged insanity, then," he says, "if the individual suffering from enfeeblement of intellect, delusion, or any other form of mental aberration, was looked upon a , to the extent of this delu ion, under the
influence of duress (the dire duress of disease), and in so. far
incapacitated to choose the good and eschew the evil, in so far, it
seems to us," he continues, "would the requirements of the law
be fulfilled; and in that way it would afford an opening, by the
evidence of experts, for the proof of the amount of self-duress in
each individual case, and thus alone can the criterion of law and
the criterion of the inductive science of medical psychology be
made to coincide." Med. J ur. of In . (Browne), § 18.
This, in our judgment, is the praqtical solution of the difficulty
before us, as it preserves to the courts and the juries, respectively,
a harmonious field for the full assertion of their time honored
functions.
So great, it may be added, are the embarrassments growing
out of the old rule, as expounded by the judges in the House
of English Lords, that, in March, 1874, a bill was brought before
the House of Commons, supposed to have been drafted by the
learned counsel for the Queen, Mr. Fitzjames Stephen, which
introduced into the old rule the new element of an absence of the
}Jower of self-control, produced by disea e affecting the mind,
and this proposed alteration of the law was cordially recommended
by the late Chief Justice Cockburn, his only objection being that
the principle was proposed to be limited to the case of homicide.
-1 Whart. Cr. Law (9th Ed.), § 45, p. 66, note 1; Browne' Med .
.J ur. of Insan., § 10, note 1.
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There are many well considered cases which support these views.

In the famous'^case of Hadfield, 27 How. St. Tr. 1283, s. c, 2

Lawson's Cr. Def. 201-215, who was indicted and tried for shooting-

the King, and who was defended by Mr. Erskine in an argument

most able and eloquent, it clearly appeared that the accused under-

stood the difference between right and wrong as applied to the

particular act. Yet he labored under the delusion that he had

constant intercourse with the Divine Creator; that the world was

coming to an end, and that, like Christ, he must be sacrificed for

its salvation. He was so much under the duress of the delusion

that he "must be destroyed, but ought not to destroy himself,"

that he committed the act for the specific purpose of being arrested

and executed. He was acquitted on being tried before Lord Ken-

yon, and, no one ever doubted, justly so.

The case of United States v. Lawrence, 4 Cr. C. C. Eep. 518,

tried in 1835, presented another instance of delusion, the prisoner

supposing himself to be the King of England and of the United

States as an appendage of England, and that General Jackson,

then President, stood in his way in the enjoyment of the right.
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Acting under the duress of this delusion, the accused assaulted

the President by attempting to shoot him with a pistol. He was,

in five minutes, acquitted by the jury on the ground of insanity.

The case of the United States v. Guiteau, 10 Fed. Eep. 161,

s. c. 2 Lawson's Cr. Def. 162, is still fresh in contemporary recol-

lection, and a mention of it can scarcely be omitted in the dis-

cussion of the subject of insanity. The accused was tried, sen-

tenced, and executed for the assassination of James A. Garfield,

then President of the United States, which occurred in July, 1881.

The accused himself testified that he was impelled to commit the

act of killing by inspiration from the Almighty, in order, as he

declared, "to unite the two factions of the Eepublican party, and

thereby save the government from going into the hands of the

ex-rebels and their Northern allies." There was evidence of

various symptoms of mental unsoundness, and some evidence tend-

ing to prove such an alleged delusion, but there was also evidence

to the contrary, strongly supported by the most distinguished

experts, and looking to the conclusion, that the accused enter-

tained no such delusion, but that, being a very eccentric and

immoral man, he acted from moral obliquity, the morbid love of

notoriety, and with the expressed hope that the faction of the

There are many well con idered a e which upport th e v1 w::.
In the famou ca e of Had field,
How. t. Tr. 12 9 . c. ·>
9
Law on'
r. Def. 901- 15, who wa indicted and tried for hootin o·
the King and who wa defended by 1fr. Er kine in an argument
most able and eloquent, it clearly appeared that the accu ed undertood the differen ce between right and wrong a applied to the
particular act. Yet h e labored under the delu ion that h e had
con tant intercour e with the Divine Creator; that the world wa s
coming to an end, and that, like hri t, he mu t be acrificed for
it salvation. He wa o much under the dure ~ of the delu ion
that he "mu t be de troyed, but ought not to de troy himself "
that he committed the act for the pecific purpo e of being arre t ed
and executed. H e wa acquitted on being tried before Lord Kenyon, and, no one ever doubted, ju tly so.
The ca e of United States v. Lawrence, 4 Cr. C. C. Rep. 51 ,
tried in 1835, presented another in tance of delu ion, the pri oner
upposing himself to be the King of England and of the "Gnitecl
tate a an appendage of England, and that General Jack on
then Pre ident, toad in his way in the enjoyment of the right.
Acting under the dure of thi delu ion, the accu ed a ..,aulted
the Pre ident by attempting to hoot him with a pistol. H e wa ,
in five minute ', acquitted by the jury on the ground of in anity.
· The ca.e of the nited States v. Guiteau, 10 Fed. Rep. 161,
.
. 9 Law on'
r. Def. 162, i till fre h in contemporary recollection, and a mention of it can carcely be omitted in the di cu ~ ion of the ubj ect of insanity.
The accu ed was tried, sent enced, and executed for the assa ination of James A. Garfield,
then Pre ident of the nited State , which occurred in Jul , 1 1.
The aecu ed him elf t tified that h wa impelled to commit the
act of killing by in piration from th Almighty, in order, a he
de lared, to unite the two faction of the Republican party, and.
th r b3 save the government from going into the hand of the
x-reb 1 and their
orthern allie .'
There wa evid nee of
rnriou ymptom of mental un oundne , and ome evidence t ·nding to prove .~uch an alleged delu ion but th re wa al o evid nee
to the ontrary, trongly supported by the mo t di tingui h c1
xpert , and looking to the conclu ion, that the accu ed ent rtained no uch delu ion, but that, being a v ry eccentric an<l
immoral man, he act d from moral obliquity, th morbid lov of
notoriety, and with the expre e 1 hop that the faction of th
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Republican party^, in whose interest he professed to act, would

intervene to protect him. The case was tried before the United

States District Court, for the District of Columbia, before Mr.

Justice Cox, whose charge to the jury is replete with interest and

learning. While he adopted the right and wrong test of insanity,

he yet recognized the principle, that, if the accused in fact enter-

tained an insane delusion, which was the product of the disease

of insanity, and not of a malicious heart and vicious nature, and

acted solely under the influence of such delusion, he could not be

charged with entertaining a criminal intent. An insane delusion

was defined to be "an unreasoning and incorrigible belief in the

existence of facts, which are either impossible absolutely, or im-

possible under the circumstances of the individual," and no doubt

the case was largely determined by the application of this defini-

tion by the jury. It must ever be a mere matter of speculation

what influence may have been exerted upon them by the high

personal and political significance of the deceased, as the Chief

Magistrate of the Government, or other peculiar surroundings of

a partisan nature. The case in its facts is so peculiar as scarcely
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to serve the purpose of a useful precedent in the future.

We note other adjudged cases, in this country, which support

the modern rule for which we here contend, including one de-

cided in England as far back as 1840, often referred to by the

text writers. In Rex v. Oxford, 2 C. & P. 225, Lord Denman

clearly had in mind this principle, when, after observing that one

may commit a crime and not be responsible, he used this significant

language: "If some controlling disease was in truth the acting

poiver within him, which he could not resist, then he will not be

responsible." The accused in that case acted under the duress of a

delusion of an insane character.

In State v. Felter, 25 Iowa, 67, the capacity to distinguish

between right and wrong was held not to be a safe test of criminal

responsibility in all cases, and it was accordingly decided, that, if

a person commit a homicide, knowing it to be wrong, but do so

under the influence of an uncontrollable and irresistible impulse,

arising not from natural passion, but from an insane condition

of the mind, he is not criminally responsible. "If," said Chief

Justice Dillon, 'T^y the observation and concurrent testimony of

medical men who make the study of insanity a specialty, it shall

be definitelv established to be true, that there is an unsound

Republican party, in whose interest he professed to act, would
intervene to protect him. The case was tried before the United
States District Court, for the ·District of Columbia, before Mr.
Justice Cox, whose charge to the jury is replete with interest and
learning. While he adopted the right and wrong test of insanity,
he yet recognized the principle, that, if the accused in fact entertained an insane delusion, which was the product of the disease
of insanity, and not of a maliciou heart and vicious nature, and
acted solely under the influence of such delu ion, he could not be
charged with entertaining a criminal intent. An insane delusion
wus defined to be "an unreasoning and incorrigible belief in the
existence of facts, which are either impossible absolutely, or impossible under the circumstances of the individual," and no doubt
the case was largely determined by the application of this definition by the jury. It must ever be a mere matter of speculation
what influence may have been exerted upon them by the high
personal and political significance of the deceased, as the Chief
Magistrate of the Government, or other peculiar surTOundings of
a partisan nature. The case in its facts is so peculiar as scarcely
to serve the. purpose of a useful precedent in the future.
We note other adjudged cases, in this country, which support
the modern Tule for which we here contend, including one decided in England as far back as 1840, often referred to by the
text writers. In Rex v. Oxford, 2 C. & P . 225, Lord Denman
clearly had in mind this principle, when, after observing that one
may commit a crjme and not be responsible, he used this significant
language: "If some controlling dis ease was in truth the actvng
power within him, which he co'llld not resist, then he will not be
responsible." The accused in that case acted under the duress of a
delusion of an insane character.
In State v. F elter, 25 Iowa, 67, the capacity to distinguish
between right and wrong was held not to be a afe test of criminal
responsibility in all cases, and it was accordingly decided, that, if
a person commit a homicide, knowing it to be wrong, but do so
under the influence of an uncontrollable and irresistible impulse,
ari::ing not from natural passion, but from an insane condition
of the mind, he is not criminally responsible. "If," said Chief
.Justice Dillon, ''by the observation and concurrent testimony of
medical men who make the study of insanity a specialty, it shall
be definitely established to be true, that there is an unsound
1
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condition of the mind, that is, a diseased condition of the mind,

in which, though a person abstract!}' knows that a given act is

wrong, he is yet, by an insane impulse, that is, an impulse pro-

ceeding from a diseased intellect, irresistibly driven to commit

it — the law must modify its ancient doctrines and recognize the

truth, and give to this condition, when it is satisfactorily shown

to exist, its exculpatory effect."

In Hopps V. People, 31 111. 385, which was an indictment for

murder, the same rule was recognized in different words. It was

there held, that if, at the time of the killing, the defendant was

not of sound mind, but affected with insanity, and such disease

was the efficient cause of the act, operating to create an uncoii-

irollable impulse so as to deprive the accused of the power of

volition in the matter, and he would not have done the act but

for the existence of such condition of mind, he ought to be ac-

quitted

In Bradley v. State, 31 Ind. 492, a like modification of the

old rule was announced, the court observing: "Men, under the

influence of disease, may know the right, and yet be powerless to
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resist the wrong. The well known exhibition of cunning by per-

sons admitted to be insane, in the perpetration of an illegal act,

would seem to indicate comprehension of its evil nature and legal

consequences, and yet the power of self-control being lost from

disease, there can be no legal responsibility."

In Earris v. State, 18 Tex. Ct. App. 287, s. c, 5 Amer. Cr.

Eep. (Gibbons), 357, this rule was applied to the disease known

as kleptomania, which was defined as a species of insanity produc-

ing an uncontrollable propensity to steal, and it was held, if clearly

established by the evidence, to constitute a complete defense in a

trial for theft.

The State v. PiTie, 49 N. H. 399, was an indictment for murder,

to which the plea of insanity was set up as a defense. It was held

to be a question of fact for the jury to determine; (1) whether

there was such a mental disease as dipsomania, which is an irre-

sistible craving for alcoholic liquors, and (2) whether the act of

killing was the product of such disease. One of the most instructive

discussions on the law of insanity, which can be found in legal

literature, is the learned opinion of Mr. Justice Doe in that case. —

Lawson on Insanity, pp. 311-312 ; 2 Lawson's Cr. Def. 311 cl seq.

This ruling was followed by the same court in State v. Jones,

condition of the mind that i a di ea ed condition of the mind,
in which, though a per on ab tractly know that a given act i
wrong, he is ye, by an insane impulse, that i an impul e proceeding from a di . . ea ed intellect, irre i tibl driven to commit
it-the law mu t modif it ancient doctrine and recognize the
truth, and gi e to this condition, when it i ati factorily hown
to exi t, it exculpatory effect."
In Hopps . People, 31 Ill. 385, which wa an indictm nt for
murder, the ame rule wa recognized in different word . It wa ·
there held, that if, at the time of the killing, the defendant wa
not of ound mind, but affected with in anity, and uch di"ea e
was the efficient cause of the act, operating to create an uncontrollable impulse so as to deprive the accused of the power of
-volition in the matter, and h e would not have done the act but
for the existence of such condition of mind, he ought to be ac·q uitted.
In Bra,dley v. State, 31 Ind. 492, a like modification of the
old rule wa announced, the court ob erving: " fen, under the
influence of di ease, may know the right, and yet be powerle s to
resist the wrong. The well known exhibition of cunning bv persons admitted to be insane, in the perpetr.ation of an illegal act,
would seem to indicate comprehension of it evil nature and legal
1consequence , and yet the power of self-control being lo t from
disease, there can be no legal re ponsibilit3 ."
In H arris v. State, 18 T ex. Ct. App. 28 , s. c., 5 Amer. Cr.
R ep. (Gibbons) 35 , this rule wa applied to the disea e known
a kl eptomania, which was defined as a specie of in anity producing an uncontrollable propen ity to teal, and it wa held, if clearl r
established by the evidence, to con titute a complete defen e in a
trial for theft.
Th e State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399, wa an indictment for murder
to which th'e plea of in anity wa et up a a defen e. It wa held
to be a que ti on of fact for the jury to determine ; ( 1) whether
there wa uch a mental di ease a dip omania, which i an irrei tible craving for alcoholic liquor , and ( 2) whether th act of
killing wa the prod u t of uch di ea e. One of th mo . . t in tructi Ye
di cu ion on the law of in anity, which can be faun 1 in leaal
literature, i the learned opinion of Mr. Ju tic Doe in that ca c.Law on on In"anity, pp. 311-312; 2 Law on'
r. D f. 311 et eq.
Thi ruling wa followed by the ame court in tate v. Jon e ,
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50 N, H. 369, s. c, 9 Amer. Rep. 243, which was an indictment

charging the defendant with murdering his wife. The evidence

tended to show that the defendant was insane, and killed her

Tinder the delusive belief that she had been guilty of adultery with

one French. The rule in McNaghtens case was entirely repudiated,,

both on the subject of the right and wrong test, and that of de-

lusions, and it was held that the defendant should be acquitted

if he was at the time afflicted with a disease of the mind of such

character as to take away the capacity to entertain a criminal

intent, and that there could be no criminal intent imputed, if, as

matter of fact, the evidence showed that the killing was the off-

spring or product of such disease.

Numerous other cases could be cited bearing on this particular

phase of the law, and supporting the above views with more or less

clearness of statement. That some of these cases adopt the ex-

treme view, and recognize moral insanity as a defense to crime,,

and others adopt a measure of proof for the establishment of

insanity more liberal to the defendant than our own rule, can

neither lessen their weight as authority, nor destroy the force of
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their logic. Many of them go further on each of these points than

this court has done, and are, therefore, stronger authorities than

they would otherwise be in support of our views. — Kriel v. Com., 5

Bush. (Ky.) 362; Smith v. Com., 1 Duv. (Ky.) 224; DejarncUe

V. Com., 75 Va. 867 ; Coyle v. Com., 100 Penn. St. 573 ; Cunning-

ham V. State, 56 Miss. 269; Com., v. Rogers, 7 Mete. 500; State v.

Johnson, 40 Conn. 136; Anderson v. State, 43 Conn. 514, 525;

Buswell on Ins., § 439 et seq.; State v. McWhorter, 46 Iowa 88.

The law of Scotland is in accord with the English law on this

subject, as might well be expected. The criminal Code of Ger-

many, however, contains the following provision, which is said tO'

have been the formulated result of a very able discussion both

by the physicians and lawyers of that country: "There is nO'

criminal act when the actor at the time of the offense is in a state'

of unconsciousness, or morbid disturbance of the mind, through

ivhich the free determination of his will is excluded." — Encyc.

Brit. (9th Ed.), Vol. 9, p. 112; citing Crim. Code of Germany

(§ 51, R. G. B.).

The Code of France provides: "There can be no crime or

offense if the accused was in a state of madness at the time of

the act." For some time the French tribunals were inclined ta
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50 N. H. 369, s. c., 9 Amer. Rep. 242, which was an indictment
charging the defendant with murdering his wife. The evidence
tended to show that the defendant was insane, and killed her
under the delusive belief that she had been guilty of adultery with
one French. The rule in McNaght en's case was entirely repudiated,.
both on the subject of the right and wrong test, and that of delusions, and it was held that the defendant should be acquitted
if he was at the time afflicted with a disease of the mind of such
character as to take away the capacity to entertain a criminal
intent, and that there could be no criminal intent imputed, if, as
matter of fact, the evidence showed that the killing was the offspring or product of such disease.
Numerous other cases could be cited bearing on this particular
phase of the law, and supporting the above views with more or less
clearness of statement. That some of these ca es adopt the extreme view, and recognize moral insanity as a defense to crim e,,
and others adopt a mea ure of proof for the establishment of
insanitv more liberal to the defendant than our own rule, can
neither Jessen their weight as authority, nor destroy the force of
their logic. Many of them go further on each of these points than
this court has done, and are, therefore, stronger authorities than
they would otherwise be in support of our views. -K riel v. Corn., 5
Bush. (Ky.) 362; Srnith v. Corn., 1 Duv. (Ky.) 224; D ejarnette·
v. Corn._. 75 Vu. 867; Coyle v. Corn., 100 Penn. St. 573; Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 2G9; Com. v. Rogers, 7 Mete. 500; State v.
Johnson, 40 Conn. 136; Anderson v. State, 43 Conn. 514: 525 ;·
Buswell on Ins., § 439 et seq.; State v. McWhorter, 46 Iowa 88.
The law of Scotland is in accord with the Engli h law on this
subject, as might well be expected. The criminal Code of Germany, however_. contains the following provision, which is said to·
have been the formulated result of a very able discussion both
by the physicians and lawyers of that country: "There is n<>
criminal act when the actor at the time of the offense is in a state·
of unconsciousness, or morbid disturbance of the mind, throu.q h
which the free det ermination of his will is excluded."-Encyc.
Brit. (9th Ed.), Vol. 9, p. 112; citing Crim. Code of Germany
(~ 51, R. G. B.).
The Code of France provides: "There can be no crime or
offense if the accused was in a state of madness at the tim e of
the act." For ~ome time the French tribunals were inclined to
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interpret this law in such a manner as to follow in substance

the law of England. But that construction has been abandoned^

and the modern view of the medical profession is now adopted in

that country.

It is no satisfactory objection to say that the rule above announced

by us is of difficult "application. The rule in McNaglitcns case^

supra, is equally obnoxious to a like criticism. The difficulty docs

not lie in the rule, but is inherent in the subject of insanity itself.

The practicable trouble is for the courts to determine in what

particular cases the party on trial is to be transferred from the

category of sane to that of insane criminals — where, in other words,

the border line of punishability is adjudged to be passed. But, as

has been said in reference to an every day fact of nature, no one

can say where twilight ends or begins, but there is ample dis-

tinction nevertheless between day and night. We think we can

safely rely in this matter upon the intelligence of our juries,,

guided by the testimony of men who have practically made a study

of the disease of insanity; and enlightened by a conscientious

desire, on the one hand, to enforce the criminal laws of the land,
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and on the other, not to deal harshly with any unfortunate victim

of a diseased mind, acting without the light of reason, or the power

of volition.

Several rulings of the court, including especially the one given.

ex mero motu, and the one numbered five, were in conflict with

this view, and for these errors the judgment must be reversed.

The charges requested by defendant were all objectionable on va-

rious grounds. Some of them were imperfect statements of the rules

above announced ; some were argumentative, and others were mis-

leading by reason of ignoring one or more of the essentials of

criminal irresponsibility, as explained in the foregoing opinion.

It is almost needless to add that where one does not act under

the duress of a diseased mind, or insane delusion, but from mo-

tives of anger, revenge or other passion, he can not claim to be

shielded from punishment for crime on the ground of insanity.

Insanity proper, is more or less a mental derangement, coexisting

often, it is true, with a disturbance of the emotions, affections and

other moral powers. A mere moral, or emotional insanity, so-

called, unconnected with disease of the mind, or irresistible im-

pulse resulting from mere moral obliquity, or wicked propensities

and habits, is not recognized as a defense to crime in our courts. —

interpret this law in . uch a manner as to follow in sub . . tancethe law of England. But that con truction ha been abandoned
and the modern view of the medical prof e ion i now adopted in_
that country.
It is no satisfactory objection to ay that the rule above announced
by u i of difficult -application. The rule in McNaghten's case~
supra, i equally obnoxiou to a like critici m. The difficulty doe._
not lie in the rule, but is inherent in the 'ubject of insauity it elf.
The practicable trouble is for the courts to determine in what
particular cases the party on trial i to be tran f erred from the
category of sane to that of insane criminals-where, in other word ,,
the border line of punishability i adjudged to be passed. But, a
ha been said in reference to an every day fact of nature, no onecan say where twilight ends or begin , but there i ample distinction neverthele between day and night. We think we can_
safely rely in this matter upon the intelligence of our juries,
guided by the testimony of men who have practically made a tudy
of the di ease of insanity; and enlightened by a conscientious
desire, on the one hand, to enforce the criminal laws of the land,
and on the other, not to deal har hly with any unfortunate victim
of a diseased mind, acting without the light of reason, or the powe:rof volition.
Several ruling of the court, including especially the one given.
ex m ero motu, and the one numbered five, were in conflict with
this view, and for the e error the judgment must be reversed.
The charges reque ted by defendant were all objectionable on variou. grounds. Some of them were imperfect statements of the rule
above announced; ome were argumentative, and others were mi leading by rea. on of ignoring one or more of the es ential of
criminal irrespon ibility, as explained in the foregoing opiuion.
It i almost needle s to add that where one does not act under
the dures of a di ea ed mind, or in ane delu ion, but from motive of anger, revenge or other pa sion, he can not claim to b
hielded from puni hment for crime on the ground of in anit}.
In anity proper, i more or les a mental derangement, coe.xi ting
often, it i true, with a di turbance of the emotion , affection and
other moral power .
mere moral, or emotional in anity, ocalled, unconnected with di ea e of the min 1 or irre i tibl impul.:: re ulting from mere moral obliquity, or wick d propen~iti
and habiL, is not r cognized a a def n e to rim in our ourt ·.-
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1 Whar. Cr. Law (9th Ed.), § 46; Boswell v. State, 63 Ala. 307,

35 Amer. Eep. 20; Ford v. State, 71 Ala. 385.

The charges refused by the court raise the question as to how

far one acting under the influence of an insane delusion is to be

exempted from criminal accountability. The evidence tended to

show that one of the defendants, Mrs. Nancy J. Parsons, acted

under the influence of an insane delusion that the deceased, whom

she assisted in killing, possessed supernatural power to afflict her

with disease and to take her life by some "supernatural trick";

that by means of such power the deceased had caused defendant

to be in bad health for a long time, and that she acted under the

belief that she was in great danger of the loss of her life from the

conduct of deceased operating by means of such supernatural

power.

The rule in McNaghtens case, as decided by the English judges,

and supposed to have been adopted by the court, is that the

defense of insane delusion can be allowed to prevail in a criminal

case only when the imaginary state of facts would, if real, justify

or excuse the act ; or, in the language of the English judges them-
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selves, the defendant "must be considered in the same situation as

to responsibility, as if the facts with respect to which the delusion

exists were real." — BoswelVs case, 63 Ala. 307. It is apparent,

from what we have said, that this rule can not be correct as applied

to all cases of this nature, even limiting it as done by the English

judges to cases where one "labors under partial delusion, and is

not in other respects insane." — McNaglitens case, 10 CI. & P. 200;

s. Q., 2 Lawson's Cr. Def. 150. It holds a partially insane person

as responsible as if he were entirely sane, and it ignores the possi-

bility of crime being committed under the duress of an insane

delusion, operating upon a human mind, the integrity of which

is destroyed or impaired by disease, except, perhaps, in cases where

the imaginary state of facts, if real, would excuse or justify the

act done under their influence. — Fields' Med. Leg. Guide, 101-104 ;

Guy & F. on Forensic Med. 220. If the rule declared by the

English judges be correct, it necessarily follows that the only pos-

sible instance of excusable homicide in cases of delusional insanity

would be, where the delusion, if real, would have been such as to

create, in the mind of a reasonable man, a just apprehension of

imminent peril to life or limb. The personal fear, or timid cow-

.ardice of the insane man, although created by disease acting

1 Whar. Cr. Law (9th Ed.), § 46; Boswell v. State, 63 Ala. 307,
35 Amer. Rep. 20; Ford v. State, 71 Ala. 385.
The charges refused by the court raise the question as to how .
far one acting under the influence of an insane delusion is to be
exempted from criminal accountability. The evidence tended to
show that one of the defendants, Mrs. Nancy J. Parsons, acted
under the influence of an insane delusion that the deceased, whom
he assisted in killing, possessed supernatural power to afflict her
with disease and to take her life by some "supernatural trick";
that by means of such po·wer the deceased had caused defendant
i:o be in bad health for a long time, and that she acted under the
belief that she was in great danger of the lo s of her life from the
conduct of decea ed operating by mean of such supernatural
power.
The rule in M cN aghten's case, as decided by the English judges,
and supposed to have been adopted by the court, is that the
defense of insane delusion can be allowed to prevail in a criminal
case only when the imaginary state of facts would, if real, justify
or excuse the act; or, in the language of the Engli h judges themselves, the defendant "must be considered in the same situation as
to responsibility, as if the facts with respect to which the delusion
exists were real." -Boswell'$ case, 63 Ala. 307. It is apparent,
from what we have i-aicl, that this rule can not be correct as applied
to all cases of this nature, even limiting it as done by the English
judges to cases where one "labors under partial delusion, and is
not in other respects insane."-McNaghten's case, 10 CL & P. 200;
s. c., ~ Lawson's Cr. Def. 150. It holds a partially insane person
as responsible as if he were entirely sane, and it ignores the possibility of crime being committed under the duress of an insane
delusion, operating upon a human mind~ the integrity of which
is destroyed or impaired by disease, except, perhaps, in cases where
the imaginary state of facts, if real, would excuse or justify the
act done under their influence.-Fields' Med. Leg. Guide, 101-104;
Guy & F. on Forensic Med. 220. If the rule declared by the
English judges be correct, it nece sarily follows that the only pos.sible instance of excusable homicide in cases of delusional insanity
would be, where the delusion, if real, would have been such as to
create, in the mind of a reasonable man, a just apprehension of
imminent peril to life or limb. The personal fear, or timid cow.ardice of the insane man, although created by di ea e acting
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through a prostrated nervous organization, would not excuse undue

precipitation of action on his part. Nothing would justify assail-

ing his supposed adversary except an overt act, or demonstration on

the part of the latter, such as, if the imaginary facts were real,

would under like circumstances, have justified a man perfectly sane

in shooting or killing. If he dare fail to reason, on the supposed

facts embodied in the delusion, as perfectly as a sane man could

do on a like state of realities, he receives no mercy at the hands of

the law. It exacts of him the last pound of flesh. It would follow,

also, under this rule, that the partially insane man, afflicted with

delusions, would no more be excusable than a sane man would be,

if, perchance, it was by his fault the difficulty was provoked,

whether by word or deed; or, if, in fine, he may have been so

negligent as not to have declined combat when he could do so

safety, without increasing his peril of life or limb. If this has

been the law heretofore, it is time it should be so no longer. It is

not only opposed to the known facts of modern medical science,

but it is a hard and unjust rule to be applied to the unfortunate

and providential victims of disease. It seems to be little less than
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inhumane, and its strict enforcement would probably transfer a

large percentage of the inmates of our Insane Hospital from that

institution to hard labor in the mines, or the penitentiary. Its

fallacy consists in the assumption that no other phase of delusion,

proceeding from a diseased brain, can so destroy the volition of an

insane person as to render him powerless to do what he knows to

be right, or to avoid doing what he may know to be wrong. This

inquiry, as we have said, and here repeat, is a question of fact for

the determination of the jury in each particular case. It is not a

matter of law to be decided by the courts. We think it sufficient

if the insane delusion — by which we mean the delusion proceeding

from a diseased mind — sincerely exists at the time of committing

the alleged crime, and the defendant believing it to be real, is so

influenced by it as either to render him incapable of perceiving

the true nature and quality of the act done, by reason of the

■depravation of the reasoning faculty, or so subverts his will as to

■destroy his free agency by rendering him powerless to resist by

reason of tJie duress of the disease. In such a case, in other words,

there must exist either one of two conditions: (1), Such mental

defect as to render the defendant unable to distinguish l)etween

right and wrong in relation to tlie jiartioular act; or (2), the over-

through a prostrated n ervou organization, would not excu e undue
precipitation of action on hi part. Nothing would justify assailing his suppo ed adver sary except an overt act, or demonstration on
the part of the latter, such a , if the imaginary fact were r al,
would under like circumstance , have justified a man perfectly sane
in shooting or killing. If he dare fail to reason, on the suppo ~ e d
facts embodied in the delu ion, as perfectly as a sane man could
do on a like state of realitie , he r eceives no mercy at the hands of
the law. It exacts of him the last pound of :fie h. It would follow,
also, under this rule, that the partially insane man, afflict ed with
delusion , would no more be excusable than a sane man would be,
if, perchance, it was by his fault the difficulty was provoked,
whether by word or deed; or, if, in fine, he may have been o
negligent as not to have declined combat when he could do '"'o
safely, without increasing his peril of life or limb. If this has
been the law heretofor , it is time it should be so no longer. It i
not only opposed to the known fa ct of modern medical science,
but it is a hard and unjust rule to be applied to the unfortunate
.-and providential victims of disease. It seems to be little le than
inhumane, and its strict enforcement would probably tran fer a
large percentage of the inmates of our Insane Hospital from that
in titution to hard labor in the mines, or the penitentiary. Its
fallacy consists in the a sumption that no other phase of delusion,
proceeding from a diseased brain, can so destroy the volition of an
insane person as to render him power less to do what he knows to
be right, or to avoid doing what he may know to be wrong. This
inquiry, as we have said, and here repeat, is a question of fact for
the determination of the jury in each particular case. It i not a
matter of law to be decided by the court. We think it sufficient
if the insane delusion-by which we mean the delusion proceeding
from a dis eased mind-sincerely exists at the time of committing
the alleged crime, and the defendant believing it to be r al, is o
influenced by it a either to render him incapable of perceiving
the true nature and quality of the act done, by r ason of th
.depravation of the reasoning faculty, or so subverts his will a to
destroy his free agency by rendering him powerle s to r e i t by
reason of the dures of th e disease. In such a a e, in other word.::,
th re mu t exist either one of two con di ti on : ( 1) , u h rn n ta l
defect as to render th defendant unal le to di ~tingui sh 1 twe n
right anl wrong in relation to the parti ular act; or ( 2) , th v r-
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mastering of defendant's will in consequence of the insane delusion

under the influence of which he acts, produced hy disease of the

mind or brain.— T^ea; v. Hadfield, 37 How. St. Tr. 1282, s. c, 2

Lawson's Cr. Def. 201; Roberts v. State, 3 Ga. 310; Com. v.

Bogers, 7 Mete. 500 ; State v. Windsor, 5 Harr. 512 ; Buswell on

Insan. §§ 434 and 440; Amer. Law Review, Vol. 4 (1869-70) pp,

236-252.

In conclusion of this branch of the subject, that we may not be

misunderstood, we think it follows very clearly from what we have

said, that the inquiries to be submitted to the jury then, in every

criminal trial where the defense of insanity is interposed, are these :

1. Was the defendant at the time of the commission of the

alleged crime, as matter of fact, afflicted with a disease of the

mind, so as to be either idiotic, or otherwise insane ?

2. If such be the case, did he know right from wrong as applied

to the particular act in question ? If he did not have such knowl-

edge, he is not legally responsible.

3. If he did have such knowledge, he may nevertheless not be

legally responsible if the two following conditions concur :
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(1.) If, by reason of the duress of such mental disease, he had

so far lost the power to choose between the right and wrong, and

to avoid doing the act in question, as that his free agency was at

the time destroyed.

(2.) And if, at the same time, the alleged crime was so con-

nected with such mental disease, in the relation of cause and

effect, as to have been the product of it solely.

The rule announced in BosivelVs case, 63 Ala. 308, supra, as

etatcd in the fourth head note, is in conflict with the foregoing

conclusions, and to that extent is declared incorrect, and is not

supported by the opinion in that case otherwise than by dictum.

We adhere, however, to the rule declared by this court in Bos-

well's case, supra, and followed in Ford's case, 71 Ala. 385, hold-

ing, that when insanity is set up as a defense in a criminal case,

it must be established to the satisfaction of the jury, by a p:^-

ponderance of the evidence ; and a reasonable doubt of the defend-

ant's sanity, raised by all the evidence, does not authorize an

acquittal.

There was no error in overruling the objection taken by the

defendants to the copy of the venire, or list of jurors, served on

them. The act approved February 17, 1885, (Acts 1884-85, pp.

ma ~tering of defendant's will in consequence of the in ane delusion
under the influence of which he acts, produced by disease of the
mind or brain.-Rex v. Hadfield, 37 How. St. Tr. 12 2, s. c., 2
Lawson's Cr. Def. 201; Rob erts v. S tate, 3 Ga. 310; Com. v.
Rogers, 7 Mete. 500; State v. Windsor, 5 Harr. 51'> ; Bu well on
In an. §§ ±34 and -140; Amer. Law Review, \ ol. ± ( 1 69- 10 ) pp.
236-252.
In conclu ion of thi branch of the ubject, that we may not be
misunderstood, we think it follow ver}' clearly from what we have
aid, that the inquiries to be ubmitted to the jury then, in every
criminal trial where the defen e of in anity i interposed, are the e :
1. Was the defendant at the t ime of the commi ion of the
alleged crime, a matter of fact, afflicted with a disease of the
mind, so a to be either idiotic, or otherwise insane?
2. If such be the ca e, did he know right from wrong as applied
to the particular act in que tion ? If he did not have uch knowledge, he i not legally re ponsible.
3. If he did have uch knowledge, he may nevertheless not be
legally re ponsible if the two following condition concur :
(1.) If, by rea on of the dures of uch mental di ease, he had
o far lo t the power to choose between the right and wrong, and
to avoid doing the act in que tion, a that his free agency wa at
the time destroyed.
( 2.) And if, at the ame time, the alleged crime wa o connected with ._ uch mental Ji ea e, in the relation of cau e and
effect, as to have been the product of it solely.
The rule announced in Bo well's ca e, G3 Ala. 30 , supra, as
@fated in the fourth head note, is in conflict with the foregoing
conclu ions, and to that extent i declared incorrect, and i not
supported by the opinion in that ca c otherwise than by dictum .
We adhere, however, to the rule declared by thi" court in Boswell's case, supra, and followed in Ford's ca e, 11 Ala. 385 holding, that when in anity i et up a a defen .. e in a criminal a e_,
it must be e, tabli hed to the ati faction of the jury, by a preponderance of the evidence; and a reasonable doubt of the defendant's sanity, raised lw all the evidence, doe not authorize an
acquittal.
There was no error in overruling the objection taken by the
defendant to the copy of the venire, or li t of jurors, erved on
them. The act approved February 1 , 18 5, (Act 1 84-85, pp.
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181, 185, Sec. 10), regulating the organization of juries, applies

to this case, and provides that "the names of the jurors so drawn"

in accordance with section 10 of the act, together with the panel,

of thirty-six jurors provided for by section 9, "shall constitute

the venire'' from which the jurors to try capital cases shall be

selected.— Acts 1884-85, pp. 185-186. The rule on this subject

declared in Posey's case, 73 Ala. 490, and Shelton's case, Ih. 5,

lias no application under this act. These cases construe section

4873 of the Code, which contains different language from the law

liere construed.

Under the rule announced in Ford v. State, 71 Ala. 385, 397,

and authorities there cited, there was no error in excluding the

proposed statement of Mrs. Nail. This testimony was defective

in not being preceded more fully by the facts and circumstances

upon which the opinion of the witness as to the sanity of the

accused was predicated, the witness not being an expert. — Eogers

on Expert Test. § 61.

The other rulings of the court need not be considered by us.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. In the mean-
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while the prisoners will be held in custody until discharged by due

process of law.

h. Intoxication.

Pigman v. State, U Ohio Rep. 555. (18Jf6.J

This is a writ of error to the court of common pleas of Marion

county.

The plaintiff in error was indicted for uttering, publishing, bar-

tering, and disposing of counterfeit bank bills. The proof was the

passing of a counterfeit bank bill of twenty dollars. A verdict

of guilty was found by the jury, and the plaintiff was sentenced

to four years' imprisonment in the penitentiary.

A number of errors are assigned. But the one chiefly relied

181, 185, Sec. 10), regulating the organization of jurie , applies
to thi case, and provides that "the name of th jurors so drawn,"
in ac ordance with section 10 of th act, together with the panel,
of thirty-six jurors provided for by ection 9, " hall con~titute
the venire," from which the juror to try capital cases . hall b
selected.- Acts 1884-85, pp. 185-1 6. The rule on this subject
declared in Posey's case, 73 Ala. 490, and helton's case, lb. 5,
has no application under thi act. These ca e con true section
4872 of the Code, which contain different language from the law
bere con trued.
·
Under the rule announced in Ford v. State, 71 Ala. 3 5, 397
. and authorities there cited, there was no error in excluding the
_propo ed statement of Mrs. Nail. This testimony was defective
in not being preceded more fully by the facts and circumstances
upon which the opinion of the witness as to the sanity of the
accused was predicated, the witnes not being an expert.-Rogers
<>n E xpert T est. § 61.
The other rulings of the court need not be considered by us.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. In the meanwhile the prisoners will be held in custody until discharged by due
:process of law.

upon, or at all available, as disclosed in the bill of exceptions, is,

that the court ruled out evidence offered by the accused, to show

b. Into xication.
Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio Rep. 555.

{1846.)

This i a writ of error to the court of common pleas of Marion
county.
The plaintiff in error was indicted for uttering, publishing, bartering, and dispo ing of counterfeit bank bills. The proof was the
passing of a counterfeit bank bill of twenty dollars. A verdict
of guilty was found by the jury, and the plaintiff was sentenc d
to four years' imprisonment in the penitentiary.
A number of errors are a ign d. But the one chiefly r Ii d
upon, or at all availabl , a di..:clo eel in th bill of exc I tion , i ,
that the court rule 1 out evidenc off red by th a cu d, to show
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that he was drunk at the time he passed the bill, and therefore did

not know what he was doing, or that the bill was counterfeit,

^o argument was submitted for the plaintifE.

Eead, J. :

that he was drunk at the time he passed the bill, and therefore did
not know what he was doing, or that the bill was counterfeit.
No argument was submitted for the plaintiff.

Drunkenness is no excuse for crime ; yet, in that class of crimes

and offenses which depend upon guilty knowledge, or the coolness

and deliberation with which they shall have been perpetrated, to

constitute their commission, or fix the degree of guilt, it should

be submitted to the consideration of the jury. If this act is of

that nature that the law requires it should be done with guilty

knowledge, or the degree of guilt depends upon the calm and

deliberate state of the mind at the time of the commission of the

act, it is proper to show any state or condition of the person that

is adverse to the proper exercise of the mind, and the undisturbed

possession of the faculties. The older writers regarded drunken-

ness as an aggravation of the offense, and excluded it for any

purpose. It is a high crime against one's self, and offensive to

society and good morals; yet every man knows that acts may be

committed in a fit of intoxication which would be abhorred in
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sober moments. And it seems strange that any one should ever

have imagined that a person who committed an act from the effect

of drink, which he would not have done if sober, is worse than

the man who commits it from sober and deliberate intent. The

law regards an act done in sudden heat, in a moment of frenzy,

when passion has dethroned reason, as less criminal than the same

act when performed in the cool and undisturbed possession of all

the faculties. There is nothing the law so much abhors as the

cool, deliberate, and settled purpose to do mischief. That is the

quality of a demon ; whilst that which is done on great excitement,

as when the mind is broken up by poison or intoxication, although,

to be punished, may, to some extent, be softened and set down to

the infirmities of human nature. Hence — not regarding it as an

aggravation — drunkenness, as anything else showing the state of

mind or degree of knowledge, should go to the Jvltj. Upon this

principle, in modern cases, it has been permitted to be shown

that the accused was drunk when he perpetrated the crime of

killing, to rebut the idea that it was done in a cool and deliberate

state of the mind, necessary to constitute murder in the first

degree. The principle is undoubtedly right. So, on a charge of

J.:
Drunkenness is no excuse for crime ; yet, in that class of crimes.
and offenses which depend upon guilty knowledge, or the coolness
and deliberation with which they shall have been perpetrated, to
constitute their commission, or fix the degree of guilt, it should
be submitted to the con ideration of the jury. If this act is of
that nature that the law requires it should be done with guilty
knowledge, or the degree of guilt depends upon the calm and
deliberate state of the mind at the time of the commission of the
act, it is proper to show any state or condition of the person that
is adverse to the proper exercise of the mind, and the undisturbed
possession of the faculties. The older writers regarded drunkenness as an aggravation of the offense, and excluded it for any
purpose. It i a high crime again t one's self, and offensive to·
society and good morals; yet every man knows that acts may be
committed in a fit of intoxication which would be abhorred in
sober moments. And it seem strange that any one should ever
have imagined that a person who committed an act from the effect
of drink, which he would not have done if sober, is worse than
the man who commits it from ober and deliberate intent. The
law regards an act done in sudden heat, in a moment of frenzy,.
when passion has dethroned reason, as less criminal than the same
act when performed in the cool and undisturbed pos ession of all
the facultie . There is nothing the law so much abhors as the
cool, deliberate, and settled purpose to do mischief. That is the
quality of a demon; whilst that which is done on great excitement,.
as when the mind is broken up by poison or intoxication, although,
to be punished, may, to some extent, be softened and set down to
the infirmities of human nature. Hence-not regarding it as an
aggravation-drunkenness, as anything el e showing the state of
mind or degree of knowledge, should go to the jury. Upon thi
principle, in modern cases, it has been permitted to be shown
that the accused was drunk when he perpetrated the crime of
killing, to rebut the idea that it was done in a cool and deliberate
state of the mind, necessary to constitute murder in the first
degree. The principle is undoubtedly right. So, on a charge of
READ,

McCooK v.

McCooK V. State . 79
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STATE

passing counterfeit money; if the person was so drunk that he

actually did not know that he had passed a bill that was counter-

feit, he is not guilty. It oftentimes requires much skill to detect

a counterfeit. The crime of passing counterfeit money, consists of

knowingly passing it. To rebut that knowledge, or to enable the

jury to judge rightly of the matter, it is competent for the person

charged to show that he was drunk at the time he passed the bill..

It is a circumstance, among others, entitled to its just weight.

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.

McCooTc V. State, 91 Ga., 7J^0. (1893.)

Lumpkin, J.:

It is the settled policy of our law that drunkenness shall not

be an excuse for crime. The fact of drunkenness may sometimes

be proved to explain motives or to illustrate intention, but in only

passing counterfeit money; if the person was o drunk that h
actually did not know that he had pas ed a bill that was counterfeit, he i not' guilty. It oftentime requires much skill to detect
a counterfeit. The crime of passing counterfeit money, consi t of
knowingly passing it. To rebut that knowledge, or to enable the
jury to judge rightly of the matter, it is competent for the person
charged to show that he was drunk at the time he passed the bill.
It is a circumstance, among others, entitled to its just weight.
Judgment rever ed, and cause remanded.

one instance will it serve as an absolute excuse for the commission

of an act which the law makes penal, and that is where it has been

"occasioned by the fraud, artifice, or contrivance of other person

McCook v. State, 91 Ga., 740.

or persons, for the purpose of having a crime perpetrated/' In

{1893.)

that event, the person or persons causing the drunkenness for such
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purpose shall be considered and punished as a principal or prin-

cipals in the commission of the offense. Code, § 4301. If a person

already drunk is procured by another to commit a crime, he can

not set up the fact of drunkenness as an excuse for his act. If

this were allowed, it would, in a large number of cases, be difficult,

if not altogether impracticable, to make a drunken man responsible

for his crimes at all ; and accordingly, we think it safer and wiser

to adhere closely to the plain meaning of the section cited. This

is not violative of the rule requiring criminal statutes to be con-

strued strictly. The general rule is that all men, drunk or sober,

are criminally responsible for their acts. One exception, and one

only, is made by the section above mentioned. The language of

that section is not ambiguous or uncertain, and we simply give it

force as expressed, there being no occasion for construction, strict

or otherwise.

J.:
It is the settled policy of our law that drunkenness shall not
be an excuse for crime. The fact of drunkenness may sometimes
be proved to explain motives or to illustrate intention, but in only
one instance will it serve as an absolute excu e for the commis ion
of an act which the law makes penal, and that i where it has been
"occasioned by the fraud, artifice, or contrivance of other person
or persons, for the purpose of having a crime perpetrated." In
that event, the per on or persons causing the drunkenness for uch
purpose hall be considered and punished as a principal or principals in the commis ion of the offen e. Code, § 4301. If a person
already drunk i procured by another to commit a crime, he can
not set up the fact of drunkenness as an excu e for his act. I f
this were allowed, it would, in a large number of cases, be difficult,
if not altogether impracticable, to make a drunken man respon ible
for hi crimes at all; and accordingly, we think it safer and wiser
to adhere closely to ·the plain meaning of the ection cited. Thi
is not violative of the rule requiring criminal statutes to be construed strictly. The general rule is that all men, drunk or ober
are criminally responsible for their acts. One exception, and one
only, is made by the section above mention d. The language of
that ection i not ambiguous or uncertain, and we simply giv it
force a expresE·ed, there being no occasion for construction, strict
or otherwise.
LU1\fPKIN,

CHAPTER III.

THE OVEET ACT.

1. Attempts and Conspiracy.

State V. Wilson, 30 Conn., 500. (1862.)

On the trial to the jury the attorney for the state offered evi-

dence to prove that, on the 4th day of September, 1861, there was

a large number of persons congregated at the railroad station in the

city of Hartford, on the occasion of the funeral of General Lyon,

CHAPTER

that the prisoners were there, and that while the attention of the

III.

persons present was engaged in the ceremonies going on. Marsh,

THE OVERT ACT.

one of the prisoners, thrust his hand into the pocket of an elderly

lady, who was engaged in observing what was passing; and that

Wilson, the other prisoner, was present, aiding and abetting Marsh.

He did not however offer any evidence to prove the name of the

1.

ATTEMPTS AND CONSPIRACY.

woman, nor attempt to prove that she had any money or other

thing of value in her pocket. The counsel for the prisoners there-

State v. Wilson_, 30 Conn., 500.

(1862.)

■upon claimed that, in the absence of any evidence to show the

name of the person into whose pocket Marsh had thrust his hand,

or that she had in her pocket anything of value, no offense known

to the laws of this state had been committed by either of the prison-
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ers, and that they should be acquitted by the jury; and they

requested the court so to charge the jury. The court did not so

instruct the jury, but charged them that, if they should find that

the prisoners had combined to obtain possession of the money of

the people present on that occasion by picking their pockets and to

divide their ill gotten gains between them, and that in pursuance

of this object the said Marsh thrust his hand into the pocket of a

woman whose name was unknown, with an intent in so doing to

steal the money or other property belonging to her if any should

be found in her personal possession, and that the said Wilson

was present aiding and abetting him, their verdict should be

that they were both guilty of the crime charged in the information.

The jury having returned a verdict of guilty against the defend-

80

On the trial to the jury the attorney for the state offered evidence to prove that, on the 4th day of September, 1861, there was
a large number of per ons congregated at the railroad station in the
'City of Hartford, on the occasion of the funeral of General Lyon,
that the prisoners were there, and that while the attention of the
persons present was engaged in the ceremonies going on, Marsh,
·one of the prisoners, thrust his hand into the pocket of an elderly
lady, who was engaged in observing what was passing; and that
Wilson, the other prisoner, was present, aiding and abetting Marsh.
He did not however offer any evidence to prove the name of the
woman, nor attempt to prove that she had any money or other
thing of value in her pocket. The counsel for the prisoners thereupon claimed that, in the absence of any evidence to show the
name of the per on into whose pocket Marsh had thrust his hand,
-0r that she had in her pocket anything of value, no offense known
to the laws of this state had been committed by either of the prison€rs, and that they should be acquitted by the jury; and they
Tequested the court so to charg~ the jury. The court did not so
instruct the jur:v, but charged them that, if they should find that
the prisoners had combined to obtain possession of the money of
the people present on that occasion by picking their pockets and to
divide their ill gotten gain between them, and that in pursuance
of this object the said Marsh thrust his hand into the pocket of a
woman whose name was unknown, with an intent in so doing to
teal the money or other property belonging to her if any should
be found in her personal possession, and that the said Wilson
was present aiding and abetting him, their verdict should be
that they were both guilty of the crime charged in the information.
The jury having returned a verdict of guilty against the defend80
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ants, they moved for a new trial for error in the charge of the

court and in the refusal to charge as they requested. They also

moved in arrest of judgment for the insufficiency of the informa-

tion. The latter motion was reserved with the other for the advice

of this court.

Butler, J. :

We are all satisfied, upon a careful consideration of the case,

.ants, they moved for a new trial for error in the charge of the
eourt and in the refu al to charge as they reque ted. They al o
moved in arre t of judgment for th in ufficien y of the information. The latter motion wa re erved with the other for the advice
of thi court.

that this verdict and judgment should stand.

It may well be doubted whether the first count of the informa-

tion is sufficient. A mere intent to commit a crime, which exists

in the mind only, and has not induced and characterized an act, is

not a punishable offense; and therefore an "attempt" necessarily

includes the intent, and also "an act of endeavor" adapted and

intended to effectuate the purpose; and both must be specifically

alleged and proved. Although it has been said by one of the

elementary writers cited, that an attempt need not be set forth

with as much exactness as is required in an indictment for the

commission of the offense, it is not true as a general proposition,

nor applicable to a case like this. In the first count the intent
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is not expressly alleged. The question was considered in some

of the old cases whether the word "intending," in the introductory

part of an indictment, was a sufficient allegation of the intent, in

cases where the intent was an essential ingredient of the crime,

(as it always is when the act of attempt is otherwise innocent

or a mere trespass) and it was holden that it was. Eex v. Phillips,

6 East., 464, and cases cited. But we are not aware that it has

ever been holden that the allegation may be wholly omitted in

an information for an attempt ; nor of any good reason why it may

not and should not be expressly alleged in all such cases. If it

be said that the words "attempt to steal" imply it sufficiently, the

conclusive answer is, that they equally imply an overt act of en-

deavor, for that is equally an element of the attempt ; and if either

element of the offense may be left to implication, both may be,

and a general averment of an attempt to steal, or to rob, or other

attempt, would in such cases be sufficient. This can not be per-

mitted in justice to the accused, nor consistently with the rule

always substantially adhered to, that the want of a direct allega-

tion of anything material in the description of the nature, sub-

stance or manner of the offense, can not be supplied by intendment

6

B TLER, J.:
We are all ..,a ti fied, upon a careful con idera ti on of th
that thi verdict and judgment hould tand.
It may well be doubted whether the fir t count of the information is sufficient. A. mere intent to commit a crime, which exi'"t
in the mind only, and has not induced and characterized an act, i
not a puni hable offen e ; and ther fore an attempt" nece aril3
includes the intent, and al o "an act of endeavor" adapted and
intended to effectuate the purpo e; and both mu t be specifically
alleged and proved. Although it has been aid by one of the
elementary writer cited: that an attempt need not be et forth
with as much exactne s as is required in an indictment for the
commi ion of the offense, it i not true a a general propo ition,
nor applicable to a ca e like thi . In the first count the intent
is not expres ly alleged. The question wa con idered in some
of the old cases whether the word "intending," in the introductory
part of an indictment, was a sufficient allegation of the intent, in
cases where the intent wa an e ential ingredient of the crime,
(as it always is when the act of attempt is otherwi e innocent
or a mere trespas ) and it was holden that it was. Rex v. Phillips,
6 Ea t., 464, und cases cited. But we are not aware that it ha
€ver been holden that the allegation may be wholly omitted in
an information for an attempt; nor of any good rea on why it may
not and should not be expre ly alleged in all uch case'" . If it
be said that the words "attempt to teal" imply it sufficiently, the
<::onclusive answer i , that they equally imply an overt act of endeavor, for that is equally an element of the attempt; and if either
element of the offen e may be left to implication, both may be,
and a general averment of an attempt to teal, or to rob, or other
attempt, would in uch ca e be ufficient. Thi can not be permitted in justice to the accu ed, nor con i t ently with the rule
always substantially adhered to, that the want of a direct allegation of anything material in the de cription of the nature, ul tance or manner of the offen e, can not be . uppli d by int ndm nl
6
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or inij)lication. 2 Hawkins P. C, Chap. 35, § 60. Rex v. Higgins,

2 East, 20. Rex v. Phillips, 6 East, 464.

Nor is the averment of the overt act sufficient. It is essential

that the act of endeavor should be intrinsically adapted to effectu-

ate the purpose ; and in order that the court and the accused may

see that the act is so adapted, it should be specifically stated. Here

the averment of the act, "by picking her pocket," is uncertain and

equivocal. What is meant by the words, "by picking her pocket,"

in the connection in which they are used? Do they state clearly

a specific act of endeavor? If the pocket was in fact picked, the

offense intended was committed, and merged the offense charged;

and it is not clear that the expressions used are not open to that

construction. If they are equivalent to the words 'T3y attempting

to pick her pocket," they are still uncertain. By what act ? What

did the accused do by way of attempt? Pockets are picked by

cutting them off and removing them, by cutting them open so as^

to expose their contents, and by thrusting the hands into them.

So various other acts are done by the intended thief, or his con-

federates, to divert or engross the attention of the victim; such
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as gathering around him in a crowd, or jostling him, or creating

in some other way confusion or alarm, while the pocket or its

contents are secured. If under a general averment of "attempting

to pick the pocket" any direct attempt to remove, open it, or grasp

its contents, and any auxiliary act calculated to engross or divert

the attention of the owner may be proved, injustice may be done

to the accused; as well because no preliminary question can be

made respecting the adaptation of the act, as because the accused

will not be able to anticipate, if innocent, the precise act which

he is called upon to explain or disprove, or have the benefit of a

definite record in the event of a subsequent prosecution.

The second count is not open to these objections. In that the

act of endeavor — "by thrusting the hand into the pocket" — and

the intent, are specifically charged; and that count in those par-

ticulars is clearly sufficient.

But it is further claimed that there must be present ability to

perpetrate the offense; that if, in this case, the pocket was empty,

there could be no such ability; and that the second count of the

information does not allege that there was in fact property in

the pocket.

There must undoubtedly be present ability to perpetrate the

or implication. 2 Hawkins P. C., Chap. 25, § 60. Rex v . Higgins,,
2 East, 20. Rex v. Phillips~ 6 East, 464.
Nor is the averment of the overt act sufficient. It is essential
that the act of endeavor should be intrinsically adapted to effectu-ate the purpose; and in order that the court and the accused may
see that the act is so adapted, it should be specifically stated. Here
the averment of the act, "by picking her pocket," is uncertain and
equivocal. What i meant by the words, ''by picking her pocket,"
in the connection in which they are used? Do they state clearly
a specific act of endeavor? If the pocket was in fact picked, the
offense intended was committed, and merged the offense charged;
and it is not clear that the expressions used are not open to that
construction. If they are equivalent to the words ''by attempting
to pick her pocket," they are still uncertain. By what act? What
did the accused do by way of attempt? Pockets are picked by
cutting them off and removing them, by cutting them open so as,
to expose their content , and by thrusting the hands into them~
So various other acts are done by the intended thief, or his confederates, to divert or engross the attention of the victim; such
as gathering around him in a crowd, or jostling him, or creating
in ome other way confusion or alarm, while the pocket or its
contents are secured. If under a general averment of "attempting
to pick the pocket" any direct attempt to remove, open it, or grasp
its contents, and any auxiliary act calculated to engross or divert
the attention of the owner may be proved, injustice may be done
to the accused; as well because no preliminary question can be
made respecting the adaptation of the act, as because the accused
will not be able to anticipate, if innocent, the precise act which
he is called upon to explain or disprove, or have the benefit of a
definite record in the event of a subsequent prosecution.
The second count is not open to the e objections. In that the
act of endeavor- "by thrusting the hand into the pocket"-and
the intent, are specifically charged; and that count in tho e particulars is clearly sufficient.
But it is further claimed that there must be present ability to
perpetrate the offense; that if, in this case, the pocket was empty,
there could be no such ability; and that the second count of the
information does not allege that there was in fact property in
the pocket.
There must undoubtedly be present ability to perpetrate the

83
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offense. The person must be of legal age, compos mentis, and in a

situation to effect the purpose, directly or by the agency of others.

But it is not true that the thing intended to be taken must be

where the attempting thief supposes it to be, or that there must

be in fact property where he supposes there is. It is sufficient if he

supposes there is property in the pocket, trunk, or other receptacle,

and attempts, by some act adapted to the purpose, to obtain it

feloniously.

Thus a conviction has been sustained for an attempt against

one who broke open a trunk, supposing there was property in it

and intending to steal it, when in fact there was none; and

against one who administered noxious drugs to a woman, sup-

posing her pregnant and intending to produce abortion, when

she was not pregnant; and against a person for thrusting his

hand into the pocket of another, supposing there was property

in it, and with intent to steal, when the fact that there was

property in it was not alleged or proved on the trial. Common-

ivealtli V. McDonald, 5 Cush., 365. In that case it is true, the

indictment was framed upon a special statute but that statute
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was in affirmance of the common law, as in force and recognized

in this state; and the same principles were involved. A similar

case has been decided in Pennsylvania {Rogers v. Commonwealth,

5 Serg. & Eawle, 463), and a case differing as to the facts, but

involving like principles upon a like statute in New York. The

People V. Bush, 4 Hill, 133. Indeed, upon principle, it would be

a novel and startling proposition, that a known pickpocket might

pass around in a crowd, in full view of a policeman, and even,

in the room of a police station, and thrust his hands into the

pockets of those present with intent to steal, and yet not be liable

to arrest or punishment, until the policeman had first ascertained

that there was in fact money or valuables in some one of the pockets

on which the thief had experimented. The statement of such

a proposition is a sufficient refutation of it; and the only safe

rule is, that the attempt is complete and punishable, when an act

is done with intent to commit the crime, which it adapted to the

perpetration of it, whether the purpose fails by reason of inter-

ruption, or because there was nothing in the pocket, or for other

extrinsic cause.

There is a class of cases, some of which have been cited, appar-

ently similar to those stated, but clearly distinguishable from them.

o:ffen . The per on mu t be of legal age, compo mentis, and in a
ituation to effect the purpo e directl or by the agency of other .
But it is not true that the thing intended to be taken mu t be
where the attempting thief uppo e it to be, or that there mu t
be in fact property where he suppo e there i . It i sufficient if he
supposes there is property in the pocket, trunk, or other receptacle,
and attempts, by some act adapted to the purpo e, to obtain it
feloniou ly.
Thu a conviction ha been su tained for an attempt again t
one who broke open a trunk, supposing there wa property in it
and intending to teal it, when in fact there wa none; and
against one who administered noxious drug to a woman, suppo ing her pregnant and intending to produce abortion, when
he wa not pregnant; and against a per on for thrusting hi
hand into the pocket of another, supposing there was property
in it, and with intent to steal, when the fact that there wau
property in it was not alleged or proved on the trial. Commonwealth v. McDonald, 5 Cush., 365. In that case it is true, the
indictment was framed upon a pecial tatute but that statute
was in affirmance of the common law, as in force and recognized
in thi tate; and the same principles were involved. A similar
ca e ha been decided in P ennsylvania (Rogers v. Commonwealth,
5 erg. & Rawle, 463), and a ca e differing as to the fact , but
involving like principle upon a like statute in New York. Th e
P eople v. Bu. h, 4 Hill, 133. Indeed, upon principle, it would be
a novel and startling proposition, that a known pickpocket might
pa around in a crowd, in full view of a policeman, and even
in the room of a police station and thru t hi hand into the
pocket of tho e pre ent with intent to steal, and yet not be liable
to arre t or puni hment, until the policeman had fir t a certained
that there wa in fact money or valuables in ome one of the pockets
on which the thief had experimented. The statement of uch
a propo ition i a ufficient refutation of it; and the only safe
rule i , that the attempt i complete and puni hable, when an act
i done with intent to commit the crime, which it adapted to the
perp tration of it, whether the purpo e fail by rea on of interruption, or because there was nothing in the pocket, or for other
extrin ic cause.
There i a cla of ca e , ome of which have been cited, apparently similar to tho e tated, but clearly distinguishable from them,
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where a different decision has been made. Thus where, with

intent to defraud, a writing was falsely made which could not by

legal possibility defraud any one, it was holden that no offense

had been committed, because. a person could not be legally pre-

sumed to intend that which was legally impossible. And where

an attempt was made to poison with an article believed to be poison-

ous, but which was in fact innoxious, and where an attempt was

made to shoot a person with a pistol which was not in fact loaded,

it was holden that no offense had been committed, because no act

had been done which was intrinsically adapted to the then present

successful perpetration of the crime. 1 Bishop Crim. Law, §§ 517,

518. Here the perpetration of the crime was legally possible, the

persons in a situation to do it, the intent clear, and the act adapted

to the successful perpetration of it ; and whether there was or was

not property in the pocket was an extrinsic fact, not essential

to constitute the attempt, and therefore one which it was not

necessary to allege.

It appears from the motion for a new trial, that the counsel

asked the court to charge that without proof of the name of the
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woman, and the fact that there was property in her pocket, the

prisoners could not be convicted.

The prisoners were not entitled to such instruction. That which,

from the nature of the case, can not be alleged, need not be; and

it is of frequent occurrence that the name of the person injured

is unknown. Justice must not fail nor the community go unpro-

tected for such cause. If the name is unknown, and it is so

averred, it need not be proved; and this is not a serious cause

of complaint by the prisoner; for if he can show, or it appears

on the trial, that the name was in fact known, it is held that he is

entitled to an acquittal. Arch. Cr. PI., 33. And if the name

is and remains unknown, it is too much for him to ask to go

unpunished for that reason. ISTor was it necessary to prove that

there was property in the pocket. The offense as we have seen

was complete, however that might be; and therefore that fact was

immaterial, and the averment surplusage.

We do not perceive any error in the charge of the judge. A

conspiracy exists when two or more combine to do an unlawful

act. The essence of the offense is the criminal combination, and no

overt act is necessary to constitute it. But when, in pursuance

of the combination, they attempt to do the particular act for which

where a different deci ion ha been made. Thu where, with
intent to defraud, a writing was falsely made which could not by
legal possibility defraud any one, it wa holden that no offense
had been committed becau e . a person could not be legally presumed to intend that which wa legally impo ible. And where
an attempt wa made to poi on with an article believed to be poi onous, but which wa in fact innoxiou , and where an attempt wa
made to shoot a person with a pistol which wa not in fact loaded,
it was holden that no offen ~ e had been committed, becau.. , e no act
had been done which was intrinsically adapted to the then present
ucce sful perpetration of the crime. 1 Bi hop Crim. Law, § 517,
518. Here th\,:; perpetration of the crime wa legally possible, the
persons in a ituation to do it, the intent clear, and the act adapted
to the succe sful perpetration of it; and whether there was or was
not property in the pocket wa an extrinsic fact, not e ential
to constitute the attempt, and therefore one which it was not
neces ary to allege.
It appear from the motion for a new trial, that the counsel
asked the court to charge that without proof of the name of the
woman, and the fact that there was property in her pocket, the
prisoners could not be convicted.
The prisoner were not entitled to such instruction. That which,
from the nature of the case, can not be alleged, need not be; and
it i of frequent occurrence that the name of the per on injured
is unknown. Justice must not fail nor the community go unprotected for such cau e. If the name i unknown, and it is so
averred, it need not be proved ; and thi i not a eriou ca use
of complaint by the prisoner; for if he can show, or it appears
on the trial, that the name was in fact known, it is held that he is
€ntitled to an acquittal. Arch. Cr. PL, 33. And if the name
is and remains unknown, it is too much for him to ask to go
unpunished for that reason. Nor wa it nece ary to prove that
the:re was property in the pocket. The offen e as we have seen
was complete, however that might be; and therefore that fact wa"
immaterial, and the averment surplu age.
We do not perceive any error in the charge of the judge. A
conspiracy exi t when two or more combine to do an unlawful
act. The esuenc:e of the offense i the criminal combination, and no
overt act is necessary to constitute it. But when, in pursuance
of the combination, they attempt to do the particular act for which
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they combined, another offense is committed, viz., an attempt,

which the former does not merge. The latter offense was alleged

in the information and proved on the trial. The former was only

important upon the question of intent, and the guilt of the prisoner

who did not actually commit the principal act of attempt. The

court did not tell the jury that if the prisoners conspired to rob

the citizens of the state generally they might convict them; but

that if they found such combination, and also found that they

had attempted to carry it into effect; if Marsh had, pursuant to

that object, thrust his hand into the pocket of the lady, and

Wilson was aiding and abetting, the verdict should be that they

were guilty of the crime charged in the information. The import

of the charge is, that if both had conspired to do that or similar

acts, and in pursuance of such combination they attempted to do

the particular act charged, they were guilty of that attempt. Thus

construed it was correct and appropriate.

A new trial is not advised.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

2. Solicitations to Commit Crime.
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Commomcealth v. Randolph, lJf6 Pa. St., S3. (1892.)

Per Curiam :

The appellant was convicted in the court below upon an indict-

ment in the first count of which it was charged that she, "Sarah A.

McGinty, alias Sarah A. Randolph, * * * unlawfully, wickedly,

and maliciously did solicit and invite one Samuel Kissinger, then

and there being, and by the offer and promise of payment to said

they combined, another offen e i committed, viz., an attempt,
which the former doe not merge. The latter offen e wa alleged
in the information and proved on the trial. The former wa onl '
important upon the que tion of intent, and the guilt of the pri oner
who did not actuall commit the principal act of attempt. The
court did not tell the jury that if the prisoners con pired to rob
the citizens of the tate generally they might convict them; but
that if they found uch combination, and al o found that they
had attempted to carry it into effect; if :Mar h had, pursuant to
that object, thru t hi hand into the pocket of the lady, and
Wilson was aiding and abetting, the verdict hould be that they
were guilty of the crime charged in the information. The import
of the charge i , that if both had conspired to do that or imilar
acts, and in pur uance of such combination they attempted to do
the particular act charged, they were guilty of that attempt. Thu ...
con trued it was correct and appropriate.
A "'1ew trial is not advised.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

Samuel Kissinger of a large sum of money, to wit, one thousand

dollars, which to him, the said Samuel Kissinger, she, the said

Sarah A. McGinty, alias Sarah A. Randolph, then and there did

propose, offer, promise, and agree to pay, did incite and encourage

him, the said Samuel Kissinger, one William S. Foltz, a citizen

2.

SOLICIT.A.TIO s TO COMMIT CRIME.

of said county, in the peace of said commonwealth, feloniously to

kill, murder, and slay, contrary to the form of the act of general

assembly in such case made and provided, and against the peace

Commonitealth v. Randolph, 146 Pa.

t., 83. (1892.)

and dignity of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania." Upon the

trial below, the defendant moved to quash the indictment upon

PER CuRIAM:

The appellant wa convicted in the court below upon an indictment in the fir t count of which it was charged that he, "Sarah A.
}.foGinty alia Sarah A. Randolph, * * * unlawfully, wickedly,
and maliciou ly did olicit and invite one Samuel Ki singer, then
and there being and by the offer and promise of payment to aid
amuel Ki inger of a large um of money, to wit, one thou and
uollar.. which to him, the aid Samuel Ki inger he, the said
Sarah A. fcGinty, alia Sarah A. Randolph, then and there did
propo e, offer promi e, and agree to pay, did incite and encourage
him, the aid Samuel Ki ing r, one William . Foltz, a citizen
of said county, in the peace of aid commonwealth, feloniou ly to
kill, murder, and lay, contrary to the form of th act of gen ral
a embly in uch ca e made and provided and against the p a
and dignity of the commonwealth of P nn ylvania.' Upon th
trial below, the defendant mov 1 to qua b th indictm nt upon
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the ground that ^"^the said indictment does not charge in any count

thereof any offense, either at common law or by statute." The

court below refused to quash the indictment, and this ruling, with

the refusal of the court to arrest the judgment, is assigned as

error.

It may be conceded that there is no statute which meets this

case, and if the crime charged is not an offense at common law, the

judgment must be reversed.

What is a common law offense? We endeavored to answer this

question in Commonwealtli v. McHale, 97 Pa., 397, 410, in which

we held that offenses against the purity and fairness of elections

M^ere crimes at common law, and indictable as such. We there

said: "We are of opinion that all such crimes as especially affect

public society are indictable at common law. The test is, not

whether precedents can be found in the books, but whether they

injuriously affect the public police and economy." Tested bv this

rule, we have no doubt that the solicitation to commit murder,

accompanied by the offer of money for that purpose, is an offense

at common law.
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It may be conceded that the mere intent to commit a crime,

where such intent is undisclosed and nothing done in pursuance

of it, is not the subject of an indictment. But there was something

more than an undisclosed intent in this case. There was the

direct solicitation to commit a murder, and an offer of money as

a reward for its commission. This was an act done, a step in the

direction of the crime; and, had the act been perpetrated, the

defendant would have been liable to punishment as an accessory

to the murder. It needs no argument to show that such an act

affects the public police and economy in a serious manner.

Authorities in this state are very meager. Smith v. Common-

wealth, 54 Pa., 209, decided that solicitation to commit fornica-

tion and adultery is not indictable. But fornication and adultery

are mere misdemeanors by our law, whereas murder is a capital

felony. Stabler v. Commonwealth, 95 Pa., 318, decided that the

mere delivery of poison to a person, and soliciting him to place

it in the spring of a certain party, is not "an attempt to admin-

ister poison," within the meaning of the eighty-second section of

the act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 403. In that case, however, the

sixth count of the indictment charged that the defendant did

"falsely and wickedly solicit and invite one John l^eyer, a servant

the ground that "the said indictment doe not charge in any count
thereof any offense, either at common law or by statute." The
court below refused to quash the indictment, and this ruling, with
the refusal of the court to arrest the judgment, is assigned as
error.
It may be conceded that there is no tatute which meet thi
ca ·c, and if the crime charged is not an offense at common law, the
judgment must be reversed.
What is a common law offense? We endeavored to answer this
question in Commonwealth \. McHale, 97 Pa., 397, 410, in which
we held that off nses against the purity and fairnes of elections
were crimes at common law, and indictable a uch. We there
said: "We are of opinion that all such crimes as especially affect
public society are indictable at common law. The te t i , not
whether precedents can be found in the book , but whether they
injuriously affect the public police and economy." Tested by thi
rule, we have no doubt that the solicitation to commit murder,
accompanied by the offer of money for that purpose, is an offense
at common law.
It may be conceded that the mere intent to commit a crime,
where such intent is undisclosed and nothing done in pursuance
of it, is not the ubject of an indictment. But there was something
more than an undisclosed intent in this case. There was the
direct solicitation to commit a murder, ancl an offer of money a
a reward for it commission. This was an act done, a step in the
direction of the crime; and, had the act been perpetrated, the
defendant would have been liable to puni hment as an accessory
to the murder. It needs no argument to how th!lt such an act
affects the public police and economy in a serious manner.
Authorities in this state are very meager. Smith v. Commonwealth, 54 Pa., 209, decided that solicitation to commit fornication and adultery is not indictable. But fornication and adultery
are mere misdemeanors by our law, whereas murder is a capital
felony. Stabler v. Commonwealth, 95 Pa., 318, decided that the
mere delivery of poison to a person, and soliciting him to place
it in the spring of a certain party, is not "an attempt to administer poison," within the meaning of the eighty-second section of
the act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 403. In that case, however, the
sixth count of the indictment charged that the d fendant did
<'falsely and wickedly olicit and invite one John Neyer, a ervant
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of the said Eichard S. Waring to administer a certain poison and

noxious and dangerous substance, commonly called Paris green,

to the said Eichard F. Waring, and divers other persons whose

names are to the said inquest unknown, of the family of the said

Eichard F. Waring," etc. The. defendant was convicted upon this

count, and, while the judgment was reversed upon the first count,

charging "an attempt to administer poison," we sustained the con-

viction upon the sixth count, Mercur, J., saying: "The conduct

of the plaintiff in error, as testified to by the witness, undoubtedly

shows an offense for which an indictment will lie without any

further act having been committed. He was rightly convicted,

therefore, on the sixth count."

The authorities in England are very full upon this point. The

leading case is Rex v. Biggins, 2 East, 5. It is very similar to

the case at bar, and it was squarely held that solicitation to com-

mit a felony is a misdemeanor and indictable at common law. In

that case it was said by Lord Kenyon, C. J. : "But it is argued

that a mere intent to commit evil is not indictable without an

act done; but is there not an act done, when it is charged that the
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defendant solicited another to commit a felony? The solicitation

is an act; and the answer given at the bar is decisive that it would

he sufficient to constitute an overt act of high treason." We are

not unmindful of the criticism of this case by Chief Justice Wood-

ward, in Smith v. Commonwealth, supra, but we do not think it

affects the authority of that case. The point involved in Bex v.

Higgins was not before the court in Smith v. CommoniveaUh, and

could not have been and was not decided. It is true, this is made

a statutory offense by statute 24 and 25 Yict. ; but, as is said by

Mr. Eussell in his work on Crimes, Vol. I., p. 967, in commenting

•on this act : "As all the crimes specified in this clause appear to

be misdemeanors at common law, the effect of this clause is merel}'

to alter the punishment of them." In other words, that statute is

merely declaratory of the common law.

Our best text books sustain the doctrine of Bex v. Higgins. "It

the crime solicited to be committed be not perpetrated, then the

adviser can only be indicted for a misdemeanor:" 1 Chit. Crim.

L., 264. See, also, 1 Archb. Crim. Pr. & PI., 19, and 1 Bish. Crim.

L., § 768, where the learned author says: "The law as adjudged

holds, and has held from the beginning in all this class of cases,

an indictment sufficient which simply charges that the defendant.

0£ the said Richard

. Waring to admini ter a certain poi on and
noxiou and dangerou ub tance commonl3 called Pari green
to the aid Richard F. Waring, and diver other per on who e
name are to the aid inque t unknown, of the family of the aid
Richard F. Waring, etc. The .defendant wa convicted upon thi ~
count and, while the judgment \\a rever ed upon the fir t coun.t,
{!harging 'an at empt to admini ter poi on," we u tained the conviction upon the ixth count, n1ercur, J., a ·ing : 'The conduct
of the plaintiff in error, a te ti:fied to by the witne , undoubtedly
hows an offen e for which an indictment will lie without an
further act having been committed. H e wa rightly convicted,
-therefore, on the ixth count.'
The authoritie in England are very full upon thi point. The
1eading ca e i R ex v. Higgins, 2 East, 5. It i ver3 imilar to
-the ca e at bar, and it was squarely held that solicitation to commit a felony i a misdemeanor and indictable at common law. In
-that ca e it was said by Lord Kenyon, C. J.: "But it i argued
-that a mere intent to commit evil is not indictable without an
.act done; but i there not an act done, when it i charged that the
defendant olicited another to commit a felony ? The solicitation
is an act; and the answer given at the bar i deci ive that it would
be ufficient to con titute an overt act of high treason." We are
"Jlot unmindful of the criticism of this ca e by Chief Ju tice Woodward, in Smith v. Commonwealth, supra, but we do not think it
.affect the authorit3 of that case. The point involved in R ex v.
Higgins wa not before the court in Smith v. Commonwealth, and
could not have been and wa not decided. It is true, this is made
.a statutory offen e by statute 24 and 25 Viet.; but, a L aid b
Mr. Ru ell in hi work on Crime , Vol. I., p. 967, in commenting
·on thi act: "A all the crime peci:fied in thi clau e appear to
be mi demeanor at common law, the effect of thi clau e i merely
io alter the puni hment of them.' In other word , that tatute i
merely declaratory of the common law.
Our be t text book u tain the doctrine of Rex v. Higgin . "If
the crime elicited to be committed be not perpetrat d then th
advi er can onl3 be indicted for a mi d mean.or : ' 1 hit. nm.
L., 264. ee, al o, 1 Archb. Crim. Pr. & Pl., 19 and 1 Bi h. rim.
L.~ § 6
wh r e the 1 arned author ay : "Th law a adjud 0 d
hold and ha h ld from th beginnina in all thi la of a. es
an indictm nt ufficient which imply har · . that th d f n lant,

88

SOLICITATIONS TQ COMMIT CRIME

88 Solicitations to Commit Crime

at the time and place mentioned, falsely, wickedly, and unlawfully

did solicit and incite a person named to commit the substantive

offense, without any further specification of overt acts. It is vain,

then, to say that mere solicitation, the mere entire thing which

need be averred against a defendant as the ground for his con-

viction, is no offense."

We are of opinion the appellant was properly convicted, and the
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judgment is Affirmed.

at the time and place mentioned, falsely, wickedly, and unlawfully
did solicit and incite a person named to commit the substantive
offense, without any further specification of overt acts. It is vain,.
then, to say that mere solicitation, the mere entire thing which
need be averred against a defend.ant as the ground for his conviction, is no offense."
We are of opinion the appellant wa properly convicted, and the
judgment is
Affirmed.

CHAPTER IV.

PARTIES TO CRIMES.

1. Principals.

Boan V. State, 26 Ind., JfOo. (1866.)

Ray^ J.:

The indictment in this case charged the appellant with unlaw-

fully, and burglariously, &c., breaking and entering, in the night

time, into the storehouse of Samuel P. Frost and John C. Valen-

tine, partners, doing business imder the firm name of Frost &

CHAPTER IV.

Valentine, with the felonious intent to steal, take and carry away

the personal goods, etc., of said Samuel P. Frost and John C.

Valentine.

PARTIES TO CRIMES.

The proof on the trial was, that while two other persons broke

and entered the storehouse, the appellant did not break or enter,

1.

PRINCIPAL .

but acting in concert with the other two, remained outside watch-

ing, and ready and near enough to render them assistance, in

ease it might be required.

It is objected that the appellant was not charged as an aider

and abetter, but as a principal. This was correct. At common

law it was not required, in order to constitute one a principal in
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an offense, that the party charged should have been an eye wit-

ness of the transaction, or within hearing; it was sufficient that

he had knowledge of the crime, and watched near enough and

ready to assist those actually engaged, if required. That made

a presence aiding and abetting, and constituted him a principal

in the second degree, and he could be charged and convicted as a

principal. Indeed, it was ruled in the case of Eex v. Winifred et

al, 1 Leach, 515, that where a person was indicted as an accessory

before the fact, he could not be convicted of that charge upon

evidence proving him to have been present aiding and abetting;

the distinction between a principal in the second degree and an

accessory before the fact being the presence of the former for the

purpose of aiding, if required, those who actually commit the

offense. That presence renders him who would otherwise have

89

Doan v. State, 26 Ind., 495. {1866.)
RAY, J.:
The indictment in this case charged the appellant with unlawfully, and burglariou ly, &c., breaking and entering, in the night
time, into the storehouse of Samuel P. Fro t and John C. Valentine, partners, doing business under the firm name of Fro t &
Valentine, with the feloniou intent to steal, take and carry away
the personal good, etc., of aid Samuel P. Fro t and John C.
Val en tine.
The proof on the trial wa , that while two other person broke
and entered the storehou e, the appellant did not break or enter,
but acting in concert with the other two, remained out ide watching, and ready and near enough to render them assistance, in_
case it might be required.
It is objected that the appellant wa not charged a an aider
and abetter, but as a principal. This wa correct. At common.
law it was not required, in order to constitute one a principal in
an offense, that the party charged should have been an eye witnes of the tran action, or within hearing; it was ufficient that
he had knowledge of the crime, and watched near enough and
ready to a i t tho e actually engaged, if required. That made
a presence aiding and ab tting, and con tituted him a prin ipal
in the econd degree, and he could be charged and convicted a a
principal. Ind ed, it wa ruled in the ca e of Rex v. Winifred t
al., 1 Leach, 515 that where a person wa indicted a an ace OTY
b fore the fact, he could not be convicted of that charge upon
vidence proving him to have been pre ent aiding and ab tting ·
the distinction between a principal in the second deo-ree and an
ace ory before the fact being the pre ence of the former for th
purpo e of aiding, if required, tho e who actually commit the
o:ffen e. That pre ence renders him who would otherwi e hav .
89
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been but an accessory before the fact, a principal in the second

degree.

"The law, however," says Archbold, "recognizes no difference

between the offense of the j)rincipal in the first degree, and of the

principal in the second ; both are equally guilty, and so immaterial

is the distinction considered in practice, that if a man be indicted

as principal in the first degree, proof that he was present aiding

and abetting another in committing the offense, although his was

not the hand which actually did it, will support the indictment,

and, on the other hand, if he be indicted as principal in the second

degree, proof that he was not only present but committed the

offense with his own hand will support the indictment. So where

an offense is punishable by a statute which makes no mention of

principal in the second degree, such principals are within the

meaning of the statute as much as the parties who actually com-

mitted the offense." 1 Arch. Crim. Prac. and PL, p. 13-.

2. Accessories.

a. Accessory before the Fact and Principal and Agent.

People V. Adams, 3 Denio (N. Y.), 190. (1846.)
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Error to the New York general sessions. The defendant in

■error and one E. E. Seymour were indicted in the sessions for an

offense against the statute (2 E. S. 677, § 53) for obtaining

money and property by false pretences. The indictment contained

been but an accessory before the fact, a principal in the second
degree.
"The law, however/' says Archbold; "recognizes no difference
between the offense of the principal in the :first degree, and of the
principal in the second; both are equally guilty, and o immaterial
is the distinction considered in practice, that if a man be indicted
as principal in the :first degree, proof that he was present aiding
and abetting another in committing the offen se, although his was
not the hand which actually did it, will· support the W.dictment,
and, on the other hand, if he be indicted as principal in the second
degree, proof that he was not only present but committed the
offen e with his own hand will support the indictment. So where
an offense is punishable by a statute which make no mention of
principal in the second degree, such principals are within the
meaning of the statute as much as the parties who actually committed the offense." 1 Arch. Crim. Prac. and PL, p. 13·.

seven counts, the first five, which are substantially alike, each set

forth that the defendants intending to cheat and defraud Ferdi-

nand Suydam and four other persons named, composing the firm

2.

of Suydam, Sage & Co. of the city of New York, commission

ACCESSORIES.

merchants, on &c. at the first ward of the city of New York in

the city and county of New YorTc, did feloniously &c. falsely

pretend and represent to those persons that the defendant Sey-

a.

Accessory before the Fact and Principal and Agent.

mour had received of the defendant Adams a very large quantity

of pork and lard, in good order, for and irrevocably subject to

P eople v. Adams, 3 Denio (N. Y.), 190.

{1846.)

the order of said firm, and did then and there exhibit and deliver

to the said firm a paper writing in the form of a receipt, signed

by Seymour, which is set out. The paper is a forwarder's receipt

■dated at Chillicothe, January 11th, 1844, by which Seymour

Error to the New York general sessions. The defendant in
.error and one R. R. Seymour were indicted in the sessions for an
offense against the statute (2 R. S. 677, § 53) for obtaining
money and property by false pretences. The indictment contained
seven counts, the :first :five, which are substantially alike, each set
forth that the defendants intending to cheat and defraud Ferdinand Suydam and four other persons named, composing the :firm
of Suydam, Sage & Co. of the city of New York, commission
merchants, on &c. at the first ward of th e city of New York in
th e city and cou.n ty of New York, did feloniously &c. falsely
pretend and represent to those persons that the defendant Seymour had received of the defendant Adams a very large quantity
of pork ancl lard, in good order, for and irrevocably subject to
the order of said :firm, and did then and there exhibit and deliver
to the said :firm a paper writing in the form of a receipt, signed
by Seymour, which is set out. The paper is a forwarder' r eceipt
4}atcd at Chillicothe, January 11th, 1844, by which Seymour

PEOPLE
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acknowledges that he has received from Adams several thousand

barrels of pork and lard, which is particularly described, for and

irrevocably subject to the order of Suydam, Sage & Co., which

he agrees to forward and deliver to them in the city of New

York, they paying charges &c., and that they (S., S. & Co.) are

to hold the property for sale on commission and to have a lien

thereon for certain drafts drawn against it amounting to $28,160,

and for their general balance against the consignor. The count

alleges that S., S. & Co. believing the said false pretences and being

deceived thereby, were induced to and did accept in writing five

drafts drawn by Adams on them for the aggregate amount men-

tioned in the receipt, which drafts are set forth; and that the

defendants did "then and there" by means of such false pre-

tences receive and obtain from S., S. & Co. the said acceptances,

w^hich the firm subsequently paid in full. It then negatives the

pretences, averring that no such property was received by Sey-

mour, that the receipt was fictitious and the statements therein

utterly untrue, and that the defendants knew it. And so the

jurors &c. say that the defendants on &c., at &c., feloniously &c.
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did obtain the acceptances, and afterwards, on &c. the money pay-

able upon them, with intent to cheat and defraud S., S. & Co. of

the same, against the form of the statute &c. The two other

counts are in a similar form, the receipt being for other property,

accompanied by drafts for $12,200.

Adams appeared in person and put in a plea, by which, after

protesting that he is not guilty of the offenses charged in the

indictment, nevertheless says "that he, the said defendant, was

born in Eoss county in the state of Ohio, of parents residing in

and then being citizens of the state of Ohio, and from the time

of his birth until the time of the exhibiting of this plea and for

and during all the intermediate times he was and has been and

still is a resident of, and in the state of Ohio; that at the said

several times when the supposed offenses set forth in the several

counts of the said indictment were, as therein alleged, committed,

lie was not, nor was he at any time prior thereto in the said

city, county or state of New York; that the said several writings

■called receipts and drafts, set forth in the said indictment, were

all drawn, signed and made in the said county of "Ross, and

whilst he the said Adams was resident therein; and tliat the

said several receipts and drafts were by the said Adams presented

acknowledges that he ha received from Adams everal thou and
barrel of pork and lard, which i particularly described, for and
irrevocably ubject to the order of Suydam, Sage & Co., which
he agrees ~ forward and deliver to them in the city of New
York, they paying charges &c., and that they ( S., . & Co.) ar .
to hold the property for sale on commi ion and to have a lien
-thereon for certain draft drawn again t it amounting to $2 ,160,
and for their general balance against the consignor. The count
.allege that ., S. & o. believing the said false pretence and being
deceived ther eby, wer induced to and did accept in writing five
drafts drawn by Adams on them for the aggregate amount men-tioned in the receipt, which draft are set forth; and that the
defendant did "then and there" by means of such fal e pretences receive and obtain from S., S. & Co. the said acceptances,
which the firm sub quently paid in full. It then negatives the
pretences, averring that no such property was received by Seymour, that the receipt was fictitiou and the statements therein
utterly untrue, and that the defendants knew it. And o the
jurors &c. say that the defendants on &c., at &c._, feloniously &c.
did obtain the acceptances, and afterwards, on &c. the money payable upon them, with intent to cheat and defraud S., S. & Co. of
-the same, against the form of the statute &c. The two other
counts are in a similar form, the receipt being for other property
.accompanied by drafts for $12,200.
Adams appeared in per on and put in a plea, by which, after
protesting that he is not guilty of the offenses charged in the
indictment, nevertheless ays "that he, the said defendant, wa
born in Ro s county in the tate of Ohio, of parent re iding in
and then being citizens of the tate of Ohio, and from the time
of hi birth until the time of the exhibiting of this plea and for
and during all the intermediate times he wa and has been and
still is a re ident of, and in the tate of Ohio; that at th said
several times when the upposed off nses set forth in the . everal
count of the aid indictment were, a ther in alleged, committed,
11e wa not, nor was he at any time prior thereto in the aitl
city, county or tate of New York; that the said s veral writin o-,
·Called receipt an] hafts, set forth in the aid indi tm nt, w r''
all drawn, . ign cl and made in the sail county of Ro. s. and.
aid dam wa r idcnt th rein· an 1 that the
whil t he th
aid e eral receipt and draft w r by th . aid Aclam pre ent d
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in the city of New York to the said persons so using the name,

style and firm of Suydam, Sage & Co., through the instrumentality

of innocent agents employed by the said Adams, whilst he, the

said Adams, was and continued to be such resident of and per-

sonally within the said county of Eoss in the state of Ohio, afore-

said, and were in the said city of 'New York j)resented to the

said persons so using the name and firm of Suydam, Sage & Co.,

by the said Adams, through such innocent agents, and the said

persons so using the name &c. then and there relying on the

truth of the same were deceived and defrauded thereby; and

the said several sujDposed offenses in the said several counts of the

said indictment set forth were committed by him the said Adams

in the said city and county of Kew York, by his causing and

procuring the same to be done therein as aforesaid, while he the

said Adams was in the said county of Eoss, in the state of Ohio

aforesaid; wherefore he the said Adams ought not to be crimi-

nally questioned or proceeded against in the state of New York

for the said acts and offenses so done by him and caused and pro-

cured to be done by him as aforesaid while he was so resident and
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being in the said county of Eoss ;" concluding with a verification.

The district attorney demurred to the plea, and the defendant

joined in demurrer. The general sessions gave judgment against

the people and discharged the defendant, and the district attor-

ney in the name of the people brought error to this court.

By the Court, Beardsley, J. :

The intent to cheat and defraud, and the falsity of the pre-

tences, as alleged in the indictment, are virtually conceded, for

they are not denied by the plea. And the acts alleged to be

criminal are expressly admitted to have been done and committed

by the defendant in the city of New York, through the instru-

mentality of innocent agents, the defendant at that time being in

the state of Ohio. No question was made on the argument, as to

the form of the indictment or the plea; and the only point to be

decided is whether here was an offense committed by the defend-

in the city of New York to the said persons so using the name7
style and firm of Suydam, Sage & Co., through the instrumentality
of innocent agents employed by the swid Adams, whilst he, the
said Adams, was and continued to be such resident of and personally within the said county of Ross in the state of Ohio, aforesaid, and were in the said city of New York presented to the
said persons so using the name and firm of Suydam, Sage & Co.,.
by the said Adams, through such innocent agents, and the said
persons so using the name &c. then and there relying on the
truth of the same were deceived and defrauded thereby; and
the said several upposed offenses in the said several counts of the
said indictment set forth were committed by him the said Adams
in the said city and county of New York, by his causing and
procuring the same to be done therein as aforesaid, while he the
said Adams was in the said county of Ross, in the state of Ohio
aforesaid; wherefore he the said Adams ought not to be criminally que tioned or proceeded against in the state of New York
for the said acts and offenses so done by him and caused and procured to be done by him as afore aid while he was so resident and
being in the said county of Ross;" concluding with a verification.
The district attorney demurred to the plea, and the defendant
joined in demurrer. The general sessions gave judgment against
the people and discharged the defendant, and the district attorney in the name of the people brought error to this court.

ant "within the boundaries of this state." (2 E. S. 697, § 1.)

If so, he may be tried and punished here; but if not, he is entitled

to an acquittal, however infamous the fraudulent transaction to

which he was a party may have been.

The crime charged in this indictment is a statute offense. Suy-

By the Court,, BEARDSLEY, J.:
The intent to cheat and defraud, and the fal ity of the pretences, as alleged in the indictment, are virtually conceded, for
they are not denied by the plea. And the act alleged to be
criminal arn expressly admitted to have been clone and committed
by the defendant in the city of New York, through the instrumentality of innocent agent , the defendant at that time being in
the state of Ohio. No question was made on the argument, as to
the form of the indictment or the plea; and the only point to be
decided is whether h er e was an offense committed by the defendant "within the boundaries of this state." (2 R. S. 697, § 1.)
If so, he may be tried and punished here; but if not, he is entitled
to an acquittal, however infamous the fraudulent tran action to
which he was a party may have been.
The crime charged in this indictment is a tatute offense. Suy-
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dam, Sage & Co. were induced by false and fraudulent pretences

to sign certain written instruments, and to part with large sums

of money. The fraud may have originated and been concocted

elsewhere, but it became mature and took effect in the city of

New York, for there the false pretences were used with success,

the signatures and money of the persons defrauded being obtained

at that place. The crime was therefore committed in the city

of New York and not elsewhere. (2 R. S. 677, § 53; 1 Chit. Cr.

Law, 4th Amer. ed., 191; Eex v. Buttery, mentioned by Chief

Justice Abbott in The King v. Burdett, 4 B. & A., 95.) And of

this crime, thus committed within the limits of this state, taking

the facts charged and admitted to be true, the defendant, in my

opinion, was plainly guilty, although at the time of its perpetra-

tion he was out of this state and within the limits of the state

of Ohio. The intent to cheat was his; the fraudulent contrivance

was his; and by agents, acting within this state, for him and

under his authority and guidance, themselves innocent of all fraud,

were the false pretences used and the crime fully consummated.

He and he alone was therefore the guilty party.
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This conclusion is certainly sound in morals and reason, and

it should be so in law. The immediate actors in effecting the

fraud were entirely guiltless: they were but instruments in the

hands of the defendant, and wholly unconscious of the part they

were made to perform in his guilty plot. A gr:at fraud was thus

perpetrated in this state and maimed or impotent indeed must

our law be, if the contriver of the mischief, by whose efforts alone

the cheat was effected, can escape punishment on the ground that

he was out of the state when his fraudulent machinations were

concocted, and when they took effect within it

Personal presence, at the place where a crime was perpetrated,

is not indispensable to make one a principal offender in its commis-

sion. Thus, where a gun is fired from the land which kills a man

at sea, the offence must be tried by the admiralty and not by the

common law courts; for the crime is committed where the death

occurs, and not at the place from whence the cause of the death

proceeds. And on the same principle an offence committed by

firing a shot from one county which takes effect in another, must

be tried in the latter, for there the crime was committed. (1 Cliit.

Cr. Law, 155, 191 ; United States v, Davis, 2 Sum. 485.) In such

cases the offender is an immediate actor in the perpetration of the

dam, Sage & Co. were induced by fal e and fraudulent pretenc
to sign certain written instrument , and to part with large um ,
of money. The fraud may have originated and b en oncocted
elsewhere, but it became mature and took effect in the city of
New York, for there th false pr t ence were u d with succe ,
the signature and money of the per on defrauded being obtained
at that place. The crime wa therefore committed in th city
of New York and not el ewhere. (2 R. S. G", § 53; 1 Chit. r.
Law, 4th Amer. ed., 191; R ex v. Buttery, mentioned by hi f
.Justice Abbott in The King v. Burdett, -± B. & A., 95.) And of
this crime, thus committed within the limit of this state, taking
the facts charged and admitted to be true, the defen lant, in my
opinion, was plainly guilty, although at the time of it perpetration he was out of this state and within the limit of the state
of Ohio. The intent to cheat was his ; the fraudulent contrivance
was hi ; and by agents, acting within this state, for him and
under his authority and guidance, themselv innocent of all fraud,
were the fal e pretences used and the crime fully consummated.
He and he alone wa therefore the guilty party.
This conclu ion i certainly sound in morals and reason, and
it should be o in law. The immediate actors in effecting the
fraud were entirely guiltless: they were but instruments in the
hands of the defendant, and wholly uncon ciou of the part they
were made to perform in his guilty plot. A gr:at fraud was thus
perpetrated in thi state and maimed or impotent indeed must
our law be, if the contriver of the mischief, by whose efforts alone
the cheat was effected, can e cape punishment on the ground that
he wa out of the state when hi fraudulent machination were
concocted, and when they took effect within it
Personal presence, at the place where a crime was perpetrated,
is not indispensable to make one a principal offender in its commi ion. Thus, where a gun is fired from the lan 1 which kill a man
at sea, the offence must be tried by the admiralty and not by the
common law courts; for the crime i committed where the c1 ath
occurs, and not at the place from whence the cau of the death
proceeds. And on the ame pr~nciple an offence committed by
firing a hot .from one county which take effect in anoth r, mu t
be tried in the latter, for there the crime wa ommitted. ( 1 Chit.
Cr. Law, 155, 191; United tates v. Davi , 2 um. 4 . ) In u h
ca es the off nder i an immediate a tor in tl1 p rp tration of the
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crime, although not personally present at the place where the law-

adjudges it to be committed. He is there, however, by the instru-

ment used to effect his purpose, and which the law holds sufficient

to make him personally responsible at that place for the act done

there.

But crimes may be perpetrated through the instrumentality of

living agents in the absence of the principal, and our law books are

full of such cases. Where poison is knowingly sent to be ad-

ministered as medicine, by attendants who are ignorant that it

is poison, and death ensues, the person who thus procures the

poison to be taken is guilty of murder. So where a child with-

out discretion, an idiot or a madman, is induced by a third

person to do a felonious act, the instigator alone is guilty, and

although not present at the perpetration of the crime, he is a prin-

cipal felon. {Foster's Cr. L. 349; 1 Hale's P. C. 617; 1 Ch. C.

L. 191; 1 Curw. Eawl. P. C. 92; Regina v. Michael, d C. & P.

356; CommonvjeaUh v. Hill, 11 Mass. 136; Stepliens' Cr. L. 7,

141.) This is on the common law principle, qui facit per alium,

facit per se, which according to the late Chief Justice Hosmer of
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Connecticut, "is of universal application, both in criminal and civil

cases." [Barhhamsted v. Parsons, 3 Conn. 8.) In misdemeanors

and in civil transactions the remark is undoubtedly correct, as it

also is in felonies where the agent is himself innocent. But where

the agent is a guilty actor in the commission of the felony, the law

makes him the principal offender, and the one by whom he was

employed or instigated, is, if absent, but an accessory before the

fact. With this qualification, what was said by the late learned

chief justice is believed to be strictly correct.

That such is the rule where both principal and agent, at the time

when the crime was perpetrated, were in the same state, although in

different counties, was not denied on the argument, nor does it

admit of a question. It was however urged, that the rule was other-

wise where they were in different states and consequently under the

immediate authority and jurisdiction of different systems of law.

But this difference in matter of fact lays no foundation for a differ-

ence in principle. We were not referred to, nor have I found an

adjudged case, or the dictum of an elementary writer, which gives

the least countenance to it. On the contrary, it has been repeat-

edly overruled and disregarded by judicial tribunals of the most

exalted character for learning and wisdom.

crime, although not personally present at the place wh ere t he law
adjudges it to be committed. H e is there, h owever, by the instrument used to effect his purpose, and which the law holds sufficient
to make him personally responsible at that place for the act done
there.
But crimes may be perpetrated through the instrumentality of
living agent in the absence of the principal, and our law books are
full of such ca cs. \Yhere poison is knowingly ent t o be administered a medicine, by attendant who are ignorant that it
is poison, and death en ues, the per on who thu procures the
poison to be taken is guilty of murder. So where a child without discretion, an idiot or a madman, is induced by a third
per on to do a felonious act, the in tigator alone is guilty, and
although not present at the perpetration of the crime, he is a principal felon. (Fost er's Cr. L . 349; 1 Hal e's P. C. 617; 1 Ch. C.
L . 191; 1 Curw. Hawk. P. C. 92 ; R egina v . lll ichael, 9 C. & P .
356; Commonwealth v. II ill, 11 M as . 13G ; · tephens' Cr. L . 7~
141.) This is on the common law principle, qui fa cit per alium,
fa cit per se, which according to the late Chief Ju tice Ho mer of
Connecticut, " i of univer ..,al application both in criminal and civil
ca es." (Barkhamsted v . Parsons, 3 Conn. 8.) In misdemeanor s
and in civil transactions the r emark is undoubtedly correct, as it.
also is in felonie where the agent is himself innocent. But where
the agent is a guilty actor in the commission of the felony, the law
makes him the principal offender, and the one by whom he was
employed or instigated, is, if absent, but an accessory before the
fact. With this qualification, what was said by the late learned
chief justice i believed to be strictly correct.
Th at such is the rule where both principal and agent, at the time
when the crime wa s perpetrated, wer e in the same state, although in
diff rent counties, was not denied on the argument, nor does it
admit of a question. It was however urged, that the rule wa otherwi e where they were in different states and consequently under the
immediate authority and jurisdiction of different systems of law.
But this difference in matter of fact lays no foundation for a difference in principle. We were not referred to, nor have I found an
adjudged case, or the dictum of an elementary writer, which gives
the least countenance to it. On the contrary, it has been repeatedly overruled and disregarded by judicial tribunals of the most
ex111tec1 character for learning and wisdom.
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The case of The King v. Brisac and Scott, (4 East, 164) is

directly in point. It was an information against the captain and

purser of a British man of war, for a conspiracy to cheat the crown

by means of false vouchers. The trial was in the county of Mid-

dlesex, and it appeared that "all the acts in which either of the

defendants immediately took a part were done by them either on

the high seas at Brassa Sound, or at Lerwick in the Isle of Shet-

land. The only acts proved to be done in Middlesex, were those

which were done by them mediately, through the intervention of

innocent persons." Upon this it was objected that "all the acts of

the defendants themselves which constituted the offence of con-

spiracy were committed out of the jurisdiction of the common

law." Grose, J., delivered the opinion of the court on this point,

which was that the acts done by the agents of the defendants in

Middlesex were their acts done in that county. "I say," said he,

"it was their acts, done by them both; for the persons who inno-

cently delivered the vouchers were mere instruments in their hands

for that purpose; the crime of presenting these vouchers was ex-

clusively their own, as the crime of administering poison through
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the medium of a person ignorant of its quality would be the crime

of the person procuring it to be administered."

The King v. Johnson (6 East, 583, 7 id. 65) was determined on

the same principle. The defendant was indicted in Middlesex in

England, for procuring a libel to be published in that county, he

being when it was procured to be so published and at the time of

its publication, as well as when he wrote it, in Ireland. But al- ,

though the defendant had personally done nothing in Middlesex or

in England, he was, notwithstanding, held to be liable for the pub-

lication in that county, and was accordingly found guilty by the

jury. There are various other cases in England and in this coun-

try, determined on the same principle. {Rex v. Munton, 1 Esp.

42; Barkhamsted v. Parsons, supra; The Commonwealth v. Gil-

lespie, 1! S. (& R. 477, 478; United States v. Davis, supra; The

case of George v. Hervey, 8 Amer. Jurist, 69.) And to the same

effect are the views of the late Mr. Justice Cowen as expressed in

Eathbun's case. (21 Wend. 528 to 541; see also StarJc. on Crim.

PI. 24.) And the principle is too reasonable and just of itself, and

too well sustained by adjudged cases, to admit, in my judgment, of

any serious doubt.

This in no sense affirms or implies an extension of our laws be-

The case of The King v. Brisac and Scott, ( 4 East, 164) i
directly in point. It was an info.rmation against the captain and
pur er of a Briti h man of war, for a conspiracy to cheat the crown
by mean of fal e vouchers. The trial wa in the county of Middle ex, and it appeared that '(all the acts in which either of the
defendants immedia.tely took a part were done by them either on
the high seas at Bra sa Sound, or at Lerwick in the Isle of Shetland. The only acts proved to be done in Middlesex, were tho c
which were done by them mediately, through the intervention of
innocent person ." Upon this it wa objected that "all the acts of
the defendants themselves which constituted the offence of conspiracy were committed out of the jurisdiction of the common
law." Grose, J ., delivered the opinion of the court on this point,
which was that the acts done by the agent of the defendants in
Middlesex were their acts done in that county. "I say," said he,
"it was their acts, done by them both; for the persons who innocently delivered the vouchers were mere instruments in their hands
for that purpose; the crime of presenting these vouchers was exclusively their own, as the crime of administering poison thro·u gh
the medium of a person ignorant of its quality would be the crime
of the person procuring it to be administered."
T he King v. Johnson (6 East, 583, 7 id. 65) was determined on
the same principle. The defendant was indicted in Middle 'ex in
England, for procuring a libel to be published in that county, he
being when it was procured to be so published and at the time of
its publication, as well as when he wrote it, in Ireland. But although the defendant had personally done nothing in Middlesex or
in England, he wa , notwithstanding, held to b liable for the publication in that county, and was accordingly found guilty by the
jury. There are various other cases in England and in this country, determined on the same principle. (R ex v. Munton, 1 Esp.
42; Barkhamsted v. Parsons, supra_; Th e Commonwealth v. Gillespie, 7 S. & R. 477, 478; United Sfates v. Davis, supra; The
case of George v. Hervey, 8 Amer. Jurist, 69.) And to the sam
effect are the view of the late Mr. Justice Cowen as expres~ed in
Rathbun's case. (21 Wend. 528 to 541; see also Sta.rk. on Crim,.
Pl. 24.) And the principle is too reasonable and just of itself, an<l
too well sustain d by adjudged cases, to admit, in my judgment, of
any serious doubt.
Thi. jn no ense affirms or implies an exten. ion of our law b -
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yond the territorial limits of the state. The defendant may have

violated the law of Ohio by what he did there, but with that we

have no concern. What he did in Ohio was not, nor could it be,

an infraction of our law or a crime against this state. He was in-

dicted for what was done here, and done by himself. True, the

defendant was not personally within this state, but he was here in

purpose and design, and acted by his authorized agents. Qui facit

per alium facit per se. The agents employed were innocent, and

he alone was guilty. An offence was thus committed, and there

must have been a guilty offender ; for it would be somewhat worse

than absurd to hold that any act could be a crime if no one was

criminal. Here the crime was perpetrated within this state, and

over that our courts have an undoubted jurisdiction. This neces-

sarily gives to them jurisdiction over the criminal. Crimen trahit

personam.

For all civil purposes a person out of this state may act by pro-

curation within its limits, and thus, although absent at the time,

lie may become subject to the state law. Eights may thus be ac-

quired by the absent party, as he also may become civilly liable
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under the law of this state, for what is done here by his authoriza-

tion and procurement. The individual remedy, in such case, is

perfect; and if the criminal law of the state is thus violated, why

should not the absent offender be responsible criminally, when

afterwards found within the state?

In authorizing another to act for him, the principal so far

voluntarily submits himself to the law of the place where the au-

thorized act is to be performed. This is confessedly so for all civil

purposes. If an act thus authorized results in wrong to an indi-

vidual, his right to redress against the principal, though absent, is

undoubted. As to the person injured, the local law was violated

by the absent wrongdoer; and if the act done was also a violation

of the local criminal law, is the author and procurer of the deed

guiltless ? Does the law hold him to have been within its jurisdic-

tion so far as respects the civil remedy, but not for the purpose of

punishment? I see no ground on which the distinction can be

sustained. An absent party procures an act to be done within this

state, and so far as respects criminal or civil responsibility, I think

he should not be allowed to say he is not amenable to the law. He

clearly would be so if the act had been done by himself in person

·ond th territorial limits of the state. The defendant may have
violated the law of Ohio by what he did there, but with that we
have no concern. What he did in Ohio was not, nor could it be,
an infraction of our law or a crime against this state. He wa indicted for what was done here, and done by himself. True, the
defendant was not personally within this state, but he wa here in
purpo e and design, and acted by his authorized agents. Qui f acit
per alium facit per se. The agents employed were innocent, and
he alone was guilty. An offence was thus committed, and there
mu t have been a guilty offender; for it would be somewhat worse
than absurd to hold that any act could be a crime if no one was
criminal. H ere the crime was perpetrated within this state, and
{)Ver that our courts have an undoubted jurisdiction. This necesarily gives to them jurisdiction over the criminal. Grimen trahit
personam.
For all civil purpo es a person out of this tate :!nay act by procuration within its limits, and thus, although absent at the time,
he may become subject to the state law. Rights may thus be acquired by the absent party, as he also may become civilly liable
under the law of this tate, for what is done here by his authorization and procurement. The individual remedy, in such case, is
perfect; and if the criminal law of the state is thus violated, why
should not the absent offender be respon ible criminally, when
afterwards found within the state?
In authorizing another to act for him, the principal so far
voluntarily submits himself to the law of the place where the aut horized act is to be performed. This is confessedly so for all civil
}Jurposes. If an act thus authorized r e ults in wrong to an individual, his right to redress again t the principal, though absent, is
undoubted. A to the person injured, the local law wa violated
by the absent wrongdoer; and if the act done was also a violation
{)f the local criminal law, i the author and procurer of the deed
guiltless? Does the law hold him to have been within it jurisdiction so fa r a respects the civil r emecly, but not for the purpo e of
punishment? I see no ground on which the distinction can be
u tained. An ab ent party procures an act to be done within thi
tate, and so far as respects criminal or civil re pon ibility, I think
he should not be allowed to say he is not amenable to the law. H e
clearly would be so if the act had been done by himself in person
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within the limits of the state^, and it is precisely the same if done

by an innocent agent.

Upon the facts conceded by the plea in this case, no one can

entertain a doubt that the defendant is civilly liable to Suydani,

Sage & Co., for the wrong done to them. But upon what principle

except that what he did was a violation of the law of this state?

What was done by the agents of the defendant must be deemed his

act, or he broke no law of this state; and if our law was not vio-

lated, no wrong was done to Suydam, Sage & Co. But if the

fraudulent acts done in Xew York are to be deemed the acts of the

defendant, then he did what the law declares to be a felony, and

for which he was consequently indictable. I certainly should not

be for holding the defendant responsible civilly for this act, if he

ought to be held guiltless of any crime. If he broke the law at all,

he did so for all purposes, criminal as well as civil. It was a crime

against the state as well as a wrong done to individuals, and the

perpetrator should be held responsible in both respects. Civil re-

dress for this violation of our law would be afforded by the courts

of Ohio, as well as of N"ew York ; but the criminal law of a state
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can be enforced only by its own tribunals. The matters pleaded

in this case are, in my opinion, no answer to the indictment. Con-

ceding every fact alleged in this plea to be true, still the defendant

may have been guilty of the crime charged against him.

The judgment should therefore be reversed and judgment ren-

dered for the people on the demurrer.

Judgment accordingly.

h. Accessory After the Fact.

Wren v. Commonivealth, 26 Grat. (Va.) 952. (1875.)

Cheistian, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a writ of error to a judgment of the Hustings Court of

the city of Eichmond.

The case is before this court for the second time.

The accused was indicted in the said Hustings Court, as acces-

sory after the fact to a felony, of which one John Dull was con-

victed in said court. The indictment after setting out, in proper

form, the felony committed by the said John Dull, charged "that

John Wren" (the plaintiff in error), "well knowing the said John

7

within the limits of the tate) and it i preci ely the ame if don·
by an innocent agent.
Upon the facts conceded by the plea in thi case) no on can
entertain a doubt that the def nclant ia civilly liable to uydam,
Sage & Co. for the wrong done to them. But upon what prin ipk
except that what he did wa a violation of the law of thi ~tat ?
vVhat wa done by the agent of the defendant must b deemed his
act) or he broke no law of this tate; and if our law was not Yiolated, no wrong wa done to Suydam, Sage & Co. But if the
fraudulent act done in New York arc to be deemed the acts of the
defendant, then he did what the law ueclare to be a felony, and
for which he was con equently indictable. I certainl3 hould not
be for holding the defendant respon ible civilly for thi ·act, if he
<rnght to be held guiltle s of any crime. If he broke the law at all
11e did so for all purposes, criminal a well a civil. It wa a crime
again t the state a well a a wrong clone to individual , and th
perpetrator should be held re ponsible in both re pect ·. Civil r dress for this violation of our law would be afforded by the courts
of Ohio, a well a of New York; but the criminal law of a tate
can be enforced only by it own tribunals. The matters pleaded
in this case are, in my opinion, no answer to the indictment.
oncedine; every fact alleged in this plea to be true, still the defendant
may have been guilty of the crime charged against him.
The judgment hould therefore be reversed and judgment rendered for the people on the demurrer.
Judgment accordingly.

b.
W1·en v.

Accessory After the Fact.

Commonwealth~

26 Grat. (Va.) 952.

(1875.)

CHRISTIAN~ J., delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a writ of error to a judgment of the Hu ting Court of
the city of Richmond.
The ca e is before thi court for the second time.
The accu ed wa indicted in the aid Hu ting Court, a acce sory aft r the fa t to a felony, of which on John Dull wa onvicted in aid court. The indictment after tting out, in prop r
form, the felony committei by th aid John Dull, harg d "that
John Wr n" (the plaintiff in error), "w 11 knowino- th . aic1 John
7

9

p ARTIES

TO CRIMES

9g Parties to Crimes

Dull to have committed the said felony in form aforesaid; to-wit^

since the said felony was committed in the year aforesaid, in the

city aforesaid, him the said John Dull did then and there unlaw-

fully receive, harbor and maintain, against the peace and dignity of

the commonwealth of Virginia."

Under this indictment the accused was found guilty at the No-

vember term of the said Hustings Court ; and his fine assessed by

the jury at one cent; and was sentenced by the court to twelve

months imprisonment in the city jail ; and to labor upon the public:

streets, or other public works, for seven hours a day during said

term of imprisonment. To that judgment a writ of error was

awarded by this court ; and upon the hearing of said writ of error

at the last term, the judgment was reversed, and the accused was.

remanded to the said Hustings Court for a new trial.

It is proper to remark, that the judgment and opinion of this

court upon the former hearing was confined to a single point ; and

that was that the instructions given by the court were calculated ta

mislead the jury, and were therefore erroneous. The opinion was

confined to the single point, and the judgment was reversed upon
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that ground only.

At the February term of the said Hustings Court, the accused

was again tried upon the same indictment ; was again found guilty,

and his fine assessed by the jury at $200; and was sentenced by the

court to imprisonment for the period of ten months and until

payment of said fine.

To this judgment a writ of error was awarded by this court.

The counsel for the prisoner, in his petition for a writ of error,

assigns two grounds of error: 1st. The granting, by the court, of

the instructions asked for by the commonwealth's attorney: and

2d. The overruling of his motion for a new trial.

The second assignment of errors will be disposed of first.

The court below refused to certify the facts proved because the

evidence was conflicting; but certified all the evidence offered, both

by the commonwealth and the accused. According to the rules

established by this court, in considering such a bill of exceptions,

the court will reject all the evidence offered by the prisoner in

conflict with that offered by the commonwealth, and determine,

upon the testimony of the commonwealth alone and all fair and

legal inferences to be drawn therefrom, whether the offence charged

in the indictment is made out and established by the proof: in

ull to have committed the said felony in form aforesaid; to-wit,.
, ince the said felony was committed in the year aforesaid, in the
city aforesaid, him the said John Dull did then and there unlawfully receive, harbor and maintain, again t the peace and dignity of
the commonwealth of Virginia."
Under thi indictment the accused was found guilty at the November term of the said Hu tings Court ; and his fine assessed by
th jury at one cent; and was sentenced by the court to twelve·
months imprisonment in the city jail ; and to labor upon the public·
streets, or other public works, for seven hours a day during said
term of imprisonment. To that judgment a writ of error wa
awarded by thi court; and upon the hearing of said writ of error
at the last t erm, the judgment was reversed, and the accused was.
remanded to the said Hustings Court for a new trial.
It is proper to remark, that the judgment and opinion of thi
court upon the former hearing was confined to a single point; and
that was that the instructions given by the court were calculated t(}
mi lead the jury, and were therefore erroneous. The opinion was
confined to the single point, and the judgment wa r eversed upon
that ground only.
At the February term of the said Hu tings Court, the accused
was again tried upon the same indictment; was again found guilty,
anc1 hi fine as ·essed by the jury at $200; and was sentenced by the
court to imprisonment for the period of ten months and until
payment of aicl fine.
To this judgment a writ of error was awa;rded by this court.
The counsel for the pri oner, in his petition for a writ of error,
a signs twe ground· of error : 1st. The granting, by the court, of
the instruction a ked for by the commonwealth's attorney : and
2c1. The overruling of his motion for a new trial.
The second a signment of errors will be disposed of first.
The court below refused to certify the facts proved becau e the
evidence wa conflicting; but certified all the evidence offered, both
by the commonwealth and the accused. According to the rule
e tablished by this court, in considering such a bill of exceptions,
the court will reject all the evidence offered by the prisoner in
conflict with that offered by the commonwealth, and determine,
upon the testimony of the commonwealth alone and all fair and
legal inferences to be drawn therefrom, whether the offence charged
in the indictment is made out and established by the proof: in
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other words, whether admitting all the facts proved by the com-

monwealth, without reference to those proved by the accused, these

facts constitute the offence charged in the indictment.

The accused is charged with accessorial guilt. He is charged in

the indictment with unlawfully receiving, harboring and maintain-

ing John Dull, knowing him to have committed a felony. This

charge constitutes what the law denominates "an accessory after

the fact." The common law definitely and distinctly defines who

is such an offender. He is a person who knowing a felony to have

been committed by another, receives, relieves, comforts or assists

the felon. 1 Hale P. C. 618 ; 1 Arch. Crim. Pract. 78, and cases

there cited.

The reason en which the common law makes a party in such a

case criminal, is that the course of public Justice is hindered, and

justice itself is evaded by facilitating the escape of the felon.

To constitute one an accessory after the fact, three things are

requisite: 1. The felony must be completed; 2. He must know

that the felon is guilty; 3. He must receive, relieve, comfort or

assist him. It is necessary that the accessory have notice, direct
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or implied, at the time he assists or comforts the felon, that he has

committed a felony. 3 Hawk. ch. 29, § 32. And although it

seemed at one time to be doubted, whether an implied notice of the

felony will not in some cases suffice, as where a man receive a felon

in the same county in which he has been attainted, which is sup-

posed to have been a matter of notoriety, it seems to be the better

opinion, that some more particular evidence is requisite to raise

the presumption of knowledge. 1 Hale 323, 622; 3 P. Wms. E.

496; 4 Black. Com. 37.

But knowledge of the commission of the felony must be brought

home to the accused, and whether he had such knowledge is always

a question for the jury.

As to the receiving, relieving and assisting, one known to be a

felon, it may be said in general terms, that any assistance given to

one known to be a felon in order to hinder his apprehension, trial

or punishment, is sufficient to make a man accessory after the fact ;

as that he concealed him in the house, or shut the door against his

pursuers, until he should have an opportunity to escape; or took

money from him to allow him to escape; or supplied him with

money, a horse or other necessaries, in order to enable him to

escape; or that the principal was in prison, and the jailor was

other words, whether admitting all the facts proved by the comm.onwealth, without reference to tho e proved by the accused, the e
facts constitute the offence charged in the indictment.
The accused is charged with acce sorial guilt. He is charged in
the indictment with unlawfully receiving, harboring and maintaining John Dull, knowing him to have committed a felony. Thig
charge constitutes what the law denominates "an accessory after
the fact." The common law definitely and distinctly defines who
is such an offender. He is a person who knowing a felony to have
been committed by another, receives, relieves, comforts or as ists
the felon. 1 Hale P. C. 618; 1 Arch. Crim. Pract. 78, and cases
there cited.
The rea on on which the common law makes a party in such a
case criminal, is that the course of public justice is hindered, and
justice itself is evaded by facilitating the escape of the felon.
To constitute one an accessory after the fact, three things are
requisite: 1. The felony must be completed; 2. He must know
that the felon is guilty; 3. H e must receive, relieve, comfort or
assist him. It i necessary that the aceessory have notice, direct
or implied, at the time he assists or comforts the felon, that he has
committed a felony. 2 Hawk. ch. 29, § 32. And although it
seemed at one time to be doubted, whether an implied notice oi the
felony will not in some cases uffice, as where a man receivt- a felon
in the same county in which he has been attainted~ which is supposed to have been a matter of notoriety, it seems to be the better
opinion, that some more particular evidence is requisite to raise
the presumption of knowledge. 1 Hale 323, 622; 3 P. Wms. R.
496; 4 Black. Com. 37.
But knowledge of the commission of the felony must be brought
home to the accused, and whether he had such knowledge is always
.
a question for the jury.
As to the receiving, relieving and assi ting, one known to be a
felon, it may be said in general terms, that any a si tance given to
one known to be a felon in order to hinder his apprehension, trial
or punishment, is sufficient to make a man accessory after the fact;
as that he concealed him in the house, or hut the door against his
pursuer , until he should have an opportunity to escape; or took
money from him to allow him to escape; or supplied him with
money, a horse or other necessaries, in order to enable him to·
escape; or that the principal was in prison, and the jailer was
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ibcd to let him escape; or conveyed instruments to him to enable

him to break prison and escape. This and such like assistance to

one known to be a felon, would constitute a man accessory after the

fact. 1 Hale 619, 621 ; 2 Hawk. c. 29, § 26. But merely suffering

the principal to escape, will not make the party accessory after the

fact ; for it amounts at most but to a mere omission. 1 Hale 619 ;

9 H. iv., 1. Or if he agree for money not to prosecute the felon ;

or if knowing of a felony, fails to make it known to the proper

authorities ; none of these acts would be sufficient to make the party

an accessory after the fact. If the thing done amounts to no more

than the compounding a felony, or the misprision of it, the doer

will not be an accessory. 1 Bishop, § 633 ; 1 Hale 371, 618. "The

true test (says Bishop, § 634) whether one is accessory after the

fact, is to consider whether what he did was done by way of per-

sonal help to his principal, with the view of enabling his principal

to elude punishment; the kind of help rendered appearing to be

unimportant."

c. In What Crimes We Have Accessories.
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Ward V. People, 6 Hill (N. Y.) lU- (18US.)

Walworth, Chancellor :

The plaintiff in error had been convicted for a petit larceny in

stealing ice from the ice-house of J. Fay ; which ice appeared by

the conviction to have been the property of Fay, and of the value

of one dollar. He was afterwards indicted for a second offence of

bribed to let him escape ; or conveyed instruments to him to enable
him to break prison and escape. This and such like assistance to
one known to be a felon, would constitute a man accessory after the
fact. 1 H ale 619, 621; 2 Hawk. c. 29, § 26. But merely suffering
t he principal to escape, will not make the party accessory after the
fact ; for it amount. at most but to a mere omission. 1 Hale 619;
9 IL iv., 1. Or if he agree for money not to prosecute the felon;
or if knowing of a felony, fails to make it known to the proper
authorities ; none of these acts would be ufficient to make the part ·
an accessory after the fact. If the thing done amounts to no more
than the compounding a felony, or the misprision of it, the doer
will not be an acce sory. 1 Bishop, § 633; 1 Hale 371, 618. "The
true test (says Bishop, § 634) whether one is accessory after the
fact, is to consider whether what he did was done by way of personal help to his principal, with the view of enabling his principal
to elude punishment; the kind of help rendered appearing to be
unimportant."

petit larceny in stealing a quantity of butter, stated in the indict-

ment to have been the property of J. Flagg. Upon the trial of the

indictment. Ward, the plaintiff in error, objected that ice was not

a subject of larceny, and that the record produced did not therefore

show a legal conviction of the former offence of petit larceny ; which

c.

In What Crimes We Have Accessories.

objection was overruled by the court. Flagg testified that he was

the owner of the butter which was stolen from his possession, and

Ward v. People, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 144.

(1843.)

that he bought it of the master of a canal boat. Ward thereupon

proposed to ask the witness whether he did not steal the butter on

l)oard the boat, or whether he and the master of the boat did not

steal it together; which question was objected to by the public

prosecutor and overruled by the court. He thereupon gave evi-

Chancellor:
The plaintiff in error had been convicted for a petit larceny in
stealing ice from the ice-house of J. Fay; which ice appeared by
the conviction to have been the property of Fay, and of the value
of one dollar. H e was afterwards indicted for a econd offence of
petit larceny in stealing a quantity of butter, stated in the indictment to have been the property of J. Flagg. Upon the trial of the
indictment, Ward, the plaintiff in error, objected that ice was not
a subject of larceny, and that the record produced did not therefore
how a legal conviction of the former offence of petit larceny; which
objection was overruled by the court. Flagg testified that he was
the owner of the butter which was stolen from his possession, ancl
that he bought it of the master of a canal boat. Ward thereupon
proposed to ai: ; k the witness wheth er he did not steal the butter on
board the boat, or whether he and the master of the boat did not
. teal it together; which question was obj ected to by the public
prosecutor and overruled by the court. H e thereupon gave eviWAL WORTH,

WARD v.

PEOPLE

101

Ward v. People 101

dence tending to prove that he did not himself steal the butter from

Flagg, but sent another person to steal it ; and that they afterwards

divided the butter between them. And he requested the court to

charge the jury that, if the butter was thus stolen, he was merely

an accessory, and could not be convicted as a principal for the petit

larceny. This the court refused; but charged the jury that, if

the other person stole the butter, in Ward's absence, by his advice

and procurement, he might be convicted as a principal, as there

were no accessories in petit larceny. Exceptions were taken to these

several decisions of the court, and upon argument of the exceptions

before the supreme court, they were disallowed; and Ward was

sentenced to imprisonment in the state prison.

It is not necessary to examine the question whether the court

before whom the indictment for the second offence was tried, had a

right to decide in this collateral way whether the first conviction

was not erroneous. For there can be no doubt that ice, when

collected and joreserved for use in an ice-house, becomes individual

property, so as to make it the subject of larceny ; although it was

not so when it constituted a part of the river or pond from whence
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it was originally taken. {See Barb. Mag. Crim. Laiv, 160.)

The public prosecutor could not object to the question put to

Flagg upon the ground that if answered in a particular way it

would subject him to a criminal prosecution. That is an objection

that the witness alone is authorized to make. («) But the objec-

tion was properly sustained upon the ground that the answer to

the question was not relevant to the matter of the issue; as it was

not material to know whether Flagg became possessed of the butter

wrongfully or otherwise. (Id. 162; 2 Buss, on Crimes, 156, Am.

ed. of 1836; 1 Leach's C. C. 522.)

The court was also right in charging the jury that if Arnold stole

the butter in the absence of Ward, but by his advice and procure-

ment, the latter was a principal in the larceny. Lord Coke says

that in the highest offence and lowest injury, there are no accesso-

ries, but all are principals; as in treason, petit larceny and tres-

pass. (2 Inst. 183.) And the law has been settled for nearly two

hundred years that in petit larceny there can be no accessory, on

account of the smallness of the felony. Those who procure, aid or

advise in the commission of the offence are principals. And those

who merely assisted the escape of the perpetrator of the offence,

(a) See Cloyes v. Thayer (3 Hill, 564, 566).

dence tending to prove that he did not himself steal the butter from
Flagg, but sent another person to steal it; and that they afterward.
divided the butter between them. And he requested the court to
charge the jury that, if the butter was thus stolen, he was merely
an accessory, and could not be convicted as a principal for the pctit
larceny. This the court refused; but charged the jury that, if
the other person stole the butter, in Ward's absence, by his advice
and procurement, he might be convicted as a principal, as there
were no accessories in petit larceny. Exceptions were taken to these
. everal decisions of the court, and upon argument of the exceptions
before the supreme court, they were disallowed; and Ward was
sentenced to imprisonment in the state prison.
It is not necessary to examine the question whether the court
before whom the indictment for the second offence was tried: had a
right to decide in this collateral way whether the first conviction
was not erroneous. For there can be no doubt that ice, when
collected and preserved for use in an ice-house, becomes individual
property, so as to make it the subject of larceny; although it wa
not so when it constituted a part of the river or pond from whence
it was originally taken. (See Barb. Mag. Crim. Law, 160.)
The public prosecutor could not object to the question put to
Flagg upon the ground that if answered in a particular way it
would subject him to a criminal prosecution. That is an obj ection
that the witness alone is authorized to make. (a) But the obj ection was properly sustained upon the ground that the answer to
the question was not relevant to the matter of the issue; as it wa
not material to know whether Flagg became possessed of the butter
wrongfully or otherwi e. (Id. 162; 2 Russ. on Crimes, 156, Am.
ed. of 1836; 1 Leach's C. C. 522.)
The court was also right in charging the jury that if Arnold stole
the butter in the absence of Ward, but by his advice and procurement, the latter was a principal in the larceny. Lord Coke say
that in the highe t offence and lowest injury, there are no accessories, but all are principals; as in treason, petit larceny and trespa s. (2 Inst. 183.) And the law has been settled for nearly two
hundred y ars tha.t in petit larceny there can be no ace ssory, on
account of the mallness of the felony. Tho e who procure, aid 01·
advise in the commi. ion of the offence are principals. And tho
who merely as isted the e cape of the perp trator of the offence,
(a) See Cloyes v. Thayer (3 Hill, 564, 566) .
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were not, at common law, regarded as criminal. (12 Coke's Rep.

81 ; 1 Hale's P. C. 530, 616 ; Barb. Mag. Crim. Law, 177 ; Fos-

ter's C. L.n'6; 2 East's C. L. 743; Cro. Eliz. 750; 2 Hawk. P. C.

440.)

The plaintiff in error was therefore rightfully convicted of this

second offence of petit larceny; and the judgment of the court

below should be affirmed.

d. Trial of Accessories.

McCarty v. State, U Ind. 2U. (1873.)

WORDEN, J. :

were not, at common law, regarded as criminal. (12 Coke's Rep.
81; 1 II ale's P. C. 530, 616; Barb. Ma.g. Crim. Law, 177; Fost er's C. L. 73 ; 2 East's C. L. 743; Oro. Eliz. 750; 2 Hawk. P. C.
4-±0.)
The plaintiff in error was therefore rightfully convicted of this
second offence of petit larceny; and the judgment of the court
below should be affirmed.

This was an indictment against Henry McCarty and Isaac Mc-

Carty, containing two counts. The first count charged them both,

as principals, with the commission of an assault and battery upon

Marion Grimes with intent to murder him.

d.

The second count charged Henry McCarty with the commission

Trial of Accesso1-ies.

of the assault and battery upon Grimes with the like intent, and

that the appellant, Isaac McCarty, was accessory before the fact of

McCarty v. Sta.te, 44 Ind. 214.

said offence.

(1873.)

The defendants demanded a separate trial, and thereupon the
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state elected to try Isaac first. He was thereupon put upon his

trial and found guilty on the second count in the indictment, and

sentenced to pay a fine and be imprisoned in the penitentiary for

the term of two years. Before judgment was rendered against the

defendant Isaac, on the verdict, Henry had been put upon trial,

on the indictment, and had been acquitted, and judgment had been

rendered in his favor.

The appellant produced the record showing the acquittal of

Henry, and the judgment in his favor, and moved to be discharged ;

but the court overruled his motion, and he excepted. Judgment

was then pronounced against him on the verdict.

The verdict against the appellant upon the second count in the

indictment, saying nothing in respect to the first, was equivalent to

a verdict of acquittal upon the first. Weinzorpflin v. The State,

7 Blackf. 186.

The appellant was found guilty only of being accessory before the

fact to the offence charged against Henry McCarty, as principal.

J.:
This was an indictment against Henry McCarty and Isaac McCarty, containing two counts. The fir t count charged them both~
as principals, with the commission of an assault and battery upon
Marion Grimes with intent to murder him.
The second count charged Henry McCarty with the commission
of the assault and battery upon Grimes with the like intent, and
that the appellant, Isaac McCarty, was accessory before the fact of
said offence.
The defendants demanded a separate trial, and thereupon the
state elected to try Isaac first. He was thereupon put upon his
trial and found guilty on the second count in the indictment, and
sentenced to pay a fine and be imprisoned in the penitentiary for
the term of two years. Before judgment was rendered against the
defendant Isaac, on the verdict, Henry had been put upon trial,
on the indictment, and had been acquitted, and judgment had been
rendered in his favor.
The appellant produced the record showing the acquittal of
Henry, and the judgment in his favor, and moved to be discharged;
but the court overruled his motion, and he excepted. Judgment
was then pronounced against him on the verdict.
The verdict against the appellant upon the second co-.rnt in the
indictment, saying nothing in respect to the first, was equivalent to
a verdict of acquittal upon the first. W einzorpfiin v. The State,
7 Blackf. 186.
The appellant was found guilty only of being accessory before the
fact to the offence charged against Henry McCarty, a principal.
WORDEN,
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103

McCarty v. State 103

Btit before judgment against the appellant, the alleged principal

was tried and acquitted ; and the question arises, whether after the

acquittal of the principal, judgment could be rightfully rendered

against the appellant, charged as such accessory.

"The leading doctrine in respect to an accessory is, that he fol-

lows, like a shadow, his principal. He can neither be guilty of a

higher offence than his principal; nor guilty at all, as accessory,

unless his principal is guilty. * * * So, according to the gen-

eral doctrine, not only a man cannot be guilty as an accessory unless

there is a principal who is guilty ; but also he cannot be convicted

except jointly with or after the principal, whose acquittal acquits

him." 1 Bishop Crim. Law, sees. 666, 667. See Johns v. The

State, 19 Ind. 421. We quote the following paragraph from 4

Cooley's Bl. 333:

"By the old common law the accessory could not be arraigned

till the principal was attainted, unless he chose it; for he might

waive the benefit of the law : and therefore principal and accessory

might, and may still, be arraigned, and plead, and also be tried

together. But otherwise, if the principal had never been indicted
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at all, had stood mute, had challenged above thirty-five jurors

peremptorily, had claimed the benefit of clergy, had obtained a

pardon, or had died before attainder, the accessory in any of these

cases could not be arraigned : for non constitit whether any felony

was committed or no, till the principal was attainted ; and it might

so happen that the accessory should be convicted one day, and the

principal acquitted the next, which would be absurd. However,

this absurdity could only happen where it was possible that a trial

of the principal might be had subsequent to that of the accessory ;

and therefore the law still continues that the accessory shall not be

tried so long as the principal remains liable to be tried hereafter.

But by statute, 1 Ann. c. 9, if the principal be once convicted, and

before attainder (that is, before he receives judgment of death or

outlawry), he is delivered by pardon, the benefit of clergy, or other-

wise; or if the principal stands mute, or challenges peremptorily

above the legal number of jurors, so as never to be convicted at all ;

in any of these cases, in which no subsequent trial can be had of

the principal, the accessory may be proceeded against as if the

principal felon had been attainted ; for there is no danger of future

contradiction. And upon the trial of the accessory, as well after

as before the conviction of the principal, it seems to be the better

::Snt before judgment again t the appellant, the alleged principal
was tried and acquitted; and the question arise , wheth r after the
acquittal of the principal, judgment could be rightfully rendered
against the appellant, charged as uch accessory.
"The leading doctrine in re pect to an acce ory i~, that h follows, like a shadow, his principal. He can neither be guilty of a
higher offence than his principal; nor guilty at all, a acce ory,
unles hi principal i guilty. * * * So, according to the general doctrine, not only a man cannot be guilty a an acce ory unle
there is a princi pa.J. who is guilty ; but also he cannot be con victecl
except jointly with or after the principal, whose acquittal acquit
him." 1 Bishop Crim. Law, secs. 66'6, 667.
See Johns v. The
State, 19 Ind. 421. We quote the following paragraph from 4
Cooley's BL 323 :
"By the old common law the accessory could not be arraigned
-till the principal was attainted, unless he chose it; for he might
waive the benefit of the law: and therefore principal and accessory
might, and inay still, be arraigned, and plead, and also be tried
together. But otherwise, if the principal had never been indicted
at all, had stood mute, had challenged above thirty-five jurors
peremptorily, had claimed the benefit of clergy, had obtained a
pardon, or had died before attainder, the accessory in any of these
·cases could not be arraigned: for non constitit whether any felony
was committed or no, till the principal was attainted; and it might
so happen that the accessory should be convicted one day, and the
principal acquitted the next, which would be absurd. However,
this absurdity could only happen where it was possible that a trial
·of the principal might be had subsequent to that of the accessory;
and therefore the law still continues that the accessory shall not be
tried so long as the principal remains liable to be tried hereafter.
But by tatute, 1 Ann. c. 9, if the principal be once convicted, and
before attainder (that i, before he receives judgment of death or
outlawry), he is deliv reel by pardon, the benefit of clergy, or otherwise; or if the principal stands mute, or challenges peremptorily
above the legal number of jurors, so as never to be convicted at all;
in any of the e ca e , in which no subsequent trial can be had of
the principal, the acce ory may be proceeded again t a if the
principal felon had been attaintecl; for there i no danger of futur
contradiction. And upon the trial of the acces ory, a well aft r
as befor th conviction of the principal, it eem to b th bett r
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opinion, and founded on the true spirit of justice, that the acces-

sory is at liberty (if he can) to controvert the guilt of his supposed

principal, and to prove him innocent of the charge, as well in point

of fact as in point of law."

Having thus adverted to the common law on this subject, we

proceed to inquire how far it has been changed by our statute.

Section 49 of the criminal code (2 G. & H. 453) subjects persons,,

aiding or abetting in the commission of any offence specified in the

act, or who shall counsel, etc., the offence to be committed, to the

same punishment as that to be inflicted upon the principal.

Section 50 defines what circumstances shall be deemed to consti-

tute any person therein mentioned an accessory after the fact, and

prescribes the punishment.

Section 51 is as follows : "Every person who shall be guilty of

any crime punishable by the provisions of the last two preceding

sections, may be indicted and convicted before or after the principal

offender is indicted and convicted." This section undoubtedly

authorizes the trial and conviction of the accessory before the prin-

cipal is convicted ; but it does not, in terms, authorize the convic-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t39z97p86
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

tion of the accessory after the principal has been tried and acquitted.

Under this provision, if any accessory is convicted, and the term of

the court has passed, at which judgment was rendered against him,

so that the court would not have the common authority to set it

aside, we do not see how he could legally avail himself of the sub-

sequent acquittal of the principal. In such case, it would seem

that he must abide by the conviction, having no remedy save that

afforded by executive clemency.

Shall the statute be construed to authorize the conviction of the

accessory after the acquittal of the principal? It does not, in

terms, as we have seen, so provide. By its provisions, the accessory

may be tried and convicted, either after the principal has been

tried and convicted, or before the principal has been tried, his

guilt remaining, in the meantime, undetermined. But if, at any

time before the final conviction of the accessory, the principal

has been tried and acquitted, there is no authority, either in the

principles of the common law or under the statute quoted, for pro-

ceeding to the final conviction of the accessory.

In this case, the appellant had been found guilty by the verdict

of a jury, but before judgment thereon the principal had been tried

and acquitted. This entitled the appellant to be discharged, and,.

opinion, and founded on the true spirit of justice, that the accesory i at liberty (if he can) to controvert the guilt of his supposed
principal, and to prove him innocent of the charge, as well in point
of fact as in point of law."
Having thus adverted to the common law on this subject, we
proceed to inquire how far it has been changed by our statute.
ection -±9 of th e criminal code (2 G. & H. -±53) ubj ects person
aiding or abetting in the commission of any offence specified in the
act, or who hall counsel, etc., the offence to be committed, to the
same punishment as that to be inflicted upon the principal.
Section 50 defines what circumstances shall be deemed to constitute any person therein mentioned an acce ory after the fact, ancI
prescribes the punishment.
Section 51 js as follows: "Every per on who shall be guilty of
any crime punj hable by the provi ion of the last two precedi11g
ection , may be indicted and convicted b fore or after the principal
offender is indicted and convicted." This section undoubtedly
authorizes the trial and conviction of the accessory before the principal is convicted; but it does not, in terms, authorize the conviction of the accessory after the principal ha been tried and acquitted.
lTnder this provision> if an:v acce ory i convicted, and the term of
the court has passed, at which judgment wa rendered against him,
so that the court would not have the common authority to set it
aside, we do not . ee how he could legally avail himself of the subequent acquittal of the prjncipal. In uch case, it would seem
that he must abide by the conviction, having no remedy save that
afforded by executive clemency.
Shall the statute be con trued to authorize the conviction of the
acce ory after the acquittal of the principal? It does not, in
terms, a we have seen, , o provide. By it provi ion , the acce sory
may be tried and convicted, either after the principal has been
tried and convicted, or before the principal ha been tried hi
guilt remaining, in the meantime, undetermined. But if, at any
time before the final conviction of the accessory, the principal
ha been tried and acquitted, ther e i no authority, either in the
prindples of the common law or under the tatute quoted, for proceedjng to the final conviction of the acce ory.
In this ca e, the appellant had been fo und guilty by the verdict
of a jury, but before judgment thereon the principal had been tried
and acquitted. This entitled the appellant to be discharged, and
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in our opinion, the court below erred in overruling his motion for

such discharge.

The judgment below is reversed, and it is ordered that the

appellant be discharged from imprisonment in the state prison.

3. Corporations.

State V. Agricultural Society, 5Jf N. J. L. 260. (1892.)

in our opinion, the court below erred in overruling hi motion forsuch di charge.
The judgment below i rev er~ed, and it i ordered that the
appellant be di charged from impri onment in the tate pri on.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Vax Syckel, J. :

The defendant was convicted in the Passaic Quarter Sessions for

keeping a disorderl}^ house.

In addition to the alleged jurisdictional defect, and the alleged

3.

CORPORATIONS.

defects in the record which have been discussed in the case of

George H. Engeman et al. v. The State, decided at the present

term of this court, other errors are assigned for reversal which it

State v. Agricultural Society, 54 N. J. L. 260.

(1892.)

is necessary to consider.

In the first place it is denied that the trial court obtained juris-

diction of the corporation.

Section 80 of the Criminal Procedure act provides that when the

summons or notice to the corporation shall be returned summoned
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or served, the corporation shall be considered as in court, and as-

appearing to said indictment, and the court shall order the clerk

to enter an appearance for said corporation and endorse the plea

of not guilty upon said indictment.

This statute applies only to involuntary appearances by corpo-

rations.

It has never been doubted that corporations could appear and

plead to indictments by attorney, and the practice has always pre-

vailed to permit attorneys of our courts to appear for corporations

they claim to represent. In fact, corporations cannot appear .in

person, they must appear by attorney.

In this case the record shows that Robert I. Hopper, one of the

practicing attorneys of this court, appeared and filed a demurrer to

the indictment. If he had appeared, knowing that he had no

authority to do so, it would have been in contempt of the trial

court. His appearance was presumably lawful, otherwise the trial

court should, in all cases where a corporation appears l)y attorney,.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
V AN SYCKEL, J. :
The defendant wa convicted in the Pa aic Quarter Se sion forkeeping a di orderly house.
In addition to the alleged jurisdictional defect and the alleged
defect in the record which have been di cu ed in the ca e of'
Georg e H. Eng eman et al. v. Th e State, decided at the pre ent
term of thi court, other errors are assigned for rever al which it
i nece ary to consider.
In the fir t place it i denied that the trial court obtained juri_,diction of the corpora ti on.
Section 80 of the Criminal Procedure act provide that when the
ummon or notice to the corporation hall be returned ummoned
or erved the corporation hall be con idered a in court, and a
appearing to aid indictment, and the court shall order the clerk
to enter an appearance for aid corporation and endor e the plea
of not guilty upon aid indictment.
This tatute applie only to involuntary appearance by corporations.
It ha never been doubted that corporation could appear and
plead to indictment b attorney and the practice ha alway prevailed to permit attorney of our court to appear for corporation
they claim to repre ent. I n fact, corporation cannot appear in
per on they mu t appear by attorney.
· In thi ca e the record how that Robert I. Hopper one of the
practicing attorney of thi court, appeared and filed a demurr r to
the indictment. If he had appeared, knowing that he had no
authority to do o it would have been in contempt of th trial
·ourt. Hi appearanc wa pre umably lawful, otherwi e th trial
court hould, in all a
where a orporation appear by att rn y
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require him to establish his right to do so by competent evidence.

Such has never been the practice ; the burden is on the corporation

to show that the appearance was unauthorized.

As the record stands, it sufficiently appears that the defendant

Avas in court to answer to the indictment.

It need not appear in the record that the trial court ordered the

-clerk to enter an appearance for said corporation and endorse the

plea of not guilty. That, also, was presumably done.

The Quarter Sessions is not an inferior court in the sense that it

must, in all respects, show its jurisdiction. Gray v. Bastedo, 17

Vroom 453.

In the second place, it is objected that sentence was pronounced

after the demurrer was overruled, without giving the defendant

corporation an opportunity to plead not guilty.

Lord Hale says : "If a person be indicted or appealed of felony

and he will demur to the appeal or indictment, and if it be judged

against him he shall have judgment or be hanged, for it is a con-

fession of the indictment." 2 Hale P. C. 257.

In King v. Gibson, 8 East 107, the court agreed that in criminal
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cases, not capital, if the defendant demur to an indictment, the

court will not give judgment against him to answer over, but final

judgment.

Mr. Bishop says: "With us, in misdemeanor, the judgment

against a defendant on his demurrer is final, unless he has leave to

withdraw it to answer over." 2 Bish. Cr. Pro., § 783, and cases

there cited.

Such is the established practice in New Jersey. The defendant

may ask leave to answer over, and under ordinary circumstances it

will be granted ; but if no such request is made, judgment will be

pronounced.

The record does not show that any request was made by the

defendant to answer over in this case after the demurrer was over-

ruled, and, therefore, final judgment was properly passed.

In days past, when the death penalty attached to crimes compara-

tively insignificant, common humanity constrained the courts to be

astute to seize upon the slightest ground for reversing convictions ;

but under our system of criminal jurisprudence, which shields the

defendant by the presumption of innocence, by a liberal right of

peremptory challenge and by the necessity of a unanimous verdict,

and where the penalty denounced against offences is humanely

r quire him to establish hi right to do so by competent evidence.
~u h has never been the practice; the burden is on the corporation
to how that the appearance was unauthorized.
A, the record tands, it ufficiently appears that the . defendant
·was in court to an wer to the indictment.
It need not appear in the record that the trial court ordered the
-clerk to enter an appearance for aid corporation and endor e the
plea of not guilty. That, al o, wa pre umably done.
The Quarter Sessions i not an inferior court in the sense that it
mu t, in all respecL, how it juri diction. Gray v. Bastedo, 17
T'room 453.
In the second place_, it i objected that sentence wa pronounced
.after the demurrer was overruled, without giving the defendant
corporation an opportunity to plead not guilty.
Lord Hale say : "If a person be indicted or appealed of felony
and he will demur to the appeal or indictment, and if it be judged
against him he hall have judgment or be hanged, for it is a confession of the indictment." 2 Hale P. C. 257.
In King v. Gibson, 8 East 107, the court agreed that in criminal
case , not capital, if the defendant demur to an indictment, the
court will not give judgment against him to answer over, but final
judgment.
J\fr. Bishop ays: "" ith us, in mi demeanor, the judgment
again t a defendant on his demurrer i final unles he has leave to
withdraw it to answer over." 2 Bish. Cr. Pro., § 783, and case
there cited.
Such is thee tablished practice in New Jersey. The defendant
may ask leave to answer over, and under ordinary circum tance it
will be granted; but if no such request i made, judgment 'lVill be
pronounced.
The record does not show that any reque t was made by the
-defendant to answer over in this case after the demurrer was overr~led, and, therefore, :final judgment wa properly passed.
In day past, when the death penalty attached to crimes comparatively insignificant, common humanity con trained the courts to be
-a tute to seize upon the slightest ground for rever ing conviction ·
but under our ·y,tem of criminal juri prudence, which hield the
defendant by the presumption of innocence, by a liberal right of
peremptory challenge and by the nece sity of a unanimou verdict.
and where the penalty denounced against offences i humanely
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graduated according to their character, there should be clear error

to constitute a mistrial.

Thirdly. It is urged that a corporation cannot be indicted for

keeping a disorderly house.

Some of the earlier cases held that trespass or case would not lie

against a corporation for a private nuisance, but that doctrine has

long since been exploded. In early days when corporate bodies

were few, it was a matter of comparatively small consequence

whether such an action could be maintained.

In these days, however, when the great concerns of business are

carried on chiefly through these artificial persons, it would be most

oppressive to hold that they are not amenable to answer for such

wrongs as subject natural persons to prosecution.

Mr. Wharton says that no good reason can be assigned why the

same acts, for which these bodies are subject to civil suit, may not

equally be the basis of criminal proceedings when they result in

injury to the public at large. 1 Wliart. Cr. L. § 87.

The Queen v. The Great North of England Railway Co., 9 Q. B.

316, is a leading and instructive case on this subject, showing the
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advance which the doctrine holding corporations criminally liable

had made at the date of that adjudication.

The earlier cases are cited there, and the summing up of Lord

Chief Justice Denman shows how firmly he held to the idea, that

upon reason and policy an indictment could be supported against a

corporation for misfeasance as well as for non-feasance.

He entertained no doubt that a corporation may be guilty, as a

corporate body, of commanding acts to be done to the nuisance of

the community at large.

In reply to the suggestion that the individuals who concur in

doing the . inhibited acts on behalf of the corporation may be in-

dicted, he said, that while of that there was no doubt> there can be

no effectual means for deterring from the commission of criminal

acts, except the remedy by an indictment against those who truly

commit them — that is. the corporation acting by its majority; and

that there is no principle which places them beyond the reach of

the law for such proceedings.

In Commomvealth v. Proprietors of Neiv Bedford Bridge, 2

Gray 339, the Massachusetts Supreme Court adopted the same view,

declaring that the tendency of the more recent cases in courts of the

highest authority has been to extend the application of all legal

graduated according to their character, there hould be clear error
to con titute a mi trial.
Thirdly. It i urged that a corporation cannot be indicted for
keeping a di orderl3 hou e.
ome of the earlier ca e held that tre pa or ca e would not lie
.again t a corporation for a private nui ance, but that doctrin ha
long ,_ince been exploded. In early days when corporate bodie
were few, it wa a matter of comparatively small con equence
whether such an action could be maintained.
In the e da., s, however, when the great concern of bu ine are
-carried on chiefly through the e artificial per ons, it would be most
oppre ive to hold that they are not amenable to answer for such
wrongs as subject natural per ons to pro ecution.
fr. Wharton say that no good rea on can be a igned why the
ame acts, for which these bodie are ubj ect to civil uit, may not
-equally be the basi of criminal proc eding when they re ult in
injury to the public at large. 1 Whart. Cr. L. § 87.
The Queen v. The Great North of England R ailway Co., 9 Q. B.
316, is a leading and in tructive ca e on thi subject, showing the
advance which the doctrine holding corporations criminally liable
had made at the date of that adjudication.
The earlier ca es are cited there, and the summing up of Lord
Chief Ju tice Denman show how firmly he held to the idea, that
upon rea on and policy an indictment could be supported against a
.corporation for mi feasance as well a for non-fea ance.
He entertained no doubt that a corporation may be guilty as a
corporate body, of commanding act to be done to the nui ance of
the community at large.
In reply to the uggestion that the individual who concur in
<laing the . inhibited acts on behalf of the corporation may be indicted, he said, that while of that there wa no doubt; there can be
no effectual mean for deterring from th commi ion of criminal
act , except the r emedy by an indictn:ent again t tho e who truly
commit them-that is, the corporation acting by it majority; and
that there i no principl which place th m beyond the reach of
the law for uch proceeding .
In Commonw ealth v. Proprietors of New B edford Bridge,
Grav 339 th M:a achu tt upr me ourt adopted the am vi w,
de laring that the t ndency of the more r ent as in c urt. of th
high t authority ha. b en to extend th appli ati n f all 1 gal
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remedies to corporations, and assimilate them, as far as possible, in

their legal duties and responsibilities to individuals.

Mr. Beach, in his treatise on Private Corporations (Vol. II., p.

458), says that the tendency of judicial decision has been to extend

the liability of corporations in civil actions for the misfeasance of

their agents, so that it is well settled that they may be held liable

for libel, malicious prosecution and for assault and battery com-

mitted by their agents in the performance of their duties, and in

view of the fact that they may in such suits be subjected to exem-

plary or punitive damages, the assertion that they cannot be held

liable to indictment for any offences, which derive their criminality

from evil intent, may well be questioned.

The very basis of- the action for libel or for malicious prosecution

is the evil intent, the malice of the party defendant. It is diffi-

cult, therefore, to see how a corporation may be amenable to civil

suit for libel and malicious prosecution and private nuisance, and

mulcted in exemplary damages, and at the same time not be in-

dictable for like offences, where the injury falls upon the public.

That malice and evil intent may be imputed to corporations has
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been repeatedly adjudged. Morton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,

103 N. Y. 645; Reed v. Home Savings Banh, 130 Mass. 443;

Buffalo Company v. Standard Oil Co., 106 N. Y. 669.

The case last cited was an action to recover damages caused by

conspiracy.

So far as this question has been agitated in Xew Jersey, our

decisions have been in line with the cases which have been cited.

State V. Morris Canal Co., 2 Zah. 537; State v. Godwinville, &c.,

20 Vroom 266; McDermott v. The Evening Journal, 14 Id. 488;.

Brol-aw v. New Jerseij R. R. Co., 3 Id. 328.

The question whether criminal intent may be imputed to a cor-

poration is not necessarily involved in the discussion of the case

before us.

The habitual indulgence in the vicious practices on the premises

of the defendant corporation stamps it as a disorderly house, with-

out regard to the intent which prompted the disorder.

In my opinion, the judgment below should be affirmed.

remedies to corporations, and assimilate them, as far as possible, in
their legal duties and responsibilities to individuals.
Mr. Beach, in his treatise on Private Corporations (Vol. II., p.
458), says that the tendency of judicial decision has been to extend
the liability of corporations in civil actions for the mi feasance of
their agents, so that it is well settled that they may be held liable
for libel, malicious prosecution and for a ault and battery committed by their agents in the performance of their dutie , and in
view of the fact that they may in such suits be subjected to exemplary or punitiYe damages, the assertion that they cannot be held
liable to indictment for any offences, which derive their criminality
from evil intent, may well be questioned.
The very basis of. the action for libel or for malicious prosecution
is the evil intent, the malice of the party defendant. It is difficult, therefore, to see how a corporation may be amenable to civil
suit for libel and malicious prosecution and private nuisance, and
mulcted in exemplary damages, and at the same time not be indictable for like offences, where the injury falls upon the public.
'rhat malice and evil intent may be imputed to corporations has
been repeatedly adjudged. Morton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,.
103 N. Y. 645; Reed v. Hom e Savings Bank, 130 Mass. 443;
Buffalo Company v. Standard Oil Co., 106 N . Y. 669.
The case last cited was .q,n action to recover damage caused by
conspiracy.
So far as this question has been agitated in New Jersey, our
decisions have been in line with the cases which have been cited.
tate v. Morris Canal Co., 2 Zab. 537; State v. Godwinville, &c.,
20 Vroom 266; McDermott v. Th e Ev ening Jour;ia.Z, 14 Id. 488;
Brokaw v. New J ersey R. R. Co., 3 Id. 328.
The question whether criminal intent may be imputed to a corporation i not necessarily involved in the discus ion of the case
before us.
'rhe habitual indulgence in the vicious practice on the premises
of the defendant corporation stamps it as a disorderly house, without regard to the intent which prompted the disorder.
In my opinion, the judgment below should be affirmed.

CHAPTER V.

MEEGER OF OFFENSES.

State V. Setter, 57 Conn., 461. (1889.)

AlSTDEEWS^ C. J. :

The appellant, together with one Mary Eeese, was informed

against in the criminal side of the Court of Common Pleas in Xew

CHAPTER V.

Haven County for the offense of conspiracy. The information

charged "that on or about the third day of April, 1889, at the city

of New Haven, Mary Eeese and Jennie Setter, both transient per-

MERGER OF OFFENSES.

sons temporarily residing in said city, with force and arms did

then and there wickedly, designing and intending to commit the

crime of theft therein, fraudulently, maliciously and unlawfully

State v. Detter, 57 Conn., 461.

conspire, combine, confederate and agree together between them-

(1889.)

selves to enter, and did enter, the store of F. M. Brown & Com-

pany of said city of New Haven and there situate, in which store

were deposited goods, wares and merchandise, the proper estate

of the said F. M. Brown & Company, with intent then and there

in the said store aforesaid to commit the crime of theft," &c. In

brief, the information charges that the persons therein named con-

spired to steal generally in the store of F. M. Brown & Co. — pos-
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sibly all the goods in that store ; at any rate so racny of the goods

as they might l^e able to lay their hands on.

The appellant had a separate trial, was convicted and sentenced,

and has appealed to this court. Upon her trial the state, for

the purpose of proving the combination between herself and her

companion, and for the purpose of proving the intent alleged,

offered evidence which tended to show that the accused actually

stole twelve neckties of the value of fifty cents each, in the store

of F. M. Brown & Co. There was no evidence of any other stealing

in the store.

The counsel for the appellant asked the court to instruct the

jury as follows: '"Under the laws of this state a conspiracy to

commit the crime of theft is a misdemeanor, while the crime of

theft itself is a felony, and that the law is so that if the conspiracy

is consummated and the theft is actually committed, then the con-

109

J. :
The appellant, together with one l\Iary Reese, wa informed
against in the criminal side of the Court of Common Plea in New
Haven County for the o:ffen e of con piracy. The information
<!harged 'that on or about the third day of April, 1889, at the city
-0f New Haven, l\Iary Ree...,e and Jennie Setter, both transient person temporarily re iding in aid city, with force and arms did
then and there wickedly, designing and intending to commit the
crime of theft therein, fraudulently, maliciou ly and unlawfully
conspire, combine, confederate and agree together between themselves to enter, and did enter, the tore of F. l\L Brown & Company of said city of New Haven and there situate, in which store
were depo ited good , wares and merchandi e, the proper estate
of the said F. 1\1. Brown & Company, with intent then and there
in the said store afore aid to commit the crime of theft," &c. In
brief, the information charge that the per ons therein named conspired to teal g nerally in the tore of F. M. Brown & Co.-possibly all the goods in that tore; at an3 rate so m~.ny of the goods
as they might be able to lay their hand on.
The appellant had a separate trial, wa convicted and sentenced,
and ha appealed to this court.
pon her trial the tate, for
the purpo e of proving the combination between herself and her
companion, and for the purpo e of proving the intent alleged,
offered evidence which tended to how that the ac(;u ed actually
tole twelve necktie of the value of fifty cent each, in the tore
of F. L Brown & Co. There wa no evidence of any other tealing
in the store.
The coun el for the appellant a ked the court to in truct the
jury as follows: "Under the laws of this state a con piracy to
commit the crime of theft i a mi demeanor, while the crime of
theft it elf is a felony, and that th law i o that if the con piracy
is consummated and the theft is actually committed, then the conANDREWS,

.
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spirucy is merged in the theft and the accused cannot lawfully

be convicted of conspiracy; that where the felony is in fact com-

mitted a conspiracy to commit such felony cannot be indicted and

punished as a distinct offense. If you find, therefore, from the

evidence, that the crime which it is alleged the accused conspired

to commit, to wit, the theft of the goods, the property of F. M.

Brown & Co., was in fact consummated and the theft was actually

committed, your verdict must be that the accused is not guilty

of the offense for which she is now on trial." The court did

not so charge the jury.

The only question argued before the court is, whether or not

the crime of conspiring to steal, as set forth in the information,

was merged in the crime of the actual theft of which evidence

appeared on the trial. In the reasons of appeal the question is

stated thus: The court erred while stating to the jury that "if

the overt act has been carried into execution and the offense has

been punished once it cannot be punished a second time;" and

in not also instructing the jury, as requested by the defendant,,

"that when the felony is in fact committed a conspiracy to com-
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mit such felony cannot be indicted and punished as a separate

offense."

The broad claim of the appellant is, that if the crime to commit

which the conspiracy is formed is actually committed, then the

conspiracy is merged in the committed crime and ceases itself to

be a crime at all. It is admitted, however, that if the contemplated

crime be of that class of crimes called misdemeanors, the conspiracy

is not merged; and that in a case where there is a conspiracy to

commit a misdemeanor and the misdemeanor is actually committed,,

the offender may be punished for the conspiracy and for the mis-

demeanor also. But it is insisted that if the contemplated crime

is of that class called felonies, then if the felony is actually com-

mitted the conspiracy is merged and no longer exists as a separate

and distinct offense. Put in its simplest form the argument i&

this : Conspiracy is a misdemeanor ; theft is a felony ; a mis-

demeanor is a less crime than a felony, and so in a case where

there is a conspiracy to commit a theft, that crime being a felony,

and the theft is _ actually committed, the less offense is merged

in the greater.

Stated in this way the argument seems quite imposing. The

force of the argument comes largely from the use of the word

piracy is merged in the theft and the accused cannot lawfully
be convicted of conspiracy; that where the felony is in fact committed a conspiracy to commit such felony cannot be indicted and
puni hed as a di tinct offense. If you find, therefore, from the
evidence, that the crime which it is alleged the accused conspired
to commit, to wit, the theft of the goods, the property of F. M.
Brown & Co., wa. in fact consummated and the theft was actually
committed, your verdict must be that the accused is not guilty
of the offense for which she is now on trial." The court did
not so charge the jury.
The only que tion argued before the court is, whether or not
the crime of con piring to steal, as set forth in the information,,.
was merged in the crime of the actual theft of which evidence
appeared on the trial. In the reasons of appeal the question ir:.
stated thus: The court erred while stating to the jury that "if
the overt act has been carried into execution and the offense has
been punished once it cannot be punished a second time;" and
in not also instructing the jury, as requested by the defendant,.
"that when the felony is in fact committed a conspiracy to commit such felony cannot be indicted and punished as a separate
offense."
The broad claim of the appellant is, that if the crime to commit
which the conspiracy is formed is actually committed, then the
conspiracy is merged in the committed crime and ceases itself to
be a crime at all. It is admitted, however, that if the contemplated
crime be of that class of crimes called misdemeanors, the conspiracy
i not merged; and that in a case where there is a conspiracy to
commit a misdemeanor and the misdemeanor is actually committed,.
the offender may be punished for the conspiracy and for the misdemeanor also. But it is insisted that if the contemplated crime
is of that class called felonies, then if the felony is actually committed the conspiracy is merged and no longer exi ts as a separate
and distinct offense. Put in its simplest form the argument is
this : Conspiracy is a misdemeanor; theft is a felony; a misdemeanor is a less crime than a felony, and so in a case where
there is a conspiracy to commit a theft, that crime being a felony,.
and the theft is. actually committed, the less offense is merged
in the greater.
Stated in this way the argument seems quite imposing. The
force of the argument comes largely from the u e of the word
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"felony," and in giving to it the same meaning it had in the com-

mon law. Originally the term imported all those offenses of

which the feudal consequence was the forfeiture of all the offend-

er's land and goods; to which, in later times, capital or other

punishment was sometimes added. In American law the word

has no clearly defined meaning except as it is given a meaning

by some statute. In Massachusetts there is a statute which enacts

that any crime punishable by death or imprisonment in the state

prison is a felony, and that no other crime shall be so considered.

There is a similar statute in New York and in some of the^other

states. In Swift's System, published in the year 1796 (Vol. 2,

pages 384 and 385), the learned author says: "Felony, according

to the English law, signifies some crime the punishment of which

is a forfeiture of estate; but in common consideration it is a

capital crime. In this state, in the title of two statutes, the word

'felonies' is used. * * * The word is never introduced into the

body of any statute, and is applied to the description of crimes

not capital and for which there is no forfeiture of estate. It is

therefore apparent that this word cannot be used in the same
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sense and for the same crimes ds in England; nor does it with

precision comprehend any class or description of crimes. A word

of such uncertain meaning ought to be banished from a code of

laws, for nothing produces greater confusion and perplexity than

the use of terms to which no precise and clear idea can be affixed.

* * * The word 'feloniously' is used in indictments for all

capital crimes and for many not capital, as for theft; but as

'felonious' in an indictment can mean nothing more than 'criminaF

and does not designate the nature or the class of the crime, it may

be deemed unnecessary and immaterial and ought to be exploded

by our courts."

Since the time when Judge Swift wrote the word "felony" has

disappeared from the statute, although the word "feloniously" is

still used in indictments and informations. And while it is still

true that this word does not with precision comprehend any class or

description of crimes in Connecticut law, it may be pretty safely

asserted that petty larceny is not a felony in this state.

The earliest American case cited by the counsel for the appel-

lant in support of their claim of merger is Commonwealth v.

Kingsbury, 5 Mass., 106. In that case the court say : "We have

considered this case and are of opinion that the misdemeanor is

'felony,' and in giving to it the ame meaning it had in the common law. Originally the term imported all those offen e of
-which the feudal con equ nee was the forfeiture of all the offendr' land and good ; to which, in later times, capital or other
puni...,hment wa ometime added. In American law the word
ha no clearly defined meaning except a it i given a meaning
by ome statute. In 1a achu ett there i a statut which enacts
that any crime puni hable by death or impri onment in the tate
prison i a felony, and that no other crime hall be o con idered.
There i a similar statute in New York and in some of the , other
tates. In Swift System, publi hed in the year 1796 (Vol. 9,
page 384 and 385), the learned author ay.. , : "Felony, according
to the Engli h law, signifie ome crime the puni hment of which
i a forf iture of tate; but in common con ideration it is a
capital crime. I n this state, in the title of two statutes, the word
'felonies' i used. * * * The word is never introduced into the
body of any statute, and i applied to the de cription of crimes
not capital and for which there is no forfeiture of estate. It is
therefore apparent that this word cannot be used in the ame
en ~ e and for the ame crimes ds in England; nor doe it with
precision comprehend any clas or description of crimes. A word
of such uncertain meaning ought to be banished from a code of
laws, for nothing produce greater confusion and perplexity than
the use of terms to which no preci e and clear idea can be affixed.
* * * The word 'feloniously' is used in indictments for all
capital crime and for many not capital, as for theft; but a
'feloniou 'in an indictment can mean nothing more than 'criminal,.
and does not de ignate the nature or the class of the crime, it may
be deemed unnece ary and immaterial and ought to be exploded
by our courts."
Since the time when Judge Swift wrote the word "felony" ha ~
disappeared from the tatute although the word "feloniou ly" i
till u ed in indictment and informations. And while it i till
true that this word doe not with precision comprehend any cla . s or
c1e cription of crime in Connecticut law it may be pretty afely
a erted that petty larceny i not a felony in this tate.
The earliest merican ca e cited by th coun el for the appellant in upport of their claim of merger is Commonw ealth Y.
Kingsbury, 5 "Ma ., 106. In that case the court ay : ''\Y han~
con idered thi a e and are of opinion that the mi dem anor i
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merged. Had the conspiracy not been effected it might have

heen punished as a distinct offense; but a contrivance to commit

a felony and executing the contrivance cannot be punished as an

offense distinct from the felony, because the contrivance is a part

of the felony when committed pursuant to it. The law is the

same respecting misdemeanors. An intent to commit a misde-

meanor manifested by some overt act, is a misdemeanor, but if

the intent be carried into execution the offender can be punished

but for one offense."

This case is the authority given for the dictum in 2 Swift's

Digest, page 359, and it is the leading if not the only authority

for the decision in every one of the cases cited on the appellant's

brief. It is noticeable that Judge Swift, while giving the case

above named as authority for the law that a conspiracy merges

in a felony, in almost the very next sentence on the same page

repudiates that case, so far as it says that a conspiracy will merge

in a misdemeanor, although the reasons given by the judge who

gave the opinion in that case for the merger in a misdemeanor

are the same as for a felony. In this respect all the cases cited
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follow Judge Swift. They reject the reasoning in the Massachu-

setts case when it applies to a misdemeanor, and adopt it when

it applies to a felony.

Mr. Bishop in his Treatise on the Criminal Law, 7th edition,

section 814, after discussing the rule that a conspiracy merges

in a felony, remarks : "The doctrine, the reader perceives, is con-

trary to just principle; it has been rejected in England, and

though there may be states in which it is binding on the courts,

it is not to be deemed the general American law." Prof. Wheaton,

Crim. Law, 8th ed., section 1344, says: "The technical rule that

a misdemeanor always sinks in the felony when the two meet,

has in some instances been recognized in this country, though

without good reason. * * * And in several of our courts a

disposition has been exhibited to reject the doctrine in all cases."

See cases cited below.

In England the doctrine that a conspiracy to commit a felony

is merged in the felony itself, has been expressly rejected. Lord

Denman, in rendering the judgment of the Court of Queen's

Bench in Regina v. Button, 11 Queen's Bench, 929, said: "A

misdemeanor which is a part of a felony may be prosecuted as a

misdemeanor, though the felony has been completed." The case

merged. Had the conspiracy not been effected it might have
been punished as a distinct offense; but a contrivance to commit
a felony and executing the contrivance cannot be punished as an
-offense distinct from the felony, becau e the contrivance is a part
of the felony when committed pursuant to it. The law is the
ame respecting mi demeanors. An intent to commit a misdemeanor manifested by ome overt act, i a misdemeanor, but if
the intent be carried into execution the offender can be puni heel
but for one offense."
This case i the authority given for the dictum in 2 Swift's
Digest, page 359, and it i the leading if not the only authority
for the decision in every one of the case cited on the appellant's
brief. It is noticeable that Judge Swift, while giving the case
above named as authority for the law that a conspiracy merge
in a felony, in almost the very· next sentence on the same page
Tepudiates that case, so far a::; it says that a conspiracy will merge
in a misdemeanor, although the rea on given by the judge who
gave the opinion in that case for the merger in a misdemeanor
are the same as for a felony. In this respect all the ca e cited
follow Judge Swift. They reject the reasoning in the M:assachu:setts case when it applies to a misdemeanor, and adopt it when
it applies to a felony.
Mr. Bishop in his Treati e on the Criminal Law, 7th edition,
section 814, after discussing the rule that a con piracy merge
in a felony, remarks : "The doctrine, the reader perceives, is contrary to just principle; it has been rejected in England, and
t hough there may be states in which it i binding on the court ,
it is not to be deemed the general American law." Prof. Wheaton,
Crim. Law, 8th ed., section 13-±4, says : "The technical rule that
a mi demeanor always sinks in the felony when the two meet,
has in some instances been recognized in this country, though
without good reason. * * * And in everal of our court a
disposition has been exhibited to reject the doctrine in all case ."
See cases cited below.
In England the doctrine that a conspiracy to commit a felony
is merged in the felony itself, has been expressly rejected. Lord
Denman, in rendering the judgment of the Court of Queen's
Bench in R egina v. Button, 11 Queen's Bench, 929, said: "A
misdemeanor which is a part of a felony may be prosecuted a a
misdemeanor, though the felony has been completed." The case
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was one where the defendants were charged with a conspiracy

to commit a theft, and the evidence tended to show that the theft

had been actually committed. Eegina v. Neale, 1 Denison's Crown

Cas., 36, is to the same effect.

If a conspiracy to commit a felony is regarded as an attempt

to commit that felony, then the authorities very largely prepon-

derate to the effect that there is no merger. State v. Shepard, 7

Conn., 54; CompioniueaUh v. Waller, 108 Mass., 309; Common-

wealth Y. Dean, 109 Mass., 349; Barnett v. The People, 54 111.,

325; Bonsall v. The State, 35 Ind., 460; The People v. Bristol,

23 Mich., 118; The People v. Smith, 57 Barb., 46; Commonivealth

V. McPike, 3 Cush., 181.

That one criminal offense may sometimes be merged in another

is doubtless true. The principles upon which the doctrine of

merger seems to rest are that the offense merged is lesser than

the one in which it is merged, and that the ingredients of the

smaller one are so identical with the ingredients of the larger

that when both have been committed they cannot in reason and

justice be separated; so that to punish an accused in such a case
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for both offenses would be in effect to punish the same act twice.

In the case above cited of Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, the rea-

sons given seem to treat the conspiracy as the beginning of the

very act the ending of which was the felony or the misdemeanor.

"There is at common law a wide distinction between a felony

and a misdemeanor. It affects alike the punishment, the proced-

ure, and several rules governing the crime itself. Out of the

distinction grows the doctrine that the same precise act viewed

with reference to the same consequences, cannot be both a felony

and a misdemeanor, — a doctrine which applies only when the

same precise act constitutes both offenses." 1 Bishop Cr. Law

(7th ed.), section 787.

"It is supposed that a conspiracy to commit a crime is merged

in the crime when the conspiracy is executed. This may be so

when the crime is of a higher grade than the conspiracy and the

object of the conspiracy is fully accomplished; but a conspiracy

is only a misdemeanor, and when its object is only to commit a

misdemeanor it cannot be merged. WTien two crimes are of equal

grade there can be no legal technical merger." The People v.

Mather, 4 Wend., 265.

To make these principles available for the appellant it must

wa one where the defendant ~ w re charged with a con ~ piracy
to commit a theft, and the evidence tended to how that the theft
had been actually committed. Regina v. eale, 1 Deni on' ro11n
a ., 36, i to the ame effect.
If a con piracy to commit a felony i regarded as an attempt
to commit that felony then the authoritie very largely prer ontate v. hepard,
derat to the ffect that th re i no merg r.
onn. 54; 0111.monwealth \. lT'alker, 10 l\Ia ., 309; Comnwnwealth \. D ean, 109 l\fa ., 3-±9; Barnett v. Th e People, 5-± Ill.,
.3 5; Bon all . Th e State, 35 Ind., 460; Th e P eople . Bri tol,
23 Mich., 118; Th e P eople v. Smith, 5 Barb., 46; Commonwealth
-v. M cPike, 3 Cush., 181.
That one criminal offen e ma} ometime be merged in another
i doubtle true. The principle upon which the doctrine of
merger e m to re t are that the offen e merged i le er than
the one in which it i merged and that the ingredienL of the
smaller one are o identical with the ingredients of the larger
-that when both have been committed they cannot in rea on and
justice be separated; o that to puni h an accu ed in uch a ca c
for both offen es would be in effect to puni h the ame act twice.
I n the case above cited of Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, the reaon given eem to treat the con piracy as the beginning of the
very act the ending of which was the felony or the misdemeanor.
" There is at common law a wide di tinction between a felony
and ~ mi demeanor. It affect alike the punishment, the procedure, and everal rule governing the crime itself. Out of the
di tinction grows the doctrine that the same preci e act viewed
with reference to the same con equences, cannot be both a felony
and a mi demeanor -a doctrine which applie only when the
same preci e act con titute both offen e ." 1 Bi hop Cr. Law
(7th ed.), ection 787.
"It i suppo ed that a con piracy to commit a crime i merged
in the crime when the con piracy is executed. Thi may be o
when the crime i of a higher gra4e than the conspiracy and the
object of the con piracy i fully accomplished; but a con piracy
is only a mi demeanor, and when it object i only to commit a
mi demeanor it cannot be merg d. vVhen two crime are of equal
grade ther can be no legal technical merger." Th e P eople
Mather, 4 Wend., 265.
T o make the e principl available for th app llant it mu t
8
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be shown that the conspiracy of which she was convicted is a

crime of a lesser grade than the larceny which she claims was

proved. In the absence of statutory graduation there is no test

l3y which to determine the grade of crimes other than the punish-

ment which may be inflicted. Conspiracy may be punished by

imprisonment in the state prison for a term not exceeding five

years and by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars. Larceny

to any value less than fifteen dollars can be punished by no more

than thirty days in the county jail and a fine of not more than

seven dollars. By this test conspiracy is much the greater crime.

'Not are the ingredients of conspiracy the same as of theft.

Theft may be committed by one person as well as by two or more;

it requires some physical act in the nature of a trespass by which

the possession of the thing stolen is taken from the owner, and

the act must be accompanied by the intent of the thief to deprive

the owner of his property. On the other hand conspiracy cannot

be committed except by two or more persons. It is the agreeing

or confederating together by two or more persons to commit some

crime or misdemeanor. Such confederation or agreement is itself
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the offense. Unlike theft no overt act is necessary, the unlawful

agreement makes the crime, and it is complete the moment the

agreement is entered into. State v. Glidden, 55 Conn., 46; Com-

monwealth V. Eastman, 1 Cush., 228. Its legal character depends

neither upon that which actually follows it nor upon that which

is intended to follow it; it is the same whether its object be accom-

plished or abandoned. It may be followed by one overt act, or

a series, but as an offense it is complete without them. Eex v.

Rispal, 3 Burrow, 1320; Eex v. Kimhcrty, 1 Levins, 62. It is an

offense falling within that part of the criminal law which seeks

to prevent the commission of crimes. "The unlawful confederacy

is therefore punished to prevent the doing of any act in the execu-

tion of it." 2 Swift's Digest, 350. It is a distinct offense well

known to the criminal law, depending upon clear principles, and

having characteristics and ingredients which separate it from all

other crimes; an offense the criminality of which is not to be

measured by the criminality of its object. Amos's Science of Law,

256. "The confederacy of several persons to effect any injurious

object creates such a new and additional power to cause injury

as requires criminal restraint, although none would be necessary

were the same thing proposed or even attempted to be done by

be shown that the conspiracy of which she was convicted i a
crime of a lesser grade than the larceny which she claims was
proved. In the ab ence of statutory graduation there is no te t
by which to determine the grade of crimes other than the punishment which may be inflicted. Con piracy may be punished by
imprisonment in the tate prison for a term not exceeding five
years and by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars. Larceny
to any value le.. , than fifteen dollars can be puni hed by no more
than thirty days in the county jail and a fine of not more than.
seven dollars. By this test conspiracy i . much the greater crime.
Nor are the ingredient of conspiracy the same as of thefL
Theft may be committed by one person a well as by two or more;
it requires some phy ical act in the nature of a trespa s by which
the pos ession of the thing stolen i taken from the owner, and
the act must bE: accompanied by the intent of the thief to deprive
the owner of his property. On the other hand conspiracy cannot
be committed except by two or more persons. It is the agreeing
or confederating together by two or more per sons to commit ome
crime or misdemeanor. Such confederation or agreement is itself
the offense. Unlike theft no overt act is necessary, the unlawful
agreement makes the crime, and it i complete the moment theagrei::ment is entered into.
tate v. Glidden, 55 Conn., 46; Commonwealth v. Ea inian, 1 Cush., 22 . It legal character depends
neither upon that which actually follow it nor upon that which
is intended to follow it; it is the same whether its object be accomplished or abandoned. It may be followed by one overt act, or
a series, but as an offense it i complete without them. R ex v.
R ispal, 3 Burrow, 1320; R ex v. Kimb crty 1 Levins, 62. It is an
offense falling within that part of the criminal law which eeks
to prevent the commi sion of crimes. "The unlawful confederacy
i therefore punished to prevent the doing of any act in the execution of it." 2 • wift's Digest, 350. It i a di tinct offen e well
known to the criminal law, depending upon clear principles, and
having characteristic and ingredients which sepa rate it from all
other crime ; an offense the criminality of which is no t to be
measured by the criminality of its obj ect. Amo ' Science of Law,
256. "The confederacy of several per ons to effect any injuriou
object creates such a new and additional power to cau e injury
as requires criminal restraint, although none would be nece ary
were the same thing proposed or even attempted to be done by
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any person singly. A solitary offender may be easily detected and

punished. But combinations against law are always dangerous

to the public peace and to private security. To guard against the

union of numbers to effect an unlawful design is not easy and to

detect and punish them is often difficult." Commomvealth v. Judd,

2 Mass., 137.

Upon the whole examination we are of opinion, upon principle

as well as upon authority, that this conviction for a conspiracy

to commit theft ought to be sustained, although the evidence by

which it was proved, proved also that the theft had been actually

committed.

There is no error in the judgment appealed from.
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In this opinion the other judges concurred.

any per on ingly. A olitary offender may be ea ily detected and
puni hed. But combination again t law are always dangerous
to the public peace and to private ecurity. To guard against the
union of number to effect an unlawful design i not easy and to
detect and puni h them is often difficult." Commonwealth v. Judd,
2 Mass., 137.
Upon the whole examination we are of opinion, upon principle
as well as upon authority, that thi conviction for a conspiracy
to commit theft ought to be sustained, although the evidence by
which it was proved, proved also that the theft had been actually
committed.
There is no error in the judgment appealed from.
I n this opinion the other judges concurred.
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SPECIFIC CRIMES.

CHAPTER VI.

OFFENSES AGAINST THE GOVEENMENT AND OF-

FENSES AGAINST THE LAW OF NATIONS.

Treason, Piracy, and Other Offenses.

For a full discussion of the above offenses see the following

cases: Respuhlica v. Carlisle, 1 Ball. (U. S.) 35, (1778) ; United

states V. Insurgents, 2 Dall. (U. S.) 335, (1795) ; United States

V. Vigol 2 Dall. (U. S.) 346, (1795) ; United States v. Mitchell,

2 Dall. (U. S.) 348, (1795) ; Exparte Bollman, 4 Cranch (U. S.)

75, (1807) ; United States v. Burr, 4 Cranch (U. S.) 469, (1807) ;

People V. Lynch, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 549, (1814) ; United States

V. Ilanway, Federal Cases, No. 15299, (1851) ; United States v.

Oreathouse, 4 Sawyer (U. S.) 465, (1863); The Confiscation

SPECIFIC CRIMES.

Cases, 30 Wall. (U. S.) 92, (1873) ; Wallach v. Van RiswicTc, 92

U. S. 202, (1875) ; Wifidsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274, (1876) ;

United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. (U. S.) 610, (1818) ; United

States V. Smith, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 153, (1820) ; United States v.

Arjona, 120 U. S. 479, (1887) ; and United States v. Yhanez, 53

CHAPTER VI.

Fed. Rep. 536, (1892).
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OFFENSES AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND OFFENSES AGAINST THE LAW OF NATIONS.
TREASON, PIRACY, AND OTHER OFFENSES.

For a full discussion of the above offenses see the following
cases : Respubl1~cav. Carlisle, 1 Dall. (U.S.) 35, (1 778); United
States v. Insurgents, 2 Dall. (U. S.) 335, (1795) ; United States
v. lligol, 2 Dall. (U.S.) 346, (1 795); United States v. Mitchell,
2 Dall. (U. S.) 348, ( 1795) ; Exparte Bollman, 4 Cranch (U. S.)
75, (1807); United States v. Burr, 4 Cranch (U.S.) 469, (1807);
People v. Lynch, 11 Johns. (N. Y. ) 549, (1814 ); United States
v. Hanway, Federal Cases, No. 15299, (1851); United States v.
Greathouse_, 4 Sawyer (U.S.) 465, (1863); The Confiscation
Cases, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 92, ( 1873) ; Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92
U. S. 202, (1875); Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274, (1876);
United .S tates v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. (U. S.) 610, (1818); United
8lates v. Smith, 5 Wheat. (TJ. S.) 153, (1820); United States v .
/-Lrjona, 120 U. S. 479, (1887); and United States v. Ybanez, 53
F ed. Rep. 536, ( 1892).
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CHAPTER VII.

OFFENSES AGAINST THE PEESON.

Homicide in General.

Must he the Death of a Human Being.

State V. Winthrop, 43 Iowa 519. (1876.)

Adams, J. :

The defendant is a physician, and was employed by one Eoxia

CHAPTER VII.

Clayton to attend her in childbirth. The child died. The de-

fendant is charged with having produced its death. Evidence was

introduced by the State tending to show that the child, previous to

OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON.

its death, respired and had an independent circulation. Evidence

was introduced by the defendant tending to disprove such facts.

The defendant asked the court to give the following instruc-

HOMICIDE IN

tion:

GE.i:

ERAL.

"To constitute a human being, in the view of the law, the child

Must be the Death of a Hitman Being.

mentioned in the indictment must have been fully born, and born

alive, having an independent circulation and existence separate

tate v. Winthrop, 43 Iowa 519. (1876.)

from the mother, l)ut it is immaterial whether the umbilical cord

which connects it with its mother be severed or not."

The court refused to give this instruction, and gave the follow-
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ing:

"If the child is fully delivered from the body of the mother,

while the afterbirth is not, and the two are connected by the

umbilical cord, and the child has independent life, no matter

whether it has Ireathed or not, or an independent circulation has

been established or not, it is a human being, on which the crime

of murder may be perpetrated."

The giving of this instruction, and the refusal to instruct as

asked, are assigned as error.

The court below seems to have assumed that a child may have

independent life, without respiration and independent circulation.

The idea of the court seems to have been that the life which tlie

child lives between the time of its birth and the time of the estab-
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J.:
The defendant i a phy ician, and wa employed by one Roxia
Clayton to attend her in childbirth. The child died. The defendant i charged with having produced its death. Evidence wa
introduced by the State tending to show that the child, previou to
it death, re pired and had an independent circulation. Evidence
was introduced by the defendant tending to di prove uch facts.
The defendant asked the court to give the following in truction:
"To con .. titute a human being, in the view of the law, the child
mentioned in the indictment must have been fully born, and born
aliv , having an independent circulation and exi tence eparate
from the mother, but it i immaterial whether the umbilical cord
which connect it with it mother be severed or not.'
The court refu .. ed to give thi in truction, and gave the followmg:
"If the child i fully delivered from the body of the mother,
while the afterbirth is not, and the two are conn.ected by the
umbilical cord, and the child ha independent life, no matter
whether it has breathed or not, or an independent circulation ha
been established or not, it i a human b ing, on which the crime
of murder may be perpetrated."
The giving of thi in truction, and th refu al to in truct a ~
a ked, are a igned a error.
The court below eem._ to have a ume 1 that a child may hav
independent life, without re piration and independ nt circulation.
Th idea of the court em to ha be n that i.h life whi h th
child live between the time of it · birth and the time of th e tabADAMS,
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lisliment of respiration and independent circulation is an inde-

pendent life. Yet the position taken by the Attorney-General, in

his argument in behalf of the State, is fundamentally different.

He says : "It will probably not be contended that independent life

can exist without independent circulation, and hence the existence

of the former necessarily presumes the existence of the latter, and

so other or further proof is unnecessary." He further says : "The

instruction complained of amounts to nothing more than the state-

ment that, if the child had an independent life, then it was not

necessary to establish those facts upon which the existence of life

necessarily depends." If such was the meaning of the court below,

the language used to express it was very unfortunate. The court

said that, if the child had independent life, it is no matter whether

an independent circulation had been established or not. The

Attorney-General says that if the child had independent life, it had

independent circulation, of course. But whether we take the one

view or the other, we think the instruction was wrong. We will

consider first the view that independent life and independent cir-

culation necessarily co-exist, and examine the instruction as if that
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were conceded.

It follows that where a child is born alive, and the umbilical

cord is not severed, and independent circulation has not been

established, independent life is impossible, and the instruction

amounts to this, that if the jury should find independent life under

such circumstances, although it would be impossible, they might

find the killing of the child to be murder. Such an instruction

could serve no valuable purpose, and would necessarily involve the

jury in confusion. It would do worse than that ; it would tell the

jury in effect that they might find independence of life in utter

disregard of the conditions in which alone it could exist. To show

how the defendant was prejudiced, if the instruction is to be

viewed in this light, we may say that there was evidence that the

ductus arteriosus was not closed. This evidence tended to show,

slightly at least, that independent circulation had not been estab-

lished. The instruction told the jury, by implication, that they

might disregard this evidence. But we feel compelled to say that

we do not think that the Attorney-General's interpretation of the

instruction ever occurred to the court below. It is plain to see

that the court below meant that independent life is not conditioned

upon independent circulation. The error, if there was one, con-

lishment of respiration and independent circulation is a:a independent life. Yet the position taken by the Attorney-General, in
his argument in behalf of the State, is fundamentally different.
He says: "It will probably not be contended that independent life
can exist without independent circulation, and hence the existence
of the former nece sarily presumes the exi .. tence of the latter, and
so other or further proof is up.neces ary." He further says: ''"The
instruction complained of amounts to nothing more than the statement that, if the child had an independent life, then it was not
necessary to establish those fact upon which the existence of life
necessarily depends." If such was the meaning of the court below,
the language used to express it was very unfortunate. The court
said that, if the child had independent life, it i no matter whether
an independent circulation had been establi hed or not. The
Attorney-General says that if the child had independent life, it had
independent circulation, of course. But whether we take the one
view or the t.: •ther, we think the instruction was wrong. We will
consider first the view that independent life and independent circulation necessarily co-exist, and examine the instruction as if that
were conceded.
It follows that where a child is born alive, and the umbilical
cord is not severed, and independent circulation has not been
established, independent life is impossible, and the instruction
amounts to this_, that if the jury should find independent life under
such circumstances, although it would be impossible, they might
find the ki1ling of the child to be murder. Such an instruction
could serve no valuable purpose, and would necessarily involve the
jury in c.onfusion. It would do worse than that; it would tell the
jury in effect that they might find independence of life in utter
disregard of the conditions in which alone it could exist. To show
how the defendant was prejudiced: if the in truction i to be
viewed in this light> we may say that there was evidence that the
ducfos arteriosus was not closed. This evidence t ended to show,
~lightly at least, that independent circulation had not been established. The instruction told the jury, by implication, that they
might disregard this evidence. But we feel compelled to say that
we do not think that the Attorney-General's interpretation of the
instruction ever occurred to the court below. It is plain to see
that the court below meant that independent life is not conditioned
upon independent circulation. 'rhe error, if there was one, con-
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listed in assuming that it was not. The question presented for

our determination is by no means free from difficulty. Can tlie

child have an independent life, while its circulation is still de-

pendent upon the mother ? There are two senses in which the word

independence niay be used. There is actual independence, and

there is potential independence. A child is actually independent

of its father when it is earning its own living; it is potentially

independent when it is capable of earning its own living. Wo

"think the court below used the word independent in the latter sense.

While the blood of the child circulates through the placenta, it is

renovated through the lungs of the mother. In such sense it

breathes through the lungs of the mother. Wharton & Stille's

Medical Jurisprudence, 2 Vol., Sec. 128. It has no occasion dur-

ing that period to breathe through its own lungs. But when the

resource of its mother's lungs is denied it, then arises the exigency

of establishing independent respiration and independent circula-

tion. Children, it seems, oftentimes do not breath immediately

npon being born, but if the umbilical cord is severed, they must

then breathe or die. Cases are recorded, it is true, where a child
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has been wholly severed from the mother, and respiration has not

apparently been established until after the lapse of several minutes

of time. During that time it must have had circulation, and the

■circulation was independent. Whether it had inappreciable respi-

ration, or was in the condition of a person holding his breath, is a

•question not necessary to be considered for the determination of

ihis case. It is sufficient to say, that while the circulation of the

•child is still dependent* its connection with the mother may be

-suddenly severed by artificial means, and the child not necessarily

die. This is proven by what is called the Csesarean operation. A

live child is cut out of a dead mother and survives. Such a child

has a potential independence antecedent to its actual independence.

So a child which has been born, but has not breathed, and is con-

nected with the mother by the umbilical cord, may have the power

to establish a new life upon its own resources antecedent to its

exercise. According to the opinion of the court below, the killing

of the child at that time may be murder. It is true that after a

child is born it can no longer be called a foetus, according to the

ordinary meaning of that word. Beck says, however, in his Medical

Juris., 1 Vol., 498 : "It must be evident that when a child is l)orn

.alive, but has not yet respired, its condition is precisely like that

..:::iisted in assuming that it was not. The que tion pre ented for
()Ur determination is by no mean free from difficulty. Can th ,
.child have an independent life, while it circulation is still dependent upon the mother? Ther e are two senses in which the word
independence n:iay be used. There i actual independence, and
there is potential independence. A child is actually independent
>0f its father when it is earning its own living; it is potentially
independent when it is capable of earning its own living. '' C;
-think the court below used the word independent in the latter sense.
While the blood of the child circulates through the placenta, it is
renovated through the lungs of the mother. In such sense it
breathes through the lungs of the mother. vV11arton & Stille' ·
Medical Jurisprudence, 2 Vol., Sec. 128. It has no occasion during that period to breathe through its own lungs. But whrn the
resource of its mother's lungs is denied it, then arises the exigency
of establishing independent respiration and independent circulaiion. Children, it seems, oftentimes do not breath immediately
upon being born, but if the umbilical cord is severed, they must
then breathe or die. Cases are recorded, it is true, where a child
b.as been wholly severed from the mother, and respiration has not
apparently been established until after the lapse of several minutes
-0f time. During that time it must have had circulation, and the
.·c irculation was independent. Whether it had inappreciable respiration, or was in the condition of a person holding his breath, is a
·question not necessary to be considered for the determination of
-this case. It is sufficient to say, that while the circulation of the
.child is still dependent; its connection with the mother may be
.suddenly severed by artificial means, and the child not neces arily
die. This is proven by what is called the Cffisarean operation. A
live child is cut out of a dead mother and survives.. Such a child
has a potential independence antecedent to its actual independence.
So a child which has been born, but has not breathed, and is connected with the mother by the umbilical cord, may have the power
to establish a new life upon its own r esources antecedent to iL
exercise. According to the opinion of the court b low, the killing
of the child at that time may be murder. It i true that after a
child is born it can no longer be called a fmtus, according to th
ordinary meaning of that word. Beck says, however, in hi f di al
.Juris., 1 Vol., 498: "It must be evident that when a child i ~ born
.alive, but ha not yet ref:;pired, its ondition is prcci . . cly likr that
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of the foetus in utero. It lives merely because the fcetal circulation

is still going on. In this case none of the organs undergo any

change." Casper says, in his Forensic Medicine, 3 Vol., 33 : "In

foro the term 'life' must be regarded as perfectly synonymous with

'respiration.' Life means respiration. Not to have breathed is

not to have lived."

While, as we have seen, life has been maintained independent

of the mother without appreciable respiration, the quotations above

made indicate how radical the difference is regarded between foetal

life and the new life which succeeds upon the establishment of

respiration and independent circulation.

If we turn from the treatises on Medical Jurisprudence to the

reported decisions, we find this difference, which is so emphasized

in the former, made in the latter the practical test for determining

when a child becomes a human being in such a sense as to become

the subject of homicide. In Bex v. Enoch, 5 C. & P., 539, Mr.

Justice J. Parke said : "The child might have breathed before it

was born, but its having l)reathed is not sufficiently life to make

the killing of the child murder. There must have been an inde-
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pendent circulation in the child, or the child cannot be considered

as alive for this purpose."

In Regina v. Trilloe, 1 Carrington & Marshman, 650, Erskine^

J., in charging the jury, said : "If you are satisfied that this child

had been wholly produced from the body of the prisoner alive, and

that the prisoner wilfully and of malice aforethought strangled the

child, after it had been so produced, and while it was alive, and

while it had an independent circulation of its own, I am of the

opinion that the charge is made out against the prisoner." See also

Greenleaf on Ev., 3 Vol., Sec. 136.

It may be asked wh}', if there is a possibility of independent

life, the killing of such a child might not be murder.

The answer is, that there is no way of proving that such pos-

sibility existed if actual independence was never established. Any

verdict based upon such finding would be the result of conjecture.

Reveesed.

of the fmtus in utero. It lives merely because the fmtal circulation
is till going on. In this case none of the organs undergo any
change." Casper says, in his Forensic Medicine, 3 Vol., 33 : "In
fora the term 'life' must be regarded as perfectly synonymous with
'respiration.' Life means respiration. Not to have breathed is
not to have lived/'
While: as we have seen, life ha been :nain tained independent
of the mother without appreciable respiration, the quotations above
made indicate how radical the difference is regarded between fmtal
life and the new life which succeeds upon the establishment of
r espiration and independent circulation.
If we turn from the treatises on Medical Jurisprudence to the
r eported decisions, we find this diff2rence, which is so emphasized
in the former, made in the latter the practical test for determining
when a child becomes a human being in such a sense as to become
the subj ect of homicide. In R ex v. Eno ch, 5 C. & P., 539, Mr~
Justice J. PARKE said: "The child might have breathed before it
was born, but its having breathed is not sufficiently life to make
th e killing of the child murder. There must have been an independent circulation in the child, or the child cannot be considered
as alive for this purpose."
In R egina v. Trillo e, 1 Carrington & Marshman, 650, ERSKI E,.
J., in charging the jury, said: "If you are satisfied that this child
had been whoJly produced from the body of the prisoner alive, and
that the prisoner wilfully and of malice aforethought strangled the
child, after it had been so produced, and while it was alive, and
while it had an independent circulation of it own, I am of the
opinion that the e:harge i made out flgainst the pri oner." See also
Greenleaf on Ev., 3 Vol._, Sec. 136.
It may be asked why, if there is a pos ibility of independent
life, the ki1ling of such a child might not be murder.
The answer is, that there is no way of proving that such posibility ex i ~ ted if actual independence was never established. Any
verdict based upon such finding would be the result of conjecture.
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State v. Bantley 1:^1

Cause and Time of Death.

State V. Bantley, U Conn. 537. (1817.)

Paedee^ J. :

On the night of June 11th, 1876, the accused inflicted a severe

Cause and Time of Death.

gun-shot wound upon the arm of one March, between the elbow

and shoulder. March died eleven days thereafter of lock-jaw. The

prosecution claimed that death resulted from the wound; the

State

accused claimed that it resulted from the treatment of the case

. Bantley, 44 Conn. 537. {1877.)

by the attending physicians. The wound was dressed in the first

instance by one surgeon, afterwards to the time of death by

another: these differed radically as to the manner in which the

case should have been treated.

The counsel for the accused claimed, and asked the court ta

charge the jur}^, that if they should find that the death of March

was the result or consequence of willful mismanagement or gross

carelessness on the part of the attending surgeons, they could not

find the accused guilty of manslaughter, as charged in the infor-

mation. The court charged the jury, that unless they should find

that March died from a wound inflicted on him by the accused^
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as charged in the information, they could not convict him of man-

slaughter; but that if they should find that the accused willfully^

and without justifiable cause, inflicted on March a dangerous

wound, from which death would be likely to ensue, and if they

should find also that his death did in fact ensue from and was

caused by the wound, and not from any other cause, carelessness

and mismanagement of whatever character on the part of the at-

tending surgeons would be immaterial, and the treatment of the

case by them, whatever it may have been, could not avail the

accused as a defense. The jury having returned a verdict of guilty^

the accused moved for a new trial for error in the charge.

As to the law applicable to this case, Eoscoe says: "The law

on this point is laid down at some length by Lord Hale. If, ho says,

a man gave another a stroke, which, it may be, is not in itself so

mortal but that with good care he might be cured, yet if he dies

within the year and day, it is a homicide or murder as the case is,

and so it has been always ruled. But if the wound be not mortal,.

J.:
On the night of June 11th, 1876, the accused inflicted a evere
gun-shot wound upon the arm of one March, between the elbow
and shoulder. March died eleven days thereafter of lock-jaw. The
prosecution claimed that death resulted from the wound: the
accused claimed that it resulted from the treatment of the ca e
by the attending physicians. The wound was dressed in the :first
instance by one surgeon, afterwards to the time of death by
another; these differed radically as to the manner in which the
case should have been treated.
The counsel for the accused claimed, and asked the conrt to
charge the jury, that if they should find that the death of March
was the result or consequence of willful mismanagement or gross
carelessness on the part of the att nding surgeons, they could not
find the accused guilty of manslaughter, as charged in the information. The court charged the jury, that unless they shoul 1 find
that March died from a wound inflicted on him by the accused_,_
a charged in the information, they could not convict him of manslaughter; but that if they should find that the accused willfully,.
and without justifiable cause, inflicted on March a dangerous
wound, from which death would be likely to ensue, and if they
hould find al o that his death did in fact ensue from and was
caused by the wound, and not from any other cause, carele. nes&
and mi managem nt of whatever character on the part of the attending surgeons would be immaterial, and the treatment of the
ca e by them, whatever it may have been, could not avail the
accused as a defen e. The jury having returned a verdict of guilty,
the accu etl moved for a new trial for ~rror in the charge.
As to the law applicable to thi ca e, Ro coe says: "The law
on this point is lai 1 down at ome length by Lord Hale. If, he says,
a man gave anoth r a troke, which, it may be, i not in it elf so
mortal but that with good care he might be cur d, yet if he dies
within the year and day it is a homicide or murder as the ca e is,
~ncl so it ha been alway ruled. But if tl1 wound b not mortal
PARDEE,
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but with ill application by the party or those about him of un-

wholesome salves or medicines the party dies, if it clearly appears

that the medicine and not the wound was the cause of the death,

it seems it is not homicide ; but then it must clearly and certainly

appear to be so. But if a man receive a wound which is not in itself

mortal, but for want of helpful applications or neglect it turn to a

gangrene or a fever, and the gangrene or fever be the immediate

cause of the death, yet this is murder or manslaughter in him that

gave the stroke or wound; for that wound, though it was not the

immediate cause of the death, yet if it were the mediate cause,

and the fever or gangrene the immediate cause the wound was the

cause of the gangrene or fever, and so consequently causa causans."

Eoscoe's Criminal Evidence, 7th ed., 717; 1 Hale P. C, 428. In

Rex V. Bews, Kelynge, 26, it was holden that neglect or disorder

in the person who receives the wound will not excuse the person

who gave it; that if one gives wounds to another who neglects the

care of them and is disorderly, and does not keep that rule which

a wounded person should do, if he die it is murder or manslaughter

according to the circumstances of the case, because if the wounds
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had not been given the man had not died. In Regina v. Holland,

2 Mood. & Eob., 351, the deceased had been severely cut with an

iron instrument across one of his fingers, and had refused to have

it amputated; at the end of a fortnight lock-jaw came on and the

finger was then amputated, but too late, and the lock-jaw ulti-

mately caused death. The surgeon expressed the opinion that early

amputation would probably have saved his life. Maule^ J., held

that a party inflicting a wound which ultimately becomes the cause

of death is guilty of murder, though life might have been preserved

if the deceased had not refused to submit to a surgical operation.

In CommomveaUh v. Pike, 3 Cush., 181, it was held that where

a surgical operation is performed in a proper manner and under

circumstances which render it necessary in the opinion of com-

petent surgeons, upon one who has received a wound apparently

mortal, and such operation is ineffectual to afford relief and save

the life of the patient, or is itself the immediate cause of the death,

the party inflicting the wound will nevertheless be responsible for

the consequences. Grcenleaf says (Greenleafs Ev., 3d Vol., sec.

139, 5th ed.,) "If death ensues from a wound given in malice, but

not in its nature mortal, but which being neglected or mismanaged

the party died, this will not excuse the prisoner who gave it; but

but with ill application by the party or those about him of unwholesome salves or medicines the party dies, if it clearly appear::;
that the medicine and not the wound was the cause of the death,
it seems it is not homicide ; but then it must clearly and certainly
appear to be so. But if a man receive a wound which is not in itself
mortal, but for want of helpful applications or neglect it turn to a
gangrene or a fever, and the gangrene or fever be the immediate
cause of the death, yet this is murder or manslaughter in him that
gave the stroke or wound; for that wound, though it was not the
immediate cause of the death, yet if it were the mediate cause,
and the fever or gangrene the immediate cause the wound was the
cause of the gangrene or fever, and so consequently causa causans."
Roscoe's Criminal Evidence, 7th ed., 717; 1 Hale P. C., 428. In
Rex v. Rews, Kelynge, 26, it was holden that neglect or disorder
in the person who receives the wound will not excuse the person
who gave it; that if one gives wounds to another who neglects the
care of them and is disorderly, and does not keep that rule which
a wounded person should do, if he die it is murder or manslaughter
according to the circumstances of the case, because if the wounds
had not been given the man had not died. In Regina v. Holland,
2 Mood. & Hob., 351, the deceased had been severely cut with an
ircn instrument across one of his :fingers, and had refused to have
it amputated; at the end of a fortnight lock-jaw came on and the
.:finger was then amputated, but too late, and the lock-jaw ultimately caused death. The surgeon expr essed the opinion that early
amputation would probably have saved his life. MAULE, J.: held
that a party inflicting a wound which ultimately becomes the cause
of death is guilty of murder, though life might have been preserved
if the deceased had not refused to submit to a surgical operation.
In Commonwealth v. Pike, 3 Cush., 181, it was held that where
.a surgical operation is performed in a proper manner and under
circumstances which render it necessary in the opinion of com_petent surgeons, upon one who has received a wound apparently
mortal, and such operation is ineffectual to afford relief and save
the life of the patient, or is itself the immediate cause of the death,
the party inflicting the wound will nevertheless be r esponsible for
the consequences. Greenleaf says (Green.leaf's Ev., 3d Vol., sec.
139, 5th ed.,) "If death ensues from a wound given in malice, but
not in its nature mmtal, but which being neglected or mismanaged
ihe party died, thi s will not excuse the prison er who gave it; but
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lie will be held guilty of the murder unless he can make it clearly

and certainly appear that the maltreatment of the wound or the

medicines administered to the patient or his own misconduct, and

not the wound itself, was the sole cause of his death, for if the

wound had not been given the party had not died." In Rex v.

Johnson, 1 Lewin C. C, 164, the deceased died from a blow re-

ceived in a fight with the prisoner ; a surgeon expressed an opinion

that a blow on the stomach, in the state in which the deceased was,

arising from passion and intoxication, was calculated to occasion

death, but not so if the party had been sober. Hallock, B., di-

rected an acquittal, observing that where the death was occasioned

partly by a blow and partly by a predisposing circumstance, it was

impossible to apportion the operation of the several causes and to

say with certainty that the death was immediately occasioned by

any one of them in particular. Of this case Eoscoe remarks that

it may be doubted how far this ruling of the learned judge was

correct. Roscoe's Crim. Ev., 7th ed., 718. In Rex v. Martin, 5

€ar. & P., 130, where the deceased, at the time when the blow was

given, was in an infirm state of health, Parke, J., said to the jury :
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^'It is said that the deceased was in a bad state of health, but that is

perfectly immaterial, as, if the prisoner was so unfortimate as to

accelerate her death, he must answer for it." In Commonwealth

V. Haclcett, 2 Allen, 13G, it was held that one who has wilfully

inflicted upon another a dangerous wound, with a deadly weapon,

from which death ensued, is guilty of murder or manslaughter as

the evidence may prove, although through want of due care or

skill, the improper treatment of the wound by surgeons may have

•contributed to the death.

Upon these authorities we may state the rule as follows: If

one person inflicts upon another a dangerous wound, one that is

calculated to endanger and destroy life, and death ensues therefrom

within a year and a day, it is sufficient proof of the offence either

■of manslaughter or murder as the case may be; and he is none

the less responsible for the result although it may appear that

the deceased might have recovered if he had taken proper care of

himself, or that unskillful or improper treatment aggravated the

wound and contributed to his death.

There is no such defect in the law as that the person who in-

tentionally inflicts a wound calculated to destroy life, and from.

whiHi (lonth ensues, can throw responsibility for the act upon either

he will be held guilty of the murder unle he can mak it cl arly
and certainly appear that the maltreatment of the wound or th
medicine admini tered to the patient or hi own mi conduct, and
not the wound it elf, wa the ole cau e of his death, for if the
wound had not been given the party had not died.' In Rex \ .
.Johnson, 1 Lewin C. C., 164, the deceased died from a blow received in a :fight with the pri oner; a urgeon expres"ed an opinion
that a blow on the tomach, in the tate in which the decea ed was,
arising from pas ion and intoxication, was calculated to occasion
-death, but not , o if the party had been ober. HALLOCK, B., directed an acquittal, ob erving that where the death wa occa -ionecl
partly by a blow and partly by a predi po ing circum tance, it was
impo ible to apportion the operation of the veral cause and to
ay with certainty that the death wa immediately occasion d by
any one of them in particular. Of thi ca e Roscoe remark that
it may be doubted how far thi ruling of the learned judge wa
correct. Ro coe' Crim. Ev., 7th ed., 118. In Rex \'". Martin, 5
'Car. & P., 130, where the deceased, at the time when the blow was
given, wa in an infirm state of health, P .ARKE, J., said to the jury:
'It is said that the c1ecea ed was in a bad tate of health, but that is
perf~ctly immaterial, as, if the prisoner wa
o unfortunate a to
-accele:r;ate her death, he mu t answer for it." In Cornrnonv. ealth
v. Ha ckett, 2 · All n, 136, it wa held that one who has wilfully
inflicted upon another a dangerou. wound, with a deadly wrapon,
from which death ensued, is guilty of murder or man laughter as
the evidence may prove, although through want of due care or
kill, the improper treatment of the wound by surgeon may have
contributed to the death.
Upon the e authoritie we may tate the rule as follow::-: If
one per on inflict upon another a dangerou ~ wound, on that i
<Calculated to endanger and destroy life: and death en ue therefrom
within a year and a day, it is ufficient proof of the offence ither
of manslaught r or murder as the ca e may be; and he i none
the le r e pon ~ibl e for the result although it may appear that
the decea cd might have recovered if he had tak n proper care of
him elf, or that un killful or improper tr atment aggravated the
wound and contribute 1 to hi death.
There is no ~ uch defect in the law a that th p r on who intentionally infli t a wound calculat d to ck troy life, ancl from
which cl ::ith n ue , can throw r , pon , il ility for th , ct upon ith r
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the carelessness or the ignorance of his victim; or shield himself

behind the doubt which disagreeing doctors may raise as to the

treatment proper for the case.

Indeed counsel for the defendant do not really deny the force

of the rule. Their complaint is rather in the nature of a verbal

criticism of the charge. The judge said to the jury that if the

death of March resulted from the wound and from no other cause,

carelessness and mismanagement of whatever character on the part

of the attending surgeons would be immaterial. It is to be pre-

sumed in favor of a charge that it refers to matters concerning

which witnesses have testified and to points concerning which coun-

sel have presented arguments ; and it is not to be presumed that it

includes within its scope all possibilities. From this record we

cannot perceive that any witness suggested even that the attend-

ing surgeons caused the death of March by an intentional misap-

plication or withholding of remedies, or that counsel in argument

intimated any such thing. The motion states that the two doctors

differed radically regarding the treatment proper for the case ; the

claim of each as to the other was that he had erred through igno-
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rance, not by criminal intention; and when the judge used the

expression complained of in this case, we are to presume that he

referred, and that the jury understood him to refer, to that kind

of mismanagement alone of which witnesses had testified and con-

cerning which counsel had argued in their hearing. With this

limitation the defendant has no occasion for complaint.

A new trial is not advised.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

Proof of Death.

Buloff V. People, IS N. Y. 179. (1858.)

By the Court, Johnson, Cb. J. :

At the opening of the trial the counsel for the prosecution, in

answer to a question of the prisoner's counsel, stated that he did

not propose to prove by any direct evidence that the infant daughter

of the prisoner, with whose murder he was charged by the indict-

ment, was dead or had been murdered, or that her dead body had

ever been found or seen by any one, but that from the lapse of

the carelessness or the ignorance of his victim ; or shield himself
behind the doubt which disagreeing doctors may raise as to the
treatment proper for the case.
Indeed counsel for the defendant do n ot r eally deny the force
of the rule. Their complnint is rather in the nature of a verbal
criticism of the charge. The judge said to the jury that jf the
death of l\Iarch r esulted from the wound and from no other cause,
carele sness and mismanagement of whatever character on the part
of the attending surgeons would be immaterial. It is to be presumed in favor of a charge that it refers to matters concerning
which witnesse have testified and to points concerning which counel have presented arguments; and it i not to be presumed that it
includes within its scope all possibilities. From this record we
cannot perceiv that any witness suggested even that the attending surgeons caused the death of March by an intentional misapplication or withholding of remedies, or that counsel in argument
intimated any such thing. The motion states that the two doctor&
differed radically regarding the treatment proper for the case; the
claim of each as to the other was that he had erred through ignorance, not by criminal intention; and when the judge used the
expre sion complained of in this case, we are to presume that he
referred, and that the jury understood him to r efer, to that kind
of mism!'.lnagement alone of which witnesses had testified and concerning which counsel had argued in their hearing. With this.
limitation the defendant has no occasion for complaint.
A new trial i not ad vised.
In this opinion the other judge .. concurred.

Proof of Death.
Ruloff v. P eople, 18

. Y. 179 . (1858.)

By the Court, JonNSON. Ch. J.:
At the opening of the trial the counsel for the prosecution, in
answer to a question of the prisoner' coun el, stated that he did
not propose to prove by any direct evidence that the infant daughter
of the prisoner, with whose murder he wa charged by the indictment, was dead or had been murdered, or that her dead body had
evrr been found or seen by any one, but that from the lapse of
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time since the cliilcl and her mother were last seen, and from other

facts and circumstances, lie should ask the jury to infer and pre-

sume and find that the infant daughter was dead and that she was

murdered by the prisoner. "The prisoner's counsel, on this, moved

the court to stop the trial, for want of proof of the corpus delicti;

that the rule laid down by Lord Hale, that no person should be

convicted of murder or manslaughter unless the facts were proved

to be done, or at least the body found dead," is the rule universally

acted upon by our courts, and should never be departed from.

The judge reserved the question till the evidence should be closed.

The prosecution gave proof tending to show that the prisoner

did not live happily with his wife; that his wife and infant

daughter were seen alive and well on the evening of June 24, 1845,

"by a woman who lived across the road from Ruloff's house. ISTo

person shows that either of them have been seen since. The next

day Euloff borrowed a wagon from a neighbor and took into it a

box from his own house, which the neighbor helped him to place

in the wagon ; he drove off with it — where, is not shown ; on the

following day he returned with the wagon and box. It was shown
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that he had in his possession a ring which his wife had worn on the

twenty-fourth, and a shawl and some other articles of her apparel ;

that he told stories as to her being at sundry places where she was

proved not to have been, and generally conducted himself in such

a way as to lead strongly to the inference that he was the author

of whatever had happened to his wife and child, if anything had,

in fact, happened to them. In the house clothes were found lying

about in disorder, dishes unwashed, a skirt lying in a circle at the

foot of the bed, and shoes, stockings and diapers. It was sworn

that Euloff had a cast iron mortar of twenty-five or thirty pounds

weight, and flat irons, which on searching the house were not

found. He absconded and was in Chicago early in August, imder

a false name; there said his wife and child had died six weeks

before on the Illinois river, in Illinois, and left a box containing

books, papers and articles of woman's apparel, which had be-

longed to Mrs. Euloff, a paper on which were the words "Oh, that

dreadful hour !" and a lock of light brown hair in another paper,

labeled "A lock of [Harriet's or Mary's] hair;" the witness

thought the word was "Harriet's."

At the close of the evidence, the prisoner's counsel renewed his

motion, made at the opening of the cause, and insisted that, as it

time ince the child and her mother were la t een, and from other
fact and circum tance he hould a k the jury to infer and presume and find that the infant daughter wa dead and that he was
murder ed b' the pri oner. 'The pri oner coun el on thi , moved
the court to . .fop the trial for want of proof of the corpus delicti;
that the rule laid down by Lord HA.LE, that no per on hould be
convicted of murder or man laughter unle the fact were proved
-to be done, or at lea t th bodv found dead" i the rule univer all)
acted upon by our court , and hould never be departed from.
The judge re erved the que tion till the evid nee ~hould be clo ed.
'The pro ecution gave proof tending to how that the pri oner
did not live happily with hi wife; that hi wif and jnfant
daughter were ..,een alive and well on the evening of June 24, 1845,
by a woman who lived aero the road from Ruloff' hou e. No
person show that either of them have been ..,een ...:ince. The next
<lay Ruloff borrowed a wagon from a nei<Yhbor and took into it a
box from his own hou e, which the neighbor helped him to place
in the wagon; he dro e off with it-where, i not hown; on the
following day he r eturned with the wagon and box. It was shown
that he had in hi ~ possession a ring which hi wife had worn on the
twenty-fourth; and a shawl and some other articles of her apparel;
that he told storie a to her being at sundry place where he was
proved not to have been, and generally conducted himself in uch
a way as to lead trongly to the inference that he wa the author
of whatever had happened to hi wife and child, if an) thing had,
in fact, happened to them. In the hou e clothe were found lying
about in di order, li he unwa ~hed a kirt lying in a circle at the
foot of the bed, and ~ho es, tockings and diaper . It wa sworn
that Ruloff had a ca t iron mortar of twenty-five or thirty pound
weight, and flat irons, which on ear ching the hou e were not
found. H e ab conded and wa in Chicago early in Augu t, under
a fal e name; there aid hi wife and child had died ix week
before on the Illinoi river, in Illinoi , and left a box containing
books, papers and article of woman'~ apparel, which had belonged to fr.,. Ruloff, a paper on which were the word 'Oh, that
dreadful hour!" and a lock of light brown hair in another paper,
lab led "A lock of [Harriet' or Mary' ] hair;" the witness
thought the word wa 'Harriet' ."
At the clo of the vid nee, th pri oner' coun cl renew d hi
motion made at th opening of th cau e and in i ted that a it
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now appeared that no direct evidence of the death or the murder

of the infant daughter had been given, no conviction for murder

could be properly had or allowed, and that the jury should be so

advised and instructed, and should be directed to find a verdict of

not guilty. The judge refused so to advise, direct and instruct the

jury, and to his refusal the prisoner's counsel excepted.

The judge then charged the jury. After explaining the legal

definition of murder, and the legal presumption of innocence in

favor of the prisoner, and the duty of the prosecution, before they

could rightfully ask a conviction, not only to prove the alleged

murder, but also to establish by evidence the guilt of the prisoner

beyond any reasonable doubt, he proceeded as follows : "The first

branch of the case, the corpus delicti, as it is termed in the law,

by which is meant the body of the crime, the fact that a murder

has been committed, must be clearly and conclusively proved by

the government. The corpus delicti is made up of two things:

first, of certain facts forming the basis of the corpus delicti, by

which is meant the fact that a human being has been killed; and

secondly, the existence of criminal and human agency as the cause
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of the death. Upon this first branch of the case, the prisoner's

counsel insists that it can only be proved by direct and positive

evidence; that the government must prove the fact of death by

witnesses who saw the killing, or at least the dead body must be

found. It has been said by some judges, that a conviction for

murder ought never to be permitted unless the killing was posi-

tively sworn to, or the dead body was found and identified. This,

as a general proposition, is undoubtedly correct, but, like other

general rules, has its exceptions. It may sometimes happen that

the dead body cannot be produced, although the proof of death

is clear and satisfactory. A strong case in illustration is that of a

murder at sea, when the body is thrown overl:)oard in a dark and

stormy night, at a great distance from land or any vessel. Al-

though the body cannot be found, nobody can doubt that the author

of such crime is guilty of murder. In such a case, the law permits

the jury to infer tliat death has ensued from the facts proved;

the circumstances being such as to exclude the least, if not almost

every probability, that such a person could have escaped with life/

and yet there is a bare possibility in such a case that the person

may have escaped with life.

"I am of opinion that the rule, as understood in this country.

now appeared that no direct evidence of the death or the murder
of the infant daughter had been given, no conviction for murder
could be properly had or allowed, and that the jury should be so·
aclvised and instructed, and should be directed t o fin d a verdict of
not guilty. The judge refused so to advise, direct and instruct the
jury, and to his refu sal the pri . . oner's counsel excepted.
The judge then charged the jury. After explaining the legal
definition of murder, and the legal presumpt ion of innocence in
fa vor of the prisoner, and the auty of the prosecution, before they
could rightfully ask a conviction, not only to prove the alleged
murder, but also to establish by evidence the guilt of t he prisoner
beyond any reasonable doubt, he proceeded as follows : "The first
branch of the case, the corpus delicti, as it is termed in the law,
by which is meant the body of the crime, the fact that a murder
ha s been committed, must be clearly and conclusively proved by
the government. The corpus delicti is made up of two things:
first, of certain facts forming the basis of the corpus delicti, by
which is meant the fact that a human being has been killed ; and
secondly, the existence of criminal and human agency as the cause
of the death. Upon this first branch of the case, the prisoner's
counsel insists that it can only be proved by direct and positive
evidence ; that the government must prove the fact of death by
witnesses who saw the killing, or at least the dead body must be.
found . It has been said by some judges, that a conviction for
murder ought never to be permitted unless the killing was positively sworn to, or the dead body was found and identified. This,
as a general proposition, is undoubtedly correct, but, like other
general rules, has its exceptions. It ma y sometimes happen that.
the dead body cannot be produced, although the proof of death
is clear and satisfactory. A strong case in illustration is that of a
murder at sea, when the body is thrown overboard in a dark and
stormy night, at a great distance from land or any vessel. Although the body cannot be found, nobody can doubt that the author
of such crime is guilty of murder. In such a case, the law permits.
the jury to infer that death has ensued from the facts proved ;
the circumstances being such as to exclude the least, if not almost
every probability, that such a person could have escaped with life,·
and yet there is a bare possibility in such a case that the person
may have escaped with life.
"I am of opinion that the rule, as understood in this country,
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does not require the fact of death to be proved by positive and

direct evidence in cases where the discovery of the body, after the

crime, is impossilde. In such cases the fact may be established by

circumstances; where the evidence is so strong and intense as to

produce the full certainty of death. By the proof of a fact by

presumptive evidence, we are to understand the proof of facts and

circumstances from which the existence of such fact may be justly

inferred. The facts and circumstances to establish the death in the

case of murder, in the absence of any positive evidence, must be so

strong and intense as to produce the full certainty of death, or, as

Mr. Wills says, 'the death may be inferred from such strong and

unequivocal circumstances as render it morally certain, and leave

no ground for reasonable doubt.' The government claim that they

have proved the body of the crime, in the case under consideration,

up to the strictest requirements of the rule. This is for you to

determine. The determination of it involves the examination of

all the facts and circumstances disclosed .by the evidence in the

case."

After, then, observing briefly upon some parts of the evidence,
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the judge concluded his charge by stating the rule that should

govern them in their ultimate conclusion, as follows: "In regard

to the first ])ranch of the case, the establishment of the corpus

ddicti, the body of the crime, before you find it against the pris-

oner you must be satisfied from the evidence in the case that it is

established by presumptive evidence of the most cogent and irre-

sistible kind, that is, established by circumstances proved, so strong

and intense as to produce the full certainty of death.

"In regard to the second branch of the case, by which we mean

the traverse between the government and the prisoner as to the

question of his guilty agency in the commission of the alleged

murder; as to this question, the rule, is that the government

are required, before they can claim a conviction, to prove by their

evidence the guilt of the prisoner beyond any rational doubt. If,

upon a full and fair consideration of all the evidence in the case,

doubts remain in the minds of the jury, it is their duty to acquit.

Upon this branch of the case, the doubts, however, which require

an acquittal should be rational doubts. They are not doubts which

may arise in a speculative mind, after the reason and judgment

are thoroughly convinced by the evidence in the cause."

The defendant's counsel excepted to so much and such parts

does not require the fact of death to be proved by positive anu.
direct evidence in case where the di covery of the body, after the
crime, is impossible. In such cases the fact may be established by
circum~ tance : where the evidence is so strong and intense as to
produce the full certainty of death. By the proof of a fact by
presumptive evidence, we are to understand the proof of facts and
circumstance~ from which the existence of such fact may be justly
inferred. The facts and circumstances t o establish the death in the
case of murder_, in the absence of any po itive evidence, must be o
strong and intense as to produce the full certainty of death, or, as
Mr. WILLS ay , 'the death may be inferred from such strong and
unequivocal circumstances as render it morally certain, and leave
no ground for reasonable doubt.' The government claim that they
have proved the body of the crime, in the ca e under consideration,
up to the strictest requirements of the rule. This is for you to
determine. The determination of it involves the examination of
all the facts and circumstances disclosed .by the evidence in the
case."
After, then, observing briefly upon some parts of the evidence,
the judge concluded his charge by stating the rule that should
govern them in their ultimate conclusion, as follows: "In regarc1
to the first branch of the case, the establishment of the corpus
delicti, the body of the crime, befor e you find it against the pri oner you mu t be satisfied from the evidence in the case that it i
established by pre umptive evidence of the most cogent and irresistible kind, that is, e tablished by circunistanc s proved, so strong
and intense as to produce the full certainty of death.
"In r egard to the second branch of the case, by which we mean
the traverse between the government and the prisoner as to the
question of hi guilty agency in the commission of the all gecl
murder; as to this que'"' tion, the rule, is that the government
are r equired, before they can claim a conviction, to prove by their
evidence the guilt of the prisoner beyond any rational doubt. If,
upon a full and fair consideration of all the evidence in the cas ,
doubts remain in the minds of the jury, it is their duty to acquit.
Upon this branch of the case, the doubts, however, which require
an acquittal should be rational doubts. They are not doubts whi h
may arise in a speculative mind, after the r eason and judgment
are thoroughly convinced by the evidence in the cau e."
The defen lant'. oumel excepted to so much and uch part.
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of the charge and instructions given to the jury as submits to

them to infer, jDresume and find, without direct proof, the death

and the murder of the infant daughter of the defendant.

The question presented to us, therefore, is, whether there be a

rule of law, in respect to the proof in cases of homicide, which

does not permit a conviction without direct proof of the death,

or of the violence or other act of the defendant which is alleged to

have produced death.

If it be objected that such a rule may compel the acquittal of

one whom the jury are satisfied is guilty, the answer is, that the

rule, if it exists, must be regarded as part of the humane policy

of the common law, which affirms that it is better that many guilty

should escape than that one innocent should suffer; and that it

may have its probable foundation in the idea that where direct

proof is absent as to both the fact of death and of criminal vio-

lence capable of producing death, no evidence can rise to the degree

of moral certainty that the individual is dead by criminal interven-

tion, or even lead by direct inference to those results; and that

where the fact of death is not certainly ascertained, all mere in-
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culpatory moral evidence wants the key necessary for its satisfac-

tory interpretation, and cannot be depended on to furnish more

than probable results. It may be, also, that such a rule has some

reference to the dangerous possibility that a general preconception

of guilt, or a general excitement of popular feeling, may creep

in to supply the place of evidence, if, upon other than direct

proof of death or a cause of death, a jury are to be permitted, upon

whatever evidence may be presented to them, competent on any part

of the case, to pronounce a defendant guilty.

I proceed, therefore, to consider whether any such rule is to be

found in the common law. Lord Hale says : "I would never con-

vict any person of murder or manslaughter unless the fact were

proved to be done, or at least the body forfnd dead, for the sake

of two cases — one mentioned in my Lord Cokey's P. C, cap. 104, p.

233, a Warwickshire case; another, that happened in my remem-

brance, in Staffordshire, where A was long missing, and upon

strong presumptions B was supposed to have murdered him, and to

have consumed him to ashes in an oven, that he should not be

found, whereupon B was indicted of murder, and convicted and

executed, and within one year after A returned being, indeed, sent

'beyond sea l\v B, against his will, and so, though B justly de-

-0f the charge and instructions given to the jury as submits to
them to infer, presume and find, without direct proof, the death
and the murder of the infant daughter of the defendant.
The question pre cnted to us, therefore, is, whether there be a
Tule of law, in respect to the proof in ca e of homicide, which
doe not permit a conviction without direct proof of the death_.
or of the violence or other act of the defendant which is alleged to
have produced death.
If it be objected that such a rule may compel the acquittal of
one whom the jury are . atisfied is guilty, the an wer is, that the
rule, if it exists, must be regarded a part of the humane policy
of the common law, which affirm that it is better that many guilty
should escape than that one innocent should suffer; and that it
may have it probable foundation in the idea that where direct
proof is absent a to both the fact of death and of criminal violence capable of producing death, no evidence can ri e to the degree
of moral certainty that the individual i dead by criminal interventicn, or even lead by direct inference to tho e re ults; and that
where the fact of death i. not certainly ascertained, all mere inculpatory moral evidence wants the key neces ary for it · sati factory interpretation, and cannot be depended on to furnish more
than probable results. It may be, also, that such a rule has some
reference to the dangerou pos ibility that a general preconcept.ion
of guilt, or a general excitement of popular feeling, may creep
in to supply the place of evidence, if, upon other than direct
proof of death or a cause of death, a jury are to be permitted, upon
whatever evidence may be pre ented to them, competent on any part
-0f the case, to pronounce a defendant guilty.
I proceed, ther fore, to consider whether any ..,uch rule is to be
found in the common law. Lord HA.LE says: "I would never convict any person of murder or manslaughter unless the fact were
proved to be done, or at lea t the body found dead, for the sake
of two cases-one mentioned in my Lord CoKE's P. C., cap. 104, p.
239, a Warwickshire ca e ; another, that happened in my remembrance, in Stafford hire, where A wa long mi sing, and upon
strong presumptions B was suppo ed to have murdered him, and to
have consumed him to ashe in an oven, that he should not be
found, whereupon B was indicted of murder, and convicted and
executed, and within one year after A returned being, indeed, ent
'beyond :::ea hy B, against hi will, and so, though B justly de-
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served death, yet he was really not guilty of that offence for

which he suffered." (3 Hale's P. C, 290.)" It forms part of the

-chapter in which he treats of "evidence requisite, or allowed by

acts of parliament, and presumptive evidence," Considering the

law of evidence, first in treason, requiring two witnesses, then upon

indictment for murder against the mother of a bastard child, where

by act of parliament the mother of such a child, concealing its

death, was to suffer as in murder, unless she proved by one witness

that the child was born dead, and next the subject of presumptive

evidence, he says: "In some cases presumptive evidences go far

to prove a person guilty, though there be no express proof of the

fact to be committed by him: but then it must be very warily

pressed, for it is l)etter five guilty persons should escape unpun-

ished than one innocent person should die." This observation he

follows by a case illustrative of his meaning, where one was exe-

•cuted for stealing a horse, whicli was proved to have been stolen,

the prisoner being found in possession of the horse, "a strong pre-

sumption that he stole him," and yet it afterwards appeared that

another person stole the horse and that the prisoner's possession
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was innocent. He proceeds: "I would never convict any person

for stealing the goods of a person unknown, merely because he

would not give an account how he came by them, unless there were

due proof made that a felon}"- was committed of these goods."

Then follows the passage first cited, which is the earliest statement

of the doctrine for which the defendant contends.

When this was written, a prisoner charged with murder or any

inferior felony was neither allowed the advantage of sworn wit-

nesses or the full aid of counsel, and it is therefore quite apparent

upon the whole passage that Lord Hale was here stating, not what

prudential principles ought to govern the action of individual

jurors in weighing evidence, but what, acting as judge, and exer-

cising the control which judges were then accustomed to exercise,

he would govern them by.

The case cited in Coke was of an uncle who brought up his

niece, whose heir at law he was. He correcting her on some occa-

sion, she was heard to cry out, "Good uncle, kill me not," and

afterwards disappeared and could not be found. He was arrested

on suspicion, and, to avert this, produced as his niece another

child of similar appearance. The imposition was detected, and he,

being indicted, was on trial convicted on these circumstances, and

9

erved death, yet he W"a' really not guilt) of that offence for
W"hi ·h be "'u:ffered.' (2 Hale P. 0 ., ·:>90.) It form part of th
hapter in which he treat, of " vidence requi ite, or allowed b3
act, of parliament, and pre umptile evidence.
on idering th·
law of evidence, :fir t in trea on, r equiring two witne e th n upon
indictment for murd r again ... t the mother of a ba tard hild, where
by act of parliament the mother of uch a child, concealing it
death wa to uff r a in murder unl s h proYed by one witne s
that the child wa, born dead, and next the ubj ct of pr esumptin~
evideJ?-ce, be ay : "In . ome ca es presumptive evidences go far
to prove a person guilty, though there be no e.xpres proof of the
fact to be committed by him; but then it mu t be very warily
pre .. eel, for it is better :five guilty per on should e cape unpunished than one innoc nt per on hould die." Thi obs rvation he
folloW" by a ca e illu trative of hi meaning, where one wa .. executed for tealing a, hor e, which "·as proved to have b"en stolen,
i:he pri oner being found in possession of the hor e, "a strong preumption that he stole him," and yet. it afterwards appeared that
another person stole the horse and that the prisoner's possession
was innocent. He proceed : "I would never convict any per on
for stealing the good" of a per~on unknown, merely because he
would not give an account how he came by them, unles there were
due proof made that a felony was committed of the e good .'J
Then follow. the pas age :first cited, which i the earliest statement
·Of the doctrine for which the defendant contends.
When this was written_, a pri oner charged with murder or any
inferior felony was neither allowed the advantage of worn witnes...,e or the full aid of coun el, and it i therefore quite apparent
upon the whole pas age that Lord HALE wa here tating, not what
prudential principle ouaht to govern the action of individual
juror in w ighing evid nc , but what, acting a judge, and exerci. ing the control which judge were then accu tomed to exerci c
be would govern them by.
The ca e cited in COKE wa of an uncle who brought up his
niece, who e heir at law he wa . He correcting her on ,ome occaion, he wa heard to cry out, "Good Hncle kill me not," ancl
afterward di appeared and could not be found. He wa arre ted
on u picion, and, to avert thi produced a bi nie e another
chil 1 of ._imilar appearanc . Th impo ition wa d t ct d and h ,
bcin indicted, wa" on trial convirt c1 on th " cir um . bmcc , and
9
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executed. The niece afterwards made her appearance, and was

proved to be the true child. Lord Coke reports this case, as he

says, to the end that Judges, in case of life and death, judge not too

hastily on 1iare presumption.

In Hindmarsh's case (2 Leach's Crown Law, 569), the indict-

ment for murder of a ship captain contained two counts, one for

killing by beating, the other for drowning. The fact happened at

sea; a witness proved that he was awakened at midnight by a

violent noise: that on reaching the deck, he saw the prisoner take

the captain up and throw him overboard into the sea, and tliat he

was not seen or heard of afterwards. Another witness proved that

the prisoner proposed to one Atkyns to kill the captain; and an-

other proved that on the deck, near where the captain was seen,

a billet of wood was found, and that the deck and part of the

prisoner's dress were stained with blood. Garrow, of counsel for

the prisoner, contended, citing the passage from Hale^ that the

prisoner was entitled to be acquitted for want of proof of the

death, as he might have been picked up by some other ship. He

cited a case before Justice Gould, where the mother and reputed
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father of a bastard child took it to the margin of a dock in Liver-

pool, stripped it and threw it in. The body of the child was not

afterwards seen; and as the tide ebbed and flowed in the dock,

the judge, observing to the jury that the tide might have carried

out the living infant, directed them to acquit him. The court,

which consisted of Sir Ja.mes ]\L\.eriott, Judge of Admiralty, Mr.

Justice AsHURST, Baron Hotham, and others, admitted the gen-

eral rule of law ; and ]\Ir. Justice Ashurst left it to the jury, on

the evidence, to say whether the captain was not killed before his

body was thrown into the sea. The jury found the fact to be so.

The case came afterwards before all the judges, who held the con-

viction to be right, and the prisoner was executed.

Blackstone says (4 Com., 358), all presumptive evidence of

felony should be admitted cautiously, for the law holds that it is

better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer ;

and Sir Matthew Hale, in particular, lays down two rules most

prudent and necessary to be observed : 1. Never to convict a man

for stealing, &c. ; and 2. Never to convict any person of murder

or manslaughter, till at least the body be found dead.

In Regina v, HopTcins (8 C. & P., 591), a woman was indicted

for the murder of her illegitimate child. It was born March twentv-

executed. The niece afterwards made her appearance, and was
proYed to be the true child. Lord CoKE reports this case, as he
"ay , to the end that judge", in ca e of life and death, judge not too
hastily on hare presumption.
In Hindmarsh's ca e (2 L each's Crown L aw, 569), the indictment for rnurc1er of a ship captain contained two counts, one for
killing by beating, the other for drowning. The fact happened at
sea; a witne s proved that he was awakened at midnight by a
Yiolent noi .~e; that on r eaching the deck, he saw the prisoner take
the captain up and throw him overboard into the sea, and that he
was not seen or heard of afterwards. Another witness proved that
the pri oner proposed to one Atkyns to kill the captain; and another proved that on the deck, near where the captain was seen,.
a billet of wood was found, and that the deck and part of the
prisoner's dre s were stained with blood. Garrow, of counsel for
the prisoner, contended, citing the passage from HALE, that the
prisoner was entitled to be acquitted fo r want of proof of the
death, as b e might have been picked up by some other ship. He
cited a ca e before Justice Go LD, where the mother and reputed
father of a ba~tard child took it to the margin of a dock in Liverpool, stripped it and threw it in. The body of the child was not
afterwards seen; and as the tide ebbed and flow ed in the dock,
the judge, ob erving to the jury that the tide might have carried
out the living infant, directed them to acquit him . The court~
which consisted of Sir JAnLES MARRIOTT, Judge of Admiralty, Mr.
Justice Asnl!RST, Baron HOTH.BI, and others, admitted the general rule of law; and fr. Justice _ SI-WRST left it to the jury, on
the evidence, to say whether the captain was not killed before his
body wa thrown into the sea. The jury found the fact to be so.
The case came afterwards before all the judges, who h ld the conviction to be right, and the prisoner was e:xecuted.
BLACKSTONE ays ( 4 Com., 35 ) , all pre umptive evidence of
felony should be admitted cautiously, for the law holds that it i
better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer;
and Sir MATTHEW HALE_. in particular, lay down two rules most
prudent and necessary to be observed: 1.
ever to convict a man
for stealing, &c. ; and 2. Never to convict any per on of murder
or manslaughter, till at least the body be found dead.
In Regina v. Ho pkins ( 8 C. & P., 591), a woman wa indicted
for the murder of h er m egitimate child. It wa . born Iarch twenty-
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the prisoner took it away, stating an intention to go to her father's.

She was seen the next day at several times, the latest being at six

in the evening, with the child in her arms on the way to her

father's. Between eight and nine she arrived there without the

child. The dead body of a child was found on the thirteenth, in

a river near the place where she was last seen with her child, which

upon proof of its age and appearance was shown not to be her

child. Lord Abixger,. after stating the particulars of this latter

proof, added, "with respect to the child which really was the child

of the prisoner, she cannot by law be called upon either to account

for it or say where it is, unless there be evidence to show that her

child is actually dead," and directed an acquittal.

In the case of Videtto (1 Park. Cr. E., 609), Walworth, Circt.

J., says : "One rule which ought never to be departed from is, that

no one should be convicted of murder upon circumstantial evidence,

unless the body of the person supposed to have been murdered has

been found, or there be other clear and irresistible proof that such

person is actually dead."
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It does not appear that this direction was material on that trial,

and it is cited only to show how constantly the doctrine has been

received as clear and undisputed law.

In the case of Wilson (3 Park. Cr. E., 207), the cook of the

schooner Eudora was indicted for the murder of the captain upon

Long Island Sound; after five months a body floated on shore,

which the prosecution claimed was shown to be that of the mur-

dered man. Strong, J., who presided at the trial, charged the

jury "that ordinarily there could be no conviction for murder until

the body of the deceased was discovered. That there were several

exceptions to the rule, however, as where the murder has been on

the high seas, at a great distance from the shore, and the body had

been thrown overboard, or where the body had ])een entirely con-

sumed by fire, or so far that it was impossible to identify it. But,

in the present case, the scene of the supposed tragedy was near the

shore, and there was strong reason to suppose that if a murder

had been committed, the body of the deceased would be discovered.

The exception to the rule is, therefore, inapplicable, and the jury \/

must be satisfied that the body discovered was that of the mur-

dered captain, before they could convict the prisoner."

In Tawell's case (Wills' Cir. Ev., 3d ed., 181), Baron Parke

third, and ent to a nur e, wh re it remained till April even, when
the pri oner took it away, tating an intention to go to her father' .
he wa een the next day at everal times, the late t being at ix
in the evening, with the child in her arm on the way to her
fath er . Between eight and nine she arrived there without the
child. The dead body of a child wa found on the thirteenth, in
a river near the place where he wa la t een with her child, which
upon proof of it age and appearance was hown not to be her
child. Lord ABT_ GER, after stating the particular of this latter
proof, added, "with re pect to the child which really wa the child
of the pri oner, he cannot by law be called upon either to account
for it or ay where it is, unle there be evidence to show that her
child i actually dead," and directed an acquittal.
In the case of\ idetto (1 Parle Cr. R., 609), WALWORTH, Circt.
J., ay : "One rule which ought never to be departed from is, that
no on should be convicted of murder upon circumstantial evidence,
unles the body of the person supposed to have been murdered has
been found: or there be other clear and irresistible proof thd such
per on i actually dead."
It doe not appear that thi direction wu material on that trial,
and it is cited only to show how constantly the doctrine has been
received as clear and undisputed law.
In the ca e of Wil on ( 3 Park. Cr. R., 207), the cook of the
schooner Eudora wa indicted for the murd r of the captain upon
Long I sland Sound; after five months a body floated on shore,
which the prosecution claimed was shown to be that of the murdered man. STRONG, J ., who pre ided at the trial, charged the
jury "that ordinarily there could be no conviction for murder until
the body of the decea eel wa di"covered. That there were everal
exception to the rule, however, a" where the murder ha been on
the high seas, at a gr at di tance from the shore, and the body had
been thrown overboard, or where the body had been entirely conumed by fire, or o far that it wa impos ible to identify it. But,
in the pre ent ca e, the cene of the uppo ed tragedy was near the
hore and there was strong reason to suppose that if a murder
had be n committed, the body of the deceased would be discovered.
The exception to the rule i , therefore, inapplicable, and the jury
mu t be sati fied that the body di covered wa that of the murdered captain, b fore they could convict the pri oner."
In Ta well ca e (Will ' ir. Ev., 3d a., 1 1) ' Baron PARKE
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proved by direct and jjositive evidence is the death of the party

by finding the body, or, when such proof is absolutely impossible,

bv circumstantial evidence leading closely to that result — as where

a body was thrown overboard, far from land, when it is quite

enough to prove that fact without producing the body."

These are tlie cases in which the rule contended for by the

■defendant has been recognized as the clearly acknowledged law-

regulating the production of evidence in cases of homicide. No

case is to be found which has been determined the other way. That

no more reported cases contain the rule, is to be accounted for on

the ground that the doctrine has been universally acted on and

acquiesced in, while it is equally certain that any case departing

from the rule would not have escaped observation.

A great deal of strong general language has been used by judges

in respect to the power of circumstantial evidence to afford suf-

ficient ground to warrant convictions, and many instances of this

have been cited and are relied on by the prosecution. Most of those

expressions have been used, in answer to the position that circum-
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stantial evidence ought not to be relied on to prove any part of the

case for the prosecution. But I have not found any case in which

a judge, speaking directly to the point here involved, has said that

without direct evidence on either branch of the corpus delicti a

conviction for murder could be allowed.

The cases contained in The Theory of Presumptive Proof, for a

considerable time after its publication, formed the basis of repeated

attacks upon the value of circumstantial evidence for any purpose

of inculpation in criminal cases. It was to dispel this error that

judges often had occasion, and sometimes took occasion, to vindi-

cate its employment. But that the general language thus em-

ployed was not intended, by those who used it, to conflict with the

rule for which the defendant in this case contends, is fairly to be

inferred.

In Cowen & Hill's Notes to Phillips (vol. 1. 394), after a review

of the cases contained in The Theory of Presumptive Proof, and

sustaining in the strongest manner the general value and im-

portance of circumstantial evidence against the attacks upon it,

as well those contained in the work mentioned as those founded

upon the cases which that work first collected, the authors say :

''In these cases of homicide, the precaution of Lord Hale seems

told the jury that " the only fact which the law requires to be
proved by direct and positive evidence is the death of the party
by :finding the body, or, when such proof is absolutely impossible,
bv circumstantial evidence leading closely to that result-as where
.aw body was thro\\·n overboard, far from land, when it i quite
enough to prove that fact without producing the body."
T hese arc the ca cs in which the rule contended for by the
·defendant ha been recognized as the clearly acknowledged law
r egulating the pro luction of evidence in cases of homicide. No
case is to be found whi h has been determined the other way. That
no more reported ca es contain the rule, i to be accounted for on
the ground that the doctrine ha been universally acted on and
acquiesced in, while it is equally certain that any case departing
from the rule would not have escaped observation.
A great deal of strong general language ha been used by judges
in respect to the power of circumstantial evidence to afford sufficient ground to warrant convictions, and many instances of this
have been cited and are relied on by the prosecution. Most of those
expressions have been used, in answer to the po ition that circumstantial evidence ought not to be relied on to prove any part of the
case for the prosecution. But I have not found any case in which
a judge, speaking directly to the point here involved, has said that
without direct evidence on either branch of the corp'us delicti a
conviction for murder could be allowed.
rrhe cases contained in The Theory of Pre umptive Proof, for a
considerable time after its publication, formed the basis of repeated
attacks upon the value of circumstantial evidence for any purpose
of inculpation in criminal cases. It was to dispel this error that
judges often had occasion, and sometimes took occasion, to vindicate its employment. But that the general language thus employed was not intended, by those who used it, to conflict with the
Tule for which the defendant in this case contends, is fairly to be
inferred.
In Cowen & Hill's Notes to Phillip (vol. 1, 39-±), after a review
()f the. cases contained in The Theory of Pre umpiive Proof, and
: ustaining in the strongest manner the general value and im})Ortance of circumstantial evidence against the attacks upon it,
a well those contained in the work mentioned as those founded
upon the ca cs which that work fir t collected, the authors ay:
" In these ca es of homicide, the precaution of Lord HALE eem
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to be enough for laying the foundation of circumstantial evidence

— citing in terms the rule. A departure from this important

suggestion, which is now universally acted upon, was a capital

error in Miles' case, before cited from the above named work. The

body being afterwards found, it plainly appeared that the death

was accidental. The judge should have stopped the prosecution.

In the two illustrative cases cited by Hale, one of the persons sup-

posed to have been murdered was sent on a long sea voyage and

the other had run away. The rule that the body must be found

dead is adhered to with great strictness in the English courts."

No one was better qualified than Judge Cowen, both by long

experience and great learning, to speak of what rules were uni-

versally acted on in the courts of England and of this country.

It is quite plain, too, that his general remarks on the value of

circumstantial evidence must in his own view have been consistent

with the rule which he thus lays down and approves.

In the next place, I proceed to consider the principal cases relied

on for the people.

Mr. Justice Washington, in United States v. Johns. (1 Wash.
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C. C. E., 363), says: "That the prisoner perpetrated the act, or

directed or procured it to be done, positive evidence is not neces-

sary. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient, and is often more per-

suasive to convince the mind of the existence of a fact than the

positive evidence of a witness, who may be mistaken; whereas a

concatenation and a fitness of many circumstances, made out by

different witnesses, can seldom be mistaken or fail to elicit the

truth. But then those circumstances should be strong in them-

selves, should each of them tend to throw light upon and to prove

each other, and the result of the whole should be to leave no doubt

upon the mind that the offence has been committed, and that the

accused and no other could be the person who committed it." The

defendant was on trial for casting away a ship. That auger holes

had been found in her bottom, which nearly sunk her, was proved

by pumping her out and bringing her to port. The whole question

of fact was the personal guilt of the accused. The remarks are

just; indeed they are cited by Judge Cowen with approbation in

the same note before referred to, and are followed by his statement

of the rule, in cases of homicide, as to proof of the fact of death.

The same remarks are applicable also to Jacobson's case (2 City

Hall Eecorder, 131, 143), where Mr. Justice Livingston is re-

to be enough for laying the foundation of circumstantial evidence
-citing in terms the rule. A departure from this important
suggestion_, which i now universally acted upon, was a capital
rror in Miles case, before cited from the above named work. The
body being afterward found, it plainly appeared that the death
was accidental. The judge should have stopped the prosecution.
In the two illustrative cases cited by HALE, one of the persons supposed to have been murdered was sent on a long sea voyage and
the other had mn away. The rule that the body must be found
dead is adhered to with great strictness in the English courts."
No one was better qualified than ,Tudge CowEN, both by long
experience and great learning, to speak of what rules were universally acted on in the courts of England and of this country.
It is quite plain_, too, that his general remarks on the value of
circumstantial evidence must in his own view have been consistent
with the rule which he thus lays down and approves.
In the next place, I proceed to con ider the principal cases relied
on for the people.
Mr. Justice WASHINGTON, in United States v. Johns. (1 Wash.
C. C. R., 363), says: "That the prisoner perpetrated the act, or
directed or procured it to be done, positive evidence is not nece sary. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient, and is often more persuasive to convince the mind of the existence of a fact than the
positive evidence of a witne s, who may be mistaken; whereas a
concatenation and a fitne s of many circumstances, made out by
different witnesses, can seldom be mistaken or fail to elicit the
trnth. But then tho e circumstances should be strong in themselves, should each of them tend to throw light upon and to prove
each other, and the result of the whole should be to leave no doubt
upon the mind that the offence ha been committed, and that the
accused and no other ould be the person who committed it." The
defendant was on trial for casting away a ship. That auger holes
had been found in her bottom, which nearly sunk her, wa proved
by pumping her out and bringing her to port. The whole question
of fact wa the p r anal guilt of the accu ed. The remark arc
just; indeed they are cited by Judge CowEN with approbation in
the same note before referred to, and are followed by his statement
of the rule, in ca
of homicide, as to proof of th fact of lcath.
The same remark ar applicable also to Jacob on' case (2 City
Hall R cord r, 131, 143) , where Mr. Ju. tice Lrvrno TO i , re-
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ported to have said : "The rule in this court, even in capital cases,

IS, that should the circumstances of a case be sufficient to convince

the mind and remove evei}^ rational doubt, the jury is bound to

place as much reliance on such circumstances as on direct and

positive proof, for facts and circumstances cannot lie." This was

also in a case of casting away a ship, and the only question was of

the personal guilt of the defendant. It was no way necessary for

the judge's argument, nor required by fairness to the defendant,

that he should stop to state an exception as to the fact of death in

murder.

In the case of Burdett (4 Barn. & Aid., 164), the question was

whether a libel had been published in a certain place; and the

observations of the judges are of course to be construed with ref-

erence to the point before them. All the judges speak of the

necessity of a resort to presumptive evidence, and recognize the

fact that, even in cases of murder, a great part of the convictions

rest upon that sort of evidence to establish the guilt of the accused ;

but Abbott^ Ch. J., only notices that kind of proof in its applica-

tion to the fact of death. Speaking of the cases of supposed murder
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mentioned by Lord Hale, which, as he says, have since operated

as a caution to all judges, he observes : "In those cases there was

no actual proof of the death of the person supposed to have been

slain, and consequently no proof that the crime of murder had

been committed." From nothing which is said or omitted to be

said in that case can it be fairly inferred that any of the judges

denied the correctness of the rule stated by Lord Hale. What was

said by Mr. Justice Best comes nearest to the purpose for which

it was cited on the part of the people. He said : "Until it pleases

Providence to give us means beyond those our present faculties

afford, of knowing things done in secret, we must act on presump-

tive proof, or leave the worst crimes unpunished. I admit, where

presumption is raised as to the corpus delicti, that it ought to be

strong and cogent." The corpus delicti, in murder, is a com-

pound fact, made up of death as result, and criminal agency of

another person as means; and therefore, if he had been speaking

of murder, he might have employed this expression without intend-

ing to deny the rule that as to one or the other branch of the crime

there must be direct evidence. But it was in no way necessar}-,

or conducive to the argument he had in hand, that he should be

minutely accurate on the point before us, for, in the case of which

ported to have said : "The rule in thi court, even in capital cases,
is, that should the circumstances of a ca e be sufficient to convince
the mind and remove every rational doubt, the jury is bound to
place as much reliance on such circumstances as on direct ancl
po itive proof, for facts and circumstances cannot lie." This was
also in a case of casting away a ship, and the only que tion was of
the personal guilt of the defendant. It wa no way nece ary for
the judge's argument, nor required by fairness to the defendant,
that he should stop to state an exception as to the fact of death in
murder.
In the case of Burdett ( 4 Barn. & Ald., 164) the question was
whether a libel had been published in a certain place; and the
observations of the judges are of cour e to be construed with reference to the point before them. All the judges speak of the
necessity of a re ort to presumptive evidence, and recognize the
fact that, even in cases of murder, a great part of the conviction
rest upon that cort of evidence to e tablish the guilt of the accused;
but ABBOTT, Ch. J., only notices that kind of proof in its application to the fact of death. Speaking of the cases of suppo ed murder
mentioned by Lord HALE, which_. as he says, have since operated
as a caution to all judges, he observes: " In those ca es the:re was
no actual proof of the death of the person supposed to have been
slain, and consequently no proof that the crime of murder had
been committed." F rom nothing which is said or omitted to be
said in that case can it be fairly inferred that any of the judges
denied the correctness of the rule stated by Lord H ALE. What wa
said by Mr. Justice BEST comes neare t to the purpo e for which
it was cited on the part of the people. H e said: "Until it pleases
Providence to give us means beyond those our present faculties
afford, of knowing things done in ecret, we mu t act on presumpt ive proof, or leave the worst crimes unpunished. I admit, where
pre umption is raised as to the corpus delicti, that it ought to be
trong and cogent." The corpus delicti, in murder, is a compound fact, made up of death as result, and criminal agency of
another person as means; and therefore, if he had been speaking
of murder, he might have employed thi expression without intending to deny the rule that as to one or the other branch of the crime
there must be direct evidence. But it was in no way necessary,
or conducive to the argument he had in hand, that he should be
minutely accurate on the point before us, for, in the case of which
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lie was speaking, the corpus delicti, the publication of the libel by

the defendant, was admitted, and the presumptive proof which

he had sustained related only to the place of publication.

What was said by Mr. Justice Paek, in Eex v. Thurtell tried for

the murder of ^Yeare, which is quoted in the opinion of ^Ir. Justice

Mason, was said in a case where the body of the defendant had

been found recently dead, and was intended to answer the address

of Thurtell to the jury, which had mainly turned on certain cases

which we read, exhibiting the fallibility of circumstantial evidence.

(2 Chron. of Crime, Lond., 1841, 85.) It affords no inference

that he denied the rule of Lord Hale.

In United States v. Gilbert (2 Sumn., 27), an indictment for

robbery on the high seas. Judge Story in summing up adverted

to certain cases which had been cited to show the danger of rely-

ing on presumptive evidence, in capital cases, as sufficient proof

of guilt. He says : '"They are brought to establish these proposi-

tions on trials for murder : 1st. That there ought to be no con-

viction for murder unless the murdered body is actually found;

2d. That men have been convicted of murder on false testimony.
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The first proposition certainly cannot be admitted as correct, in

point of common reason or of law, unless courts of justice are to

establish a positive rule to screen persons from punishment who

may be guilty of the most flagitious crimes. In the case of murders

on the high seas the body is rarely if ever found, and a more

complete encouragement and protection for the worst offences of

this sort could not be invented than a rule of this strictness. It

would amount to a universal condonation of all murders committed

on the high seas." Strong as this language is, I find in it no

support for the idea that, in the absence of any direct evidence

showing that anybodv' has been killed, and accounting for the ab-

sence of the dead bocly, it is to be put to a jury to find, according

to their belief, that a murder has or has not been committed.

The other cases cited for the prosecution, People v. Thorn (6

Law Eep., 54), Commonwealth v. Harman (4 Barr, 269), State v.

Turner (1 Wright Ohio, 20), and Commonwealth v. Webster (5

Cush., 310), except that last mentioned, were cases in which the

fact of death was clearly established by finding the body ; and in

Webster's case, the identification of the remains as those of Dr.

Parkman was the vital fact on which the success of the prosecution

'depended.

be was peaking, the corpus delicti, the publication of the libel by
-the defendant, wa admitted, and the pre umptive proof "·hich
he had u tained related only to the place of publication.
What wa aid by fr. Ju tice PARK, in Rex . Thurtell, tried for
the murder of \\eare, which i quoted in the opinion of Ir. Ju tice
lYI.Aso~, was aid in a ca e where the boc1y of the defendant had
been found recently dead and wa intended to an wer the addre ..,
of Thurtell to the jur ·, which had main13 turned on certain ca e
which we read, exhibiting the fallibility of circum tantial evidence.
(2 hron. of rime Lond., 1 -±1, 5.) It afford no inference
that he denied the rule of Lord HALE.
In United tate \. Gilbert (2 umn., 9 ), an indictment for
robbery on the high ea· .Judge STORY in umming up adl'erted
to certain ca e which had been cited to how the danger of relying on pre umptive evidence, in capital ca e , a ufficient proof
of guilt. He ay . . : .(They are brought to e.,tablish the e propo i-tion on trial for murder: 1st. That there ought to be no conviction for murder unle the murdered body i actually found;
2d. That men bave been convicted of muTder on fal e te timon}.
The fir t propo ition certainly cannot be admitted a correct, in
_point of common rea on or of law, unle court of ju tice are to
e tabli h a po . . itive rule to creen per on from puni hment who
mav be guilty of the mo t flagitiou cTime . In the ca e of murder
on the high sea the body i rarel3 if ever found, and a more
complete encouTagement and protection for the war t offence of
thi ...,ort could not be invented than a rule of thi ..,trictne.._ . It
would amount to a univer al condonation of all murd r committed
on the high ea ." Strong as thi language is, I find in it no
upport for the idea that, in the ab . . ence of any direct evidence
hawing that anybody ha been killed, and accounting for the abence of the dead body, it i to b put to a jury to find, according
to their b lief, that a murder ha or has not been committed.
The other ca e cited for the pro ecution People . Thorn ( 6
Law Rep. 54), ommonwealth v. Hannan (-± Barr 269)
tate v.
Turn er (1 Wriaht Ohio '>O) and Commonu; ealth v. Web ter (5
Cu h. 310), except that lat mentionetl were ca e in which the
fact of death wa clenrly tabli hed by :finding the body; and in
Web ter ca e, the jdentifi ation of th remain a tho c,f r.
Parkman wa ~ the vital fact on which the ucce of th pro ecution
dep nde l .
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I proceed to consider briefly what has been written by elemen-

tary writers on this subject.

Mr. Stakkie (1 Stark. Ev., 575), under the rule which he lays

down, that it is essential that the circumstances should to a moral

certainty actually exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to

be proved, says. "Hence results the rule in criminal cases, that the^

coincidence of circumstances tending to indicate guilt, however

strong and numerous they may be, avails nothing, unless the

corpus delicti, the fact that the crime has been actually perpe-

trated, be first established. So long as the least doubt exists as to

the act, there can be no certainty as to the criminal agent. Hence,

upon charges of homicide, it is an established rule that the accused

shall not be convicted unless the death be first distinctly proved

either by direct evidence of the fact or by inspection of the body —

a rule warranted by melancholy experience of the conviction and

execution of supposed ofl'enders, charged with the murder of per-

sons who survived their alleged murderers; as in the case of the

uncle, cited by Sir Edward Coke and Lord Hale.'"

On a subsequent page of the same work, when speaking of the
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proof of the death of the person specified in the indictment as

having been murdered, he says: "It has been laid down by Lord

Hale as a rule of prudence in cases of murder, that, to warrant

a conviction, proof should be given of the death, by evidence of the

fact or the actual finding of the body. But although it be certain

that no conviction ought to take place unless there be most full

and decisive evidence as to the death, 3-et it seems that actual proof

of the finding and identifying of the body is not absolutely essen-

tial. And it is evident that to lay down a strict rule to that extent

might be productive of the most horrible consequences." (2 Stark.

Ev., 710.) Hindmarsh's case is then stated by him, thus illustrat-

ing the meaning of the expressions he has just employed, and the

allowable exposition of the terms of Lord Hale^s rule.

Having finished the discussion of the proof of the corpus delicti,

he proceeds : "When it has been clearly established that the crime

of willful murder has been perpetrated, the important fact whether

the prisoner was the guilty agent is, of course, for the considera-

tion of the jury, under all the circumstances of the case." (Id.,

719.) It is in this connection, and with reference, I think, mainly,

if not exclusively, to this branch of the inquiry, that he observes

that "it is essential to the security of mankind that juries should

I proceed to consider briefl} what has been written by elemen~
tary writers on this "'ubject.
l\fr. STARKIE (1 Stark. Ev., 575), under the rule which he lays
clown, that it is essential that the circumstances should to a moral
certainty actually exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to
be proved, says. "Hence results the rule in criminal cases, that thecoincidence of circumstances tending to indicate guilt~ however
strong and numerous they may be, avails nothing, unless the
corpus delicti, the fact that the crime has been actually perpetrated, be first established. So long as the least doubt exists as to,
the act, there can be no certainty as to the criminal agent. H ence,
upon charges of homicide, it is an e tabli ...hed rule that the accused
.. hall not be convicted unless the death be first distinctly proved
either by direct evidence of the fact or by inspection of the bodya rule warranted by melancholy experience of the conviction and
execution of supposed offender , charged with the murder of perons who survived their alleged murderers; as in the case of the
uncle, cited by Sir Enw .\.RD COKE and Lord HALE."
On a subsequent page of the same work, when speaking of the
proof of the death of the person pecified in the indictment a
having been murdered, he ays : "It has been laid down by Lord
HALE as a rule of prudence in case of murder, that, to warrant
a conviction, proof should be given of the death, by evidence of the
' fact or the actual finding of the body. But although it be certain
that no conviction ought to take place unless there be most full
and decisive evidence as to the death, yet it seem that actual proof
of the finding and identifying of the body i not absolutely essential. And it is eYident that to lay down a strict rule to that extent
might be productive of the most horriLle con equences." (2 Stark.
Ev., 710.) Hindmarsh's case i then stated by him, thu illustrating the meaning of the exprcs ion he ha just employed, and the
allowable expo ition of the terms of Lord H.\.LE's rule.
Having finished the discus ion of the proof of the corpus delicti,
he proceed : "\\hen it ha " been clearly e tablished that the crime
of willful murder ha been perpetrated, the important fact whether
the prisoner wa the guilty agent is of course, for the consideration of the jury, under all the circum tance of the case.' (Id.,
119.) It i in thi connection, and with reference, I think, mainly,
if not exclusively, to this branch of the inquiry, -that he observe
that "it i ... e ~cntial to the security of mankind that juries should

EuLOFF V. People 137

RULOFF V.

PEOPLE

137

convict, when they can do so safely and conscientiously, upon cir-

cumstantial evidence which excludes all reasonable doubt, and that

it should be well known and understood that the secrecy with

which crimes are committed will not secure impunity to the crimi-

nal." (Id., 720.) Specifying, under this head, among the topics

of circumstantial evidence pertinent to the inquiry, the conduct of

the prisoner in seeking for opportunities to commit the offence, or

in using means to avert suspicion and remove material evidence, he

adds: "The case cited by Lord Coke and Lord Hale is a melan-

choly instance to show how cautiously proof arising by inference

from the conduct of the accused is to be received, when it is not

satisfactorily proved by other circumstances that a murder has

been committed ; and even when satisfactory proof has been given

of the death, it is still to be recollected that a weak, inexperienced

and injudicious person will often, in hope of present relief, have

recourse to deceit and misrepresentations." (Id., 720.)

Having explained himself fully as to proof of the corpns delicti

in another place, it was not necessary, to avoid misconception, for

him to inweave that distinction into this passage, and it ought
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not to be taken to qualify what has been before carefully stated.

Indeed, his language, attentively considered, requires no modifica-

tion, for he distinguishes between the proof of the murder — of

both brandies of the corpus delicti — and proof of the death alone.

In Eussell on Crimes (vol. 1, 473) it is said: "It has been

holden as a rule that no person should be convicted of murder,

unless the body of the deceased has been found ; and a very great

judge says : 'I would never convict any person of murder or man-

slaughter, unless the fact were proved to be done, or at least the

body be found dead.' But this rule, it seems, must be taken with

some qualifications; and circumstances may be sufficiently strong

to show the fact of the murder, though the body has never been

found."

The rule which is thus qualified is that which prohibits a convic-

tion unless the body be found, not the rule stated by Lord Hale.

This appears by what immediately follows in illustration, a state-

ment of Hindmarsh's case, which the defendant's counsel admits to

be correctly decided. In that case the violent noise which awakened

the witness, the blood on the deck and the prisoner's clothes, the

l)illet of wood lying by, and the actual casting into the sea, made a

satisfactory case of proof under Lord Hale's rule.

convict, when they can do o saf ly and conscientiously, upon circumstantial evidence which excludes all reasonable doubt, and that
it should be well known and understood that the secrecy with
which crimes are committed will not secure impunity to the criminal." (Id., 720.) Specifying, under this head, among the topic
of circumstantial evidence pertinent to th inquiry, the conduct of
the prisoner in seeking for opportunities to commit the offence, or
in using means to avert suspicion and remove material evidence, headds: "The case cited by Lord COKE and Lord HALE is a melancholy instance to show how cautiously proof arising by inference
from the conduct of the accused is to be received, when it js not
satisfactorily proved by other circumstances that a murder has
been committed; and even when satisfactory proof has been given
of the death, it is still to be recollected that a weak, inexperienced
and injudicious person will often, in hope of present relief, have·
recourse . to deceit and misrepresentations." (Id., 720.)
Having explained himself fully as to proof of the corpus delict-i
in another place, it was not necessary, to avoid misconception, for ·
him to in.weave that distinction into this passage, and it ought
not to be taken to qualify what ha s been before carefully stated.
Indeed, his language: attentively consider ed, requires no modification, for he distingui she between the proof of the murder-of
both branches of the corpus delicti-and proof of the death alone.
In Russell on Crimes (vol. 1, 473) it is said: "It has been
holden as a rule that no person should be convict ed of murder,
unless the body of the deceased has been found; and a very great
judge says: 'I would never convict any person of murder or manlaughter, unless the fact were proved to be done, or at least the
body be found dead.' But this rule, it seems, mu t be taken with
ome qualifications ; and circumst an ces may be sufficiently strong
to show the fact of the murder, though the body has never been
found."
The rule which is thus qualifi d is that which prohibits a conviction unless the body be found, not the rule stat ed by Lord H ALE.
This appear by what immediately follow in illustration, a st atement of Hindmar h' ca e, which the defendant's counsel admit to
be correctly decid d. In that case the violent noise which awakened
the witnes , the blood on th deck an d th prisoner's clothe , th
billet of wood lying by, and the actual a tin g into the sea, made a
ati factory ca. e of proof under Lord H _t\LE's rule.
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Gkeenleaf says (3 Greenl. Ev., § 30) : "It is seldom that either

the corpus delicti or the identity of the prisoner can be proved by

direct testimony, and, therefore, the fact may lawfully be estab-

lished by circumstantial evidence, provided it be satisfactory. Even

in the case of homicide, though ordinarily there ought to be the

testimony of persons who have seen and identified the body, yet

this is not indispensably necessary in cases where the proof of

death is so strong and intense as to produce the full assurance of

moral certainty."

For this proposition. Wills on Circumstantial Evidence (157,

162) is referred to, and Hindmarsh's case is cited as an example.

Such judicial observations as are referred to, in the places cited

in Wills, were made by judges with reference to the further

proofs of crime, after the fact of death had been fully established

by direct and unequivocal evidence. The only case cited in which

any relaxation of the rule — that the body must be found — has taken

place, in Hindmarsh's, and that, as we have seen, stands upon

satisfactory grounds, there being direct and unequivocal proof of

what was done with the man or his body. He proceeds : "But it
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must not be forgotten that the books furnish deplorable cases of the

conviction of innocent persons, from the want of sufficiently certain

proofs, either of the corpus delicti, or of the identity of the prisoner.

It is obvious that, on this point, no precise rule can be laid down,

except that the evidence ^ought to be strong and cogent,' and that

innocence should be presumed until the case is proved against the

prisoner, in all its material circumstances, beyond any reasonable

doubt." (3 Greenl. Ev., § 30.)

"The corpus delicti, or the fact that a murder has been com-

mitted, is so essential to be satisfactorily proved, that Lord Hale

advises that no person be convicted of culpable homicide unless the

fact were proved to have been done, or at least the body found

dead. Without this proof, a conviction would not be warranted,

though there were evidence of conduct of the prisoner exhibiting

satisfactory indications of guilt. But the fact, as we have already

seen, need not be directly proved, it being sufficient if it be estab-

lished by circumstances so strong and intense as to produce the

full assurance of moral certainty." (3 Greenl. Ev., § 131.)

"§ 132. The most positive and satisfactory evidence of the fact

of death is the testimony of those who were present when it

happened, or who, having been personally acquainted with the

GREENLE.AF say ( 3 Greenl. Ev., § 30) : "It is seldom that either
the corpus delicti or the identity of the prisoner can be proved by
clirect testimony, and, therefore, the fact may lawfully be establi hed by circumstantial evidence, provided it be satisfactory. Even
in the case of homicide, though ordinarily there ought to be the
testimony of person who have seen and identified the body, yet
-this is not indispensably necessary in cases where the proof of
death is so strong and intense as to produce the full assurance of
moral certainty."
For this proposition, Wills on Circumstantial Evidence (157,
162) is referred to, and Hindmarsh' ca e is cited as an example.
Such judicial observations as are referred to, in the places cited
in WILLS; were made by judge with reference to the further
proofs of crime, after the fact of death had been fully establi hed
by direct and unequivocal evidence. · The onl) case cited in which
any relaxation of the rule-that the body must be found-has take:::i.
place, in Rindmarsh's, and that, as we have een, tancls upon
satisfactory grounds, there being direct and unequivocal proof of
what was done with the man or his body. Re proceed : "But it
mu t not be forgotten that the book furnish deplorable cases of the
conviction of innocent persons, from the want of ufficiently certain
proofs, either of the corpus delicti; or of the identity of the prisoner.
It is obvious that, on thi point, no precise rule can be laid down,
except that the evidence 'ought to be strong and cogent,' and that
innocence should be presumed until the case is proved against the
prisoner, in all its material circumstances, beyond any reasonable
doubt." ( 3 Greenl. Ev., § 30.)
"The corpus del·icti; or the fact that a murder has been committed, is so essential to be satisfactorily proved, that Lord HALE
advises that no person be convicted of culpable homicide unless the
fact were proved to have been clone, or at least the body found
dead. Without this proof, a conviction would not be warranted,
-though there were evidence of conduct of the p_risoner exhibiting
satisfactory indications of guilt. But the fact, as we have already
seen, need not be directly proved, it being sufficient if it be establi ·hed by circumstances so strong and inten.::e as to produce the
full assurance of moral certainty." (3 Greenl. Ev., § 131.)
"§ 132. The mo t positive and sati factory evidence of the fact
of death is the t estimony of tho e who were present when it
1rnppened, or who, having been personally acquainted with the
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deceased in his lifetime, have seen and recognized his body after

life was extinct. Tliis evidence seems to be required in the English

House of Lords, in claims of peerage, and, a fortiori^ a less satisfac-

tory measure of proof ought not to be required in a capital trial.

"§ 133. But though it is necessary that the body of the deceased

he satisfactorily identified, it is not necessary that this be proved

by direct and positive evidence, if the circumstances be such as to

leave no reasonable doubt of the fact. Where only mutilated

remains have been found, it ought to be clearly and satisfactorily

shown that they are the remains of a human being, and of one

answerirg to the sex, age and description of the deceased; and the

agency of the prisoner in their mutilation, or in producing the

appearances found upon them, should be established."

The question will be found further discussed in Best on Pre-

sumptions (2T1-276), Wharton's American Criminal Law (283-

287), Wills on Circumstantial Evidence (15G-1T0), and in Burrill

on Circumstantial Evidence (G78-C80). The last writer stales, as

his conclusion, that "the fact of death, when the body cannot bo

found, may be proved by circumstances. It may be inferred, says
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Mr. WiLLS^ from such strong and unequivocal circumstances of

presumption as render it morally certain, and leave no ground for

reasonable doubt." In illustration, Hindmarsh's case is again

referred to, and, it may be assumed, to show what is meant by the

•expression so constantly used, "such strong and unequivocal cir-

cumstances of presumption as render the fact morally certain, and

leave no ground for reasonable doubt." He says further: "A

dead body or its remains having been discovered and identified as

that of the person charged to have been slain, and the basis of a

corpus delicti being thus fully established, the next step in the

process, and the one which serves to complete the proof of the

indispensable preliminary fact, is to show that the death has been

occasioned by the criminal act or agency of another person. This

may always be done by means of circumstantial evidence, including

that of the presumptive kind ; and for this purpose, a much wider

range of inquiry is allowed than in regard to the fundamental fact

of death, and all the circumstances of the case, including facts of

conduct on the part of the accused, may be taken into considera-

tion. (Burr, on Cir. Ev., 682; Best on Presum., § 205; Will.^'

Cir. Ev., 1G8.)

If wbat is said by these writers is to be iaken as intimating

decea ed in his lifetime, have een and recognized his body after
life wa extinct. Thi evidence eem to be required in the Engli h
House of Lords, in claim of peerage, and, a fortiori, a le s ati factory mea ure of proof ought not to be required in a capital trial.
"§ 133. But though it i nece "ary that the body of the dee a d
be ati factoril:; identified, it i not nee ary that thi be proved
by direct and positive evidence, if the circum tance be uch a to
leave no rea onable doubt of the fact. Where only mutilated
:remains have been found, it ought to be clearly and atisfactorily
shown that they are the remains of a human being, and of one
an~wering to the sex, age and de cription of the deceased; and the
agency of the prisoner in their mutilation, or in producing the
.appearance found upon them: hould be e tabli hed."
The question will be found further di cu ed in Best on Presumption (2 1-216), Wharton' American Criminal Law (2 83281), Wills on Circumstantial Evidence ( 156-11 0), and in Burrill
on Circum tantial Evidence ( G78-G 0). The last writer taie , a
bis conclusion, that "the fact of death, when the body cannot L~
found, may be prOI ed by circumstances. It may be inferred, say"
Mr. WILLS, from such strong and unequivocal circumstances of
_pre umption as render it morally certain, and leave no ground for
rea onable doubt." In illu tration, Hindmarsh's case is again
referred to, and, it may be as"umed, to show what is meant by the
-expression so con tantly used, "such strong and unequivocal cir,cumstances of pre umption as render the fact morally certain, and
l eave no ground for rea onable doubt." He says further: "A
dead body or its remain having been discovered and identified a
that of the person charged to have been slain, and the basis of a
corpus delicti being thus fully establi hed, the next tep in the
:proce s, and the one which serve to complete the proof of the
indispensable preliminary fact, is to show that the death has been
occasioned by the criminal act or agency of another per on. Thi
may always be don by means of circum tantial evidence, including
that of the pre umptive kind; and for this purpo e, a much wider
range of inquiry is allowed than in regard to the fundamental fact
of death, and all the circumstances of the case, including fa t of
conduct on the part of the accused, may be taken into con id r;.1tion. (Burr. on ir. Ev., 6 ; Be t on Pre um., § 90 · \Yilb'
Cir. E\'., 1G8.)
If what i aid by th
writ r i: to lX' bk n a. jntimatinO'
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their opinion that Lord Hale's rule may be departed from, I find

no judicial authority warranting the departure. The rule is not

founded in a denial of the force of circumstantial evidence, but in

the danger of allowing any but unequivocal and certain proof that

some one is dead to be the ground on which, by the interpretation

of circumstances of suspicion, an accused person is to be convicted

of murder.

We are of opinion that the judge, at the trial, erred, and that

he should have directed an acquittal.

EoosEVELT, J., dissented.

Judsrment reversed and new trial ordered.

Felonious Homicide.

Murder and Manslaughter.

Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 295. (1850.)

The defendant, professor of chemistry in Harvard University,.

was indicted for the murder of Dr. George Parkman of Boston.

their opinion that Lord HALE'S rule may be departed from, I find
no judicial authority warranting the departure. The rule is not
founded in a denial of the force of circumstantial evidence, but in
the danger of allowing any but unequivocal and certain proof that
"ome one is dead to be the ground on which, by the interpretat ion
of circumstances of . . uspicion, an accused person is to be convicted
of murder.
We are of opinion that the judge, at the t rial, erred, and tha t
he should have directed an acquittal.
ROOSEVELT, J., dissented.
Judgment reversed and new t rial ordered.

The government introduced evidence, that Dr. George Park-

man, quite peculiar in person and manners, and very well known

to most persons in the city of Boston, left his home in Walnut
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street in Boston in the forenoon of the 23d of November, 1849,

in good health and spirits ; and that he was traced through various.

FELO.r rous HolVlICIDE.

streets of the city until about a quarter before two o'clock of that

day, when he was seen going towards and about to enter the medi-

Murd er and Manslai1ghter.

cal college : That he did not return to his home : That on the next

day a very active, particular, and extended search was commenced

in Boston and the neighboring towns and cities, and continued

Commonwealth v. W ebster, 5 Cush . (Mass.) 295. {1850 .)

until the 30th of November; and that large rewards were offered

for information about Dr. Parkman: That on the 30th and 31sc

of November, certain parts of a human body were discovered, in and

about the defendant's laboratory in the medical college; and a

great number of fragments of human bones and certain blocks of

mineral teeth, imbedded in slag and cinders, together with small

quantities of gold, which had been melted, were found in an assay

furnace of the laboratory : That in consequence of some of these

discoveries the defendant was arrested on the evening of the 30th

of November : That the parts of a human body so found resembled

The defendant, professor of chemistry in Harvard University
wa indicted for the murder of Dr. G orge Parkman of Boston.
The government introduced evidence, that Dr. George Parkman, quite peculiar in person and manners, and very well known
to mo t persons in the city of Bo ton, left hi home in Walnut
trcct in Bo ton in the forenoon of the 93d of November 1 49
in good health and spi rit ~ ; and that he was traced through variou
street of the city until about a quarter before two o'clock of that
day, when he wa ~ ecn going toward and about to enter the medical college : That he did not return to hi home : That on the next
day a very active, particular, and extended search wa commenced
in Bo ton and the neighboring towns and cities, and continued
until the 30th of X o,·embcr; and that large r ewards were offered
for information about Dr. P arkman: That on the 30th and 31 t
of N ovcmber, certain parts of a human body wer e di covered, in and
about the defendant's laboratory in the medical college; and a
great number of fragment of human bone and certain blocks of
mineral teeth, imbedded in slag and cind r , together with mall
quantities of gold, which had been melted, were found in an as ay
furnace of the laboratory: That in con equence of some of these
di .. cov rie the defendant wa arre t ed on the evening of the 30th
of }\ ovember: That the part of a human body o found resembled
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in every respect the corresponding portions of the body of Dr.

Parkman, and that among them all there were no duplicate parts ;

and that they were not the remains of a body which had been dis-

sected : That the artificial teeth found in the- furnace were made

for Dr. Parkman by a dentist in Boston in 1846, and refitted to his

mouth by the same dentist a fortnight before his disappearance:

That the defendant was indebted to Dr. Parkman on certain notes,

and was pressed by him for payment ; that the defendant had said

that on the 23d of NovemlDer, about nine o'clock in the morning,

he left word at Dr. Parkman's house, that if he would come to the

medical college at half past one o'clock on that day, he would pay

him: and that, as he said, he accordingly had an interview with

Dr. Parkman at half past one o'clock on that day, at his laboratory

in the medical college : That the defendant then had no means of

paying, and that the notes were afterwards found in his pos-

session.

Shaw, C. J. :

Homicide, of which murder is the highest and most criminal

species, is of various degrees, according to circumstances. The
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term, in its largest sense, is generic, embracing every mode by

which the life oi one man is taken by the act of another. Homi-

cide may be lawful or unlawful ; it is lawful when done in lawful

war upon an enemy in battle ; it is lawful when done by an officer

in the execution of justice upon a criminal, pursuant to a proper

in every re ·pect the corr ponding portions of the body of Dr.
Parkman, and that among them all there w re no duplicate part ;
.and that they were not the remain of a body whi h had been di ect d: That the artificial teeth found in the furnace were mad
for Dr. Parkman by a denti t in Boston in 1846, and refitted to hi
mouth by the same denti t a fortnight before his disappea.rance:
That the defendant wa indebted to Dr. Parkman on c rtain note ,
and was pre sed by him for payment; that the defendant had said
that on the 23d of November, about nine o'clock in the morning,
he left word at Dr. Parkman's house, that if he would come to the
medical college at half pa t one o'clock on that day, he would pay
him; and that, a be said, he accordingly had an interview with
Dr. Parkman at half past one o'clock on that day, at hi laboratory
in the medical college: That the defendant then had no means of
paymg, and that the notes were afterwards found in hi possess10n.

warrant. It may also be justifiable, and of course lawful, in neces-

sary self-defence. But it is not necessary to dwell on these dis-

tinctions; it will be sufficient to ask attention to the two species

of criminal homicide, familiarly known as murder and man-

slaughter.

In seeking for the sources of our law upon this subject, it is

proper to say, that whilst the statute law of the commonwealth

declares (Eev. Sts. c. 125, § 1,) that "Every person who shall

commit the crime of murder shall suffer the punishment of death

for the same;" yet it nowhere defines the crimes of murder or

manslaughter, with all their minute and carefully-considered dis-

tinctions and qualifications. For these, we resort to that great

repository of rules, principles, and forms, the common law. This

we commonly designate as the common law of England ; but it

might now be properly called the common law of Massachusetts.

C. J.:
Homicide, of which murder is the highest and mo t criminal
species, is of various degree., according to circumstances. The
term, in its largest sense, is generic, embracing every mocle by
which the life of one man L taken by the act of another. Homicide may be lawful or unlawful; it is lawful when done in lawful
war upon an enemy in battle; it is hrwful when done by an offic r
in the execution of justice upon a criminal, pur uant to a proper
warrant. It may also be justifiable, and of course lawful, in nece sary self-defence. But it is not necessary to dwell on these distinctions; it will be sufficient to a k attention to the two Rpecie
of criminal homicide, familiarly known a murd r and manslaughter.
In seeking for the <.:ources of our law upon this ubje t, iL i:::
proper to say, that whilst the tatute law of th commonwealth
declare (Rev. ~ ts. c. 125, § 1,) that "Every person who hall
commit the crime of murder shall uffer the puni hment of death
for the same;" yet it nowhere d fine the crimes of murder or
manslaughter, with all their minute and carefully-considered di tinction and qualification . For these, we resort to that gr at
repo itory of rul , principles, and form , th common law. Thi
we commonly designate a the ommon law of Englan 1 · but it
might now be properly called the common law of Ma a hu tt .
SHAW,
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It was adopted when our ancestors first settled here, by general

consent. It was adopted and confirmed by an early act of the

provincial government, and was formally confirmed by the pro-

vision of the constitution (ch. 6, art. 6,) declaring that all the laws

which had theretofore been adopted, used, and approved, in the

province or state of Massachusetts bay, and usually practised on

in the courts of law, should still remain and be in full force until

altered or repealed by the legislature. So far, therefore, as the

rules and principles of the common law are applicable to the

administration of criminal law, and have not been altered and

modified by acts of the colonial or provincial government or by

the state legislature, they have the same force and effect as laws

formally enacted.

By the existing law, as adopted and practised on, unlawful homi-

cide is distinguished into murder and manslaughter.

Murder, in the sense in which it is now understood, is the killing

of any person in the peace of the commonwealth, with malice afore-

thought, either express or implied by law. Malice, in this defini-

tion, is used in a technical sense, including not only anger, hatred,
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and revenge, but every other unlawful and unjustifiable motive.

It is not confined to ill-will towards one or more individual per-

sons, but is intended to denote an action flowing from any wicked

and corrupt motive, a thing done malo animo, where the fact has-

been attended with such circumstances, as carry in them the plain

indications of a heart regardless of social dut3% and fatally bent on

mischief. And therefore malice is implied from any deliberate

or cruel act against another, however sudden.

Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another without

malice; and may be either voluntar}^, as when the act is com-

mitted with a real design and purpose to kill, but through the

violence of sudden passion, occasioned by some great provoca-

tion, which in tenderness for the frailty of human nature the

law considers sufficient to palliate the criminality of the offence;

or involuntary, as when the death of another is caused by some

unlawful act, not accompanied by any intention to take life.

From these two definitions, it will be at once perceived, that

the characteristic distinction between murder and manslaughter

is malice, express or implied. It therefore becomes necessary,,

in every case of homicide proved, and in order to an intelligent

inquiry into the legal character of the act, to ascertain with

lt wa adopted when our ancestors first settled here, by general
con . . ent. It was adopted a.nd confirmed by an early act of the
provincial government, and was formally confirmed by the provision of the constitution (ch. 6, art. 6,) declaring that all the law ·
which had theretofore been adopted, used, and approved, in the
province or state of Massachusetts bay, and usually practised on
in the court of law, should still remain and be in full force until
altered or repealed by the legislature. So far, therefore, as the
rules and principles of the common law are applicable to the
administration of criminal law, and have not been altered and
modified by acts of the colonial or provincial government or by
the state legislature, they have the same force and effect as laws.
formally enacted.
By the existing law, a adopted and practised on, unlawful homicide is distinguished into murder and manslaughter.
Murder, in the ense in which it i · now understood, is the killing
of any person in the peace of the commonwealth, with 11ialice aforethoug ht, either expres or implied by law. Malice, in this definition, i used in a t echnical ense, including not only anger, hatred,
and revenge, but every other unlawful and unjustifiable motive.
It is not confined to ill-wiJl toward s one or more individual persons, but is intended to denote an action flowing from any wicked
and corrupt motive, a thing clone malo animo, wh re the fact ha
been attended with such circum tances, as carry in them the plain
indications of a heart r egardle.ss of social duty, and fatally bent on
mischief. And ther efore malice is implied from any deliberate
or cruel act against another, however udden.
Manslaughter i the unlawful killing of another without
mulice ; and may be either voluntary, as when the act is committed with a r eal design and purpose to kill, but through the
violence of sudd en passion; occasioned by . ome great provocation, which in t enderne s for the frailty of human nature the
law con siders suffi cient to palliate the criminality of the offence;
or involuntary, as when the death of another i caused by some
unlawful act, not accompanied by an y intention to take life.
From these two definition s, it will be at once perceived, that
the characteristic distinction between murder and manslaughter
is malice, express or implied. It there£ ore becomes necessary,,
in every case of homicide proved, and in order to an intelligent
inquiry into the legal character of the act, to ascertain with
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some precision the nature of legal malice, and what evidence is

requisite to establish its existence.

Upon this subject, the rule as deduced from the authorities

is, that the implication of malice arises in every case of inten-

tional homicide; and, the fact of killing being first proved, all

the circumstances of accident, necessity, or infirmity, are to be

satisfactorily established by the party charged, unless they arise

out of the evidence produced against him to prove the homicide,

and the circumstances attending it. If there are, in fact, circum-

stances of justification, excuse, or palliation, such proof will

naturally indicate them. But where the fact of killing is proved

by satisfactory evidence, and there are no circumstances disclosed,

tending to show justification or excuse, there is nothing to rebut

the natural presumption of malice. This rvile is founded on the

plain and obvious principle, that a person must be presumed

to intend to do that which he voluntarily and wilfully does in

fact do, and that he must intend all the natural, probable, and

usual consequences of his own acts. Therefore, when one person

assails another violently with a dangerous weapon, likely to kill
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and which does in fact destroy the life of the party assailed, the

natural presumption is, that he intended death or other great

bodily harm; and, as there can be no presumption of any proper

motive or legal excuse for such a cruel act, the consequence fol-

lows, that, in the absence of all proof to the contrary, there is

nothing to rebut the presumption of malice. On the other hand,

if death, though wilfully intended, was inflicted immediately after

provocation given by the deceased, supposing that such provoca-

tion consisted of a blow or an assault, or other provocation on his

part, which the law deems adequate to excite sudden and angry

passion and create heat of blood, this fact rebuts the presumption

of malice; but still, the homicide being unlawful, because a man

is bound to curb his passions, is criminal, and is manslaughter.

In considering what is regarded as such adequate provocation,

it is a settled rule of law, that no provocation by words only,

however opprobrious, will mitigate an intentional homicide, so as

to reduce it to manslaughter. Therefore, if upon provoking

language given, the party immediately revenges himself by the

use of a dangerous and deadly weapon likely to cause death, such

as a pistol discharged at the person, a heavy bludgeon, an axe, or a

knife: if death ensues, it is a homicide not mitigated to man-

some prec1s10n the nature of legal malice, and what evidence i
requisite to e~tablish its existence.
Upon this subject, the rule a deduced from the authorities
is, that the implication of malice ari e in every case of intentional homicide; and, the fact of killing b ing first provE d, all
the circumstances of accident, necessity, or infirmity, are to be
atisfactorily established by the party charged unle s they ari e
out of the evidence produced against him to prove the homicide,
and the circumstances attending it. If there are, in fact, circumstances of justification, excuse, or palliation, such proof will
naturally indicate them. But where the fact of killing is proved
by ati factory evidence, and there are no circumstances disclosed,
tending to show ju tification or excuse, there is nothing to rebut
the natural presumption of malice. This rule is founded on the
plain and obviou principle, that a person must be presumed
to intend to do that which he voluntarily and wilfully does in
fact do, and that he must intend all the natural, probable, and
usual consequences of his own acts. Therefore, when one person
assails another violently with a dangerous weapon, likely to kill
and which does in fact destroy the life of the party assailed, the
natural presumption is, that he intended death or other great
bodily harm; and, as there can be no presumption of any proper
motive or legal excuse for such a cruel act, the consequence follows, that, in the absence of all proof to the contrary, there is
nothing to rebut the presumption of malice. On the other hand,
if death, though wilfully intended, was inflicted immediately after
provocation given by the decea ed, supposing that such provocation consisted of a blow or an as ault, or other provocation on his
part, which the law deems adequate to excite sudden and angrr
passion and create heat of blood, this fact rebuts the presumption
of malice; but still, the homicide being unlawful, because a man
is bound to curb his passions, is criminal, and is manslaughter.
In con idering what is regarded as such adequate provocation,
it is a settled rule of law, that no provocation by words only,
however opprobrious, will mitigate an intentional homicide, , o a
to reduce it to manslaughter.
Therefore, if upon provoking
language given, the party immediately revenges himself by the
u e of a dangerous and deadly weapon likely to cau e death, uch
a a pi tol di charged at the per on, a heavy bludgeon, an ax , or a
knife; if death ensue , it is a homicide not mitigated to man-
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■slaughter by the circumstances, and so is homicide by malice

aforethought, within the true definition of murder. It is not

the less malice aforethought, within the meaning of the lafw,

because the act is done suddenly after the intention to commit

the homicide is formed; it is sufficient that the malicious inten-

tion jsrecedes and accompanies the act of homicide. It is manifest,

therefore, that the words "malice aforethought/' in the description

of murder, do not imply deliberation, or the lapse of considerable

time between the malicious intent to take life and the actual

execution of that intent, but rather denote purpose and design, in

■contradistinction to accident and mischance.

In speaking of the use of a dangerous weapon, and the mode

of using it upon the person of another, I have spoken of it as

indicating an intention to kill him, or do him great bodily harm.

The reason is this. Where a man, without justification or excuse,

causes the death of another by the intentional use of a dangerous

weapon likely to destroy life, he is responsible for the conse-

•quences, upon the principle already stated, that he is liable for

the natural and probable consequences of his act. Suppose, there-
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fore, for the purpose of revenge, one fires a pistol at another,

regardless of consequences, intending to kill, maim, or grievously

wound him, as the case may be, without any definite intention

to take his life; yet, if that is the result, the law attributes the

same consequences to homicide so committed, as if done under

an actual and declared purpose to take the life of the party

assailed.

I propose to verify and illustrate these positions, by reading

a few passages from a work of good authority on this subject,

a work already cited at the bar. East's Pleas of the Crown, c 5,

§§ 2, 4, 12, 19, 20.

"Murder is the voluntary killing of any person of malice pre-

pense or aforethought, either express or implied by law ; the

sense of which word malice is not only confined to a particular

ill-will to the deceased, but is intended to denote, as Mr. Justice

Foster expresses it, an action flowing from a wicked and corrupt

motive, a thing done malo animo, where the fact has been attended

with such circumstances as carry in them the plain indications of

a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent upon mischief.

And therefore malice is implied from any deliberate, cruel act

against another, however sudden." § 2.

. laughter by the circumstances, and so is homicide by malice
aforethought, within the true definition of murder. It is not
the less malice aforethought, within the meaning of the law,
because the act is done suddenly after the intention to commit
the homicide is formed; it is sufficient that the malicious intention precedes and accompanies the act of homicide. It is manifest,
therefore, that the words "malice aforethought," in the clescription
of murder, do not imply deliberation, or the lapse of considerable
time between the malicious intent to take life and the actual
execution of that intent, but rather denote purpose and design, in
·Contradistinction to accident and mischance.
In speaking of the use of a dangerous weapon, and the mode
of using it upon the per on of another, I have spoken of it a
indicating an intention to kill him, or do h'im great bodily harm.
'T he reason is this. Where a man, without justification or excuse,
·causes the death of another by the intentional use of a dangerou-:;
weapon likely to destroy life, he is responsible for the conse·quences, upon the principle already stated, that he is liable for
the natural and probable consequences of his act. Suppose, therefore, for the purpose of r evenge, one fires a pistol at another,
regardless of consequences, intending to kill, maim, or grievously
wound him, as the case may be, without any definite intention
to take his life; yet, if that is the result, the law attr!butes the
same consequences to homicide so committed, as if done under
an a dual and declared purpose to take the life of the party
assailed.
I propose to verify and illustrate these positions, by reading
a few passages from a work of good authority on this subject,
a work already cited at the bar, East's Pleas of the Crown, c 5,
§§ 2, 4, 12, 19, 20.
"Murder is the voluntary killing of any person of malice prepense or aforethought, either express or implied by law; the
ense of which word 'malice is not only confined to a particular
ill-will to the deceased, but is intended to denote, as Mr. Justice
Foster expresses it, an action flowing from a wicked and corrupt
motive, a thing done malo animo, where the fact has been attended
with such circumstances as carry in them the plain indications of
.a heart regardless of ocial duty and fatally bent upon mii::chief.
And therefore malice is implied from any deliberate, cruel act
against another, however sudden." § 2.
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"Manslaughter is principally distinguishable from murder in

this; that though the act which occasions the death be unlawful,

or likely to be attended with bodily mischief, yet the malice, either

express or implied, which is the very essence of murder, is pre-

sumed to be wanting ; and, the act being imputed to the infirmity

of human nature, the correction ordained for it is proportionately

lenient.'' § 4.

''The implication of malice arises in every instance of homicide

amounting, in point of law, to murder; and in every charge of

murder, the fact of killing being first proved, all the circumstances

of accident, necessity, or infirmity, are to be satisfactorily proved

by the prisoner, unless they arise out of the evidence produced

against him." § 12.

"\Alienever death ensues from sudden transport of passion or

heat of blood, if upon a reasonable provocation and without malice,

or if upon sudden combat, it will be manslaughter; if without

such provocation, or the blood has had reasonable time or oppor-

tunity to cool, or there be evidence of express malice, it will be

murcler." § 19.
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"Words of reproach, how grievous soever, are not provocation

sufficient to free the party killing from the guilt of murder;

nor are contemptuous or insulting actions or gestures, without

an assault upon the person; nor is any trespass against lands or

goods. This rule governs every case, where the party killing

upon such provocation made use of a deadly weapon, or otherwise

manifested an intention to kill, or to do some great bodily harm.

But if he had given the other a box on the ear, or had struck him

with a stick, or other weapon not lil-ely to htll, and had unluckily

and against his intention killed him, it had been but man-

slaughter." § 20.

The true nature of manslaughter is, that it is homicide miti-

gated out of tenderness to the frailty of human nature. Every

man, when assailed with violence or great rudeness, is inspired

with a sudden impulse of anger, which puts him upon resistance

before time for cool reflection; and if, during that period, he

attacks his assailant with a weapon likely to endanger life, and

death ensues, it is regarded as done through heat of blood or

violence of anger, and not through malice, or that cold-blooded

desire of revenge which more properly constitutes the feeling,

emotion, or passion of malice.

10

"~fan laughter i principally di ~ tingui hable from murder in
-thi ; that though the act which occa .. ion the death be unlawful,
or likely to be attended with bodil:; mi chief, yet the malice, either
e:xpre or implied, which i the very e ence of murder, i preumed to be wanting; and, th act being imputed to the infirmit ·
of human nature; the correction ordained for it i proportionately
lenient.'
§ 4.
'The implication of malice arise._ in every in tance of homicide
amounting,- in point of law, to murder; and in every charge of
murder, the fact of killing being fir t proved, all the circum tance
of accident, nece . . ity, or infirmity, are to be atisfactorily proved
b:; the pri oner;. unle they ari e out of the evidence produced
against him." ; 19.
"Whenever death en ue from sudden tran port of pas ion or
heat of blood, if upon a reasonable provocation and without rualice,
or if upon udden combat, it will be man laughter; if without
such provocation, or the blood ha had rea onable time or opportunity to cool, or there be e' idence of expre.. malice, it will be
murder." ~ 19.
"\\ ord~ of reproach, how gri vou soever, arP, not provocation
ufficient to free the party killing from the guilt of murder;
nor are contemptuou or insulting action or gesture , without
an a~ a ult upon the person; nor i any tre pas again t lands or
good . This rule governs every case, where the party killing
upon uch provocation made u e of a deadly weapon, or otherwi e
manife ted an intention to kill, or to do some great bodily harm.
But if he had given the other a box on the ear, or had struck him
with a tick, or other weapon not likely to kill, and had unluckily
and again t hi intention killed him, it · had been but manslaughter.:' § 20.
Th true nature of manslaughter i , that it i homicide mitigated out of tenderne to the frailty of human nature. Every
man, when a ailed with violence or great rudenes , i in pired
with a udden impuLe of anger which put him upon re i ~ tance
before time for cool reflection; and if, during that period, h
attack hi,. a ailant with a weapon likely to endanger life, and
death en. ue : it is regarded a done through heat of blood or
violence of anger, and not throuah malic , or that cold-blooded
de ire of reven e which more properl3 con titute the feeling
emotion or pa . . ion of malice.
10
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The same rule applies to homicide in mutual combat, which

is attributed to sudden and violent anger occasioned by the com-

bat, and not to malice. When two meet, not intending to quarrel,

and angry words suddenly arise, and a conflict springs up in which

blows are given on both sides, without much regard to who is the

assailant, it is a mutual combat. And if no unfair advantage is

taken in the outset, and the occasion is not sought for the pur-

pose of gratifying malice, and one seizes a weapon and strikes a

deadly blow, it is regarded as homicide in heat of blood; and

though not excusable, because a man is bound to control his angry

passions, yet it is not the higher offence of murder.

We have stated these distinctions, not because there is much

evidence in the present case which calls for their application,

but that the jury may have a clear and distinct view of the leading

principles in the law of homicide. There seems to have been

little evidence in the present case that the parties had a contest.

There is some evidence tending to show the previous existence of

angry feelings; but unless these feelings resulted in angry words,

and words were followed by blows, there would be no proof of
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heat of blood in mutual combat, or under provocation of an

assault, on the one side or the other ; and the proof of the defend-

ant's declarations, as to the circumstances under which the parties

met and parted, as far as they go, repel the supposition of such

a contest.

With these views of the law of homicide, we will proceed to

the further consideration of the present case. The prisoner at the

bar is charged with the wilful murder of Dr. George Parkman.

This charge divides itself into two principal questions, to be

resolved by the proof: first, whether the party alleged to have

been murdered came to his death by an act of violence inflicted

by any person; and if so, secondly, whether the act was com-

mitted by the accused.

Under the first head we are to inquire and ascertain, whether

the party alleged to have been slain is actually dead; and, if so,

whether the evidence is such as to exclude, beyond reasonable

doubt, the supposition that such death was occasioned by acci-

dent or suicide, and to show that it must have been the result

of an act of violence.

When the dead body of a person is found, whose life seems to

have been destroyed by violence, three questions naturally arise.

The same rule applies to homicide in mutual combat, which
is attributed to sudden and violent anger occasioned by the combat, and not to malice. When two meet, not intending to quarrel,
and angry words suddenly arise, and a conflict springs up in which
blows are given on both sides, without much regard to who is the
assailant, it is a mutual combat. And if no unfair advantage is
taken in the outset, and the occasion is not sought for the purpose of gratifying malice, and one seizes a weapon and strikes a
deadly blow, it is regarded as homicide in heat of blood; ancl
though not excusable, because a man is bound to control his angry
pa ions, yet it is not the higher offence of murder.
We have stated these distinctions, not because ther.e is much
evidence in the present case which calls for their application,
but that the jury may have a clear and distinct view of the leading
principles in the law of homicide. There seems to have been
little evidence in the present case that the parties had a contest.
There is some evidence tending to show the previous existence of
angry feelings ; but unless these feelings resulted in angry words,
and words were followed by blows, there would be no proof of
heat of blood in mutual combat, or under provocation of an
as ault, on the one ide or the other; and the proof of the defendant's declarations: as to the circumstances under which the parties
met and parted, as fa r as they go, repel the supposition of such
a contest.
With thes~ views of the law of homicide, we will proceed to
the further consideration of the present case. The prisoner at the
bar is charged with the wilful murder of Dr. George Parkman.
This charge divides itself into two principal questions, to be
resolved by the proof: first, whether the party alleged to have
been murdered came to hi death by an ad of violence inflicted
by any person; and if so, secondly, whether the act was committed by the accused.
Under the first head we are to inquire and ascertain, whether
the party alleged to have been slain is actually dead; and, if so,
whether the evidence is such as to exclude, beyond reasonable
doubt, the supposition that such death was occasioned by accident or suicide, and to show that it must have been the re ult
of an act of violence.
When the dead body of a person is found, whose life seems to
have been destroyed by violence, three questions naturally arise
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Or was it caused by violence inflicted on him by others? In

most instances, there are facts and circumstances surrounding

the case, which, taken in connection with the age, character, and

relations of the deceased, will put this beyond doubt. It is with

a view to this, and in consequence of the high value which the

law places upon the life of every individual under its protection,

that provision is made for a prompt inquiry into such cases, prior

to any question of guilt or innocence. The high and anxious

regard of the law, for the protection and security of the life of

the subject, pervades its whole system; and that upon the prin-

ciples of simple humanity, without reference to the condition or

circumstances of individuals. Indeed, you must have perceived,

from the whole course of this trial, the extreme tenderness of the

law for the rights of human life; as well as the life of the de-

ceased, whose death is the subject of this trial, as that of the

prisoner, whose own life is put in jeopardy by it. Hence, in case

of a sudden and violent death, a coroner's inquest is provided, in

order to an inquiry into its true cause, whilst the facts are recent,
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and the circumstances unchanged. If, on such an inquiry, made

by an officer appointed for the purpose, and by a jury acting upon

evidence given on oath, it satisfactorily appears that the deceased

came to his death by accident or a visitation of providence, the

result will have a strong tendency to allay unjustifiable suspicion,

and to satisfy and tranquillize the feelings of the vicinity and of

the community at large, always deeply interested in such an event.

But if, as in the present case, the result of such an early inquiry

tends to fasten suspicion on any individual as the guilty cause,,

then it naturally leads to other proceedings which may vindicate

the law, and l:)ring the suspected party to trial, and, if found

guilty, to punislimcnt.

The importance of this inquiry into the circumstances of a

supposed violent death, and of collecting and preserving the proofs

of them, will appear from the further consideration of the present

case. It is one where the first important and leading fact, proved

by uncontested evidence, is, that the person alleged to have been

slain, Dr. Parkman, suddenly disappeared from his family and

home on Friday the 23d of November last, without any caiTse

known to them, and was never afterwards seen. The theory upon

which the prosecution is founded, and to establish which evidence.

Did he destroy hi own life? Was his death cau e'd by accident?
Or wa it cau ed by violence inflicted on him by others? In
mo t instance , there are fa t and circum tance urrounding
the case, which, taken in connection with the age, character, and
relations of the decea ed, will put this beyond doubt. It i with
a view to this, and in consequence of the high value which the
law places upon the life of every individual under its protection,
that provision is made for a prompt inquirv into such case , prior
to any question of guilt or innocence. The high and anxious
regard of the law, for the protection and security of the life of
the subject, pervades it whole system; and that upon the principles of simple humanity, without r efer nee to the condition or
circum ·tance of individuals. Indeed, you must have perceived,
from the whole course of this trial, the extreme tenderness of the
law for the rights of human life; as well as the life of the deceased, whose death is the subject of this trial, as that of the
prisoner, whose own life is put in jeopardy by it. Hence, in case
of a sudden and violent death, a coroner' inquest is provided, in
order to an inquiry into it tru cause, whilst the facts are recent,
and the circum<:::tances unchanged. If, on such an inquiry, madC"
by an officer appointed for the purpose, and by a jury acting upon
ev idence gjven on oath, it sati factorily appears that the deceased
came to his death by accident or a visitation of providence, the
re ult will have a strong tendency to allay unjustifiable su pi ion,
and to sati fy and tranquillize the feelings of the vicinity and of
the community at large, always deeply interested in such an event.
But if, as in the present case, th result of such an early inquiry
tend to fasten su picion on any individual as the guilty cause,.
then it naturally lead to other proceedings which may vindicate
the law, and bring the suspected party to trial, and, if found
guiltv, to puni ·hment.
The importanc of this inquiry into the circumstance of a
uppo ed violent death, and of collecting and preserving the proofs
of them, will appear from the further consideration of the present
ca . . e. It is one where the first important and leading fact, proved
by uncontested evidence, is, that the person alleged to have been
lain, Dr. Parkman, suddenly disappeared from his family ancl
home on Friday the 23d of ovember last, without any cau
known to them, and wa nev r afterwards e n. The th ory upon
which th e pro cution i, founded, and to establi h which vid n .
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has been laid before you, is, that he was deprived of life in the

afternoon of the day mentioned, under such circumstances as lead

to a strong belief, that his death was caused by an act of violence

and by human agency.

This case is to be proved, if proved at all, by circumstantial

evidence; because it is not suggested that any direct evidence

can be given, or that any witness can be called to give direct testi-

mon}^, upon the main fact of the killing. It becomes important,

therefore, to state what circumstantial evidence is; to point out

the distinction between that and positive or direct evidence; and

to give some idea of the mode in wbich a judicial investigation is

to be pursued b}^ the aid of circumstantial evidence.

The distinction, then, between direct and circumstantial evi-

dence, is this. Direct or positive evidence is when a witness can

be called to testify to the precise fact which is the subject of the

issue on trial ; that is, in a case of homicide, that the party accused

did cause the death of the deceased. Whatever may be the kind

or force of the evidence, this is the fact to be proved. But suppose

no person was present on the occasion of the death, and of course
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that no one can be called to testify to it; is it wholly unsuscepti-

ble of legal proof? Experience has shown that circumstantial

evidence m-ay be offered in such a case ; that is, that a body of facts

may be proved of so conclusive a character, as to warrant a firm

belief of the fact, quite as strong and certain as that on which

discreet men are accustomed to act, in relation to their most im-

portant concerns. It would be injurious to the best interests of

society, if such proof could not avail in judicial proceedings. If

it was necessary always to have positive evidence, how many crim-

inal acts committed in the community, destructive of its peace

and subversive of its order and security, would go wholly unde-

tected and unpunished?

The necessity, therefore, of resorting to circumstantial evidence,

if it is a safe and reliable proceeding, is obvious and absolute.

Crimes are secret. Most men, conscious of criminal purposes, and

about' the execution of criminal acts, seek the security of secrecy

and darkness. It is therefore necessary to use all other modes

of evidence besides that of direct testimony, provided such proofs

may be relied on as leading to safe and satisfactory conclusions ;

and, thanks to a beneficent providence, the laws of nature and the

relations of things to each other are so linked and coml)ined to-

has been laid before you, is, that he was deprived of life in the
afternoon of the day mentioned, under such circumstances as lead
to a strong belief, that his death was caused by an act of violence
and by human agency.
This case is to be proved, if proved at all, by circumstantial
evidence; because it is not suggested that any direct evidence
can be given, or that any witness can be callecl to give direct te timony, upon the main fact of the killing. It becomes important,
therefore, to . Jat e what circumstantial evidence is; to point out
the distinction between that and positive or direct evidence ; and
to give some idea of the mode in which a judicial investigation is
to be pursued by the aid of circum tantial evidence.
The distinction, then, between direct and circumstantial evidence, is this. Direct or positive evidence is when a witness can
be called to testify to the precise fact which is the subject of the
issue on trial; that is, in a case of homicide, that the party accused
did cause the death of the deceased. Whatever may be the kind
or force of the evidence, this is the fact to be proved. But suppose
no person was present on the occasion of the death, and of course
that no one can be called to testify to it; is it wholly unsusceptible of legal proof? Experience bas shown that circumstantial
evidence may he offered in such a ca e ; that is, that a body of fact·
may be proved of so conclusive a character, as to warrant a firm
belief of the fact, quite as strong and certain as that on which
discreet men are accustomed to act_, in relation to their most important concerns. It would be injurious to the best interests of
society, if such proof could not avail in judicial proceedings. If
it was n ecessary alway. to have positive evidence, how many criminal acts committed in the community, destructive of its peace
and subversive of its order and security, wollld go wholly undetected and unpunished?
The necessity, therefore, of resorting to circumstantial evidence,
if it is a safe and reliable proceeding, is obvious and absolute.
Crimes are secret. Most men, conscious of criminal purpose', and
abouf the execution of criminal acts, seek the security of secrecy
and darkne s. It is therefore necessary to use all other mode"
of evidence besid s that of direct te timony, provided such proof...
1nay be relied on as leading to safe and satisfactory conclusions;
~rnd, thanks to a beneficent providence, the laws of nature and the
r elations of things to each other are o linked and combined to-
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gether, that a medium of proof is often thereby furnished, leading

to inferences and conclusions as strong as those arising from

direct testimony.

On this subject, I will once more ask attention to a remark in

the work already cited, East's Pleas of the Crown, c 5,^ 11. "Per-

haps," he says, "strong circumstantial evidence, in cases of crimes

like this, committed for the most part in secret, is the most satis-

factory of any from Avhence to draw the conclusion of guilt; for

men may be seduced to perjury by many base motives, to which

the secret nature of the offence may sometimes afford a tempta-

tion; but it can scarcely happen that many circumstances, espe-

cially if they be such over which the accuser could have no control,

forming together the links of a transaction, should all unfor-

tunately concur to fix the presumption of guilt on an individual,

and yet such a conclusion be erroneous."

Each of these modes of proof has its advantages and disad-

vantages; it is not easy to compare their relative value. The

advantage of positive evidence is, that it is the direct testimony

of a witness to the fact to be proved, who, if he speaks the truth,
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saw it done, and the only question is, whether he is entitled to

belief. The disadvantage is, that the witness may be false and

corrupt, and that the case may not afford the means of detecting

his falsehood.

But, in a case of circumstantial evidence where no witness can

testify directly to the fact to be proved, it is arrived at by a series

of other facts, which by experience have been found so associated

with the fact in question, that in the relation of cause and effect,

they lead to a satisfactory and certain conclusion; as when foot-

prints are discovered after a recent snow, it is certain that some

animated being has passed over the snow since it fell ; and, from

the form and number of the footprints, it can be determined with

equal certainty, whether they are those of a man, a bird, or a,

quadruped. Circumstantial evidence, therefore, is founded on ex-

perience and observed facts and coincidences, establishing a con-

nection between the known and nroved facts and the fact sought

to bo proved. The advantages are, that, as the evidence commonly

eomes from several witnesses and different sources, a chain of cir-

cumstances is less likely to be falsely prepared and arranged, and

falsehood and perjury are more likely to be detected and fail of

their purpose. The disadvantages are, that a jury has not only to

gether, that a medium of proof i often th reby furni hed, leading
to inferences and conclusions as strong as those arising from
direct testimony.
On this subj ect, I will once more a k attention to a remark in
the work already cited, East's Pleas of the Crown, c 5, § 11. "Perhaps," he says, "strong circumstantial evidence, in cases of crimes
like this, committed for the most part in secret, is the most sati~
factory of any from whence to draw the conclusion of guilt; for
men may be seduced to perjury by many base motiv s, to which
the secret nature of the offence may sometime afford a temptation; but it can scarcely happen that many circumstances, especially if they be such over which the aecuser could have no control,
forming together the links of a transaction, should all unfortunately concur to fix the presumption of guilt on an individual,
and yet such a conclusion be erroneous."
Each of these modes of proof has its advantages and disadvantages; it is not easy to compare their relative value. The
advantage of positive evidence is, that it is the direct testimony
of a witness to the fact to be proved, who, if he speaks the truth~
saw it done, and the only question is, whether he is entitled to
belief. The disadvantage is, that the witness may be false and
corrupt, and that the ca e may not afford the means of detecting
his fal ehood.
But, in a case of circumstantial evidence where no witness can
testify directly to the fact to be proved, it is arrived at by a serieq
of other facts, which by experience have b en found so associated
with the fact in question, that in the relation of cause and effect,,
they lead to a satisfactory and certain conclusion; as when footprints are discovered after a recent snow, it i certain that some
animated being has passed over the snow since it fell; and, from
the form and number of the footprints, it can be determined with
equal certainty, whether they are tho e of a man, a bird, or a
quadruped. Circumstantial evidence, therefore, is found cl on experience and ob erved facts and coin ·idenc s, e tablishing a connection between the known and proved facts and the fact e:tought
to be proved. The advantages are, that, as the evidence commonly
come from several witnesses and cliff rent sources, a chain of cirum tances i ... le ·s likely to be fal ely pr pared and arranged, and
falsehoo<l and p rjury ar more likely to be dct ct d and fail o E
their purpose. The disadvantages are, that a jury ha not only to
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weigh the evidence of facts, but to draw just conclusions from

them; in doing which, they may be led by prejudice or partiality,

or by want of due deliberation and sobriety of judgment, to make

hasty and false deductions; a source of error not existing in the

consideration of positive evidence.

From this view, it is manifest, that great care and caution

ought to be used in drawing inferences from proved facts. It

must be a fair and natural, and not a forced or artificial conclu-

sion; as when a house is found to have been plundered, and there

are indications of force and violence upon the windows and shut-

ters, the inference is that the house was broken open, and that

the persons who Ijroke open the house plundered the property.

It has sometimes ])een enacted by positive law, that certain facts

proved shall be held to l)e evidence of another fact; as where it

is provided by statute, that if the mother of a bastard child gives

no notice of its expected birth and is delivered in secret, and

afterwards is found with the child dead, it shall be presumed that

it was born alive and that she killed it. This is a forced and not

a natural presumption, prescribed by positive law, and not con-
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formable to the rule of the common law. The common law appeals

to the plain dictates of common experience and sound judgment;

and the inference to be drawn from the facts must be a reasonable

and natural one, and, to a moral certainty, a certain one. It is

not sufficient that it is probable only; it must be reasonably and

morally certain.

The next consideration is, that each fact which is necessary

to the conclusion must be distinctly and independently proved

by competent evidence. I say, every fact necessary to the con-

clusion; because it may and often does happen, that, in making

out a case on circumstantial evidence, many facts are given in

evidence, not because they are necessary to the conclusion sought

to be proved, but to show that they are consistent with it and

not repugnant, and go to rebut any contrary presumption. As in

the present case, it was testified by a witness, that, the day

before the alleged homicide, he saw Dr. Parkman riding through

Cambridge and inquiring for Dr. Webster's house; this evidence

had a slight tendency to show that he was then urgently pressing

his claim; but not being necessary to the establishment of the

main fact, if the witness was mistaken in the time or in the fact

itself, such failure of proof would not prevent the inference from

weigh the evidence of fact , but to draw just conclusion from
them; in doing which, they may be led by prejudice or partiality,
or hy want of due deliberation and sobriety of judgment, to make
hasty and false J eductions; a source of error not exi ting in the
consideration 0£ positive evidence.
From this Yicw, it is manifest, that great care and caution
ought to be used in drawing inf rence from proved facts . It
must be a fair and natural; and not a forced or artificial conclusion; as when a house is found to have been plundered, and there
are indications of force and violence upon the windows and shutt er , the inference i that the house was broken open, and that
the persons ·who broke open the hou e plundered the property.
It has sometime heen enact d by po itive law, that certain fact
proved shall be held to be evidence of another fact; as where it
is provided by statute, that if the mother of a bastard child gives
no notice of its expected birth and i delivered in secret, and
afterwards is found with the child dead, it shall be presumed that
it was born ahve and that she killed it. Thi· i a forced and not
a natural presumption, prescribed by positive law, and not conformable to the rule of the common law. Th common law appeal
to the plain dictates of common experience and sound judgment;
and the inference to be drawn from the facts must be a reasonable
and natural one, and, to a moral certainty, a certain one. It i
not sufficient that it is probable only _; it mu t be Teasonably and
morally certain.
The next consideTation is, that each fact whi ~h is neces ary
to the conclusion must be distinctly and independently proved
by competent evidence. I say, every fact nee ssary to the conclu ion; because it may and often doe happen, that, in making
out a case on circumstantial evidence, many fact are given in
evidence, not because they are necessary to the conclusion sought
to be proved but to show that they are con i tent with it ancl
not repugnant, and go to rebut any contrary presumption. As in
the present case, it was testified by a witness, that, the day
before the alleged homicide, he saw Dr. Parkman riding tl1rough
Cambridge and inquiring for Dr. Web ter' house; this evidence
had a slight tendency to show that he was then urgently pressing
hi claim; but not being necessary to the e tablishment of the
main fact, if th e witnes was mi taken in the time or in the fact
itself, such failure of proof would not prevent the inference from
1
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other facts, if of themselves sufficient to warrant it. The failure

of such proof does not destroy tlie chain of evidence; it only fails

to give it that 2:)articular corroboration, which the fact, if proved,

might afford.

So to take another instance arising out of the evidence in the

present case. The fact of the identity of the body of the deceased

with that of the dead body, parts of which were found at the med-

ical college, is a material fact, necessary to be established by the

proof. Some evidence has been offered, tending to show, that the

shape, size, height, and other particulars respecting the body, parts

of which were found and put together, would correspond with

those of the deceased. But inasmuch as these particulars would

also correspond with those of many other persons in the com-

munity, the proof would be equivocal and fail in the character

of conclusiveness upon the point of identity. But other evidence

was then offered, respecting certain teeth found in the furnace,

designed to show that they were the identical teeth prepared and

fitted for Dr. Parkman. ISTow, if this latter fact is satisfactorily

proved, and if it is further proved to a reasonable certainty, that
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the limbs found in the vault and the burnt remains found in the

furnace were parts of one and the same dead body, this would be

a coincidence of a conclusive nature to prove the point sought to

be established; namely, the fact of identity. Wh}', then, it may

be asked, is the evidence of height, shape, and figure of the remains

found, given at all? The answer is, because it is proof of a fact

not repugnant to that of identity, but consistent with it, and may

tend to rebut any presumption that the remains were those of any

other person; and therefore, to some extent, aid the proof of identi-

fication. The conclusion must rest upon a basis of facts proved,

and must be the fair and reasonable conclusion from all such

facts taken together.

The relations and coincidences of facts with each other from

which reasonable inferences may be drawn, are some of a physical

or mechanical, and others of a moral nature. Of the former, some

are so decisive as to leave no doubt; as where human footprints

are found on the snow (to use an illustration already adduced),

the conclusion is certain, that a person has passed there; because

we know, by experience, that that is the mode in which such foot-

prints are made. A man is found dead, with a dagger-wound in

his breast; this being the fact proved, the conclusion is, that his

oth r fact , if of them efres ufficient to warrant it. The failure
of uch proof doe not de troy the chain of e1idence; it only fail
to give it that particular corroboration whi h the fact, if proved,
might afford.
o to take another instance ari ing out of the evidence in the
pre ent ca~e. The fact of th identity of the body of the decea ed
with that of the dead body, part of which were found at thr medical college, i a material fact, nece ary to be e tabli hed b · the
proof. Some evidence ha been offered, tending to .. how that the
hape, ize, height, and other particular re pecting the bod3, part
of which were found and put together would corre pond with
tho e of the deceased. But ina much a the e particular would
also corre pond with tho e of man3 other per on in the community, the proof would be equivocal and fail in the haracter
of conclusivene upon the point of identity. But oth r e1idence
was then offered, respecting certain teeth found in the furnace,
designed to how that they were the identical teeth prepared and
fitted for Dr. Parkman. Now, if this latter fact is sati factorily
proved, and if it i further proved to a rea ... onable certainty, that
-the limb. found in the vault and the burnt r main found in the
furnace were part of one and the same dead body, thi would be
a coincidence of a conclusive nature to prove the point ought to
be e tablished; namel3, the fact of identit3. \\hy, then it may
be a ked, i the evidence of height, shape, and figure of the remains
found, given at all? The an wer i , becau e it i proof of a fact
not repugnant to that of identity, but consistent with it, ancl may
tend to rebut an3 presumption that the remains were tho e of any
other per on; and therefore, to . ome extent, aid the proof of identification. The conclu ~ ion mu t re t upon a ba"i. of fact pro1ed,
and mu t be the fair and reasonable conclu ion from all uch
fact taken together.
The relation and coincidence of fact with each other from
whi h reasonable inferences may be drawn ar ome of a phy ical
or mechanical, and others of a moral nature. Of the former: ome
ar o deci i ve a to leave no doubt; a where human footprint.
are found on th ~ now (to u an illu tration already adduced),
the onclu~ion i" certain, that a p r on ha pa ed there; becau
we know, by experience, that that i the mod in which uch footprint are made.
man i found dead, with a dagger-woun 1 in
li.i brea t; thi .. being the fact proved, th onclu ion i that hi
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death was caused by that wound, because we know that it is an

adequate cause of death, and no other cause is apparent.

We may also take an instance or two from actual trials. A

recent case occurred in this court, where one was indicted for

murder by stabbing the deceased in the heart, with a dirk-knife.

There was evidence tending to show that the prisoner had posses-

sion of such a knife on the day of the homicide. On the next

morning, the handle of a knife, with a small portion of the blade

remaining, was found in an open cellar, near the spot. Afterwards,

upon a post moi-tem examination of the deceased, the blade of a

knife was found broken in his heart, causing a wound in its

nature mortal. Some of the witnesses testified to the identity of

the handle, as that of the knife previously in the possession of the

accused. Xo one, probably, could testify to the identity of the

blade. The question, therefore, still remained, whether that blade

belonged to that handle. Xow, when these pieces came to be

placed together, the toothed edges of the fracture so exactly fitted

each other, that no person could doubt that they had belonged

togetlier; because, from the known qualities of steel, two knives
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conld not have been ])roken in such a manner as to produce edges

that v/ould so precisely match.

So, an instance is mentioned of a trial before lord Eldon, when

a common-law judge, where the charge was of murder with a

pistol. There was much evidence tending to show that the ac-

cused was near the place at the time, and raising strong suspicions

that he was the person who fired the pistol; but it fell short of

being conclusive, — of fastening the charge upon the accused. The

surgeon had stated in his testimony, that the pistol must have

been fired near the body, because the body was blackened, and the

wad found in the wound. It was asked, by the judge, if he had

preserved that wad; he said he had. but had not examined it. On

being requested to do so, he unrolled it carefully, and on an ex-

amination it was found to consist of paper, constituting part of

a printed ballad; and the corresponding part of the same ballad, —

as shown by the texture of the paper and the purport and form of

stanza of the two portions, — was found in the pocket of the ac-

cused. This tended to identify the defendant as the person who

loaded and fired the pistol.

These are cases where the conclusion is drawn from known

relations and coincidences of a physical character. But there are

death was caused by that wound, because we know that it i an
adequate cause of death, and no other cause is apparent.
We may also take an instance or two from actual trials. A
recent case occurred in thi court, wher one was indicted for
murder by stabbing the deceased in the heart, with a dirk-knife~
There was evidence tending to sho1-v that the pri oner had po e sion of such a knife on the day of the homicide. On the next
morning, the handle of a knife, with a small po~tion of the blade
remaining, wa found in an open cellar, near the pot. Afterwards,
upon a post nw1·tem examination of the deceased, the blade of a
knife was found broken in hi heart, causing a wound in it
nature mortal. Some of the witnesses te tified to the identity of
the handle, a ~ that of the knife previously in the pos ession of the
accuse 1. No one, probably, could testify to the identity of the
blade. The question, therefore, still remained, whether that blade
belonged to that handle. Row, when these piece came to be
placed together, the tcothed edges of the fracture o exactly fitted
each other, that no perRon could doubt that they had belonged
together; becan"'e, from the known qualities of teel, two kni ve,
conld not have been broken in uch a manner as to produce edge ..
that would o precisely match.
So, an instance is mentioned of a trial before lord Eldon; when
a common-law judge, where the charge was of murder with a
pi tol. There wa much evidence tending to how that -the accused was near the place at the time, and raising trong u picion
that he was the person who fired the pistol ; but it fell short oi
being conclusive,-of fa tening the charge upon the accused. Thcsurgeon had stated in hi testimony, that the pi tol must have
been fired near the body, because the body was blackened, aml the
wad found in the wound. It was asked, by the judge, if he had
preserved that wad; he said he had. bnt had not examined it. On
being requested to do ~ o, he unrolled it carefully, and on an examination it wa found to consi t of paper, con tituting part of
a printed ballad; and the corresponding part of the same bal1ad,as shown by the texture of the paper and the purport and form oi
shrnza of the two portions,-wa found in the pocket of the accused. This tended to identify the defendant a the person who
loaded and fired the pi tol.
Thes are ca ~ cs where the conclu ion is drawn from known
relation and oincidences of a phy ical character. But there are
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tho?e of a moral nature, from which conclusions may as legiti-

mately be drawn. The ordinary feelings, passions, and propensities

under which parties act, are facts known by observation and ex-

perience; and they are so uniform in their operation, that a

conclusion may be safely drawn, that if a person acts in a par-

ticular manner he does so under the influence of a particular

motive. Indeed, this is the only mode in which a large class of

crimes can be proved. I mean crimes, which consist not merely

in an act done, but in the motive and intent with which they are

done. But this intent is a secret of the heart, which can only be

directly known to the searcher of all hearts; and if the accused

makes no declaration on the subject, and chooses to keep his own

secret, which he is likely to do if his purposes are criminal, such

criminal intent may be inferred, and often is safely inferred, from

his conduct and external acts.

A few other general remarks occur to me upon this subject,

which I will submit to your consideration. "WTiere, for instance,

probable proof is brought of a state of facts tending to criminate

the accused, the absence of evidence tending to a contrary con-
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clusion is to be considered, — though not alone entitled to much

weight; because the burden of proof lies on the accuser to make

out the whole case by substantive evidence. But when pretty

stringent proof of circumstances is produced, tending to support

the charge, and it is apparent that the accused is so situated that

he could offer evidence of all the facts and circumstances as they

existed, and show, if such was the truth, that the suspicious cir-

cumstances can be accounted for consistently with his innocence,

and he fails to offer such proof, the natural conclusion is, that

the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting, would tend to sustain

the charge. But this is to be cautiously applied, and only in

cases where it is manifest that proofs are in the power of the

accused, not accessible to the prosecution.

To the same head may be referred all attempts on the part

of the accused to suppress evidence, to suggest false and decep-

tive explanations, and to cast suspicion, without just cause, on

other persons: all or any of which tend somewhat to prove con-

sciousness of guilt, and, when proved, to exert an influence against

the accused. But this consideration is not to be pressed too

urgently; because an innocent man, when placed by circumstances

in a condition of suspicion and danger, may resort to deception

tho. e of a moral nature, from which conclu ion may a legitimate! be drawn. The ordinar feeling , pa ion, and propen itie
under which partie act, are fact known b.) ob ervation and xperience; and they are o uniform in their operation, that a
conclu ion may be ,afely drawn, that if a per on act in a particular manner he doe o under the influence of a particular
motive. Indeed, thi i the only mode in which a large cla.., of
crime can be proved. I mean crime , which con i t not merel ,.
in an act done, but in the motive and intent with which they ar
done. But thi intent i a secret of the heart, which can only b
directl known to the earcher of all heart ; and if the accu ed
make no declaration on the subject, and choo e to keep hi own
ecret, which he i likely to do if hi purpo e are criminal; uch
criminal intent rnav be inferred, and often i afelv inferred, from
hi conduct and external act .
.A few other general remark occur to me upon thi ubject,
which I will submit to your con ideration. "Where, for instance,
probable proof i brought of a state of fact tending to criminate
the accu ed, the ab ence of evidence tending to a contrary conclu ion i to be con idered,-though not alone entitled to much
weight; becau e the burden of proof lie on the accuser to make
out the whole ca e by sub tantive evidence. But when pretty
tringent proof of circum tance i produced, tending to upport
the charge, and it i apparent that the accu ed i so ituated that
he could offer evidence of all the facts and circum tance a;:; they
existed, and . how, if such wa the truth, that the su piciou circum tances can be accounted for consi tently with hi innocence,
and he fail to offer . uch proof, the natural conclu ion i , that
the proof if produced, in ... tBad of rebutting, would tend to uutain
the charge. But thi . . i to be autiou ly applied, and on]y in
ca e where it i manife . . t that proof are in the power of the
accu ed, not acce ~ ible to the pro ecution.
To the ame head may be referred all attempt on the part
of the accu ed to uppre ~ vidence, to ugge t fal e and deceptive explanation , and to ca . . t u...,picion, without ju t cau e on
other p r on : all or any of which tend omewhat to prove con,ciou nes of guilt, and, when proved to exert an influence again t
the accu ed. But thi on ideration i not to be pre ed too
urgently· becau e an innocent man, when placed by circum tan ~
in a condition of u picion and danger mav r ort to dee pti n
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in the hope of avoiding the force of such proofs. Sucli was the

case often mentioned in the books, and cited here yesterday, of

a man convicted of the murder of his niece, who had suddenly

disappeared under circumstances which created a strong sus-

picion that she was murdered. He attempted to impose on the

court by presenting another girl as the niece. The deception was

discovered and naturally operated against him, though the actual

appearance of the niece alive, afterwards, proved conclusively that

he was not guilty of the murder.

One other general remark on the subject of circumstantial evi-

dence is this; that inferences drawn from independent sources,

different from each other, but tending to the same conclusion, not

only support each other, Imt do so with an increased weight. To

illustrate this, suppose the case just mentioned of the wad of a

pistol consisting of part of a ballad, the other part being in the

pocket of the accused; it is not absolutely conclusive, that the

accused loaded and wadded the pistol himself; he might have

picked up the piece of paper in the street. But suppose that l)y

another and independent witnecs it were proved, that that indi-
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vidual purchased such a ballad at his shop; and further, from

another witness, that ho purchased such a pistol at another shop.

Here are circumstances from different and independent sources,

bearing upon the same conclusion, to wit, that the accused loaded

and used the pistol ; and they, therefore, have an increased weight

in establishing the proof of the fact.

I will conclude what I have to say on this subject, by a refer-

ence to a few obvious and well-established rules, suggested by

experience, to be applied to the reception and effect of circumstan-

tial evidence.

The first is, that the several circumstances upon which the

conclusion depends must be fully established by proof. They are

facts from which the main fact is to be inferred; and they are to

be proved by competent evidence, and by the same weight and

force of evidence, as if each one were itself the main fact in issue.

Under this rule^ every circumstance relied upon as material is to

be brought to the test of strict proof ; and great care is to be taken

in guarding against feigned and pretended circumstances, which

may bo designedly contrived and arranged, so as to create or divert

suspicion and prevent the discovery of tlie truth. These, by care

and vigilance, may generally be detected, because things are so

in the hope of avoiding the force of uch proofs. Such was the
case often mentioned in the books, and cited here }'e t erday, of
a man convicted of the murder of his niece, who had suddenly
disappeared under circumstance which created a trong suspicion that she was murdered. H e attempted to impose on the
court by presenting another girl as the niece. The deception wai::,
discovered and naturally operated again t him, though the actual
appearance of the niece alive, afterward , proved conclusively that
he was not guilty of the murder.
One other general remark on the subject of circumstantial vidence is this; that inferences drawn from independent sources,
different from each other., but t ending to the ame conclusion, not
only support each other, but do so with an increased weight. To
illustrate this, uppose the ca e ju t mentioned of the wad of a
pistol consisting of part of a ballad, t he other part being in the
}Jocket of the accused _; it is not ab olutely conclu ive, that the
.accused loaded and wadded the pistol himself; he might have
picked up the piece of paper in the street. But suppose that by
another and independent witne" it were proved, that that individual purchased such a ballad at his shop; and further, from
another witne s, that he purchased such a pistol at another hop.
H ere are circum tance from different and independent source ,
bearing upon the same conclusion, to wit, that the accused loaded
and u ed the pi tol; and they therefore, have an increa sed weight
in establishing the proof of the fact.
I will conclude what I have to say on this subject, by a reference to a few obvious and well-established rules, suggested by
experience; to be applied to the reception and effect of ircumstantial evidence .
.The :first is, that tbe several circumstances upon which the
conclusion depend mu t be fully established by proof. They are
facts from which the main fact i to be inferred; and they are to
be proved by competent evidence, and by the same weight and
force of evidence, as if each one were it elf the main fact in is ue.
Under thi rule) every circumstance relied upon as material is to
be brought to the test of ~ trict proof; and great care is to be taken
i11 gi..rn rdin ~ against fe igned and pretended circum tances, which
may ; >~ 1k. ignec1ly contrived and arranged. so a to create or divert
uspicion and prevent the discovery of the truth. These, by care
am1 vigilance, may generally be detected, becau e thing are o
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ordered by providence, — events and their incidents are so combined

and linked together, — that real occurrences leave behind them ves-

tiges by which, if carefully followed, the true character of the

occurrences themselves may be discovered. A familiar instance

is, where a person has been slain by the hands of others, and

circumstances are so arranged as to make it appear that the de-

ceased committed suicide. In a case recorded as having actually

occurred, the print of a bloody hand was discovered on the deceased.

On examination, however, it was the print of a left hand upon

the left hand of the deceased. It being impossible that this

should have been occasioned by the deceased herself, the print

proved the presence and agency of a third person, and excluded

the supposition of suicide. So where a person was found dead,

shot by a pistol-l)all, and a pistol belonging to himself was found

in his hand, apparently just discharged; indicating death by

suicide. Upon further examination, it appearing that the ball

which caused the mortal wound was too large for that pistol, the

conclusion was inevitable, that suicide in the mode suggested must

have been impossible.
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The next rule to which I ask attention is, that all the facts

proved must be consistent with each other, and with the main

fact sought to be proved. When a fact has occurred, with a series

of circumstances preceding, accompanying, and following it, we

know that these must all have been once consistent with each other ;

otherwise the fact would not have been possible. Therefore, if

any one fact necessary to the conclusion is wholly inconsistent

with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, it breaks the chain

of circumstantial evidence upon which the inference depends;

and, however plausible or apparently conclusive the other cir-

cumstances may be, the charge must fail.

Of this character is the defence usually called an alibi; that

is, that the accused was elsewhere at the time the offence is alleged

to have been committed. If this is true, — it being impossible that

the accused should be in two places at the same time, — it is a

fact inconsistent with that sought to be proved, and excludes its

possibility.

This is a defence often attempted by contrivance, subornation,

and perjurv. The proof, therefore, offered to sustain it, is to be

subjected to a rigid scrutiny, liccause, without attempting to con-

trol or rel)ut the evidence of facts sustaining tbc charge, it attempts

ordered by providence,-event and their in id nt are o ombin cl
and linked together -that real occurrence leav behind th m vestige by which if carefull3 followed the true character of the
cccurrenc th rn el v may be di covered. A familiar in.. an c
i .' where a per on ha been lain by the hand of other.._ and
circurn . Jance are o arranged a to make it appear that the cl cea ed committed uicide. In a caEe recorded a having actually
occurred, the print of a blood3 hand wa di covered on thG decea...,ed.
On examination, however, it wa the print of a left hand upon
the left han':1 of the decea ed. It being impo ~ ible that thi~
hould have been occa ioned by the decea eel her elf, the print
proved the presence and agency of a third per on, and excluded
the uppo._iti0n of . _ uicide.
o where a per on wa found dead
hot by a pi:::tol-ball, and a pi tol belonging to him elf wa found
in hi hand, apparentl3 ju t di charged; indicating death by
uicide.
pon further examination, it appearing that the ball
which cau eel the mortal wound wa . too large for that pi . . tol, the
conr.lusiou was inevitable, that suicide in the mode sugge ted mu t
have been impo sible.
The next rule to which I a k attention i that all the fact
proved mu..,t be con i tent with each other,. and with the main
fact ought to be proved. V\ hen a fact ha occurred, with a serie~}
-0f circum tance~ preceding, accompanying and following it, wc
know that the emu t all have been once con i tent with each other;
otherwi e the fact would not have been po ible. Therefore, if
any one fact neces ary to the conclu ion i wholly inconsistent
with the hypothe is of the guilt of the accu ed, it break the chain
of circum 'tantial evidence upon which the inference depend .. ;
.and, however plau ible or apparently conclu ive the other circum tance may be, the charge mu t fail.
Of thi character i the defence u ually called an alibi _
; that
i , that the accu ~e d wa elsewhere at the time the offence L alleged
to have be n committed. If thi i true,-it b ing impo sible that
the accu eel hould be in two place at the ame time,-it i a
fact in.con i tent with that sought to be proved, and exclude it ·
po ibility.
Thi i a d fen e often attempted by contrivance, ubornatio11.
an l p Yjury. Th proof,. therefore, offer c1 to u tain it, i ~ to bC'
ubj tec1 t a ri o·id "crutiny, 1 ·i:rn. , 'rithout 8ttcrnp tino- to ontrol or r l <.1.t th vic1 nee of foct: sn. tain:11 _c:!: tllC' ·hnrge, it alt mpt
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to prove affirmative^ another fact wholly inconsistent with it;

and this defence is equally available, if satisfactorily established,

to avoid the force of positive, as of circumstantial evidence. In

considering the strength of the evidence necessary to sustain this

defence, it is obvious, that all testimony, tending to show that the

accused was in another place at the time of the offence, is in direct

conflict with that which tends to prove that he was at the place

where the crime was committed, and actually committed. In this

conflict of evidence, whatever tends to support the one, tends in

the same degree to rebut and overthrow the other; and it is for

the jury to decide where the truth lies.

Another rule is, that the circumstances taken together should

be of a conclusive nature and tendency, leading on the whole to

a satisfactory conclusion, and producing in effect a reasonable

and moral certaint}', that the accused, and no one else, committed

the offence charged. It is not sufficient that they create a proba-

bility, though a strong one; and if, therefore, assuming all the

facts to be true which the evidence tends to establish, they may-

yet, be accounted for upon any hypothesis which does not include
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the guilt of the accused, the proof fails. It is essential, therefore,

that the circumstances taken as a whole, and giving them their

reasonable and just weight, and no more, should to a moral cer-

tainty exclude every other hypothesis. The evidence must establish

the corpus delicti, as it is termed, or the offence committed as

charged; and, in case of Homicide, must not only prove a death

by violence, but must, to a reasonable extent, exclude the hypothesis

of suicide, and a death by the act of any other person. This is

to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Then, what is reasonable doubt? It is a term often used,

probably pretty well understood, but not easily defined. It is not

mere possible doubt ; because every thing relating to human affairs,

and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or

imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case, which, after the

entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves

the minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot say they

feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of

the charge. The burden of proof is upon the prosecutor. All

the presumptions of law independent of evidence are in favor

of innocence; and every person is presumed to be innocent until

he is proved guilty. If upon such proof there is reasonable doubt

to prove affirmatively another fact wholly incon i tent with it,.
and this defence is equally available, if satisfactorily establi hed,
to avoid the force of positive, as of circumstantial evidence. In
considering the strength of the evidence neces ary to sustain this
defence, it i obvious, that all testimony, tending to ho" that the
accused wa in another place at the time of the offence, is in direct
conflict with that which tends to prove that he wa at the place
where the criIPe was committed, and actually committed. In thi ·
conflict of evidence, whatever tends to support the one, tends in
the same degree to rebut and overthrow the other; and it i for
the jury to decide where the truth lie .
_ nother rule is, that the circumstances taken together , hould
be of a conclusive nature and tendency, leading on the whole to,
a atisfactory conclu ion, and producing in effect a rea onable
and moral certainty, that the accu . . ed, and no one eLe, committed
the offence charged. It i not sufficient that they create a probabiMy, though a strong one; and if, therefore, a suming all the
fact to be true which the evidence tends to establish, they may
yet be accounted for upon any hypothe is which do not include
the guilt of the accu ed: the proof fail . It i e ential, therefore,
that the circum tance, taken a a whole, and giving them their
reasonable and just weight, and no more, should to a moral certainty exclude every other hypothe i . The evidence must establish
the corpus delicti, a it is termed, or the offence committed :L
charged; and, in case of liomicide, mu t not only prove a death
by violence_. but mu t, to a reasonable extent, exclude the hypothesisof . uicide, and a death by the act of any other per. on. This is
to be proved beyond rea onable doubt.
Then, what i reasonable doubt? It i a term often u ed,.
probably pretty well understood, but not ea ily defined. It i not
mere pos ~ ible doubt; because every thing relating to human affairs,
and depending on moral evidence, i open to ome po sible or
imaginary doubt. It i that state of the ca e, which, after the
entire compari on and consideration of all the e\idence, leave
the minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot ay they
feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty of the truth of
the charge. The burden of proof i upon the pro ecutor. All
the pre umptions of law independent of evidence are in favor
of innocence; and every per on i pre urned to be innocent until
he is proved guilty. If upon uch proof there i rea onable doubt
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lemainiug, the accused is entitled to the benefit of it by an acquit-

tal. For it is not sufficient to establish a probability, though a

strong one arising from the doctrine of chances, that the fact

charged is more likely to be true than the contrary; but the evi-

dence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and

moral certainty; a certainty that convinces and directs the under-

standing, and satisfies the reason and judgment, of those who are

bound to act conscientiously upon it. This we take to be proof

beyond reasonable doubt; because if the law, which mostly de-

pends upon considerations of a moral nature, should go further

-than this, and require absolute certainty, it would exclude circum-

stantial evidence altogether.

In every criminal prosecution, two things must concur; first,

a good and sufficient indictment in which the criminal charge is

set forth; and, secondly, such charge must be established by the

legal proof. The sufficiency of the indictment in substance and

form is a matter of law, upon which, if drawn in question, it is

the duty of the court to give an opinion. The general rule is,

that no person shall be held to answer to a criminal charge, until
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the same is fully and plainly, substantially and formally, described

to him. A good indictment, therefore, is necessary, independent

of proof.

This indictment contains four counts, which are four different

modes in which the homicide is alleged to have been committed.

To a person unskilled and unpractised in legal proceedings, it

may seem strange that several modes of death, inconsistent with

each other, should be stated in the same document. But it is often

necessary; and the reason for it, when explained, will be obvious.

The indictment is but the charge or accusation made by the grand

jury, with as much certainty and precision as the evidence before

them will warrant. They may be well satisfied that the homicide

was committed, and yet the evidence before them may leave it

somewhat doubtful as to the mode of death ; but, in order to meet

the evidence as it may finally appear, they are very properly allowed

to set out the mode in different counts; and then if any one of

them is proved, supposing it to be also legally formal, it is sufficient

to support the indictment.

Take the instance of a murder at sea; a man is struck down,

lies some time on the deck insensible, and in that condition is

thrown overboard. The evidence proves the certainty of a homi-

remamrng the accused i entitled to th ben fit of it by an acquittal. For it i ~ not uffici nt to e tabli h a probability, though a
trong one ari ing from the doctrine of chance , that th fact
charged i mor likely to be true than the contrary; but the evidence mu ·t establi h the truth of the fact to a rea onable and
moral certainty · a certainty that convinces and direc the undertanding, and ati fie the rea on and judgment, of tho e who are
bound to a ·t con"cientiou ly upon it. Thi we take to be proof
beyond rea onable doubt; becau e if the law, which mo tly depend upon consideration of a moral nature, hould go further
than thi , and require absolute certainty it would exclude circumtantial evidence altogether.
In every criminal pro ecution, two thing mu t concur; fir t,
a good and Qufficient indictment in which the criminal charge i
et forth; and, econdlY, uch charge mu t be e tabli hed by the
legal proof. The _ufficiency of the indictment in sub tance and
form i a matt r of law upon which, if drawn in que tion: it is
the dut3 of the court to give an opinion. The general rule i ,
that no per on hall be held to answer to a criminal charge_, until
the ame i fullv and plainly; ub tantially and formallY, de cribed
to him. A good indictment, therefore, is neces ary, independent
-0f proof.
This indictment contains four count , which are four different
mode" in which the homi ide i alleged to have been committed.
To a per on unskilled and unpracti eel in legal proceeding , it
may seem trang that several modes of death, incon istent with
€ach other hould be tatecl in the ame document. But it i often
nece" arv; and the rea on for it when explained, will be obvious.
The indictment i but the charg or accu ation made by the grand
jury, with a.., ruuch certainty and pr ci ion a the evidence before
them will warrant. They may be well ati fied that the homicide
wa committed: and yet the evid nee before them may leave it
omewhat doubtful a to the mode of death· but, in order to meet
th eyidence a it may finally appear, they are very properly allowed
to set out the mode in different counts; and then if any one of
them i proved uppo ing it to be al o legally formal, it i ufficient
to upport the indictment.
Take the in ~tance of a murder at ea; a man i truck down
lie ome tim on the deck in en ible, and in that condition i ·
thrown overboard. Th viden e prove the certainty of a homi-
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ciJe by the blow, or by the drowning, but leaves it uncertain by

which. That would be a fit case for several counts, charging a

death by a blow, and a death by drowning, and j^erhaps a third

alleging a death by the joint result of both causes combined.

It may perhaps be supposed, that, in the long and melancholy

history of criminal jurisprudence, a precedent can be found for

every possible mode in which a violent death can be caused; and

it is safer to follow precedents. It is true that these precedents

are numerous and various ; but it is not true, that, amidst new dis-

coveries in art and science and the powers of nature, new modes

of causing death may not continually occur. The powers of ether

and chloroform are of recent discovery. Suppose a person should

be forcibly or clandestinely held, and those agents applied to his

mouth till insensibility and death ensue. Though no such instance

ever occurred before, the guilty agent could not escape.

Of course, I do not mean to intimate that these supposed agencies

were used in the present instance, but allude to them simply by

way of illustration. But, if such or any similar new modes of

occasioning death may have been adopted, they are clearly within
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the law. The rules and principles of the common law, just as

when applied to steamboats and locomotives, though these have

come into existence long since those principles were established,

are broad and expansive enough to embrace all new cases as they

arise. If, therefore, a homicide is committed by any mode of death,

which, though practised for the first time, falls within these prin-

ciples, and it is charged in the indictment with as much j)recision

and certainty as the circumstances of the case will allow, it comes

within the scope of the law and is punishable.

The iirinciple is well stated in East's Pleas of the Crown, c. 5,

§ 13 : — "The manner of procuring the death of another with malice

is, generally speaking, no otherwise material than as the degree

of cruelty or deliberation with which it is accompanied may in

conscience enhance the guilt of the perpetrator; with this reser-

vation, however, that malice must be of corporal damage to the

party ; and, therefore, working upon the fancy of another, or treat-

ing him harshly or unkindly, by which he dies of fear or grief,

is not such a killing as the law takes notice of; but he who wil-

fully and deliberately does any act, which apparently endangers

another's life and thereby occasions his death, shall, unless he

clearly prove the contrary, be adjudged to kill him of malice
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ciJe by the blow, or by the drowning, but leaves it uncertain by
which. That would be a fit case for several counts, charging a
death by a blow, and a death by drowning, and perhaps a third
alleging a death by the joint result of both causes combined.
It may perhaps be supposed, that, in the long and melancholy
history of criminal jurisprudence, a precedent can be found for
every possible mode in which a violent death can be caused; and
it is safer to follow precedents. It is true that these precedents.
are numerous and various; but it is not true, that, amidst new discoveries in art and science and the powers of nature, new mode&
of causing death may not continually occur. The powers of ether
and chloroform are of recent discovery. Suppose a person should
be forcibly or clandestinely held, and those agents applied to his
mouth till in sensibility and death ensue. Though no uch instance
ever occurred before, the guilty agent could not e cape.
Of course, I do not mean to intimate that these supposed agencie
were used in the present instance, but allude to them simply by
way of illustration. But, if such or any similar new modes of
occasioning death may have been adopted, they are clearly within
the law. The rules and principles of the common law, ju t a
when applied to steamboats and locomotives, though .these hav
come into existence long since those principles were established,
are broail and expansive enough to embrace all new cases as they
arise. If, therefore, a homicide i committed by any mode of death,
which, though practised for the £.rst time, falls within these principles, and it is charged in the indictment with as much precision
and certainty as the circumstances of the case will allow_, it come
within the scope of the law and is punishable.
The principle is well stated in East's Pleas of the Crown, c. 5,
§ 13 :-"The manner of procuring the death of another with malice
is, generally speaking, no otherwise material than as the degree
of cruelty or deliberation with which it is accompanied may in
conscience enhance the guilt of the perpetrator; with this reservation, however, that malice must be of corporal damage to tb
party; and} therefore, working upon the fancy of another, or treating him harshly or unkindly, by which he dies of fear or grief,
is not such a killing as the law takes notice of; but he who wilfully and deliberately does any act, which apparently endanger ·
another's life and thereby occasions his death, shall, unless he
clearly prove th e contrary, be adjudged to kill him of malice
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prepense." This, the author proceeds to illustrate by a number

of remarkable and peculiar cases.

In looking at this indictment, we find that the first count, after

the usual preamble, charges an assault and a mortal wound by

stabbing with a knife; the second, by a blow on the head with a

hammer; and the third, by striking, kicking, beating, and throw-

ing on the ground.

The fourth and last count, which is somewhat new, it will be

necessary to examine more particularly. [Here the chief justice

read the fourth count, as inserted on page 296.]

The court are all of opinion, after some consideration, that

this is a good count in the indictment. From the necessity of the

case, we think it must be so, because cases may be imagined where

the death is proved, and even where remains of the deceased are

discovered and identified, and yet they may afford no certain evi-

dence of the form in which the death was occasioned ; and then we

think it is proper for the jury to say, that it is by means to them

unknown.

We have already seen that a death occasioned by grief or terror
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cannot in law be deemed murder. Murder must be committed

by an act applied to or affecting the person, either directly, as by

inflicting a wound or laying poison; or indirectl}', as by exposing

the person to a deadly agency or influence, from which death

ensues. Here the count charges an assault upon the deceased (a

technical term well understood in the law, implying force applied

to or directed towards the person of another), in some way and

manner, and by some means, instruments, and weapons, to the

jury unknown; and that the defendant did thereby wilfully and

maliciously deprive him of life.

The rules of law require the grand jury to state their charge

with as much certainty as the circumstances of the case will

permit; and, if the circumstances will not permit a fuller and

more precise statement of the mode in which the death is occa-

sioned, this count conforms to the rules of law. I am therefore

instructed by the court to say, that, if you are satisfied upon the

evidence, that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, this

form of indictment is sufficient to sustain a conviction.

We now come to consider that ground of defence on the part

of the defendant which has been denominated, not perhaps with

precise legal accuracy, an alibi; that is, that the deceased was

prepen e.' Thi , the author pro e 1 to illustrate by a number
of remarkable and peculiar ca es.
In looking at thi indictment, we find that the fir t count, after
the u ual preamble, charge an a"' ault and a mortal wound by
the second, by a blow on the head with a
stabbing with a knif
hammer; and the third, by striking, kicking, beating, and throwing on the ground.
The fourth and last count, which is somewhat new, it will be
neces ary to examine more particularly. [Here the chief ju tice
read the fourth count, as inserted on page 296.]
The court are all of opinion, after some consideration, that
this is a good count in the indictment. From the necessity of the
case, we think it mu t be so, because cases may be imagined where
the death is proved, and even where remain of the decea ed are
discovered and identified, and yet they may afford no certain evidence of the form in which the death was occasioned ; and then we
think it is proper for the jury to say, that it is by means to them
unknown.
We have already een that a death occa ioned by grief or terror
cannot in law be deemed murder. Murder mu t be committed
by an act applied to or affecting the person, either directly, as by
inflicting a wound or laying poison; or indirectly, as by expo ing
the person to a deadly agency or influence, from which death
en ue"'. Here the count charge an assault upon the decea. ed (a
technical term well under toad in the law, implying force appliecl
to or directed towards the person of another), in some way an 1
manner, and by ome mean , instruments, and weapons, to the
jury unknown; and that the defendant did thereby wilfully and
maliciou ly deprive him of life.
The rule of Jaw require the grand jury to tate their charge
with a much ertainty as the circumstances of the case will
permit; and, if the circum. tances will not permit a fuller aml
more precise tatement of the mode in which the death i oc aioned, this count conform to the rules of law. I am therefore
instructed by the court to ay, that, if you are sati fied upon the
evidence, that th , d f ndant i guilty of the crim charged, this
form of indictment is ufficient to sustain a conviction.
We now come to c_onsider that ground of defence on the part
of the defendant which has been denominated, not perhaps with
preci e legal accuracy, an alibi· that i , that the deceased wa
0
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seen elsewhere out of the medical college after the time, when,

by the theory of the proof on the part of the prosecution, he is

supposed to have lost his life at the medical college. It is like the

case of an alihi in this respect, that it proposes to prove a fact

which is repugnant to and inconsistent with the facts constituting

the evidence on the other side, so as to control the conclusion, or

at least render it doubtful, and thus lay the ground of an acquittal.

And the court are of opinion that this proof is material; for,

although the time alleged in the indictment is not material, and

an act done at another time would sustain it, yet in point of evi-

dence it may become material; and in the present case, as all the

circumstances shown on the other side, and relied upon as proof,

tend to the conclusion that Dr. Parkman was last seen entering

the medical college, and that he lost his life therein, if at all, the

fact of his being seen elsewhere afterwards would be so incon-

sistent with that allegation, that, if made out by satisfactory

proof, we think it would be conclusive in favor of the defendant.

Both are affirmative facts; and the jury are to decide upon

the weight of the evidence. When you are called upon to consider
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the proof of any particular fact, you will consider the evidence

which sustains it m connection with that which makes the other

way, and be governed by the weight of proof. Proof which would

be quite sufficient to sustain a proposition, if it stood alone, may

be encountered by such a mass of opposite proof as to be quite

overbalanced by it.

In the ordinary case of an alihi, when a party charged with

a crime attempts to prove that he was in another place at the time,

all the evidence tending to prove that he committed the offence

tends in the same degree to prove that he was at the place when

it was committed. If, therefore, the proof of the alibi does not

outweigh the proof that he was at the place when the offence was

committed, it is not sufficient.

There is one other point remaining to which it is necessary

to ask your attention ; and that is the evidence of character. There

are cases of circumstantial evidence, where the testimony adduced

for and against a prisoner is nearly balanced, in which a good

character may be very important to a man's defence. A stranger,

for instance, may be placed under circumstances tending to render

him suspected of larcen}^ or other lesser crime. He may show,

that, notwithstanding these suspicious circumstances, he is

seen elsewhere out of the medical college after the time, when,
by the theory of the proof on the part of the prosecution, he is
supposed to haYe lo. t his life at the medical college. It i like the
ca e of an alibi in th] respect, that it propose to prove a fact
which is repugnant to and inconsistent with the facts constituting
the evidence on the other ide, so as to control the conclusion, or
at lea t render it doubtful, and thu lay the ground of an acquittal.
And the court are of opinion that thi proof is material; for,
although the time alleged in the indictment is not material, and
an act done at another time would su tain it, yet in point of evidence it may become material; and in the pre ent case, as all the
circum tance hown on the other ide, and relied upon as proof,
tend to the conclusion that Dr. Parkman was last seen entering
the medical college, and that he lost his life therein, if at all, the
fact of his being seen elsewhere afterward would be so inconistent with that allegation, that, if made out by satisfactory
proof, we think it would be conclusive in favor of the defendant.
Both are affirmative fact ; and the jury are to decide upon
the weight of the evidence. When you are called upon to consider
the proof of any particular fact, you will consider the evidence
which sustains it in connection with that which makes the other
way, and be governed by the weight of proof. Proof which would
be quite sufficient to sustain a propo ition, if it stood alone, may
be encountered by such a mass of opposite proof a to be quite
overbalanced by it.
In the ordinary ca e of an alibi, when a party charged with
a crime attempts to prove that he was in another place at the time,
all the evidence tending to prove that he committed the offence
tends in the ame degree to prove that he wa at the place when
it was committed. If, therefore, the proof of the alibi does not
outweigh the proof that hr. wa at the place when the offence wa
committed, it i not ufficien t.
There is one other point remaining to which it is nece ary
to ask your attention; and that is the evidence of character. There
are cases of circumstantial evidencr where the te timony addn ed
fo::: and again t a pri oner is nearly balanced, in which a good
character may be very important to a man's defence. A tranger,
for in tance; may be placed under circumstances tending to render
him suspected of larceny or other lesser crime. He may show,
that, notwithstanding these su pic]ous circumstances, he is
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esteemed to l)c of perfectly good character for honest}' in the coni-

inunity where he is known : and that may be sufficient to exonerate

liim. But where it is a question of great and atrocious criminality,

the commission of the act is so unusual, so out of tlie ordinary

course of things and beyond common experience ; it is so manifest

that the offence, if perpetrated, must have been influenced by

motives not frequently operating upon the human mind; that

evidence of character, and of a man's habitual conduct under com-

mon circumstances, must be considered far inferior to what it is

in the instance of accusations of a lower grade. Against facts

strongly proved, good character cannot avail. It is therefore in

smaller offences, in such as relate to the actions of daily and com-

mon life, as when one is charged with pilfering and stealing, that

evidence of a high character for honesty will satisfy a jury that

the accused is not likely to yield to so slight a temptation. In

such case, where the evidence is doul)tful, proof of character may

be given with good effect.

But still, even with regard to the higher crimes, testimony of

good character, though of less avail, is competent evidence to the
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jury, and a species of evidence which the accused has a right to

offer. But it behooves one charged with an atrocious crime like

this of murder to prove a high character, and, by strong evidence,

to make it counterbalance a strong amount of proof on the part

of the prosecution. It is the privilege of the accused to put his

character in issue or not. If he does, and offers evidence of good

character, then the prosecution may give evidence to rebut and

counteract it. But it is not competent for the government to give

in proof the bad character of the defendant, unless he first opens

that line of inquiry by evidence of good character.

Defendant was found guilty and sentenced to death. While

in prison after the trial he confessed to the killing of Parkman.

It seems Dr. Parkman called at the medical building at the ap-

pointed time and demanded pay of Webster. Words passed between

them, and Webster in a fit of passion struck Parkman with a stick

of wood and killed him. The body was dissected and disposed of

by chemicals and fire. The friends of Professor Webster made

great efforts to secure a pardon, but to no avail, for at the appointed

time the sentence was carried out.

11

€Steem cl to be of perf ctly good character for hon sty in the community wher h i . . known: and that may b ufficient to xoneratc
11im. But where it i ~ a question of great and atrocious criminality,
-the commi sion of the act i o unusual, o out of the ordinary
cour e of thing and beyond common experience; it is so manifest
-that the offence, if perpetrated, must have b en influenced by
motive not frequently operating upon the human mind; that
evidence of haractcr, and of a man'. habitual onduct under common circum tances, must be con ilered far inferior to what it i.
in the instan e of accusatjon of a lower grade. Aga]nst facts
strongly proved, good character cannot avail. It is therefore in
smaller offences, in such as relate to the action of daily and common life, as when one is charged with pilfering and stealing, that
eviden e of a high character for hone ty will ati fy a jury that
-the accused is not likely to yi Id to o slight a temptation. In
·such .case, where the evidence is doubtful, proof of character may
b given with good effect.
But till, even with regard to the higher crimes, testimony of
good character, though of le s avail, i · competent evidence to the
jury, and a species of evidence which the accused has a right to
-0ffer. But it behooves one charged with an atrocious crime like
-this of murder to prove a high character, and, by strong evidence,
to make it counterbalance a trong amount of proof on the part
-0f th prosecution. It is the privilege of the accused to put hi
character in i ~ sue or not. If he does, and offers evidence of good
·c haracter, then the prosecution may give evidence to rebut and
count ract it. But it i not competent for the government to give
in proof the bad character of the defendant unless he fir t opens
-that line of inquiry by evidence of good character.
D fendant wa found guilty and sentenced to death. While
in pri ..on after the trial he confessed to the killing of Parkman.
It s ems Dr. Parkman called at the medical building at th appointed tim and demanded pay of Webster. Word passed between
them, and Web ter in a fit of pa . ion truck Parkman with a tick
of wood and kill d him. T'hc body wa di sected and dispo. d of
by chemicals and fire. The friends of Prof or Webst r mad '
great effort to ecure a pardon, but to no avail, for at the appoint d
time the sentence wa carried out.
0
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Wellar v. People, 30 Mich. 16. (1874.)

Campbell^ J. :

Plaintiff in error was convicted of the murder of Margaret

Campbell by personal violence committed on July 25, 1873.

Wellar v. People, 30 Mich. 16. (187 4.)

They had lived together for several months, and on the occasion

of her death she had been out on an errand of her own in the

neighborhood, and on coming back into the house entered the

front door of the bar-room, and fell, or was knocked down upon

the floor. While on the floor there was evidence tending to show

that Wellar ordered her to get up, and kicked her, and that he

drew her from the bar-room through the dining-room into a

bed room, where he left her, and where she afterwards died. The

injury of which she died was inflicted on her left temple, and the

evidence does not seem to have been clear how she received it or at

what specific time. It was claimed by the prosecution to have

been inflicted by a blow when she first came in, and if not, then by

a blow or kick afterwards. All of the testimony is not returned,

and the principal questions arise out of rulings which depend on

the assumption that the jury might find that her death was caused
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by some violent act of Wellar's; which they must have done to

convict him. There can be no question but that, if she so came

to her death, he was guilty of either murder or manslaughter. The

complaint made against the charge is, that a theory was put to

the jury on which they were instructed to find as murder what

would, or at least might be, manslaughter.

There was no proof tending to show the use of any weapon,,

and, if wo may judge, from the charge, the prosecution claimed

the fatal injury came from a blow of Wellar's fist, given as she

entered the house. The judge seems to have regarded it as shown

by a preponderance of proof, that the injury was visible when she

was in the bar-room, and that the principal dispute was as to how

it was caused, whether by a blow, or kick, or by accident. It also

appears that, if inflicted in that room, it did not produce insensi-

bility at the time, if inflicted before the prisoner dragged her into

the bed room. It does not appear from the case at what hour she

died.

It may be proper to remark that while it is not desirable to

J.:
Plaintiff in error was convicted of the murder of Margaret
Campbell by personal violence committed on July 25, 1873.
They had lived together for several months, and on the occasion
of her death she had been out on an errand of her own in the
neighborhood, and on coming back into the house entered the
front door of the bar-room, and fell, or was knocked down upon
the floor. ·while on the floor there was evidence tending to show
that \Yellar ordered her to get up, and kicked her, and that he
drew her from the bar-room through the dining-room into a
bed room, where he left her, and where she afterwards died. The
injury of which she died was inflicted on her left temple, and the
evidence does not seem to have been clear how she received it or at
what specific time. It wa claimed by the prosecution to have
been inflicted by a blow when she first came in, and if not, then by
a blow or kick afterwards. All of the testimony is not returned,
and the principal question ari . . e out of rulings which depend on
the a sumption that the jury might find that her death wa s caused
by ome vjolent act of Wellar' ; which they must have done to
convict him. There can b no question but that, if he so came
to her death, he wa guilty of eitber murder or manslaughter. The
complaint macle again. t the charge i , that a theory was put to
the jury on which they were in tructed to find as murder what
would, or at lea . . t might be, manslaughter.
There wa no proof tending to how the use of .rny weapon,
and, if we may judge, from the charge, "the pro ecution claimed
the fatal injury came from a blow of Wellar's fist, given as she
entered the house. The judge seems to have regarded it as . . hown
by a preponderance of proof, that the injury was visible when she
wa in the bar-room, and that the principal dispute was as to how
it was caused, whether by a blow, or kick, or by accident. It al o
appears that, if inflicted in that room, it did not produce insen ibility at the time, if inflicted before the pri oner dragged her into
the bed room. It does not appear from the case at what hour he
died.
It may be proper to remark that while it is not de irahle to.
CAMPBELL,
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introduce all the testimony into a bill of exceptions in a criminal

case, it is important to indicate in some way the whole chain of

facts which the evidence tends to prove. Without this we can-

not fully appreciate the relations of many of the rulings, or know

what instructions may be necessary to be sent down to the court

below. The bill before us is full upon some things, but leaves out

some things which it would have been better to include.

Upon any of the theories presented, there is no difficulty in

seeing that if Wellar killed the deceased, and if he distinctly

intended to kill her, his crime was murder. It is not claimed

on his behalf that there was any proof which could reduce the

act to manslaughter if there was a specific design to take life.

Upon this the charge was full and pointed, and is not complained

of. There was no claim that he had been provoked in such a

way or to such an extent as to mitigate intentional slaying to

anything below one of the degrees of miirder.

But it is claimed that, although the injury given was fatal, yet,

if not intended to produce any such results, it was of such a char-

acter that the jury might, and properly should, have considered
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it as resting on different grounds from those which determine

responsibility for acts done with deadly weapons used in a way

likely to produce dangerous consequences. But the charge of the

court did not permit them to take that view.

It will be found by careful inspection of the charge, that the

court specifically instructed the jury, that if Wellar committed

the homicide at all, it would be murder, and not manslaughter,

unless it was committed under such extreme provocation as is

recognized in the authorities as sufficient to reduce intentional

and voluntary homicide committed with a deadly weapon to that

degree of crime. And in this connection the charge further given

that if the intent of the respondent was to commit bodily harm,

he was responsible for the result, because he acted willfully and

maliciously in doing the injury necessarily led to a conviction of

murder, because there was no pretense of any provocation of that

kind.

Manslaughter is a very serious felony, and may be punished

severely. The discretionary punishment for murder in the second

degree comes considerably short of the maximum punishment for

manslaughter. But the distinction is a vital one, resting chiefly

on the greater disregard of human life shown in tbe higher crime.

introduce all the t e timony into a bill of exceptions in a criminal
ca e, it is important to indicate in some way the whole chain of
fad which the evidence tend to prove. \Yithout this w cannot fully appr ciate the r elation of many of the ruling , or know
what instruction may be nece ary to be sent down to the court
below. The bill b fore us is full upon some things, but leaves out
ome thing which it would have been better to include.
Upon any of the th~ories presented, there i no difficulty in
eeing that if \\ llar killed the deceased, and if he distinctly
intended to kill her, his crime was murder. It is not claimed
on his behalf that there was any proof which could redu ·e the
act to man laught r if there was a specific de ign to take life.
Upon this the cha1ge ·was full and pointed, and is not complained
of. There wa no claim that he had been provoked in uch a
way or to such an extent a to mitigate intentional slaying to
anything below one of the degrees of murder.
But it is claimed that, although the injury given was fatal, yet,
if not intended to produce any such result , it wa of uch a character that the jury might, and properly should, have con idered
it as resting on different grounds from tho e which determine
respon ibility for acts done with deadly weapons used in a way
likelv to produce dangerous consequences. But the charge of the
court did not permit them to take that view.
It will be found by careful inspection of the charge, that the
court specifically in tructed the jury, that if Wellar committed
th homicide at all, it would be murder, and not manslaughter,
unle it was committed under such extreme provocation as i ·
recognized in the authorities as sufficient to reduce intentional
and voluntary homicide committed with a deadly weapon to that
degree of crime. And in this connection the charge further given
that if the intent of the re pondent wa to commit bodily harm,
he wa re pon ibl for the result, becau e he acted willfully an<l.
maliciously in doing the injury necessarily led to a conviction of
murder, becau e there was no pretense of any provocation of that
kind.
Manslaughter i a very serious felony, and may b punished
severely. Th di er tionary puni hment for murder in the second
degree comes con iderably hort of the maximum punishm nt for
man laughter. But the di tin tion is a vital one, r ting hi fly
on th greater di r gard of human life hown in the high r rrime.
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And in determining whether a person who has killed another with-

out meaning to kill him is guilty of murder or manslaughter, the

nature and extent of the injur}- or wrong which was actually in-

tended, must usually be of controlling importance.

It is not necessary in all cases that one held for murder must

have intended to take the life of the person he slays l)y his wrong-

ful act. It is not always necessary that he must have intended a

personal injury to such person. But it is necessary that the intent

with which he acted shall be equivalent in legal character to a

criminal jjuri^ose aimed against life. Generally the intent must

have been to commit either a specific felony, or at least an act

involving all the wickedness of a felony. And if the intent be

directly to produce a bodily injur}^, it must be such an injury as

may be expected to involve serious consequences, either periling

life or leading to great bodily harm. There is no rule recognized

as authority which will allow a conviction of murder where a fatal

result was not intended, unless the injury intended was one of a

very serious character which might naturally and commonly involve

loss of life, or grievous mischief. Every assault involves bodily
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harm. But any doctrine which would hold every assailant as a

murderer where death follows his act, would be barbarous and

imreasonable.

The language used in most of the statutes on felonious assaults,

is, an intent to do "grievous bodily harm :" Carr. Sup., p. 237.

And even such an assault, though "unlawfully and maliciously"

made, is recognized as one where, if death followed, the result

would not necessarily have been murder : Ibid. Our own statutes

have made no provision for rendering assaults felonious, unless

committed with a dangerous weapon, or with an intent to commit

some felony : Comp. L., ch. 244.

In general, it has been held that where the assault is not com-

mitted with a deadly weapon, the intent must be clearly felonious,

or the death will subject only to the charge of manslaughter. The

presumption arising from the character of the instrument of vio-

lence, is not conclusive in either way, but where such weapons are

used as do not usually kill, the deadly intent ought to be left in no

doubt. There are cases on record where death by beating and kick-

ing has been held to warrant a verdict of murder, the murderous

intent being found. But where there was no such intent the ruling

has been otherwise. In State v. McNah, 20 X. H., 160, it is held

And in determining whether a person who ha killed another without meaning to kill him i . . guilty of murder or man laughter, the
nature and extent of the injury or wrong which was actually intended, must usually be of controlling importance.
It is not nece >;ary in all ca es that one held for murder mu t
have intended to take the life of the person he slays by hi wrongful act. It is not always nece sary that he must have intended a
personal injury to such person. But it is neces ary that the intent
with which he acted shall be_ equivalent in legal character to a
criminal purpo e aimed against life. Generally the. intent must
have been to commit either a specific felony, or at least an act
involving all the wickedne s of a felony . And if the intent be
directly to produce a bodily injury, it must be such an injury as
may be expect d to involve serious consequences, either periling
life or leading to great bodily harm. There is no rule r ecognized
as authority which will allow a conviction of murder where a fatal
result was not intended, unless the injury intended wa one of a
very serious character which might naturally and commonly involve
loss of life, or grievous mischief. Every assault involves bodily
harm. But any doctrine which would hold every assailant as a
murderer where death follows hi act, would be barbarous and
unreasonable.
The language used in most of the statutes on felonious assaults,
is, an intent to do "grievous bodily harm:" Carr. Sup., p. 237.
And even such an as ault, though " unlawfully and maliciously"
made, is recognized as one where, if death followed, the result
would not necessarily have be n murder: Ibid. Our own statute
have made no provision for rendering a aults felonious, unless
committed with a dangerous weapon, or with an intent to commit
ome felony: Comp. L., ch. 24-±.
In general, it ha been held that where the a sault i not committed with a deadly weapon, the intent mu t be clearly feloniou ,
or the death will subject only to the charge of manslaughter. The
}Jresumption arising from the character of the instrmnent of violence, is not conclusive in either way, but where such weapons are
11 cd a do not usually kill, the deadly intent ought to be left in no
doubt. There are ca e on record where death by beating and kicking has been held to warrant a verdict of murder, the murd erou ·
intent being found . But where there wa no such intent the ruling
ha been otherwise. In State Y. McNab, 20 N. H., 160 it is held
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that unless the unlawful act of violence intended was felonious,

the offense was manslaughter. The same doctrine is laid down

in State v. Smith, 32 Maine, 369. That is the statutory rule in

Xew York and in some other states.

The willful use of a deadly weapon, without excuse or provoca-

tion, in such a manner as to imperil life, is almost universally

recognized as showing a felonious intent: See 2 Bish. Cr. L.,

§§ 680, 681. But where the weapon or implement used is not one

likely to kill or to maim, the killing is held to he manslaughter,

unless there is an actual intent which shows a felonious purpose:

See Turner's case, 1 Eaym., 114, where a servant was hit on the

head with a clog; State v. Jarrott, 1 Ired., 76, where the IjIow

was with a hickory stick; Holly v. State, 10 Humph., 141, where

a boy threw a stone; Rex v. KelUij, 1 Moody, C. C, 113, where it

was uncertain whether a person was killed by a blow with the fist

which threw him on a brick, or by a blow from a brick, and the

court held it a clear case of manslaughter. In Darry v. People,

10 X. Y., 120, the distinctions are mentioned and relied upon, and

in the opinion of Parker J. there are some remarks very applicable.
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In the case of Com. v. V^ehster, 5 Cush. E., 295, the rulings of

which have been regarded as going beyond law in severity, this

question, is dealt with in accordance with the same views, and

quotations are given from East to the same purport.

The case of death in a prize fight is one of the commonest illus-

trations of manslaughter, where there is a deliberate arrangement

to fight, and where great violence is always to be expected from

the strength of the parties and the purpose of fighting till one or

the other is unable to continue the contest. A duel with deadly

weapons renders every killing murder; but a fight without

weapons, or with weapons not deadly, leads only to manslaughter,

unless death is intended: 1 East, P. C, 270; Murphy's case, 6 C.

& P., 103 ; Hargrave's case, 5 C. & P., 170.

The case of Commonwealth v. Fox, 7 Gray, 585, is one resembling

the present in several respects, in which the offense was held to be

manslaughter.

The judgment must be reverse.d, and a new trial granted.

that unle the unlawful act of iolence intended "aoc feloniou,
the offen e wa man laughter. The ,ame doctrin i laid down
in State v. mith, 39 1\laine 369. That i the tatutory rule in
); ew York and in ome other tate ~ .
The willful u of a deadl3 weapon, without excu ' e or pro ocation, in uch a manner a to imperil life, i almo t univer ally
recognized a hawing a f loniou intent: See 2 Bi h. Cr. L .,
. 6 0, 6 1. But where the weapon or implement u ed i not one
likely to kill or to maim: the killing i held to b manslaughter_,
unless there i an actual intent which how a felonious purpo e:
ee Turner' ·ca e, 1 Raym., 1±4, where a er vant wa hit on the
head with a clog .~ State v. J arrott, 1 Ired., 6, where the blow
wa with a hickory tick; Hally v. State .. 10 Humph., 141, where
a boy threw a tone; R ex v. K elley, 1 l\food3, C. C., 113, where it
wa uncertain whether a per on wa killed. by a blow with th fist
which threw him on a brick, or by a blow from a brick, and the
court held it a clear ca e of man laught r. In Darry v. P eople,
10 N. Y., 120, the distinctions are mentioned and relied upon, and
in the opinion of Parker J. there are ·ome remarks very applicable.
In the ca e of Com. v. lV ebster, 5 Cush. R., 295, the ruling of
which have been r gard d a going beyond law in everity, thi
que tion is dealt with in accordance with the ame views, and
quotation are given from Ea t to the ame purport.
The ca e of death in a prize fight i on of the commone t illu tration of manslaughter, where th re i a deliberate arrangement
to fight, and where great violence is alway to b expected from
the trength of th partie and the purpo e of :fighting till one or
th other i unable to continue th e conte t. A duel with deadly
weapon render every killing murder; but a fight without
weapon , or with weapon not deadly, lead only to man laughter,
unle death i intended : 1 Ea t, P . C., 270; Murphy's ca e, 6 C.
& P., 103; Hargrave' a>::.e, 5 C. & P., 1 0.
The· ca e of Cornmonuedlth v. Fox, 7 Gra , 585 i one resembling
the pre ent in everal r e p cL, in which th off n e wa h ld to b
man ·laughter.
Th judgment mu t be reverse.d, and a new trial granted.
0
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Degrees of Murder.

Ilopt V. People, lOIf U. S. 631. (1881.)

Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff in error was indicted, convicted, and sentenced

for the crime of murder in the first degree in the District Court

Degrees of Murder.

of the Third Judicial District of the Territory of Utah, and

presented a bill of exceptions, which was allowed by the presiding

judge, and from his judgment and sentence appealed to the Su-

H opt v. P eople, 104 U.

1 •

631. (1 881.)

preme Court of the Territory, and that court having affirmed the

judgment and sentence, he sued out a writ of error from this court.

Of the various errors assigned, we have found it necessary to con-

sider two only.

The Penal Code of Utah contains the following provisions:

*'Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other

kind of wilful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing;

or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any

arson, rape, burglar}^ or robbery ; or perpetrated from a premedi-

tated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any

other human being, other than him who is killed; or perpetrated
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by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, and evidencing

a depraved mind regardless of human life, — is murder in the first

decree; and anv other homicide, committed under such circum-

stances as would have constituted murder at common law, is mur-

der in the second degree." Sect. 89. "Every person guilty of

murder in the first degree shall suffer death, or, upon the recom-

mendation of the jury, may be imprisoned at hard labor in the

penitentiary for life, at the discretion of the court ; and every per-

son guilty of murder in the second degree shall be imprisoned at

hard labor in the penitentiary for not less than five nor more than

fifteen years." Sect. 90. Compiled Laws of Utah of 1876, pp.

585, 586.

By the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, the charge of the

judge to the jury at the trial "must be reduced to writing before

it is given, unless by the mutual consent of the parties it is given

orally" (sect. 257, cl. 7) ; the jury, upon retiring for deliberation,

may take with them the written instructions given (sect. 289) ;

MR . •JUSTICE GRAY delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaint iff in error wa indicted, convicted, and sentenced
for the crime of murder in the first degree in the District Court
of the Third Judicial District of the T erritory of Utah, and
presented a bill of exceptions, which was allowed by the presiding
j udge, and from h is judgment an d entence appealed to the Supreme Court of the rrerritory, and that court having affirmed the
j udgment and sentence, he sued out a writ of error from this court.
Of the various errors assigned, we have found it necessary to consider t wo only.
The P enal Code of Utah contains the following provisions :
"Every murder perpetrat ed by poison, lying in wait, or any other
kind of wilful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing;
or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any
ar son, r ape, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any
other human being, other than him who is killed; or perpetrated
by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, and evidencing
a depraved mind regardless of human life,- is murder in the first
degree ; and any other homicide, committed under such circumstances as would have constituted murder at common law, is murder in the second degree." Sect. 89. "Every person guilty of
murder in the :fir8t degree hall suffer death, or, upon the r ecommendation of the jury, may be imprisoned at hard labor in the
penitentiary fo r life, at the discretion of the court; and every person guilty of murder in the second degree shall be imprisoned at
h ard labor in the penitentiary for not less th an :five nor more than
:fifteen years." Sect. 90. Compiled Law of Utah of 1876, pp.
585, 586.
By the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, the charge of the
judge to the jury at the trial " must be r educed to writing before
it is given, unless by the mutual con ent of the parties it is given
orally" (sect. 257, cl. 7) ; the jury, upon retiring for deliberation,
may take with them the written instructions given ( sect. 289);
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and "when written charges have been presented, given, or refused,

the questions presented in such charges need not be excepted to or

embodied in a bill of exceptions, but the written charges or the

report, with the indorsements showing the action of the court,

form part of the record, and any error in the decision of the court

thereon may be taken advantage of on appeal, in like manner as if

presented in a bill of exceptions." Sect. 315. Laws of Utah of

1878, pp. 115, 131, 126.

It appears by the bill of exceptions that evidence was intro-

duced at the trial tending to show that the defendant was intoxi-

cated at the time of the alleged homicide.

The defendant's fifth request for instructions, which was in-

dorsed "refused" by the judge, was as follows: "Drunkenness

is not an excuse for crime: but as in all cases where a jury find

a defendant guilty of murder they have to determine the degree

of crime, it becomes necessary for them to inquire as to the state

of mind under which he acted, and in the prosecution of such an

inquiry his condition as drunk or sober is proper to be considered,

where the homicide is not committed by means of poison, lying in
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wait, or torture, or in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate

arson, rape, robbery, or burglary. The degree of the offence de-

pends entirely upon the question whether the killing was wilful,

deliberate, and premeditated; and upon that question it is proper

for the jury to consider evidence of intoxication, if such there be;

not upon the ground that v.'runkenness renders a criminal act less

criminal, or can be received in extenuation or excuse, but upon the

ground that the condition of the defendant's mind at the time

the act was committed must be inquired after, in order to justly

determine the question as to whether his mind was capable of that

deliberation or premeditation which, according as they are absent

or present, determine the degree of the crime."

Upon this subject the judge gave only the following written

instruction : "A man who voluntarily puts himself in a condition

to have no control of his actions must be held to intend the con-

sequences. The safety of the community requires this rule. In-

toxication is so easily counterfeited, and when real is so often

resorted to as a means of nerving a person up to the commission

of some desperate act, and is withal so inexcusable in itself, that

law has never recognized it as an excuse for crime."

The instruction requested and refused, and the instruction given,

and ·'when written charge" have been pre . . ented given, or r efu ed
the question pre ented in such charg need not be excepted to or
.embodied in a bill of exception , but the written charges or th
r eport, with the indorsements showing the action of the court,
form part of the r cord, and any error in the deci ion of the court
thereon may be taken advantage of on appeal, in like manner as if
presented in a bill of exception . ' Sect. 315. Law of Utah of
1 878, pp. 115, 1 '> 1, 126.
It appear by the bill of exception that evidence wa introduced at the trial tending to show that the defen lant was intoxi·cated at the time of the alleged homicide.
The defendant' fifth request for in truction which wa indorsed "refu ed" by the judge, was a follow : "Drunkennes
is not an excuse for crime; but as in all case where a jury :find
a. defendant guilty of murder they have to determine the degree
·of crime, it becomes necessary for them to inquire a to the state
of mind under which he acted, and in the pro ecution of such an
inquiry his condition as drunk or sober is proper to be consider d,
where the homicide is not committed by means of poison, lyjng in
wait, or torture, or in the perp tration of or attempt to perpetrate
arson, rape, robbery, or burglary. The degree of the offence depends entir ly upon the que. tion whether the killing was wilful_,
deliberate, and premeditated; and upon that question it is proper
for the jury to consider evidence of intoxication, if uch there b ;
not upon the ground that \.~ runk enn es r ender s a criminal act les
criminal, or can be received in extenuation or excuse, but upon the
ground that the condition of the defendant's mind at the time
the act wa committed mu t be inquired after, in order to justly
det ermine the question a to whether his mind wa. capable of t hat
deliberation or premeditation which, according as they are absent
or present, d termine the degree of the crim ."
Upon thL . ubj ect the judge gave only the following written
instruction: "A man who voluntarily put himself in a condition
to have no control of hi actions mu t be held to intenrl the con~equ enc es .
The safety of the comm unity requires thi rule. I ntoxication is so easilv counterfeited, and when real is so often
resorted to a a mean of nervin g a per on up to the commis ion
-0f some desperate act, and i . . withal o ]nexcu able in it elf, that
law has never recognized it a an xcu for rime."
The instruction r que te 1 and rcfu c1 an 1 the in .. truction giv n,
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being matter of record and subjects of appeal under the provision

of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, sect. 315, above quoted^

their correctness is clearly open to consideration in this court.

Young v. Martin, 8 Wall. 354.

At common law, indeed, as a general rule, voluntary intoxi-

cation affords no excuse, justification, or extenuation of a crime

committed under its influence. United States v. Drew, 5 Mas. 28 ;

United States v. McGlue, 1 Curt. 1 ; Commonwealth v. Hawkins,

3 Gray (Mass.), 463; People v. Rogers, 18 K. Y. 9. But when a

statute establishing different degrees of murder requires deliberate

premeditation in order to constitute murder in the first degree^

the question whether the accused is in such a condition of mind,

by reason of drunkenness or otherwise, as to be capable of deliberate

premeditation, necessarily becomes a material subject of considera-

tion by the jury. The law has been repeatedly so ruled in the

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in cases tried before

a full court, one of which is reported upon other points {Com-

monwealth V. Dorsey, 103 Mass. 412); and in well-considered

cases in courts of other States. Pirtle v. Slate, 9 Humph. (Tcnn.)
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663; Haile v. State, 11 id. 154; Kelly v. Commonwealth, 1 Grant

(Pa.), Cas. 484; Keenan v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. St. 55; Jones

V. Commonwealth, 75 id. 403; People v. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544;

People V. Williams, 43 id. 344; State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136,

and 41 id. 584; Pigman v. State of Ohio, 14 Ohio, 555, 557. And

the same rule is expressly enacted in the Penal Code of Utah, sect.

20 : "No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary

intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in such

condition. But whenever the actual existence of any particular

purpose, motive, or intent is a necessary element to constitute any

particular species or degree of crime, the jury may take into con-

sideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time, in

determining the purpose, motive, or intent with which he com-

mitted the act." Compiled Laws of Utah of 1876, pp. 568, 569.

The instruction requested by the defendant clearly and accu-

rately stated the law applicable to the case; and the refusal to

give that instruction, taken in connection with the unqualified

instruction actually given, necessarily prejudiced him with the

Jury.

One other error assigned presents a question of practice of

being matter of record an<l ·ubject of appeal under t he provision
of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, sect. 315, above quoted,.
their correctnes i clearly open to consideration in this courL
Young\. Martin, 8 Wall. 354.
At common law, indeed, as a general rule, voluntary intoxication affords no excuse, justification, or extenuation of a crime
committed under its influence. United States v. Drew, 5 Mas. 2 ;
United States v. llfcGlue, 1 Curt. 1; Commonwealth v. H awkins?
3 Gray (Mas . ) , 463; People v. Rogers, 18 N . Y. 9. But when a
, tatute establi hing different degrees of murder r equires deliberat e
premeditation in order to constitute murder in the first degree,.
the que tion whether the accused i in uch a condition of mind,
by rea on of drunkenness or otherwise, as to be capable of deliberat e
premeditation, necessarily become a material subject of con ideration by the jury. The law ha been repeatedly so ruled ju the
Supreme Judi ·ial Court. of 1\fa sachu ett in ca es t ri ed before
a full co1lft, one of which i reported upon other points (Comnionwealth v. Dorsey, 103 fass . -119 ) ; and in well-considered
cases in courts of other State . Pirtle v. State, 9 Humph. ( T enn.)
663; Haile v. tate, 11 id. 154; Kelly v . Commonwealth, 1 Grant
(Pa. ), Cas. 484; Keenan v. Co11imonwealth, 44 P a. St. 55 ; J ones
v. Commonwealth, 75 id. 403; People v. Belencia, 21 Cal. 5--14 ;
People v. Willicims, ,13 id. 3-±4; State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136,
and --11 id. 5 -±; Pigman v. tate of Ohio, 14 Ohio, 555, 557. And
the ame rule i expressly enacted in the Penal Code of Utah.. ect.
20: "No act committed by a person while in a tate of voluntary
intoxication i less criminal by rea on of hi having been in uch
condition. But whenever the actual existence of any particular
purpo. e, motiYe, or intent i a nece ary element to con titute any
particular species or degree of crime the jury may take into consi<leration the fad that the accu ed was intoxicated at the time, in
determining the purpo e, motive, or intent with which he committed the act." Compiled Laws of tah of 1 '6, pp. 568, 569.
The instruction reque ted by the defendant clearly and accurately tated the law applicable to the ca e; and the refu~ al togive that instruction, taken in connection with the unqualified
instruction actually given, necessarily prejudiced him with the
Jury.
One other error assigned present a question of practice of
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such importance that it is jiroper to express an opinion upon it,

in order to prevent a repetition of the error upon another trial.

By the provisions of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure,

already referred to, the charge of the judge to the jury at the

trial must be reduced to writing before it is given, unless the

parties consent to its being given orally; and the written charges

or instructions form part of the record, may be taken by the jury

on retiring for deliberation, and are subjects of appeal. The

object of these provisions is to require all the instructions given

by the judge to the jury to be reduced to writing and recorded,

so that neither the jury, in deliberating upon the case, nor a court

of error, upon exceptions or appeal, can have any doubt what those

instructions were; and the giving, without the defendant's con-

sent, of charges or instructions to the jury, which are not so

reduced to writing and recorded, is error. Feriter v. State, 33

Ind. 283 ; State of Missouri v. Cooper, 45 Mo. 64 ; People v. San-

ford, 43 Cal. 29 ; Gile v. People, 1 Col. 60 ; State v. Potter, 15

Kan. 302.

The bill of exceptions shows that the presiding judge, after
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giving to the jury an instruction requested in writing by the

defendant upon the general burden of proof, proceeded of his

own motion, and without the defendant's consent, to read from

a printed book an instruction which was not reduced to writing,

nor filed with the other instructions in the case, but was referred

to in writing in these words only: "Follow this from Magazine

American Law Eegister, July, 1868, page 559 ;" and that to the

instruction so given an exception was taken and allowed.

This was a clear disregard of the provisions of the statute. The

instruction was not reduced to writing, filed, and made part of the

record, as the statute required. If the book was not given to

the jury when they retired for deliberation, they did not have

with them the whole of the instructions of the judge, as the statute

contemplated. If they were permitted to take the book with them

without the defendant's consent, that would of itself be ground

of exception. Merrill v. Nary, 10 Allen (Mass.), 416.

For those reasons, the judgment must be reversed, and the case

remanded with instructions to set aside the verdict and order a

New trial.

uch importance that it i proper to express an opinion upon it,
in order to preYent a repetition of the error upon another trial.
By the provision. of the Utah Code of Criminal Proc dure,
already referred to, the charge of the judge to the jury at th
trial must be reduced to writing before it is given, unless the
parties consent to its being given orally; and the written charges
or instruction form part of the record, may be taken by the jury
on retiring for deliberation, and are subjects of appeal. The
object of the e provi ions is to require all the instructions given
by the judge to the jury to be reduced to writing and recorded~
so that neither the jury, in deliberating upon the case, nor a court
of error, upon exceptions or appeal, can have any doubt what those
instructions were; and the giving, without the defendant'E consent, of charges or instructions to the jury, which are not so
reduced to writing and recorded, is error. Feriter v. State, 33
Ind. 283; State of Missouri v. Cooper, 45 Mo. 64; People v. Sanford, 43 Cal. 29; Gile v. People, 1 Col. 60; State v. Potter, 15
Kan. 302.
The bill of exceptions shows that the presiding judge.. after
giving to the jury an in truction requested in writing by the
defendant upon the general burden of proof, proceeded of his
own moticn, and without the defendant's consent, to read from
a printed book an in truction which was not reduced to writing,
nor filed with the other instructions in the case, but was referr d
to in writing in the e words only: "Follow this from Magazine
American Law RegLter, July, 1868, page 559 ;" and that to the
in truction o given an exception was taken and allowed.
This wa a clear di regard 9f the provisions of the statute. The
in truction was not reduced to writing, filed, and made part of the
record, as the statute required. If the book "\Va not giYen to
the jury when the r retired for deliberation, they did not have
with them the whole of the instructions of the judge, as the statute
contemplated. If they were permitted to take the book with them
without the defendant's consent, that would of it lf be ground
of exception. M err-ill v. Nary, 10 Allen (Mass.), 416.
For the e reason , the judgment must be reversed, and the ca
remanded with in tructions to set aside the verdict and ord r a

New trial.
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Suicide.

CommonweaUh v. i¥/nl% 123 Mass. 1,22. (1877.)

Indictment for the murder of Charles Eicker at Lowell, in the

county of Middlesex, on August 31, 1876. Trial before Ames and

S uicide.

Morton^ J J., who allowed a bill of exceptions in substance as fol-

lows:

It was proved that Charles Eicker came to his death by a shot

from a pistol in the hand of the defendant. The defendant intro-

Commonwealth v. lll inkJ 123 Mass. 422.

{1877.)

duced evidence tending to show that she had been engaged to be

married to Eicker; that an interview was had between them at

her room, in the course of which he expressed his intention to

break off the engagement and abandon her entirely ; that she there-

upon went to her trunk, took a pistol from it, and attempted to

■use it upon herself. Math the intention of taking her own life; that

Eicker then seized her to prevent her from accomplishing that

purpose, and a struggle ensued between them; and that in the

struggle the pistol was accidentally discharged, and in that way

the fatal wound inflicted upon him.

The jury were instructed on this point as follows: "If you
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believe the defendant's story, and that she did put the pistol to her

head with the intention of committing suicide, she was about to

do a criminal and unlawful act, and that which she had no right

to do. It is true, undoubtedly, that suicide cannot be punished

by any proceeding of the courts, for the reason that the person

who kills himself has placed himself beyond the reach of justice,

and nothing can be done. But the law, nevertheless, recognizes

suicide as a criminal act, and the attempt at suicide is also crimi-

nal. It would be the duty of any bystander who saw such an

attempt about to be made, as a matter of mere humanity, to inter-

fere and try to prevent it. And the rule is, that if a homicide is

produced by the doing of an unlawful act, although the killing

was the last thing that the person about to do it had in his mind,

it would be an unlawful killing, and the person w^ould incur the

responsibility which attaches to the crime of manslaughter.

"Then you are to inquire, among other things, and if you reach

that part of the case. Did this woman attempt to commit suicide

fo r the murder of Charle Ricker at Lowell, jn the
county of :J!Iiddle ex, on August 31, 18 6. Trial before Ames and
lliorton, JJ., who allowed a bill of exceptions in substance as follows :
It was proved that Charles Ricker came to his death by a shot
from a pistol in the hand of the defendant. The defendant introduced evidence tending to how that he had been engaged to be
married to Ricker; that an interview was had between them at
her room, in the cour e of which he e.xpre ed hi intention to
break off the engagement and abandon her entirely ; that he thereupon went to her trunk, took a pi tol from it, and attempted to
·use it upon herself, with the intention of taking her own life; that
Ricker then eized her to preYent her from accompli bing that
purpose, and a truggle ensued between them; and that in the
struggle the pi tol was accidentally di charged, and in that way
the fatal wound inflicted upon him.
The jury were instructed on this point as follows : " If you
believe the defendant's tory, and that he did put the pi tol to her
11ead with the intention of committing uicide, he wa about to
do a criminal and unlawful act, and that which he had no righ t
to do. It i true, undoubtedly, that uicide cannot be puni hed
by any proceeding of the courts, for the rea on that the person
who kills him elf ha placed him. elf beyond the reach of justice
and nothing can be done. But the law, neverthele , recognize
suicide as a criminal act, and the attempt at . ., uicide i also criminal. It would be the duty of any bystander who aw such au
attempt about to be made, a a matter of mere humanity, to interfe re and try to prevent it. And the rule i , that if a homicide i8
p roduced by the doing of an unlalfful act, although the killing
was the htst thing that the person about to do it had in hi mind,
it vroulcl be an unlawful killing, and the per on would incur the
rc~ pon ibility w·hich attache to the crime of man laughter.
"Then you are to inquire, among other thing , and if you reach
that part of the case, Did thi woman attempt to commit uicide
I N DI CTM E TT
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in the presence of Kicker? and, if she did, I shall have to instruct

you that he would have a right to interfere and try to prevent it

by force. He would have a perfect right, and I think I might go

further and say that it would be his duty, to take the pistol away

from her if he possibly could, and to use force for that purpose.

If then, in the course of the struggle on his part to get possession

of the pistol to prevent the person from committing suicide, the

pistol went off accidentally, and he lost his life in that way, it would

be a case of manslaughter, and it would not be one of those acci-

dents which would excuse the defendant from being held criminally

accountable.

"Did she get into such a condition of despondency and disap-

pointment that she was trying to commit suicide, and was about

to do so? If that was her condition, if she was making that

attempt, and he interfered to prevent it and got injured by an

.accidental discharge of the pistol, it would be manslaughter." The

jury returned a verdict of guilty of manslaughter; and the de-

fendant alleged exceptions.

Gray, C. J.
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The life of every human being is under the protection of the

law, and cannot be lawfully taken by himself, or by another with

Ills consent, except by legal authority. By the common law of

England, suicide was considered a crime against the laws of God

and man, the goods and chattels of the criminal were forfeited to

the King, his body had an ignominious burial in the highway, and

lie was deemed a murderer of himself and a felon, felo de se.

in the preuen e of Ricker? and, if he did, I hall have to in ... tnrnt
you that he would have a right to interfere and try to pr v nt it
by force. He would have a perfect right an l I think I might go
further and ay that it would be hi" duty to take the pi tol away
from her if he po . . ibly could, and to u e force for that purpo e.
If then, in the cour e of the truggle on his part to get po se ion
of the pistol to prevent the person from committing uicid , the
pistol went off accidentally, and he lost his life in that way, it would
be a ca e of man laughter, and it would not be one of tho e accidents which would excuse the defendant from being held criminally
.accountable.
"Did she get into such a condition of despondency and di appointment that he was trying to commit uicide, and wa about
io do o? If that was her condition, if he was making that
.attempt, and he interfered to prevent it and got injured by an
,accidental discharge of the pi tol, it would be man laughter." The
jury returned a verdict of guilty of man laughter; and the deiendant alleged exception .

Hales V. Petit, Plowd. 253, 261. 3 Inst. 54. 1 Hale P. C. 411-

417. 2 Hcile P. C. 62. I Hawk. c. 27. 4 Bl. Com. 95, 189, 190.

■"He who kills another upon his desire or command is, in the judg-

ment of the law, as much a murderer as if lie had done it merely

of his own head." 1 Hawk. c. 27, § 6. One who persuades an-

other to kill himself, and is present when he does so, is guilty of

murder as a principal in the second degree; and if two mutually

agree to kill themselves together, and the means employed to pro-

duce death take effect upon one only, the survivor is guilty of the

murder of the one who dies. Bac. Max. rcg. 15. Rex v. Dyson,

Piuss. & Ey. 523. Regina v. Alison, 8 Car. & P. 418. One who

encourages another to commit suicide, but is not present at the

act which causes the death, is an accessory before the fact, and

c.

J.
The life of every human being is under the protection of the
law, and cannot be lawfully taken by himself, or by another with
bi. consent, except by legal authority. By the common law of
England, uicide was con._,idered a crime again t the law. of God
and man, the good :ind chattels of the criminal were forfeited to
the King, hi body had an ignominiou burial in the highway, and
b e was deemed a mmderer of him elf and a felon, felo de se.
Hales v. Petit, Plowd. 253, 261. 3 Inst. 54. 1 Hale P. C. 41141 . 2 Hale P. C. 62. I Hawk. c. 9 • 4 Bl. Com. 95; 1 9, 190.
·"He who kill another upon hi desire or command i , in the judgment of the law, as much a murderer as if he had done it merely
{)f hi own head." 1 Hawk. c. 27, § 6. One who per uade another to kill him elf, :md is present \.Vhen he loe o, is guilty of
JTiurder as a principal in the econd degree; and if two mutually
.ao-ree to kill them elve together, and the m an. mploy"d to pro<luc death take effect upon one only the urvivor is guilt) of the
mur for of the one who dies. Bae. :M:ax. reg. 15. Rex v. Dy on,
Rus . & Ry. 523. Regina v. Afoon, 8 Car. & P. 418. On who
en ·ourage anoth r to commit ui ide but i. not pre ent nt the
a t which cau ~ e th death i an a ·ce~" ory h for th fact, an
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at common law escaped punishment only because his principal

could not be first tried and convicted. Eussell's case, 1 Moody,

356. Begina v. Leddington, 9 Car. & P. 79. And an attempt to-

commit suicide is held in England to be punishable as a misde-

meanor. Begina v. Doody, 6 Cox C. C. 463. Begina v. Burgess^

Leigh & Cave, 258; S. C. 9 Cox C. C. 247.

In the Colony of Massachusetts, by the Body of Liberties of

1641, all lands and heritages were declared to be free, not only

from all feudal burdens, but from all "escheats and forfeitures

upon the death of parents or ancestors, be they natural, casual

or judicial," to which later codes, besides inserting the word "un-

natural," added "and that forever." Body of Liberties, art. 10;

28 Mass. Hist. Coll. 218. Mass. Col. Laws (ed. 1660), 48; (ed.

1672) 88; Ane. Chart. 147. The principle thus declared has

always been followed in practice; and there has accordingly never

been in Massachusetts any forfeiture upon one's death on convic-

tion or suicide, unless under some particular statute creating the

crime, of which no instance is remembered. 5 Dane Ab. 4, 251,

252. 7 Dane Ab. 318. But suicide continued to be considered
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malum in se, and a felony.

In 1660, the Legislature "judgeth that God calls them to bear

testimony against such wicked and unnatural practices, that others

may be deterred therefrom," and therefore enacted that every self-

murderer "shall be denied the privilege of being buried in the com-

mon burying-place of Christians, but shall be buried in some

common highway where the selectmen of the town where such,

person did inhabit shall appoint, and a cart-load of stones laid

upon the grave, as a brand of infamy, and as a warning to others.

to beware of the like damnable practices." 4 Mass. Col. Rec. pt. i.

432; Mass. Col. Laws (ed. 1672), 137; Anc. Chart. 187. That

statute, though fallen into disuse, continued in force until many

years after the adoption of the Constitution of the Common-

wealth. 7 Dane Ab. 208, 298.

An early statute of the Province directed that the form of ver-

dict upon a coroner's inquest should state "where, at what time,

by what means, with what instrument and in what manner the

party was killed or came by his death," and that "if it appear to

be self-murder, the inquisition must conclude after this manner,

viz. : And so the jurors aforesaid say upon their oaths, that the

said A. B. in manner and form aforesaid, then and there volun-

at common law e.. caped p~mishment only because his principal
<..:oulc1 not be first tried and convicted. Russell's case, 1 Moody,
356. Regina v. Leddington, 9 Car. & P. 79. And an attempt to.
ommit suicide is held in England to be punishable as a misdemeanor. Regina v. Doody, 6 Cox C. C. 463. Regina v. Bt1,rgess,.
Leigh & Cave) 25 ; S. C. 9 Cox C. C. 247.
In the Colony of Massachusetts, by the Body of Liberties of
16-±1, all lands and heritages were declared to be free, not only
from all feudal burdens, but from all "escheats and forfeitures·
upon the death of parents or ance tors, be they natural, casual
or judicial," to which later codes, be ides inserting the word "unnatural," added "and that forever." Body of Liberties, art. 10;
28 Mass. Hist. Coll. 218. Mass. Col. Laws (ed. 1660), 48; (ed.
1672) 88; Anc. Chart. 147. The principle thus declared ha
always been followed in practice; and there ha accordingly never
been in Ma sachu etts any forfeiture upon one's death on conviction or suicide, unless under some particular statute creating the
crime_, of which no in tance is remembered. 5 Dane Ab. 4, 251,.
952 . 7 Dane Ab. 318. But suicide continued to be considered
malttm in se, and a felony.
In 1660, the Legislature "judgeth that God calls them to bear
testimony again, t ocUCh wicked and unnatural practices, that otherS'
may be deterred therefrom" and therefore enacted that every elfmurderer " hall be denied the privilege of being buried in the common burying-place of Chri tian , but shall be buried in some
common highway where the selectmen of the town where such
per._on did inhabit shall appoint, <rnd a cart-load of stones laid
upon the grave, a" a brand of infamy, and as a warning to other .
to beware of the like damnable practices." 4 :M:a . ., s. Col. Rec. pt. i.
43'2; Ma. Col. Law ( d.16~),131; Anc. Chart. 187. Tha t
statute, though fallen into disuse, continued in force until many
years after the adoption of the Con titution of the Commonwealth. 7 Dane Ab. 208, 298.
An early statute of the Province directed that the form of verdie:t upon a coroner's inquest hould state "where, at what time,
by what means, with what in trument and in what manner the
party was killed or came by his d ath,' and that "if it appear to.
be _elf-murder, the inquisition must conclude after this manner,
viz.: And o the juror aforesaid ay upon their oaths, that the
aid A. B. in manner and form aforesaid, then and there volun-
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tarily and feloniously, as a felon of himself, did kill and murder

himself, against the peace of our sovereign Lord the King, his

crown and dignity." Prov. St. 1700-1701 (12 W. III.) c. 3, § 7;

1 Prov. Laws (State ed.), 429; Anc. Chart. 350. This accorded

with the usual, though perhaps not necessary, form at common

law. 1 Saund. 356, note. A statute, passed at the close of the

American Eevolution, upon the same subject, reenacted these direc-

tions, except in substituting for the last clause, "against the peace

and dignity of the Commonwealth and the laws of the same."

St. 1783, c. 43, § 2.

In CommomceaUh v. Boiven, 13 Mass. 356, it was held that

where one counselled another to commit suicide, who by reason of

his advice, and in his presence, did so, the adviser was guilty

of murder. The grounds of the decision of that case appear more

clearly in the full report of the trial in a pamphlet published at

Northampton, in 1816, from which the statement of the case in

13- Mass. is taken.

The indictment, draAvn by Perez Morton, Attorney General,

contained two counts. The first count alleged that Jonathan
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Jewett, with a cord, of which he had tied and fastened one end

around his neck, and the other end around the iron gate of a

window, "feloniously, wilfully and of his malice aforethought,

did hang and strangle himself," and by reason thereof died, and

so, "as a felon of himself, in manner and form aforesaid, feloni-

ously, wilfully and of his malice aforethought, did kill and murder

himself." This count then went on to allege that the defendant,

*T3efore the felony and self-murder aforesaid," "feloniously, wil-

fully and of his malice aforethought, did counsel, hire, persuade

and procure the said Jonathan Jewett the felony and murder of

himself as aforesaid, in manner and by the means aforesaid, to do

and commit," and so the defendant the said Jewett, "in manner

and form aforesaid, feloniously, wilfully and of his malice afore-

thought, did kill and murder." The second count was an ordinary

count for murder, alleging that the defendant murdered Jewett

by tying and fastening and procuring to be tied and fastened a

cord around his neck and around the iron grate of a window, and

thus hanging, strangling and suffocating him, and causing and

procuring him to be hung, strangled and sufEocated. Bowen's

Trial, 3-6.

At the trial, before Chief Justice Parker and Justices Jackson

taril ' and feloniou ly, a a felon of him elf, did kill and murder
him elf again t the peace of our ov reign Lor 1 the King hi
crown and lignity." Prov. St. L 00-1 01 (1 \\. III.) c. 3, § 7;
1 Prov. La\\v (Stat ed.), 4 9 · Anc. Chart. 350. This accorded
wi i.h the u ~ ual_, though perhap ' not nece sary, form at common
law. 1 Saund. 356 note. A tatute, pa ed at th clo e of th American Revolution, upon the ame ubject, r eenacted these directions, except in substituting for the last clau e, "against the peace
and dignity of the Commonwealth and the laws of the ame."
St. 17 3, c. 43, § 2.
In Cornrnonu ealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356, it was held that
where one coun elled another to commit uicide, who by r eason of
his advice, an<l in his presence: did so, the adviser was guilty
()f murder. The grounds of the decision of that case appear more
clearly in the full report of the trial in a pamphlet published at
.N ortharnpton, in 1816, from which the statement of the case in
13- Mass. is taken.
The indictment, drawn by Perez Morton, Attorney Grneral,
contained two count . The first count alleged that Jonathan
J ewett, with a cord, of which he had tied and fastened one end
8.round hi neck, and the other end around the iron gate of a
window, ""feloniou ly, wilfully and of hi malice afor thought,
did hang and trangle him elf," an 1 by r ason thereof died: and
so, "as a f lon of himself, in manner and form aforesaid, feloni()usly, wilfully and of hi malice aforethought, did kill and murder
him elf." Thi count then went on to allege that the defendant,
''before the felony and self-murder aforesaid," "feloniou ly, wilfully and of his malice aforethought, did counsel, hire, persuad
and procme th aiu Jonathan J ewett th felony and murd er of
himself as aforesaid, in manner and by the mean afore aid, to do
and commit n and o the defendant the aid J ewett, "in manner
and form afore ~aid, feloniously, wilfully and of hi malice afor thought, did kill and murder." The secon 1 count wa an ordinary
count for murder, alleging that the defendant murdered J ewett
by tying and fa stening and procuring to be tied and fa t ened a
cord around hi neck and around the iron grate of a window, and
thu hanging, trangling and u:ffocating him, and causing and
prncuring him to be hung, trangled and uffocat d. Bowen'~
Trial, 3-6.
At the trial, before Chi £ Ju tice Park r and Ju tice Jack on
0
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and Putnam, the attorney general put in evidence, without objec-

tion, the verdict of the coroner's jury, finding in substance that

Jewett was found dead in prison, with a cord around his neck

and around the iron grate, and concluding, in the form prescribed

by the St. of 1783, that he "feloniously and as a felon of himself

killed and murdered himself." Bowen's Trial, 12. The defend-

ant's counsel, in argument, having stated that the first count

charged the defendant as an accessory before the fact by aiding

and abetting the murder, and the second count as the actor or

principal in the murder, the Chief Justice suggested that he con-

ceived both counts to charge the defendant as principal, and to

this the attorney general assented, p. 22.

The Chief Justice, in charging the jury, said: "You have

heard it said, gentlemen, that admitting the facts alleged in the

indictment, still they do not amount to murder; for Jewett him-

self was the immediate cause and perpetrator of the act which

terminated in his own destruction. That the act of Bowen was

innocent no one will pretend, but is his offence embraced by the

technical definition of a principal in murder? Self-destruction
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is doubtless a crime of awful turpitude; it is considered in the.

eye of the law of equal heinousness with the murder of one by

another. In this offence, it is true the actual murderer escapes

punishment; for the very commission of the crime, which the

law would otherwise punish with its utmost rigor, puts the oifender

beyond the reach of its infliction. And in this he is distinguished

from other murderers. But his punishment is as severe as the

nature of the case will admit; his body is buried in infamy, and'

in England his property is forfeited to the King. Now if the

murder of one's self is felon}^, the accessory is equally guilty as

if he had aided and abetted in the mui'der of A. by B. ; and I

apprehend that if a man murders himself, and one stands by, aid-

ing in and abetting the death, he is as guilty as if he had con-

ducted himself in the same manner where A. murders B. And if

one becomes the procuring cause of death, though absent, he is

accessory." Bowen's Trial, 51, 52. It is evident that this part of

the charge related solely to the first count; for the introductory

words "admitting the facts alleged in the indictment" could have

no application to the second count; and what was said about an

accessory was comparatively immaterial, because the defendant,'

as we have already seen, was charged as a principal only.

and Putnam, the attorney general put in evidence, without objection, the verdict of the coroner's jury, finding in sub tance that
Jewett was found dead in prison, with a cord around his neck
an~1 around the iron grate, and concluding, in the fo rm prescribed
by the St. of 1783, that he "feloniou. ly and a a felon of him elf
killed and murdered himself." Bowen's Trial, 12. The defend~mt's counsel, in argument, having tated that the first count
charged the defendant as an acces ory before the fact by aiding
and abetting the murder, and th econd count as the actor or
principal in the murder, the Chief Justice suggested that he conceived both counts to charge the defendant as principal, and to
this the attorney general a sented. p. 22.
rrhe Chief Ju tice, in charging the jury, said : "You have
heard it said, gentlemen, that admitting the fact alleged in the
indictment, till they do not amount to murder; for Jewett himself was the immediate cau e and l)Crpetrator of the act which
t erminated in hi own destruction. That the act of Bowen wa ~
innocent no one will pretend, but is hi offence embraced by the
technical definition of a principal in murder? Self-de truction
is doubtless a crime of awful turpitude; it i considered in the-.
eye of the law of equal heinousnes with the murder of one by
another. In thi offence, it i true the actual murderrr escapen
puni··hment; for the very commi sion of the crime, which th
law would otherwi, e puni h with it utmo t ri gor, puts the offender
beyond the rcrich of its infliction . And in thi he is di tinguishecl
from other murderer . But hi puni hment is as severe as the
nature of the case will admit; hi body is buried in infamy, and
in England hi property i forfeited to t he King.
ow if th
murder of one' elf i felony, the ace sory is equally guilty a .
if he had aided and abetted in the musd r of A. by B. ; and I
apprehend that if a man murder him elf, and one stands by, aiding in and abetting the death, he is a guilty as if he had conducted himself in the same manner where A. murders B. And if
one become the procuring cause of death, though absent, he i
acres ory." Bowen's Trial, 51, 59 • It is evident that this part of
the charge related solely to the first count; for the introductory
words "admitting the facts alleged in the indictment" could have
no application to the second count; and what was aid about an
acce sory was comparatively immaterial, becau e the defendant,.'
a we have already seen, was charged as a principal only.
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Suicide has not ceased to be unlawful and criminal in this

Commonwealth by the simple repeal of the Colony Act of 1660

by the St. of 1823, c. 143, which (like the corresponding St. of

■4 G, IV. c. 52, enacted by the British Parliament within a year

before) may well have had its origin in consideration for the

feelings of innocent surviving relatives; nor by the briefer direc-

tions as to the form of coroner's inquests in the Eev. Sts. c. 1-10,

§ 8, and the Gen. Sts. c. 175, § 9, which in this, as in most other

matters, have not repeated at length the forms of legal proceed-

ings set forth in the statutes codified; nor by the fact that the

Legislature, having in the general revisions of the statutes meas-

ured the degree of punishment for attempts to commit offences by

the punishment prescribed for each offence if actually committed,

has, intentionally or inadvertently, left the attempt to commit

suicide without punishment, because the completed act would not

be punished in any manner. Eev. Sts. c. 133, § 12. Gen. Sts.

e. 168, § 8. Commonwealth v. Dennis, 105 Mass. 162. After all

these changes in the statutes, the point decided in Bowen's case

was ruled in the same way by Chief Justice Bigelow and Justices
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Dewey, Metcalf and Chapman, in a case which has not been re-

ported. Commonwealth v. Pratt, Berkshire, 1862.

Since it has been provided by statute that "any crime pun-

ishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison is a felony,

and no other crime shall be so considered," it may well be that

suicide is not technically a felony in this Commonwealth. Gen.

Sts. c. 168, § 1. St. 1852, c. 37, § 1. But being unlawful and

criminal as malum in se, any attempt to commit it is likewise

unlawful and criminal. Every one has the same right and duty

to interpose to save a life from being so unlawfully and criminally

taken, that he would have to defeat an attempt unlawfully to take

the life of a third person. Fairfax, J., in 22 E. IV. 45, pi. 10.

Marler v. Ayliffe, Cro. Jac. 134. 2 Eol. Ab. 559. 1 Hawk. c. 60,

§ 23. And it is not disputed that any person who, in doing or

attempting to do an act which is unlawful and criminal, kills an-

other, though not intending his death, is guilty of criminal homi-

cide, and, at the least, of manslaughter.

The only doubt that we have entertained in this ease is, whether

the act of the defendant, in attempting to kill herself, was not so

malicious, in the legal sense, as to make the killing of another

Suicide ha not cea ed to be unlawful and criminal in thi
Commonwealth b) the imple repeal of the Colony ct of 1660
b) the St. of 1 3, c. 143, which (like the corre ponding t. of
-1 G, IV. c. 52, enacted by the Briti h Parliament within a year
before) may well have had its origin in con ideration for the
feeling of innocent urviving relative ; nor by th briefer direction a to the form of coroner inque t in the Rev. St . c. 1±0,
§ 8, and the Gen. St . c. 1 5, § 9 which in thi , a in mo t other
matter , have not repeated at length the form of legal prnceeding et forth in the tatute codified; nor b) the fact that the
Legislature, having in the general revision of the statutes mea ured the degree of punishment for attempt to commit offence by
the puni hment pre cribed for each offence if actuall} committed,
ha , intentionally or inadvertently 1 ft the attempt to commit
uicide without puni hment, because tl:.e completed act would not
be pund1ed in any manner. Rev. Sts. c. 133, § 12. Gen. t .
c. 168, 3 8. Commonwealth v. Dennis, 105 :Ma . 162. After all
these change in the statute , the point decided in Bowen'- ca e
was ruled in the ame way by Chief Justice Bigelow and Ju tice
Dewe}, Metcalf and Chapman, in a case whi ch has no~ been reported. Go11imonu·ealth v. Pratt, Berkshire, 1 69 .
Since it ha · been provided by tatute that "any crime puni hable h) death or irnpri onment in the tate pri on i a felony,
and no other crime hall be o con idered," it may well be that
suie:ide i not technically a felony in thi Commonwealth. Gen.
St . c. 168, § 1. St. 1852, c. 37, § 1. But being unlawful and
criminal as malum in se, any attempt to commit it is likewi e
unlawful and criminal. Every one ha the am right and duty
to interpo..,e to "ave a life from b ing o unlawfully and criminally
taken, that he would have to de£eat an attempt unlawfully to take
the li£e of a third per .. on. Fairfax, J., in 22 E. IV. 45, pl. 10.
Marler v. Ayliffe, Oro. J ac. 13-±. 2 Rol. Ab. 559. 1 Hawk. c. GO,
§ 23 . And it i not di puted that any per on who, in doing or
attempting to do an act which is unlawful and criminal, kill another, though not intending his death, i guilt) of criminal homicide, and, at the least, of manslaughter.
The only doubt that we have entertained in thi .. case is, wh th r
the act of the defendant, in attempting to kill hersel£, wa not o
maliciou , in the 1 aal en e, a to make the killing of anoth r
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person, in the attempt to carry out her piirpose, murder, and

whether the instructions given to the jury were not therefore too

favorable to the defendant. Exceptions overruled.

Distinction Between. Murder and Manslaughter.

People V. Freel, J^S Cal. JfSG. (1S7J,.)

person, in the attempt to carry out her purpo"'e, murder, and
whether the in truction given to the jury were not therefore too
Exception overruled.
favorable to the defendant.

The defendant was indicted for the crime of murder, alleged

to have been committed at San Francisco, on the first day of

November, 1873, by killing one Edward W. Allen. Allen kept a

saloon, and a crowd of persons having collected there so as to

Distinction B(dween lliurrler and Manslaughter.

obstruct his doorway, he went from his place behind the bar with a

cane or stick to clear the passage-way. A difficulty took place,

P eople \'. Freel, 48 Cal . 43G. (1 14.)

during which he was killed. The defendant claimed to have been

justified, but the testimony was of such a character, that it became

a question, if he was not justified, whether the offense was murder

or manslaughter. The defendant was convicted of murder in the

second degree, and appealed.

By the Court, Niles, J. :

The Court instructed the jur}^ as follows: "You will also ob-

serve that the difference between murder and manslaughter is,
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that in manslaughter there is no intention whatever either to kill

or to do bodily harm. The killing is the unintentional result of a

sudden heat of passion, or of an unlawful act committed without

due caution or circumspection."

This is clearly erroneous. ^Yhether the homicide amounts to

murder or to manslaughter merely, does not depend upon the pres-

ence or absence of the intent to kill. In either case there may be

a present intention to kill at the moment of the commission of the

act. But when the mortal blow is struck in the heat of passion,

excited by a quarrel, sudden, and of sufficient violence to amount

to adequate provocation, the law, out of forbearance for the weak-

ness of human nature, will disregard the actual intent and will

reduce the offense to manslaughter. In such case, although the

intent to kill exists, it is not that deliberate and malicious intent

which is an essential element in the crime of murder.

Under the circumstances of this case, as shown by the testimony,

it was important that the distinctions lietween the several grades

The defendant wa indicted for the crime of murder, alleged
to have been committed at San Franci co on the first day of
November, 1 13, by killing one Edward \f. Allen. Allen kept a
aloon, and a crowd of per on having collected there so a to
ob truct hi doorway, he w nt from hi place behind the bar with a
cane or tick to clear the pa age-way. A difficulty took place,
during which he wa killed. The defendant claimed to have been
ju tified, but the testimony wa of uch a cha racter, that it became
a question, if he was not ju tified, whether the offense wa murder
or man laughter. The d fendant wa convicted of murder in the
second degree, and appealed.
By the Court, NILES, J.:
The Court instructed the jury a follows : "You will also observe that the difference between murder and man laughter i ,
that in man laughter there i no intention whatever ither to kill
or to do bodily harm. The killing i the unintentional re ult of a
sudden heat of pas ion, or of an unlawful act committed without
due caution or circum pection."
rhis is clearly erroneou . Whether the homicide amount to
murder or to man laughter merel}, doe not depend upon the pre cnce or absence of the intent to kill. In either ca e there may be
a pre ent intention to kill at the moment of the commission of the
act. But when the mortal blow i struck in the heat of pas ion,
excited by a quarrel, udden, and of ufficient violence to amount
to adequate provocation, the law, out of forbearance for the weaknes of human nature, will di regard the actual intent and will
reduce the offense to man laughter. In uch ca e, although the
intent to kill exi t , it is not that deliberate and malicious intent
which is an e sential element in the crime of murder.
Under the circum tance of thi ca e, a hown by the te timony,
it was jmportant that the distinctions between the everal grade~
1
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of homicide should be correctl}- stated to the jury. They couhl

hardly fail to be misled by the erroneous instruction we have

noticed.

Several other points were made . by the counsel for defendant,

which we do not deem it necessary to discuss.

Judgment and order reversed, and cause remanded for a new

trial.

Voluntary Manslaugliter.

Maker v. People, 10 Mich. 212. (1862.)

Chrtstiancy, J. :

The prisoner was charged with an assault with intent to kill

<>f homicide hould be correctly tated t the jury. They coul l
hardl:; fail to b misled bY the rron ou instru tion we han:!
noticed.
everal other point w re mad by the coun el for defendant,
which we do not deem it nece ary to di cu .
Judgment and order rever . . ed, and cau e remanded for a new
-trial.

and murder one Patrick Hunt. The evidence on the part of the

prosecution was that the prisoner entered the saloon of one Michael

Voluntary Manslaughter.

Foley, in the village of Houghton, where said Hunt was standing

with several other persons; that prisoner entered through a back

door, and by a back way leading to it, in his shirt sleeves, in a

Maher v. People, 10 Mich.

state of great perspiration, and appearing to be excited, and, on

12.

{1862.)

being asked if he had been at work, said he had been across the

lake; that, on entering the saloon, he immediately passed nearly

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t39z97p86
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

through it, to where said Hunt was standing, and, on his way

towards Hunt, said something, but it did not appear what, or to

whom ; that, as soon as the prisoner came up to where Hunt was

standing, he fired a pistol at Hunt, the charge of which took effect

upon the head of Hunt, in and through the left ear, causing a

severe wound thereon ; by reason of which Hunt in a few moments

fell to the floor, was partially deprived of his sense of hearing in

that ear, and received a severe shock to his system, which caused

him to be confined to his bed for about a week, under the care of a

physician ; that, immediately after the firing of the pistol, prisoner

left the saloon, nothing being said by Hunt or the prisoner. It did

not appear how, or with what, the pistol was loaded. The prisoner

offered evidence tending to show an adulterous intercourse between

his wife and Hunt on the morning of the assault, and within less

than half an hour previous ; that the prisoner saw them going into

the woods together about half an hour before tlie assault ; that on

their coming out of the woods the prisoner followed them imme-

diately (evidence having already been given that the prisoner had

12

J.:
The pri oner wa charged with an a.., ault with intent to kill
and murder one Patrick Hunt. The evidence on the part of the
prosecution was that the prisoner entered the saloon of one Michael
Foley in the village of Houghton, where said Hunt was standing
with everal other persons; that prisoner entered through a back
door and by a back wa3 leading to it, in hi shirt sleeves; in a
state of great perspiration, and appearing to be excited: and, on
being asked if he bad been at work, aid he had been across the
lake; that, on entering the saloon, he immediately passed nearly
through it, to where said Hunt was tanding, and, on his way
towards Hunt aid omething, but it did not appear what, or to
whom; that, as soon as the pri oner came up to where Hunt wa
standing, he fired a pi tol at Runt, the charge of which took effect
upon the head of Hunt, in and through the left ear, causing a
evere wound thereon; by rea on of which Hunt in a few mom nt~
fell to the floor, was partially deprived of hi sense of hearing in
that ear, and received a evere hock to hi y tem, which cau ed
him to be confined to hi bed for about a week, under the care of a
phy ician; that, immediately after the firing of the pi tol, pri oner
left the aloon, nothing being aid by Hunt or the prisoner. It did
not appear how, or with what, the pi tol wa loaded. The pri oner
offered evidence tending to how an adulterou intercourse between
hi wife and Hunt on the morning of the a sault, and within 1 s
than half an hour previou ; that the pri oner saw them going into
th wood together about half an hour before the a a ult; that on
their coming out of the wood th pri on r followed th m imm <liately (evidence having already b en giv n that the pri oner had
CHRISTIA CY,

12

178 Feloxioi's Ho:micide

118

FELOXIOL"S Ro~ncrnE

followed them to the woods) ; that on their coming out of the

woods the prisoner followed them, and went after said Hunt into

the saloon, where, on his arrival, the assault was committed ; that

the prisoner, on his way to the saloon, a few minutes before en-

tering it, was met by a friend, who informed him that Hunt and

the prisoner's wife had had sexual intercourse the day before in

the woods. This evidence was rejected by the court, and the

prisoner excepted. Was the evidence properly rejected? This is-

the main question in the case, and its decision must depend upon

the question whether the proposed evidence would have tended to

reduce the killing, had death ensued, from murder to manslaughter,

or, rather, to have given it the character of manslaughter, instead

of murder? If the homicide, in case death had ensued, would

have been but manslaughter, then defendant could not be guilty

of the assault with intent to murder, but only of a simple assault

and battery. The question therefore involves essentially the same

principles as where evidence is offered for a similar purpose in a

prosecution for murder; except that, in some cases of murder, an

actual intention to kill need not exist; but, in a prosecution for
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an assault with intent to murder, the actual intention to kill must

be found, and that under circumstances which would make the

killing murder.

Homicide, or the mere killing of one person by another, does

not, of itself, constitute murder; it may be murder, or man-

slaughter, or excusable, or justifiable homicide, and therefore

entirely innocent according to the circumstances, or the disposition

or state of mind or purpose, which induced the act. It is not,

therefore, the act which constitutes the offense, or determines its

character: but the quo animo, the disposition, or state of mind,

with which it is done. "Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea."

People V. Pond, 8 Mich. 150.

To give the homicide the legal character of murder, all the

authorities agree that it must have been perpetrated with malice

prepense or aforethought. This malice is just as essential an in-

gredient of the offence as the act which causes the death; without

the concurrence of both, the crime cannot exist; and, as every

man i? presumed innocent of the offense with which he is charged,

till he is proved to be guilty, this presumption must apply equally

to both ingredients of the offense, — to the malice as well as to the

killing. Hence, though the principle seems to have been sometimes

follo\Vecl them to the woods); that on their coming out of the·
woods the prisoner followed them, and went after said Runt into
the saloon, where, on his arrival, the assault was committed; that.
the prisoner, on his way to the saloon, a few minutes before entering it, was met by a friend, who informed him that Hunt and
the prisoner's wife had had sexual intercourse the 'day before in
the woods. Thi evidence was rej ected by the court, and the
prisoner excepted. Wa the evidence properly rejected? This is.
the main question in the case, and its decision must depend upon
the question whether the proposed evidence would have tended to
reduce the killing, had death ensued, from murder to man laughter,
or, rather, to have given it the character of man laughter, in tead
of murder? If the homicide, in case death had ensued, would
have been but manslaughter, then defendant could not be guilty
of the as ault with intent to murder, but only of a simple assault
and battery. The question therefore involve e sentially the ame
principle as where evidence i offered for a similar purpo e in a.
pro ecution for murder; except that, in some cases of murder, an
actual intention to kill need not exist; but, in a prosecution for
an assault with intent to murder, the actual intention to kill must
be found, and that under circum tances which would make the
killing murder.
Homicide, or the mere killing of one person by another, does
not, of itself, con titute murder; it may be murder, or manslaughter, or excu able, or ju tifiable homicide, and therefore
entirely innocent according to the circum tances, or the di position
or state of mind or purpose, which induced the act. It is not,
therefore, the act which constitutes the o:ffen e, or determines its
character ; but the quo animo, the di position, or state of mind,
with which it i clone. "Actus non facit r eum ni i men it rea."
P eople v. Pond, 8 Mich. 150.
To giYe the homicide the legal character of murder, all the
authorities agree that it must have been perpetrated with malice
prepense or aforethonght. Thi malice i just as e ential an ingredient of the off nee a the act which cau e the death; without
the concurrence of both, the crime cannot exist; and, a every
man is presumed innocent of the o:ffen e with which he is charged,
till he is proved to be guilty, this pre umption must apply equally
to both ingredients of the offense,-to the malice as well a to the
killing. Hence, though the principle seems to have been sometimes
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overlooked, the burden of proof, as to each, rests equally upon the

prosecution, though the one may admit and require more direct

proof than the other; malice, in most cases, not being susceptible

of direct proof, but to be established by inferences more or less

strong, to be drawn from the facts and circumstances connected

with the killing, and which indicate the disposition or state of

mind with which it was done. It is for the court to define the

legal import of the term "malice aforethought," or, in other words,

that state or disposition of mind which constitutes it; but the

question whether it existed or not, in the particular instance, would,

upon principle, seem to be as clearly a question of fact for the

jury, as any other fact in the cause, and that they must give such

weight to the various facts and circumstances accompanying the

act, or in any way bearing upon the question, as, in their judg-

ment, they deserve, and that the court have no right to withdraw

the question from the jury by assuming to draw the proper in-

ferences from the whole, or any part of, the facts proved, as pre-

sumption of law. If courts could do this, juries might be required

to find the fact of malice where they were satisfied from the whole
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evidence it did not exist. I do not here speak of those cases in

which the death is caused in the attempt to commit some other

offense, or in illegal resistance to public officers, or other classes of

cases which may rest upon peculiar grounds of public policy, and

which may or may not form an exception; but of ordinary cases,

such as this would have been, had death ensued. It is not neces-

sary here to enumerate all the elements which enter into the legal

definition of "malice aforethought." It is sufficient to say that,

within the principle of all recognized definitions, the homicide

must, in all ordinary cases, have been committed with some degree

of coolness and deliberation, or, at least, under circumstances in

which ordinan^ men, or the aver-age of men recognized as peaceable

citizens, would not be liable to have their reason clouded or ob-

scured by passion; and the act must be prompted by, or the cir-

cumstances indicate that it sprung from, a wicked, depraved or

malignant mind, — a mind which, even in its habitual condition,

and when excited by no provocation which would be liable to give

undue control to passion in ordinary men, is cruel, wanton, or

malignant, reckless of human life, or regardless of social duty.

But if the act of killing, though intentional, be committed un-

der the influence of passion, or in heat of blood, produced by an

overlooked the burden of proof a to acl1, re t equally upon the
pro ecution, though the one may admit and require more direct
proof than the other; malice, in most ca e , not being u ceptible
of direct proof but to be e tabli hed by inferences more or le
trong, to be drawn from the facts and circum tances connected
with the killing, and which indicate the dispo ition OT state of
mind with which it was done. It is for the court to define the
legal import of the term "malice aforethought" or in other word ,
that state or di positio•n of mind which con titutes it; but the
question whether it exi ted or not, in the particular instance, would,
upon principle, eeem to be a clearly a question of faot for the
jury a any other fact in the cause, and that they mu t give such
weight to the variou facts and circumstances accompanying the
act, or in an) way bearing upon the que tion, a , in their ju lgment, they de ervc, and that the court have no right to withdraw
the que. tion from the jury by as urning to draw the proper inferences from the whole, or any part of, the fact proved, as presumption of law. If courts could do thi , juri s might be required
to find the fact of malice wher e they were ati fied from th whole
eYidence it did not exi t. I do not here peak of those cases in
which the death is caused in the attempt to commit ome other
offen e, or in illegal re istance to public officers, or other clas. es of
ca e which may re t upon peculiar grounds of public policy, and
which may or may not fm:m an exception; but of ordinary case ,
uch a thi would have been, had death ensued. It is not nece . ary here to enumerate all the elements which enter into the legal
definition of "malice aforethought." It is ufficient to av that,
within the principle of all recognized definition , the homicide
mu t, in all orlinary cases, have been committed with ome degree
of coolne s ancl deliberation, or, at least, und r circum tances in
which ordinary men, or the aver-age of men recognized a.s peaceable
citizens, would not be liable to have their reason clouded or obcurcd by pa" ion; and the act mu._ t be prompted by, or the cirum tance inc1icate that it prung from, a wicked, depraved or
malianant mind,-a mind which, even in its habitual condition,
an 1 when excited by no provocation which would be liable to give
un lue control to pa ion in ordinary men, i cruel, wanton, or
malignant, reckles of human life, or regardle of o ial duty.
But if the act of killing, though intentional, be committ d under the influence of passion, or in heat of blood, produced by an
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adequate or reasonable provocation, and before a reasonable time

lias elapsed for the blood to cool and reason to resume its habitual

control, and is the result of the temporary excitement, by which

the control of reason was disturbed, rather than of any wickedness

of heart or cruelty or recklessness of disposition, then the law,

out of indulgence to the frailty of human nature, or, rather in

recognition of the laws upon which human nature is constituted,

very properly regards the offense as of a less heinous character

than murder, and gives it the designation of manslaughter.

To what extent the passions must be aroused, and the dominion

of reason disturbed, to reduce the offense from murder to man-

slaughter, the cases are by no means agreed; and any rule which

should embrace all the cases that have been decided in reference

to this point would come very near obliterating, if it did not en-

tirely obliterate, all distinction between murder and manslaughter

in such cases. We must therefore endeavor to discover the prin-

ciple upon which the question is to be determined. It will not do

to hold that reason should be entirely dethroned, or overpowered

by passion, so as to destroy intelligent volition. State v. Hill, 4
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Dev. & B. 491; Haile v. State, 1 Swan, 248; Young v. State, 11

Humph. 200. Such a degree of mental disturbance would be

equivalent to utter insanity, and, if the result of adequate provo-

cation, would render the perpetrator morally innocent. But the

law regards manslaughter as a high grade of offense; as a felony.

On principle, therefore, the extent to which the passions are re-

quired to be aroused and reason obscured must l)e considerably

short of this, and never beyond that degree within which ordinary

men have the power, and are therefore morally as well as legally

bound, to restrain their passions. It is only on the idea of a

violation of this clear duty that the act can be held criminal. There

are many cases to be found in the books in which this considera-

tion, plain as it would seem to be in principle, appears to have

]:)een, in a great measure, overlooked, and a course of reasoning

adopted which could only be justified on the supposition that the

question was between murder and excusable homicide.

The principle involved in the question, and which I think

clearly deducible from the majority of well-considered cases, would

seem to suggest as the true general rule that reason should, at the

time of the act, be disturbed or obscured by passion to an extent

which might render ordinary men, of fair average disposition,

adequate or reasonable provocation, and before a reasonable time
lrns elapsed for the blood to cool anc1 reason to resume its habitual
coutrol, anc1 i the result of the t emporary excitement, by which
the control of rea on was di turbecl, rather than of any wickedne s
of heart or cruelty or recklessne s of disposition, then the law,
out of indulgence to the frailty of human nature, or, rather in
recognition of the law upon which human nature i con stituted~
very properly regards the o:ffen e a of a les heinous character
than murder, and gives it the de ignation of man laughter.
'ro what extent the pa ssions must be arou ed, and the dominion
of reason disturbed, to reduce the offen e from murder to manslaughter, the cases are by no mean agreed; and any rule which
should embrace all the cases that have been decided in reference
to this point would come very near obliterating, if it did not entirely obliterate, all distinction between murder and manslaughteT
in such cases. We must therefore endeavor to discover the principle upon which the question is to be determined. It will not do
to hold that reason should be entirely dethroned, or overpowered
by passion, so as to destroy intelligent volition. S tate v. Hill, 4
Dev. & B. 4.91; Haile v. State, 1 Swan, 2-18; Young v. State, 11
Humph. 200. Such a degree of mental di turbance would be
equivalent to utter insanity, and, if the result of adequate provocation, would render the perpetrator morally innocent. But the
law regards manslaughter as a high grade of offen e _; as a felony.
On principle, therefore, the extent to which the pa sions are required to be aroused and reason obscured must be considerably
short of this, and never beyond that legree within which ordinary
men have the power, and are therefore morally a well as legally
bound, to restrain their passions. It is only on the idea of a
violation of this clear duty that the act can be held criminal. There
are many cases t o be found in the books in which this con ideration, plain as it would seem to be in principle, appear to have
been, in a great measure, overlooked, and a cour e of reasoning
adopted which could only be ju ·tified on the suppo ition that the
question was between murder and excusable homicide.
The principle involved in the question, and which I think
clearly deducible from the majority of well-considered ca es, would
seem to sugge t as the true general rule that reason should, at the
ti.me of the act, be disturbed or ob cured by pas ion to an extent
which might render ordinary men, of fair average di.spo . . ition,
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liable to act rashly, or without due deliberation or reflection, and

from passion, rather than judgment.

To the question, what shall be considered in law a reasonable or

adequate provocation for such state of mind, so as to give to a.

homicide com.mitted under its influence the character of man-

slaughter? on principle, the answer, as a general rule, must be,

anything the natural tendency of which would be to produce such

a state of mind in ordinary men, and which the jur}^ are satisfied

did produce it in the case before them, — not such a provocation

as must, by the laws of the human mind, produce such an effect

with the certainty that physical effects follow from physical causes,

for then the individual could hardly be held m.orally accountable.

Xor, on the other hand, must the provocation, in every case, be

held sufficient or reasonable, because such a state of excitement

has followed from it; for then, by habitual and long-continued

indulgence of evil passions, a bad man might acquire a claim to

mitigation which would not be available to better men, and on

account of that very wickedness of heart which, in itself, consti-

tutes an aggravation both in morals and in law.
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In determining whether the provocation is sufficient or reason-

able, ordinary human nature, or the average of men recognized

as men of fair average mind and disposition, should be taken as

the standard, — unless, indeed, the person whose guilt is in question

be shown to have some peculiar weakness of mind or infirmity of

temper, not arising from wickedness of heart or cruelty of dis-

position.

It is, doubtless, in one sense, the province of the court to define

what, in law, will constitute a reasonable or adequate provocation,

but not, I think, in ordinarv' cases, to determine whether the provo-

cation proved in the particular case is sufficient or reasonable. This

is essentially a question of fact, and to be decided with reference

to the peculiar facts of each particular case. As a general rule,

the court, after informing the jury to what extent the passions

must be aroused, and reason obscured, to render the homicide man-

slaughter, should inform them that the provocation must be one,

the tendency of which would be to produce such a degree of excite-

ment and disturbance in the minds of ordinar}^ men; and if tlicy

should find sucli provocation from the facts proved, and should

further find tliat it did produce that effect in the particular in-

stance, and that the homicide was the result of such provocation.

liable to act rashly, or without due delib ration or reflection and
from pas. ion, rather than. judgment.
To the que tion, what shall be con idered in law a reasonable or
adequate provocation for uch tate of mind, o a to give to u.
homicide committed under it influence the character of manlaughter? on principle, the an wer, as a general rule, mu t be,
anything the natural tendency of which would be to produce uch
a tate of mind in ordinary men, and which the jury are sati fied
did produce it in the case before them,-not uch a provocation
a must, by the laws of the human mind, produce such an effect
with the certainty that physical effect follow from phy iral cau e-,
for then the individual could hardly be held morally accountable.
~or, on the other hand, must the provocation, in every case, be
held ufficient or rea onable, becau e uch a tate of excitement
has followed from it; for then, by habitual and long-continued
indulgence of evil passion , a bad man might acquire a claim to
mitigation which would not be available to better men, and on
account of that very wickedness of heart which, in it elf, con titute an aggravation both in morals and in law.
In determining whether the provocation is ufficient ur reasonable, ordinary human nature, or the average of men recognized
a men of fair average mind and dispo ition, hould be taken a
the tandard,-unle indeed, the per on whose guilt is in que tion
be hown to have ome peculiar weaknes of mind or infirmity of
temper, not ari ing from wickedne s of heart or cruelty of di po ition.
I t is, doubtle , in one en e, the province of the court to define
what, in law, will constitute a rea onable or adequate provocation,
but not, I think, in ordinary ca e , to determine whether the pro ocation proved in the particular ca e i ·ufficient or rea onn.ble. Thi
i e. entially a qu tion of fact, and to be decided with reference
to the peculiar fact of each particular ca e. A a general rule
the court, after informing the jury to what extent the pa" ion,
mu t be arou~ ed, and rea on ob cured, to render the homicide manlaughter, hould inform them that the provocation mu t b n ,
th tendency of which would be to produce u h a degree of ex item nt and di turban in the mind of ordinary men; an 1 if ih r
hould find u h provocation from the fact proved, and ,_h ul,
further find that it did produce that eff t in the particular in£tanc , and that the homicide wa the re ult of . uch provo ati n,
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it would give it the character of manslaughter. Besides the con-

sideration that the question is essentially one of fact, jurors, from

the mode of their selection, coming from the various classes and

occupations of society, and conversant with the practical affairs

of life, are, in my opinion, much better qualified to judge of the

sufficiency and tendency of a given provocation, and much more

likely to fix, with some degree of accuracy, the standard of what

constitutes the average of ordinary human nature, than the judge

whose habits and course of life give him much less experience of

the Avorkings of passion in the actual conflicts of life.

The judge, it is true, must, to some extent, assume to decide

upon the sufiiciency of the alleged provocation, when the question

arises upon the admission of testim.ony; and when it is so clear

as to admit of no reasonable doubt, upon any theory, that the

alleged provocation could not have had any tendency to produce

such state of mind, in ordinary men, he may properly exclude the

evidence; but, if the alleged provocation be such as to admit of

any reasonable doubt, whether it might not have had such ten-

dency, it is much safer, I think, and more in accordance with
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principle, to let the evidence go to the jury under the proper in-

structions. As already intimated, the question of the reasonable-

ness or adequacy of the provocation must depend upon the facts

of each particular case. That can with no propriety be called a

rule (or a question) of law which must vary with, and depend

upon, the almost infinite variety of facts presented by the various

cases as they arise. See Starkie, Ev. (Am. Ed. 1860) pp. (i'76-

680. The law cannot with justice assume, by the light of past

decisions, to catalogue all the various facts and combinations of

facts which shall be held to constitute reasonable or adequate

provocation. Scarcely two past cases can be found which are

identical in all their circumstances, and there is no reason to hope

for greater uniformity in future. Provocations will be given

wdthout reference to any previous model, and the passions they

excite will not consult the precedents.

The same principles which govern, as to the extent to which

the passions must be excited and reason disturbed, apply with

equal force to the time during which its continuance may be

recognized as a ground for mitigating the homicide to the degree

of manslaughter, or, in other words, to the question of cooling

time. This, like the provocation itself, must depend upon the

it would give it the character of manslaughter. Besides the consideration that the question is essentially one of fact, jurnrs: from
the mocle of their selection, coming from the various classes and
occupations of society, and conversant with the practical affairs
of life, are, in my opinion, much better qualified to judge of the
sufficiency and tendency of a given provocation, and much more
likely to :fix, with some degree of accuracy, the standard of what
constitutes the average of ordinary human nature, than the judge
whose habits and course of life give him much less experience of
the workings of pa sion in the actual conflicts of life.
The judge, it is true, must, to some extent, assume to decide
upon the sufficiency of the alleged provocation, when the que tion
ari es upon the admission of testimony; and when it is so clear
as to admit of no reasonable doubt, upon any theory, that th2
alleged provocation could not have had any tendency to produce
such state of mind, in ordinary men, he may properly exclude the
evidence; but, if the alleged provocation be such as to admit of
any reasonable doubt, whether it might not have had such tendency, it is much safer, I think, and more in accordance with
principle, to let the evidence go to the jury under the proper instructions. As already intimated, the question of the r easonableness or adequacy of the provocation must depend upon the facts
of each particular case. That can with no propriety be called a
rule (or a question) of law which must vary with, and depend
upon, the almost infinite variety of facts presented by the various
cases as they arise. See Starkie, Ev. (Am. Ed. 1860) pp. 676680. The law cannot with justice assume, by the light of past
decisions, to catalogue all the various fa cts and combinations of
facts which shall be held to constitute reasonable or adequate
provocation. Scarcely two past cases can be found which are
identical in all their circumstances, and there is no reason to hope
for greater uniformity in future. Provocations will be given
without reference to any previous model, and the passions they
excite will not consult the precedents.
The same principles which govern, a to the extent to which
the passions must be excited and reason disturbed, apply with
equal force to the time during which its continuance may be
recognized as a ground for mitigating the homicide to the degree
of manslaughter, or, in other words, to the question of cooling
time. This, like the provocation itself, must depend upon the
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nature of man and the laws of the human mind, as well as upon

the nature and circumstances of the provocation, the extent to

which the passions have been aroused, and the fact whether the

injury inflicted by the provocation is more or less permanent or

irreparable. The passion excited by a blow received in a sudden

quarrel, though perhaps equally violent for the moment, woidd be

likely much sooner to subside than if aroused by a rape committed

upon a sister or a daughter, or the discovery of an adulterous

intercourse with a wife ; and no two cases of the latter kind would

be likely to be identical in all their circumstances of provocation.

K'o precise time, therefore, in hours or minutes, can be laid down

by the court, as a rule of law, within which the passion must be

held to have subsided and reason to have resumed its control,

without setting at defiance the laws of man's nature, and ignoring

the very principle on which provocation and passion are allowed

to be shown, at all, in mitigation of the offense. The question

is one of reasonable time, depending upon all the circumstances

of the particular case; and where the law has not defined, and

cannot without gross injustice define, the precise time which shall

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t39z97p86
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

be deemed reasonable, as it has with respect to notice of the dis-

honor of commercial paper. In such case, where the law has de-

fined what shall be reasonable time, the question of such reasonable

time, the facts being found by the Jury, is one of law for the court,

but in all other cases it is a question of fact for the jury ; and the

court cannot take it from the jury, by assuming to decide it as a

question of law, without confounding the respective provinces of

the court and jury. Starkie, Ev. (Am. Ed. 1860) pp. 768, 769,

774, 775, In Eex v. Ilayward, 6 Car. & P. 157, and Rex v. Lynch,

5 Car. & P. 324, this question of reasonable cooling time was ex-

pressly held to be a question of fact for the jury. And see Whart.

Cr. Law (4th Ed.), § 990, and cases cited. I am aware there are

many cases in which it has been held a question of law, but I can

see no principle on which such a rule can rest. The court should,

I think, define to the jury the principles upon which the question

is to be decided, and leave them to determine whether the time

was reasonable, under all the circumstances of the particular case.

I do not mean to say that the time may not be so great as to enable

the court to determine that it is sufficient for the passion to have

cooled, or so to instruct the jur}', without error; but the case

should be very clear. And in cases of applications for a new trial.

nature of man and the laws of the human mind, a well a'" upon
the nature and circum...,tance of the provocation the ext nt to
which the pa ion . . ha' been arou ed, an l the fact whether the
injury inflicted by the provocation i . . more or le permanent or
irreparable. The pa '" ion excited by a blow received in a udden
quarrel, though perhap equally Yiol nt for the moment woul d b€
likely much ooner to , ub ide than if arou ed by a rape committee
upon a si . . ter or a daughter, or the di covery of an adult rou . .
inter cour e with a wife; and no two ca e of the latter kind would
b e likely to be identical in all th ir circum . . tance of provocation.
No preci e time, therefore, in hour or minute , can be laid down
by the court, a a rule of law, within which the pa ion mu t br
h eld to have subsided and r ea on to have re umed it control,
without etting at defiance the laws of man nature, and ignoring
the very principle on which provocation and pa..,sion are allowed
to be hown, at all, in mitigation of the o:ffen e. The que tion
i one of rea.. , onable time, depending upon all the circum tance . .
of the particular case ; and where the law ha not defined, and
cannot without gro injustice define, the precise time whicb hall
b e deemed rea . . onable, a it ha with r e pect to notice of the dishonor of commercial paper. In uch case, where the law ha defined what shall be reasonable time, the que tion of such r ea onable
time, the facts being found by the jury, is one of law for the court,
but in all other cases it i, a question of fact for the jm7; and the
court cannot take it from the jury, by as uming to decide it a 3
que tion of law, without confounding the r e pective province of
the court and jtu3. Starkie, Ev. (Am. Ed. 1860) pp. 768, 169,
, -±, 75. In Rex v. H ayward, 6 Car. & P. 157, and R ex v . Lynch,
5 Car. & P. 324, thi que tion of r ea onable cooling time wa expre . ly h eld to be a question of fact for the jury. And ee Whart.
Cr. Law (4th Ed.), R 990, and ca e cited. I am aware there are
man3 case in which it ha been held a que tion of law, but I an
ee no principle on which uch a rule can re t . The court J10uld,
I think, define to the jury th e princip1 upon which the que tion
i to be decided, and leave them to determine whether the time
wa" rea onable, under all the circum tances of the particular ca .
I do not mean to sa3 that the time may not be o great as to enabl ·
the court to determin that it i ufficient for the pa ion to hav
a c
cooled, or o to in . . truct the jury, without rror · but th
hould be very clear.
ncl in ca, c of appli ation. f r a n "' trial_.
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depending upon the discretion of the court, the question may very

properly be considered by the court.

It remains only to apply these principles to the present case.

The proposed evidence, in connection with what had already been

given, would have tended strongly to show the commission of

adultery by Hunt with the prisoner's wife, within half an hour

before the assault ; that the prisoner saw them going to the woods

together, under circumstances calculated strongly to impress upon

his mind the belief of the adulterous purpose; that he followed

after them to the woods; that Hunt and the prisoner's wife were,,

not long after, seen coming from the woods ; and that the prisoner

followed them, ond went in hot pursuit after Hunt to the saloon^,

and was informed by a friend on the way that they had committed

adultery the day before in the woods. I cannot resist the convic-

tion that this would have Ijeen sufficient evidence of provocation,

to go to the jury, and from which, when taken in connection with

the excitement and "great perspiration" exhibited on entering the

saloon, the hasty manner in which he approached and fired the

pistol at Hunt, it would have been competent for the jury to find
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that the act was committed in consequence of the passion excited

by the provocation, and in a state of mind which, within the prin-

ciple already explained, would have given to the homicide, had

death ensued, the character of manslaughter only. In holding

otherwise the court below was doubtless guided by those cases in

which courts have arbitrarily assumed to take the question from

the jury, and to decide upon the facts, or some particular fact, of

the case, whether a sufficient provocation had been shown, and what

was a reasonable time for cooling.

**** ***:!< *******

The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted.

Involuntary Manslaugliter.

State V. Hardie, ^7 loiva, 6kl. (1818.)

The defendant was indicted for murder in the second degree.

He was convicted of the crime of manslaughter, and sentenced

to the penitentiary for one year. The facts of the case appear in

the opinion.

depending upon the discretion of the court, the question may very
properly be considered by the court.
It remains only to apply these principles to the present case
The proposed evidence, in connection with what had already been
given, would have tended strongly to show the commission of
adultery by Hunt with the prisoner's wife, within half an hour
before the assault; that the prisoner aw them going to the woods
together, under circumstances calculated strongly to impress upon
his mind the belief of the adulterous purpose; that he :followed
after them to the woods; that Hunt and the prisoner's wife were,.
not long after, seen coming from the woods; and that the prisoner
followed them, :md went in hot pursuit after Hunt to the saloonr
and was informed by a friend on the way that they had committed
adultery the clay before in the wood. . I cannot resist the conviction that this would have 1 een sufficient evidence of provocation
to go to t.he jury: and from which, when taken in connection with
the excitement and "great per piration" exhibited on entering the·
saloon, the ha uty manner in which he approached and fired the
pistol at Hunt, it would hav been competent for the jury to find
that the act was committed in con equence of the passion excited
by the provocation, and in a state of mind which, within the principle already explained, would have given to the homicide, had
death ensued, the character of manslaughter only. In holding
otherwi e the court below wa doubtless guided by those cases in
which courts have arbitrarily assumed to take the question from
the jury, and to decide upon the facts, or some particular fact, of
the case, whether a sufficient provocation had been show11, and what
was a reasonable time for cooling.

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * *
The judgment should be r ver ed, and a new trial granted.

*

Involuntary Manslaughter.
State v. Hardie, 47 Iowa, 647.

{1878.)

The defendant was indicted for murder in the second degree.
He was convicted of the crime of manslaughter, and sentenced
to the penitentiary for one year. · The facts of the case appear in
the opinion.

State v. Hardie 185

ST.ATE ' . HARDIE

185

EOTHROCK, Ch. J. :

I. It appears from the evidence that the defendant was a

boarder in the family of one Gantz, who is his brother-in-law.

On the day of the homicide defendant was engaged in varnishing

furniture. Mrs. Sutfen, a neighbor, called at the house, and after

some friendly conversation she went into the kitchen. When she

came back defendant picked up a tack hammer and struck on the

door. She said, "My God, I thought it was a revolver." A short

time afterwards she went into the yard to get a kitten. Defendant

said he would frighten her with the revolver as s.he came in. He

took a revolver from a stand drawer and went out of the room,

and was in the kitchen when the revolver was discharged. He

immediately came in and said to Mrs. Gantz, his sister, "My God,

Hannah, come and see what I have done." His sister went out

and found Mrs. Sutfen lying on the sidewalk at the side of the

house, with a gunshot wound in the head, and in a dying condition.

A physician was immediately called and made an examination of

the deceased, took the revolver from the defendant, and informed

him that nothing could be done for the deceased, whereupon the
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defendant became violent, said the shot was accidental, and ex-

claimed several times that he would kill himself. It became

necessary to secure him, which was done by tying him with ropes.

The revolver had been in the house for about five years. It was

found by Gantz in the road. There was one load in it when found.

Some six months after it was found Gantz tried to shoot the load

from it and it would not go off. He tried to punch the load out,

but could not move it. He then laid it away, thinking it was

harmless. The defendant was about the house and knew the con-

dition of the revolver. Upon one occasion Gantz said he would

try to kill a cat with the revolver. Defendant l)eing present said

he would not be afraid to allow it to be snapped at him all day.

The revolver remained in the same condition that it was when

found, no other load having been put into it, and it was considered

by the family as well as defendant as entirely harmless.

The foregoing is the substance of all the evidence.

The State did not claim that the defendant was guilty of mur-

der, but that he was guilty of manslaughter because of criminal

carelessness. The defendant insisted that there was no such care-

lessness as to render the act criminal, and that it was homicide

by misadventure, and therefore excusable.

ROTHROCK_.
H. J. :
I. It appear from the evidence that the defendant wa a
boarder in the family of on
antz who i hi brother-in-law.
On the da} of the homicide defendant wa engaged in varni hing
furniture. Mr . Sutfen, a neighbor called at the hou e, and after
. ome friendl:y conver ation he went into the kitchen. When she
came back defendant picked up a tack hammer and truck on the
door. She said, "My God, I thought it wa a revolver." A hort
time afterward she went into the yard to get a kitten. Defendant
aid he would frighten her with the revolver a she came in. He
took a revolver from a stand drawer and went out of the room,
and wa,~ in the kitchen when the revolv r wa discharged. He
immediately came in and said to Mrs. Gantz, hi i ter, "M:y God,
Hannah, eome and ee what I have done." His si ter went out
and found Mr ~ . Sutfen lying on the sidewalk at the side of the
house, with a gunshot wound in the head, and in a dying condition.
A physician was immediately called and made an examination of
the deceased, took the revolver from the defendant, and informed
him that nothing could be done for the decea ed, whereupon the
defendant became violent, aid the hot wa. accidental, and exclaimed several time that he would kill himself. It became
neces ary to secure him, which wa done by tying him with rope .
The revolver had been in the house for about :five year . It wa
found by Gantz in the road. There was on load in it when found.
Some ix months after it was found Gantz tried to hoot the load
from it and it would not go off. He tried to punch the load out,
but could not mov it. H e then laid it away, thinking it wa
harmles . The defendant was about the hou e and knew the condition of the revolver. Upon one occasion Gantz said he would
try to kill a cat with the revolver. Defendant being present aid
he would not b afraid to allow it to be napped at him all day.
The revolver remained in the ame condition that it was wh n
found, no other load having b en put into it, and it was con idered
by the family a well a defendant as entirely harmles .
The foregoing i the ub tance of all the vidence.
The tate did not claim that the defendant wa guilty of murder, but that he wa guilty of man laughter becau e of riminal
car le ne . The defendant in i . . ted that th r wa no u h ar le ne a to r nder the act riminal, and that it wa horni i 1
by mi adventur and th refore excu abl .
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The court instructed the jury as follows : ''5. And on the charge

of manslaughter, I instruct you that if the defendant used a

dangerous and deadly weapon, in a careless and reckless manner,

by reason of which instrument so used he killed the deceased, then

he is guilty of manslaughter, although no harm was in fact in-

tended."

Other instructions of like import were given, and the question

of criminal carelessness was submitted to the jury, as follows:

"8th. And in this case I submit to you to find the facts of reck-

lessness and carelessness under the evidence, and if you find that

the death of the party was occasioned through recklessness and

carelessness of the defendant then you should convict him, and if

not you should acquit. And by this I do not mean that defendant

is to be held to the highest degree of care and prudence in hand-

ling a dangerous and deadly weapon, but only such care as a

reasonably prudent man should and ought to use under like cir-

cumstances, and if he did not use such care he should be convicted,

otherwise he should be acquitted."

There can be no doubt that the instructions given by the court
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embody the correct rule as to criminal carelessness in the use of

a deadly weapon. Counsel for defendant insist that the instruc-

tions of the court do not go far enough, and upon the trial asked

that the court give to the jury the following instruction:

"3. Although the deceased came to her death from the dis-

charge of a pistol in the hands of the defendant, yet if the de-

fendant had good reason to believe, and did believe, that the pistol

which caused her death was not in any manner dangerous, but

was entirely harmless, and if he did nothing more than a man of

ordinary prudence and caution might have done under like cir-

cumstances, then the jury should find him not criminally liable

and should acquit."

This instruction and others of like import were refused by the

court, and we think the ruling was correct. That the revolver

was in fact a deadly weapon is conclusively shown by the terrible

tragedy consequent upon defendant's act in firing it off. If it had

been in fact unloaded no homicide would have resulted, but the

defendant would have been justly censurable for a most reckless

and imprudent act in frightening a woman by pretending that it

was loaded, and that he was about to discharge it at her. No jury

would be warranted in finding that men of ordinary prudence so

The court instructed the jury as follows: "5. And on the charge
of manslaughter, I instruct you that if the defendant u ed a
dangerous and deadly weapon, in a carele and reckles manner,
by reason of which instrument so used he killed the deceased, then
he i guilty of manslaughter, although no harm wa in fact intended."
Other in tructions of like import were given, and the question
of criminal carele sness was submitted to the jury, as :follows:
'' th. And in thi ca e I submit to you to find the facts of recklessness and carele sncss under the evidence, and if you find that
the death of the party was occa ioned through reckle sne and
carelessness of the defendant then you hould convict him, and if
not you should acquit. And by thi I do not mean that defendant
i to be held to the highe t degree of care and prudence in handling a dangerou anfl deadly weapon but only uch care a a
reasonably prudent man hould and ought to use under· like circum tances, and if he did not u e uch care he should be convicted,
otherwise he hould be acquitted."
There can be no doubt that the instructions given by the court
embody the correct rule a to criminal carele ne in the use of
a deadly weapon. Coun el for defendant in i t that the in tructions of the court do not go far enough, and upon the trial asked
that the court give to the jury the following in huction:
"3 . Although the decea ed came to her death from the discharge of a pistol in the hands of the defendant, yet if the defendant had good reason to believe, and did believe, that the pi tol
'vhich caused her death wa, not in any manner dangerous, but
was entirely harmless, and if he did nothing more than a man of
ordinary prudence and caution might have done under like circum tances, then the jury should find him not criminally liable
and hould acquit."
Thi instruction and other of like import were r efused by the
court, and we think the ruling was correct. That the r evolver
was in fact a deadly weapon i conclusively shown by the tenible
tr:igedy consequent upon defendant'. act in firing it off. If it had
hcen in fact unloaded no homicide would have r e ulted, but the
defendant would have been justly cen urable for a mo t reckle s
and imprudent act in frightening a woman by pretending that it
was loaded, and that he was about to discharge it at her. No jury
would be warranted in finding that men of ordinary prudence so
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couduct themselves. On the contrary, such conduct is grossly reck-

less and reprehensible, and without palliation or excuse. Human

life is not to be sported with by the use of firearms, even though

the person using them may have good reason to believe that the

weapon used is not loaded, or that being loaded it will do no in-

jury. When persons engage in such reckless sport they should

be held liable for the consequences of their acts.

II. It' is argued that the evidence does not show the defend-

ant guilty of criminal carelessness, because it does not appear that

the defendant pointed the pistol at the deceased, or how it hap-

pened to be discharged. The fact that defendant took the weapon

from the drawer with the avowed purpose of frightening the

deceased, and while in his hands it was discharged with fatal

effect, together with his admission that he did the act, fully war-

ranted the jury in finding that he purposely pointed the pistol and
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discharged it at the deceased. Affirmed.

conduct them~el e . On the contrary, uch conduct i gro ,h reckle and reprehrn.. , ible, and without palliation or excu e. Human
life i not to be ported with by the u e of firearm even though
the per.. , on u...,ing them may have good rea on to believe that the
weapon u d i ~ not loaded, or that being loaded it will do no inj ur . When per on engage in uch reckle..., port they hould
be held liable for the consequence. of their act .
IL It' i argued that the evidence doe..., not how the defendant guilty of criminal careles ne , becau e it doe not appear that
the defendant pointed the pi tol at the decea ed, or how it happ ened to be di charged. The fact that defendant took the weapon
from the drawer with the avowed purpo e of frightening the
decea ed, and while in hi hand. it wa di charged with fatal
effect, together with his admis ion that he did the act, fully warrnnted the jury in finding that he purpo ely pointed the pi tol and
discharged it at the deceased.
AFFIRMED.

CHAPTER VIII.

OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON. [Continued.]

Justifiable Homicide.

Head v. Martin, 85 Ky. J,80. (1881.)

Judge Holt delivered the opinion of the court.

CHAPTER VIII.

The single question presented is, whether a peace officer may,

in. order to arrest one upon a warrant for bastardy, or to prevent

his escape after arrest, kill him when feeing. If he has the right

under such circumstances to shoot and wound him, as was done

OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON.

[CONTINUED.]

in this instance, then it necessarily follows that he can not be held

J

responsible if it results in death.

STIFIABLE Ho:M:ICIDE.

It is attempted to draw a distinction between a case where one

is attempting to avoid arrest, and where one is endeavoring to

escape after arrest. If, however, the offender is in flight, and is

Head v. Mm·tin, 85 Ky. 480.

{1887.)

not at the time resisting the officer, then the law is the same,

whether he be fleeing to avoid arrest or to escape from custody.

(2 Bishop on Criminal Law, section 664; Wharton on Homicide,

sections 212-214.) The averments of the answer, admitted by the

demurrer, show that the appellee, Martin, had in fact been arrested

by the appellant. Head, as deputy sheriff, and was shot by the
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latter when fleeing from his custody ; but the fact that an arrest

had been made does not alter the law of the case.

A bastardy proceeding is, under our law, a civil one. Yet it

proceeds in the name of the Commonwealth, and under the statute

the offender is subject to arrest. As to the question now before

us, it is, therefore, to be regarded in the same light as a misde-

meanor.

Our statute is silent, unless it may be regarded as speaking by

implication, as to the force an officer may use in effecting an ar-

rest, or in recapturing a prisoner. It merely provides, that "no

unnecessary force or violence shall be used in making the arrest."

We, therefore, turn to the common law for guidance. By it an

officer in a case of felony may use such force as is necessary to

capture the felon, even to killing him when in flight. In the case

of a misdemeanor, however, the rule is different. It is his duty

188

delivered the opinion of the court.
The "ingle que tion pre ented is, whether a peace officer may?
in. order to arrest one upon a warrant for bastardy, or to prevent
his escape after arrest, kill him when fieeing . If he has the right
under such circumstances to shoot and wound him, as was done
in thi instance, then it neces arily follows that he can not be held
responsible if it results in death.
It is attempted to draw a distinction between a case where one
is attempting to avoid arre t, and where one i endeavoring to
escape after arre t. If, however, the offender i in fiight, and i
not at the time resi ting the officer, then the law i the same?
whether he be fleeing to avoid arre t or to escape from custody.
(2 Bishop on Criminal Law, section 664; Wharton on Homicide,
sections 212-214.) The av rment of the answer, admitted by the
demurrer; how that the appellee, Martin, had in fact been arrested
by the appellant, Head, as deputy sheriff, and wa hot by the
latter when fi ee ing from hi cu tody; but the fact that an arrest
had been made does not alt r the law of the ca e.
A bastardy proceeding i , under our law, a iYil one. Yet it
proceed in the name of the Commonwealth, and under the statute
the offender i ubject to arre t. A .. to the qu tion now before
us, it is, therefore, to be regarded in the same light a a misdemeanor.
Our tatute i silent, unle s it may be regarded a peaking by
implication, as to the force an officer may u e in effecting an arrest, or in recapturing a prisoner. It merely provides, that "no
unneccs"ary force or violence shall be u ed in making the arre t.
We, therefore, turn to the common law for guidance. By it an
officer in a ca e of felony may use such force a i neces ary to
capture the felon, even to killing him when in flight. In the case
of a misdemeanor, however, the rule is different. It is hi duty
JUDGE Ho LT

188

Head v. Marti x 189

HEAD ' . :JLi.RTLN

1 9

to make the arrest; lie ma}- summon a posse, and may defend

himself, if resisted, even to the taking of life; but when the

offender is not resisting, but fleeing, he has no right to kill.

Human life is too sacred to admit of a more severe rule. Officers

of the law are properly clothed with its sanctity; they represent

its majesty, and must be properly protected; but to permit the

life of one charged with a mere misdemeanor to be taken when

fleeing from the officer would, aside from its inhumanity, be pro-

ductive of more abuse than good. The law need not go unenforced.

The officer can summon his posse, and take the offender.

The reason for this distinction is obvious. The security of person

and property is not endangered by a petty offender being at large,

as in the case of a felon. The very being of society and govern-

ment requires the speedy arrest and punishment of the latter.

Bishop says: "The justification of homicide happening in the

arrest of persons charged with misdemeanors, or breaches of the

peace, is subject to a different rule from that which we have been

laying down in respect to cases of felony; for, generally speak-

ing, in misdemeanors it will be murder to kill the party accused
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for flying from the arrest, though he can not otherwise be over-

taken, and though there be a warrant to apprehend him; but

under circumstances, it may amount only to manslaughter, if it

appear that death was not intended. * * * *

"But in misdemeanors and breaches of the peace, as well as in

cases of felony, if the officer meet with resistance and the offender

is killed in the struggle, the killing will be justified." (2 Bishop

on Criminal Law, sections 662-3.)

The same rule may be found in the works of the other common

law writers.

Hale says: "And here is the difference between civil actions

and felonies. If a man be in danger of arrest by a capnas in debt

or trespass and he flies, and the bailiff kills him, it is murder; but

if a felon flies, and he can not be otherwise taken, if he be killed

it is no felony, and in that case the officer so killing forfeits noth-

ing, but the person so assaulted and killed forfeits his goods."

(1 Hale's Pleas of the Crown, page 481.)

So great, however, is the law's regard for human life, that if

even a felon can be taken without the taking of life, and he be

slain, it is at least manslaughter. Even as to him, it can be done

only of necessity.

to make the arrest; h may ummon a po e, and may defend
him elf, if re i ted, ev n to the taking of life; but when the
offender i not re i ting, but fleeing, h has no right to kill.
Human life i. too acred to admit of a more ..,evere rul . Officer
of the law are properly clothed with it anctity; they repres nt
its maje ty, and must b properly protected; but to permit the
life of one charged with a mere misdemeanor to be taken when
fleeing from the officer would, aside from its inhumanity, be productive of more abu e than good. The law need not go unenforced.
The officer can summon his posse, and take the off nder.
The reason for thi distinction is obvious. The ecurity of person
and property is not endangered by a petty offender being at large,
as in the case of a felon. The very being of ociety and government requires the speedy arrest and punishment of the latter.
Bishop mys: " The justification of homicide happening in the
arrest of persons charged with misdemeanors, or breaches of the
peace, is subject to a different rule from that which we have been
laying down in re pect to cases of felony; for, generally 1'.-peaking, in mi demeanors it will be murder to kill the party accused
for flying from the a.rre t, though he can not otherwise be overtaken, and though there be a warrant to apprehend him; but
under circum tance , it may amount only to man laughter, if it
appear that death "a" not intended. ::: * * *
"But in mi demeanor· and breaches of the peace, as well a in
case of felony, if the officer meet with resi tance and the offender
is killed in the truggle, the killing will be ju tified." ( 2 Bi hop
on Criminal Law, section 662-3.)
The same rule may be found in the work of the other common
law writers.
Hale _ays: "And here is the difference between civil actions
and f lonie . If a man be in clanger of arrest by a capia in debt
or trespa s and he flie , and the bailiff kill him, it is murder; but
if a felon flie , and he can not be otherwise taken, if he be killed
it i no felony, and in that ca e the officer so killing forfeits nothing, but the per on o assaulted and killed forfeit hi goods."
( 1 Hale's Plea of the Crown, page 481.)
So great, however, is the law' regard for human life, that i£
even a -f Ion can b taken without the taking of life, and he be
slain, it i.., at lea t manslaughter. Even as to him, it can be done
only of neces ity.
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An officer in arresting or preventing an escape for a misde-

meanor may oppose force to force, and sufficient to overcome it,

even to tlie taking of life. If tlie offender puts the life of the

officer in jeopardy, the latter may se defendendo slay him; but he

must not use any greater force than is reasonably and apparently

necessary for his protection.

It is often said, that an officer may use such force as is neces-

sary to make an arrest. Generally speaking, this is true. It was

so said ill the cases of Fleetwood v. Commonwealth, 80 Ky. 1,

and Moccahee v. Commonwealth^ 78 Ky. 380. But in those cases

a deadly affray between parties was in progress or about to occur,

endangering the lives not only of the participants, but innocent

persons; and it was the duty of the officer, when resisted, to quell

it even at the sacrifice of human life. In these cases he was justi-

fied in killing, not only se defendendo, but to prevent the impend-

ing commission of a felony.

In case, however, of a mere riot upon one day, and an attempted

arrest upon the next, surely the officer would not be justified in

killing the offender when fleeing from custody or to escape arrest.
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A person commits a misdemeanor by the use of profane language;

he flees from the officer attempting to arrest him or from custody.

The dictates of humanity as well as the legal rule forbid the taking

of his life under such circumstances.

The officer must in such a case summon his posse, and take him.

fle has no more right to kill him than he would have if the offen-

der were to lie down and refuse to go with him.

It is said, however, that the appellee was in the wrong; that

there as a sort of contributory neglect upon his part which pro-

duced the injury. It was not, however, such neglect or conduct

as, under ordinary circumstances, would produce the injury. It

could not be expected that, in consequence of it, the officer would

go beyond the limit of the law, and employ force when and of a

character forbidden by it. It is not a question whether unneces-

sary force was used; but the answer of the appellant shows that

he used it when and in a degree forbidden by the law.

The demurrer was, therefore, properly sustained, and the judg-

ment must be affirmed.

An officer in arresting or preventing an escape for a mi demeanor may oppose force to force, and sufficient to overcome it,
eYcn to the taking of life. If t he offender puts the life of the
officer in jeopardy, the latter may se de fendendo slay him; but he
must not u e any greater fo rce than is reasonably and apparently
:aeces ary for hi · -protection.
It i often said, that an officer may use such force as is necessary to make an arre t. Generally speaking, this is true. It was
so said in the cases of Fleetwood v. Commonwealth, 80 K y. 1,
and M occa.bec v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 380. But in those case
a deadly affray between parties was in progress or about to occur,
endangering the live not only of t he participants, but innocent
persons; and it was the duty of the officer, when resiste d~ to quell
it even at the acrifice of human life. I n these cases he was justifiecl in killing, not only se defendendo, but to prevent the impending commission of a felony .
In case; however, of a mere riot upon one day, and an attempted
arrest upon the next, surely the officer would not be justified. in
killing the offender when fleeing from cu tody or to escape anest.
A person commit.· a mi::::demeanor by the use of profane language;
he ft es from the officer attempting to arre t him or from custody.
The dictate of humanity a well as the legal rule forbid the taking
oI his lif under such circumstance .
The officer mu t in such a case summon his posse, and take him.
II c has no more right to kill him than he would have if the offender were to lie down and refuse to go with him.
It is said, however, that the appellee was in the wrong ; that
there as a sort of contributory neglect upon hi part which produced the injury. It was not, however, such neglect or conduct
af', under ordinary circumstances, would produce the injury. It
could not be expected that, in con equence of it, the officer would
go beyond the limit of the law, and employ force when and of a
character forbidden by it. It is not a question whether unneces. ary force was u"ed; but the answer of the appellant show that
he used it when and in a degree forbidden by the law.
The demurrer was, therefore, properly sustained, and the judgment must be affirmed.
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Pond V. People, 8 Mich. 149. (1S60.)

Campbell, J. :

The defense of this case, as presented in the court below, was

based upon a claim that the accused was only chargeable with

ExcusABLE Hol\IICIDE.

excusable or justifiable homicide. And as most of the questions

raised before us involve the consideration of the same subject, it

Pond v. P eople, 8 Mich. 111-9.

may be necessary to examine somewhat carefully into the rules

which divide homicide into its various heads, and determine the

(1860.)

character of each act of slaying.

The facts are claimed, by the counsel for the accused, to have a

tendency to establish the act as innocent on various grounds —

first, as excusable in defense of himself or his servant; second, as

justifiable in repelling a riotous attack, and, third, as justfiable

in resisting a felony.

The first inquiry necessary is one which applies equally to all

of the grounds of defense; and is whether the necessity of taking

life, in order to excuse or justify the slayer, must be one arising

out of actual and imminent danger; or whether he may act upon
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a belief, arising from appearances which give him reasonable cause

for it, that the danger is actual and imminent, although he may

turn out to be mistaken.

Human life is not to be lightly disregarded, and the law will

not permit it to be destroyed unless upon urgent occasion. But

the rules which make it excusable or justifiable to destroy it under

some circumstances, are really meant to insure its general pro-

tection. They are designed to prevent reckless and wicked men

from assailing peaceable members of society, by exposing them to

the danger of fatal resistance at the hands of those whom they

wantonly attack, and put in peril or fear of gi-eat injury or death.

And such rules, in order to be of any value, must be in some rea-

sonable degree accommodated to human character and necessity.

They should not be allowed to entrap or mislead those whose mis-

fortunes compel a resort to them.

Were a man charged with crime to be held to a knowledge of

all facts precisely as they are, there could be few cases in which

J. :
The defen e of thi case) as presented in the court below, wa
based upon a claim that the accu ed wa only chargeable with
excusable or justifiable homicide. And as most of the question_
raised before us involve the consideration of the same "ubject, it
may be nece sary to examine omewhat carefully into the rule
which divide homicide into it various head , and determine the
character of each act of slaying.
The fact are claimed, by the coun el for the accu ed, to have a
tendency to e tablish the act a innocent on various ground first as excusable in defense of him elf or hi servant; second, a
ju tifiable in repelling a riotous attack, and, third, ns justfiable
in re isting a felony.
The fir. t inquiry n ces ary i one which applie equally to all
of the grounds of defen"e ; and is whether the necessity of taking
life, in order to excuse or justify the slayer, must be one arising
out of actual and imminent danger; or wh ther he may act upon
a belief, ari ing from appearances which give him reasonable cau e
for it, that the danger is actual and imminent, although he may
turn out to be mistaken.
Human life is not to be lightly disregarded, and the law will
not permit it to be destroyed unle s upon urgent occa ion. But
the rule which make it excusabl or justifiable to destro:v it under
ome circumstance , are really meant to in ure· it general protection. They are d signed to prevent r eckle and wicked men
from assailing peaceable member of ocietv, by exposing them to
the danger of fatal re istance at the hand of tho e whom th y
wantonly attack) and put in peril or fear of great injury or death.
And rnch rule , in order to be of any value, mu t be in some reaonable degree accommodated to human chara ter and nece ity.
They should not be allowed to entrap or mislead those who e mi fortunes compel a resort to them.
Were a man charged with crime to be held to a knowl Jg of
all fact preci ely as they are, there could be few ca es in whi h
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the most innocent intention or honest zeal could justify or excuse

homicide. The jury, hy a careful sifting of witnesses on both

sides, in cool blood, and aided by the comments of court and coun-

sel, may arrive at a tolerably just conclusion on the circumstances

of an assault. But the prisoner, who is to justify himself, can

hardly be expected to be entirely cool in a deadly affray, or in all

cases to have great courage or large intellect; and can not well

see the true meaning of all that occurs at the time; while he can

know nothing whatever concerning what has occurred elsewhere,

or concerning the designs of his assailants, any more than can be

inferred from appearances. And the law, while it will not gen-

erally excuse mistakes of law (because every man is bound to

know that), does not hold men responsible for a knowledge of

facts unless their ignorance arises from fault or negligence.

A criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of every crime. And

therefore it is well remarked by Baron Parke in Regina v, Thur-

lorn, 2 C. & K. 832, that "as the rule of law, founded on justice

and reason, is that actus non facit reuni nisi mens sit rea, the guilt

of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear
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to him." And Mr. Bishop has expressed the same rule very

clearly, by declaring that "in all cases where a party, without fault

or carelessness, is misled concerning facts, and acts as he would

be justified in doing if the facts were what he believed them to be,

he is legally as he is morally innocent: 1 Bish. Cr, L., § 242.

These principles have always been recognized, and are sustained

by numerous authorities; but they need no vindication, and a

further citation would add nothing to the clear and intelligible

statements already referred to. And from an examination of some

of the charges given, we are very much inclined to believe that the

court below entertained the same views, at least as to some branches

of the defense. But as some of the charges actually given, and par-

ticularly those in response to the first and second instructions

requested, negative this rule, and the jury upon those must have

been misled, we must regard these charges as erroneous unless

they were inapplicable to the case altogether. Their applicability

will be presently considered.

In order to determine the materiality of the questions of law

raised, it becomes necessary to determine under what circum-

stances homicide is excusable or justifiable. In doing this, it will

be proper to advert merely to those instances which may be re-

the most innocent intention or honest zeal could justify or excuse
homicide. The jury, by a car"cful sifting of witnesses on both
sides, in cool blood, and aided by the comments of court and counsel, may arrive at a tolernbly just conclu ion on the circumstances
of an assault. But the prisoner) who i to justify himself, can
hardly be expected to be entirely cool in a deadly affray, or in all
case to have great courage or large intellect; and can not well
see the true meaning of all that occur at the time; while he can
know nothing whatever concerning what ha occurred elsewhere,
or concerning the designs of his a sailants, any mo·r e than can be
inferred from appearances. And the law, while it will not gener::tlly excuse mistakes of law (because every man is bound to
know that), does not hold men responsible for a lmowledge of
facts unles' their ignorance arises from fault or negligence.
A criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of every crime. And
therefore it is well remarked by Baron Parke in R egina v. Thurborn, 2 C. & K. 832, that "as the rule of law, founded on justice
and reason, is that actus non fa cit reu.m nisi mens sit rea, the guilt
of the accused mu t depend on the circumstances as they appear
to him." And Mr. Bishop has expre sed the same rule very
clearly, by declaring that "in all case where a party, without fault
or carelessness, is misled concerning facts, and acts as he would
be justified in doing if the facts were what he believed them to be.
h e is legally as he is morally innocent: 1 Bish. Cr. L., § 242.
These principles have always been recognized, and are sustained
by numerous authorities; but they need no vindication, and a
further citation would add nothing to the clear and intelligible
statements already r eferred to. And from an examination of some
ol the charges given, we are very much inclined to believe that the
court below entertained the same views, at lea..,t as to some branches
of the defense. But as some of the charges actually given, and particularly those in response to the first and second instructions
r equested, negative this rule, and th e jury upon those must have
been misled, we must regard these charge as erroneous unless
they were inapplicable to the ca e altogether. Their applicability
will be presently consider ed.
In order to determine the materiality of the questions of law
raised, it becomes necessary to determine under what circumstances homicide is excusable or justifiable. In doing this, it will
he proper to nclvert merely to those instances which nay he re-
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garded as coming nearest to the circumstances of the case before

us. The other cases we are not called upon to define or consider;

and what we say is to be interpreted by the case before us.

The only variety of excusable homicide (as contradistinguished

from justifiable homicide at common law) which we need advert

to^ is that which is technically termed homicide se aut sua defen-

dendo, and which embraces the defense of one's own life, or that

of his family, relatives or dependents, within those relations

where the law permits the defense of others as of one's self. Prac-

tically, so far as punishment is concerned, there is no distinction

with us between excusable and justifiable homicide; but a resort

to common law distinctions will nevertheless be convenient, in

order to illustrate the difference l^etween the various instances of

liomicide in repelling assaults, according as they are or are not

felonious. Homicide se defendendo was excusable at common

law when it occurred in a sudden affray, or in repelling an attack

not made with a felonious design. According to Mr. Hawkins,

it was excusable and not justifiable, because, occurring in a quarrel,

it generally assumed some fault on both sides : Hawk, P. C, B. 1,
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Ch. 28, § 2-1. In these cases, the original assault not being with

a felonious intent, and the danger arising in the heat of blood on

one or both sides, the homicide is not excused unless the slayer

does all which is reasonably in his power to avoid the necessity

of extreme resistance, by retreating where retreat is safe, or by

any other expedient which is attainable. He is bound, if possible,

to get out of his adversary's way, and has no right to stand up

and resist if he can safely retreat or escape. See 2 Bish. Cr. L.,

§§ 543 to 552, 560 to 562, 564 to 568 ; People v. Sullivan, 3 Seld.

39G ; 1 Puss. Cr. 660, et seq. Mr. Eussell lays down the rule very

concisely as follows (p. 661) : "The party assaulted must therefore

flee, as far as he conveniently can, either by reason of some wall,

ditch, or other impediment, or as far as the fierceness of the assault

will permit him; for it may be so fierce as not to allow him to

yield a step without manifest danger of his life or great bodily

harm; and then, in his defense, he may kill his assailant instantly.

Before a person can avail himself of the defense that he used a

weapon in defense of his life, he must satisfy the jury that that

defense was necessary; that he did all he could to avoid it; and

that it was necessary to protect his own life, or to protect himself

from such serious bodilv harm as would give him a reasonable

gard d a coming near t to th circum tance of the ca before
us. The other ca"'e we are not called upon to define or con"'.ider;
and what we say i to be interpr t cl b · the ca e before u~ .
The only variety of excu abl homicide (a contra di tingui hed
from ju tifiable homicide at ommon law) which we need advert
to i that which is technically termed homicide se aid ua rief endendo and which embrace the defen e of one own life) or that
of hi family) r elative or dependent·) within those relation
where the law permit the c1 fen e of oth r a of one' elf. Practically, o far a puni hment i · concern d, there i no lli tinction
with u between excu able and ju . . tifiable homicide; but a re ort
to common law di tinction will neverthele s be convenient, in
order to illu trate the difference between the variou in tance of
bomicide in repelling a saulL, accordin g a. they are or are not
f eloniou . Homicide se defendenclo wa excusable at common
law when it occurred in a sudden affray, or in repelling an attack
not made with a feloniou de ign. According to Mr. Hawkin . . ,
it was excusable and not ju tifiable, becau e) occurring in a quarrel,
it generally a sumed some fault on both ide : Hawk. P. C., B. 1
Ch . .9 8, § 2-1. In the e ca e , the original a ault not being with
a feloniou intent, and the danger ari . . ing in the heat of blood on
one or both ides, the homicide i not e:x:cu ed unless the layer
do all which is rea onably in hi power to avoid the nece ity
of extreme resi tance, by retreating where r etreat is safe) or by
.any other expedient which i attainable. He i bound) if pos ible,
to get out of hi. adversary) way, and ha no right to stand up
.and re ist if he can safely retreat or escape. See 2 Bish. Cr. L ...
§ 543 to 552, 560 to 562, 564 to 568; P eople v. Sullivan, 3 Seld.
39G · 1 Ru . Cr. 660, et seq. fr. Ru sell la y down the rule very
<:onci ely a follow (p. 661) : "The party a aulted mu t therefore
flee, a far a he conveniently can, either by rea on of some wall:
<litch, or other impediment: or a far a the :fiercene s of the as ault
will permit him; for it may be so fierce a not to allow him to
Jield a step without manife t danger of hi. life or great hodily
harm; and then in hi s defense, he may kill hi a ailant in tantly.
Before a per . . on can avail him elf of the d fen e that h u c1 a
weapon in defen e of his life, h mu t ati fy the jury that that
d f n e wa .., n c ary; that he lid all he could to avoid it; anc.1
that it wa nece ary to protect hi own lif or to protect him lf
fr m Ruch eriou bodily harm a. woul 1 gi vc him a r a onal l
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a])prehension that his life was in immediate danger. If he used

the weapon, having no other means of resistance, and no means of

escape, in such case, if he retreated as far as he could, he would

be justified." A man may defend his family, his servants or his.

master, whenever he may defend himself. How much further this

mutual right exists, it is unnecessary in this case to consider. See

2 Bish. Cr. L., § 581, and cases cited; 1 Euss. Cr. 662; 4 Bl. Com.

184.

There are many curious and nice questions concerning the extent

of the right of self-defense, where the assailed party is in fault.

But as neither Pond nor Cull were in any way to blame in bringing

about the events of Friday night, which led to the shooting of

Blanchard, it is not important to examine them. The danger to be

resisted must be to life, or of serious bodily harm of a permanent

character; and it must be unavoidable by other means. Of course,

we refer to means within the power of the slayer, so far as he is

able to judge from the circumstances as they appear to him at the

time.

A man is not, however, obliged to retreat if assaulted in his
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dwelling, but may use such means as are absolutely necessary

to repel the assailant from his house, or to prevent his forcible

entry, even to tlie taking of life. But here, as in the other cases,

lie must not take life if he can otherwise arrest or repel the

assailant: 2 Bish. Cr. L., § 560; 3 Greenl. Ev., § 117; Hawk.

P. C, B. 1, ch. 28, § 23. Where the assault or breaking is felonious,

the homicide l)ecomes justifiable, and not merely excusable.

The essential difference between excusable and justifia])le homi-

cide rests not merely in the fact that at common law the one was

felonious, although pardoned of course, while the other was inno-

cent. Those only were justifiable homicides where the slayer was

regarded as promoting justice, and performing a public duty;

and the question of personal danger did not necessarily arise,

although it does generally.

It is held to be the duty of every man who sees a felony at-

tempted by violence, to prevent it if possible, and in the perform-

ance of this duty, which is an active one, there is a legal right to

use all necessary means to make the resistance effectual. Where a

felonious act is not of a violent or forcible character, as in picking

pockets, and crimes partaking of fraud rather than force, there

is no necessity, and, therefore, no justification, for homicide, unless

apprehension that his life was in immediate danger. If he used
the weapon, having no other means of resistance, and no means of
c cape, in such case, if he r etreated as far as h e could, he would
be justified." A man may defend hi family, his servants or his
master, whenever he may defend himself. How much further this
mutual right exi"ts, it is unneces ' ary in this ca e to consider. See
'2 Bish. Cr. L., § 581, and ca es cited; 1 Ru . Cr. 662; 4 BL Com.
18-L
There arc many curious and nice questions concerning the extent
of the right of self-defense, where the as ailed party is in fault.
But as neither Pond nor Cull were in any way to blame in bringing
al•out the events of Fridav night, which led to the shooting of
Blanchard, it is not important to examine them. The danger to be
resisted must be to life, or of serious bodily harm of a permanent
character; and it must be unavoidable by other means. Of course,
we refer to means within the power of the slayer, so far as he i
able to judge from the circumstances as they appear to him at the
time.
A man is not, however, obliged to retreat if a aultecl in his
dwelling, but may u e such means as are ab olutely n ecessary
to repel the assailant from hi house, or to prevent hi forcible
entry, even to the taking of life. But here, as in the other case ,
he must not take life if he can otherwise arrest or repel the
assailant: ? Bish. Cr. L., § 560; 3 Greenl. Ev., § 117; H awk.
P. C., B. 1) rh. 28_, § 23. 'Where the assault or breaking is felonious,.
the homicide become" justifiable, and not merely excusable.
The essential difference between excusable and justifiable homicir1e rests not merely in the fact that at common law the one was
fe]oniou .. , although pardoned of course, while the other was innocent. Those only were justifiable homicides where the slayer was
regarded as promoting justice, and performing a public duty;
and the question of personal clanger did not nece sarily arise,
although it does generally.
It js held to be the duty of very man who sees a felony attrmpted hy violence. to prevent it if possible, and in the performance of this duty. which is an active one, there is a legal right to
use all necessar:v means to make the resistance effectual. Where a
felonious act is not of a violent or forcible character, as in pickin opockets, and crimes partaking of fraud rather than force, there
no necessity, and, therefore, no justification, for homicide, unless
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possibly in some exceptional cases. The rule extends only to cases

of felony, and in those it is lawful to resist force by force. If any

forcible attempt is made, with a felonious intent against person or

property, the person resisting is not obliged to retreat, but may

pursue his adversary, if necessary, till he finds himself out of

danger. Life may not properly be taken under this rule where the

evil may be prevented by other means within the power of the

person who interferes against the felon. Eeasonable apprehen-

sion, however, is sufficient here, precisely as in all other cases.

It has also been laid down by the authorities, that private per-

sons may forcibly interfere to suppress a riot or resist rioters,

although a riot is not necessarily a felony in itself. This is owing

to the nature of the offense, which requires the combination of three

or more persons, assembling together and actually accomplishing

some object calculated to terrify others. Private persons who can

not otherwise suppress them, or defend themselves from them, may

justify homicide in killing them, as it is their right and duty to

aid in preserving the peace. And perhaps no case can arise where

a felonious attempt by a single individual will be as likely to
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inspire terror as the turbulent acts of rioters. And a very limited

knowledge of human nature is sufficient to inform us, that when

men combine to do an injury to the person or property of others,

of such a nature as to involve excitement and provoke resistance,

they are not likely to stop at half-way measures, or to scan closely

the dividing line between felonies and misdemeanors. But Avhen

the act they meditate is in itself felonious, and of a violent char-

acter, it is manifest that strong measures will generally be required

for their effectual suppression, and a man who defends himself,

his famJly or his propertv, under such circumstances, is justified

in making as complete a defense as is necessary.

When we look at the facts of this case, we find very strong cir-

cumstances to bring the act of Pond within each of the defenses we

have referred to. Without stopping to recapitulate the testimony

in full or in detail, we have these leading features presented:

Without any cause or provocation given by Pond, we find Plant,

Eobilliard and Blanchard combining with an expressed intention

to do him personal violence. On Thursday evening this gang, with

from fifteen to twenty associates, having been hunting for Pond,

found him at a neighbor's, and, having got him out of doors, sur-

rounded him, while Plant struck him with his fist, and kickcfl liim

pos ibly in som e exceptional case . The rule xtends only to case
of felony, and in tho e it is lawful to re i t force by force. If any
fo rcible attempt is made, with a feloniou intent again t person or
property, the per ocon re i, ting is not obli g cl to retreat, but may
pur ue his adversary, if nece ary, till h e finds himself out of
danger. Life may not pro1 erly be taken under this rule wh re the
evil may be pr event -cl by other means within the power of the
per on who interfere against the felon. Reasonable apprehenion, however, i ~ ufficient here, precisely as in all other caseR.
It has also been laid down by the authoriti s, that privat persons may fo rcibly interfere to suppress a riot or r esist rioters,
although a riot is not necessarily a felony in itself. This is owing
to the nature of the offen e_. which r equires the combination of three
or mor e person , assembling together and actually accorn pli<;:hing
. ome object calculated to t errify others. Private per on who can
not otherwifl.e suppress them, or defend them, elve fro m them, may
justify homicide in killing them, as it is their right and duty to
aid in preserving the peace. And perhap no case can arise where
a felonious attempt by a in ale indivi lual will be as likely to
inspire t error as the turbulent act s of rioter . And a very limited
knowledge of human nature is sufficient to inform u , that when
men combine to J.o an injury to the per son or property of other s,
of uch a nature a to involve excitement and provoke re i tance,
they are not likely to , top at half-way measures, or to scan clo 'ely
the dividing line between felonies and misdemeanors. But when
the act they meditate i in itfl. lf felonious, and of a violent character, it is manife t that strong measure will generally be r equired
for their effectual suppres ion, and a man who defend him elf,
his family or his property, under such circumstances, is ju tified
in making as complete a defen e a is necessary.
When we look at the facts of this case, we find very strong circumstance to bring the act of Pond within each of the defen es we
have r ei erred to. \Yithout stopping to recapitulate the t stimony
in full or in cl tail, we Lave these leading features I resent cl:
Without any cau e or provocation given bv Pond, we find Plant,
Robilliard and Blanchard combining with an expres, ed intention
to do him personal violence. On Thursday ev ning this gang, with
from fifteen to twenty associate having been hunting for P ond,
found him at a neighbor's, and, having got him out of rl oor:-i. ~nr
roun led him, whil P lant truck him with hi · fi , t, and ki k <l him
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in the breast, with insulting language,, evidently designed to draw

him into a fight. He escaped from them, and ran away into the

woods, and succeeded in avoiding them that night. That same

night they tore down the door of the net-house, where his servants

were asleep, in search of him, and not finding him there went to

the house, the whole rabble being with them, and wanted Pond,

and expressed themselves determined to have him; but refused

to tell his wife what they wanted of him. Not finding him there,

they started off elsewhere in search of him. Tliis was between nine

and ten o'clock at night. About noon of Friday, Plant and Blan-

chard met Pond, when Plant threatened again to whip him, and

then went up to him, told him not to say anything, and that if he

did he would give him slaps or kicks. Plant then took a stone

in his hand, and threatened if Pond spoke to throw it at him.

Pond said nothing, but went home quietly, and Plant went off

and was heard making further threats soon after. Friday night

neither Pond nor his family went to bed, being in fear of violence.

Between one and two o'clock that night. Plant, Eobilliard and

Blanchard went to the net-house, and partially tore it down, while
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AMiitney and Cull were in it. They then went to the house where

Pond, his wife and children were, shook the door, and said they

wanted Pond. Pond concealed himself under the bed, and his wife

demanded what they wanted of him, saying he was not there, when

Plant shook the door again, and ordered Mrs. Pond to open it;

saying they wanted to search the house. She refusing, they re-

sorted to artifice, asking for various articles of food, and objecting

to receiving them except through the door. Plant then repeatedly

commanded her to open the door, saying if she did not, she would

regret it. On opening the door from six to twelve inches, by slid-

ing the cord, to hand them some sugar, which they demanded, they

did not take the sugar, but Plant seized Mrs. Pond's arm, and

squeezed it until she fainted. Not succeeding in getting into the

house, they then left for Ward's, and Pond went to the house of his

brother-in-law, and borrowed a double-barreled shot gun loaded

w'ith pigeon shot, and returned home. While at Ward's, Blanchard

told the latter that they had torn down part of Pond's net-house,

and had left the rest so that when they went back they would have

the rest of the fun. Blanchard also said, "I want to see Gust

Pond; he al)used an Irishman, and I want to abuse him Just as

bad as he abused the Irishman. Pond has to be abused any way."

in the breast, with jn ulting language; evidently designed t o draw
him into a fight. He escaped from them, and ran away into the
wcods, and succeeded i.n avoiding them that night. That same
night they tore down the door of the net-hou e, where hi servant
were asleep, in search of him, and not finding him there went to
the hou~ e, the whole rabble being with them, and wanted Pond,
and expre sed themselYe determined to have him · but refo eel
to tell hi wife what they wanted of him. Not finding him there,
they started off elsewhere in earch of hfrn . Thi was between nine
and ten o'clock at night. About noon of Friday, P lant and Blanchard met Poncl, when Plant threatened again to whip him, and
then went up to him, told him not to ay anything, and that if he
did h e would give him slap or kick . Plant then took a stone
in hi hand, anJ threatened if Pond poke to thr ow it at him .
Pond said nothing, but went home quietly, and Plant went off
and was h ear<l. making further threat oon after. Friday night
n either Pond nor his family went to bed, being in fear of violence.
Between one and two o'clock that night, P lant, Robilliarc.1 and
Blanchard went to the net-hou e, and partially tore it down, while
Whitney and Cull were in it. They then went to the house where
Pond, his wife and children were, hook the door, and ai(1 they
wanted Pond. Pond concealed him elf under the bed, and hi.s wife
demanded what they wanted of him, saying he was not there, when
Plant shook the door again, and ordered ~Irs . Pond to open it;
saying they wanted to search the hou e. She refusing, they resorted to artifice, asking for variou articles of food, and objecting
to receiving th em except through the door. Plant then r epeatedly
commanded her to open the door, saying if he did not, she would
r egret it. On opening th e door from six to twelve inche , b)' sliding the cord, to hand them '" ome sugar, which they demanded, they
did not take the sugar, but Plant seized M:rs. Pond's arm, and
squeezed it until , he fainted. Not succeeding in getting into the
house, they then left for Ward's, and Pond went to the house of his
brother-in-law, and borrowed a double-barrele 1 hot gun loaded
-with pigeon shot, and returned home. \Yhile at Ward's, Blanchard
told the latter that they had torn down part of Pond' n et-hou e,
and had left the rest so that when they went back they woull have
the rest of the fun . Blanchard also '"ai 1, "I want to , ee Gu t
Pond; he abused an Irishman, and I want to abu e him ju t a
bacl a he abused the Trishman. Pond ha s to be abused ::my way."
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He also said to Ward, "This is good bread, I don't know but it may

be the last piece of bread I'll eat." Plant also made threats. A

short time after returning, they were heard to say they were going

back again; were going to find him and to whip him, or have the

soul out of him." It is to be remarked that we have their language

as rendered by an interpreter, who was evidently illiterate, or at

least incompetent to translate into very good English, and it is

impossible for us to determine the exact force of what was said.

The party then went back to Pond's, and asked admittance to

search for him. His wife refused to let them in. They imme-

diately went to the net-house, where Cull was asleep. Plant seized

Cull, and pulled him out of bed on the floor, and began choking

him. Cull demanded who it was, but received no answer. Blan-

chard and Eobilliard had commenced tearing down the boards.

Pond went to the door and hallooed, ""V\nio is tearing down my

net-house ?" to which there was no answer. The voices of a woman

and child were heard crying, and the woman's voice was heard

twice to cry out "for God's sake!" Cull's voice was also heard

from the net-house, not speaking, but hallooing as if he was in
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pain. Pond cried out loudly, "Leave, or I'll shoot." The noise

continuing, he gave the same warning again, and in a few seconds

shot off one barrel of the gun. Blanchard was found dead the next

morning. Pond took immediate steps to surrender himself to

justice.

A question was raised whether the net-house was a dwelling

or a part of the dwelling of Pond. We think it was. It was near

the other building, and was used not only for preserving the nets

which were used in the ordinary occupation of Pond, as a fisher-

man, but also as a permanent dormitorv^ for his servants. It was

held in The People v. Taylor, 2 Mich., 250, that a fence was not

necessary to include buildings within the curtilage, if within a

space no larger than that usually occupied for the purposes of the

dwelling and customary out-buildings. It is a very common thing

in the newer parts of the country, where, from the nature of the

materials used, a large building is not readily made, to have two

or more small buildings, with one or two rooms in each, instead

of a large building divided into apartments.

We can not, upon a consideration of the facts manifest from

the bill of exceptions, regard the charges asked by the defense

as abstract or inapplicable to the case. It was for the jury to

He al o aid to Ward, 'Thi i good bread, I don't know but it may
be the la t piece of bread I'll eat." Plant al o made threat . A
hort time after returning, they were heard to ay they were going
back again; were going to find him and to ' whip him, or have the
oul out of him.' It is to be remarked that we have their language
as rendered by an interpreter, who was evid ntly illiterate, or at
lea t incompetent to tran late into very good Engli h, and it i
impo sible for u to determine the exact force of "hat wa aid.
The party then went back to Pond' , and asked admittance to
ear ch for him. Hi wife refu ed to let them in. They immediately went to the net-house, where Cull was a leep. Plant ~ eized
ull, and pulled him out of b d on the floor, and began choking
him. Cull demanded who it wa., but re eived no answer. Blanchard and Robilliard had commenced tearing down the boards.
Pond went to the door and hallooed_. "vVho i tearing down my
nct-hou e ?" to which there was no answer. The voices of a woman
and child were heard crying, and the woman's voice wa heard
twice to cry out "for God's ake !" Cull's voice was al o heard
from the net-hou e, not speaking, but hallooing a if he was in
pain. Pond cried out loudly, "Leave, or I'll shoot." The noise
continuing, he gave the same warning again, and in a few second
hot off one barrel of the gun. Blanchard was found dead the next
morning. Pond took immediate teps to surrender himself to
ju. tice.
A question was raised whether the net-hou e was a dwelling
or a part of the dwelling of Pond. We think it was. It was near
the other building, and wa u ed not only for pre erving the net·
whi h were u ed in the ordinary occupation of Pond, a a :fisherman, but al o a a permanent dormitory for his ervant . It wa
h lcl in The P eople v . Taylor~ 2 Mich., 250, that a fence was not
nee sary to include building within the curtilage, if within a
. pace no larger than that u ually occupied for the purpose of th e
dw lling and cu tomary out-building . It is a Yery common thin g
in th newer part of the country where, from the nature of the
material u ed, a large bui] ling i not r eadily made, to hav two
or J~or mall 1 uildings, with one or two room in a h, in tead
of a large building divided into apartment .
W can not, upon a con id ration of th fact manife t from
th bill of exception ~, regard the hargc. a k d hy th lcf n e
a ab tract or inapplicable to the ca e. It wa for th jury to
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•consider the whole chain of proof ; but if they believed the evidence

as spread out upon the case, we feel constrained to say that there

are very few of the precedents which have shown stronger grounds

of justification than those which are found here. Instead of reck-

less ferocity;, the facts display a very commendable moderation.

Apart from its character as a dwelling, which was denied by

the court IdbIow, the attack upon the net-house for the purpose

of destroying it, was a violent and forcible felony. And the fact

that it is a statutory and not common law felony, does not, in our

view, change its character. Eape and many other of the most

atrocious felonious assaults, are statutory felonies onl}^ and yet no

one ever doubted the right to resist them unto death. And a break-

ing into a house with the design of stealing the most trifling article,

being common law burglary, was likewise allowed to be resisted in

like manner, if necessary. We think there is no reason for making

any distinctions between common law and statute felonies in this

respect, if they are forcible and violent. So far as the manifest

danger to Pond himself, and to Cull, is concerned, the justifica-

tion would fall within the common law.
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It is claimed by the prisoner's counsel, that we are authorized

to jironounce upon the case the judgment which the facts war-

rant. Had the facts spread out in the bill of exceptions been

found as a special verdict by the jury, this would be true. But

as the case stands, we can only consider them as bearing upon the

instructions given or refused. The errors being in the rulings,

and not in the record outside of the bill of exceptions, we can do

nothing more, in reversing the judgment, than to order a new

trial. The district judge has ruled upon the law questions in

such a way as to present them all fairly as questions not before

decided in this state. We think there was error in requiring the

actual instead of apparent and reasonably founded causes of appre-

hension of injury; in holding that the protection of the net-house

could not be made by using a dangerous weapon; and that the

conduct of the assailing party was not felonious ; and also in using

language calculated to mislead the jury upon the means and extent

of resistance justifiable in resisting a felony.

We do not deem it necessary to pass upon the minor points, as

we do not suppose the authorities will deem it important to proceed

further, unless the facts are very different from those presented.

The iudsfment below must be reversed, and a new trial granted.

·consider the whole chain of proof; but if they believed the evidence
as spread out upon the case, we feel constrained to say that there
are very few of the precedent s which h ave shown stronger grounds
of justification than those which are found her e. In tead of reckless ferocity} the fact display a ver y commendable moderation.
Apart from its charac ter as a dwelling, which l'i·a denied by
the court below, the attack upon the net-hou e fo r the purpose
of dest roying it, wa a violent and forcible felony. And the fact
that it is a statutory and not common law felony, does not, in our
Yiew, change its character. Rape and many other of the most
atrocious felonious assaults, are statutory felonies only, and yet no
one ever doubted the right to r esi$t them unto death. And a breaking in to a house with the design of st ealing the mo t trifling article,
being common law burglary, was likewi e allowed to be resisted in
like manner, if necessary. We think there i no reason for making
any distinctions between common law and statute felonies in thi
r espect, if they are forcible and violent. So far as the manifest
danger to Pond him self, and to Cull, is concerned, the justificat ion would fall within the common law.
It is claimed ·by the prisoner's coun el, that we are authorized
to pronounce upon the case the judgment which the facts warrant. Had the facts spread out in the bill of exceptions been
found as a special verdi ct by the jury, this would be true. But
as the case stands, we can only consider them as bearing upon the
instructions given or refu sed. The error being in the rulings,
and not in the r ecord outside of the bill of exceptions, we can do
n othing more, in r eversing the judgment, t:1an to order a new
trial. The district judge has rnled upon the law questions in
such a way as to present them all fairly as questions not before
decided in this st at e. We think there was error in r equiring the
actual instead of apparent and reasonably founded cau es of appreh ension of in jury ; in holding that the protection of the net-house
could not be made by using a dangerous weapon; and that the
conduct of the assailing party was not felonious; and also in using
language calculated to mislead the jury upon the means and extent
of resistance justifiable in resisting a felony.
We do not deem it n ece sary to pa ss upon the minor point , as
we do not suppose the authorities will deem it important to proceed
further, unless the fact s are very different from those presented.
The judgment below must be rever ed, and a new trial gran ted.

CHAPTER IX.

OFFENSES AGAIXST THE PEESOX. [Continued.]

Eape.

CommoniveaUh v. Burke, 105 Mass. 376. (1870.)

Gray, J. :

The defendant has been indicted and convicted for aiding and

CHAPTER IX.

assisting Dennis Green in committing a rape upon Joanna Caton.

The single exception taken at the trial was to the refusal of the

presiding judge to rule that the evidence introduced was not suf-

ficient to warrant a verdict of guilty. The instructions given were

OFFENSE

GAI:.N"ST THE PER

ox. [

OXTI TUED.]

not objected to, and are not reported in the bill of exceptions. The

RAPE.

•only question before us therefore is, whether, under any instruc-

tions applicable to the case, the evidence would support a convic-

tion.

Commonicealth \. Burke, 105 Ma. s. 3 6. {18 0.)

That evidence, which it is unnecessary to state in detail, was

sufficient to authorize the jury to find that Green, with the aid

and assistance of this defendant, had carnal intercourse with Mrs.

GRAY,

J .:

Caton, without her previous assent, and while she was, as Green

and the defendant both knew, so drunk as to be utterly senseless

and incapable of consenting, and with such force as was necessary
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to effect the purpose.

All the statutes of England and of Massachusetts, and all the

"text books of authority, which have undertaken to define the

crime of rape, have defined it as the having carnal knowledge of

a woman by force and against her will. The crime consists in

the enforcement of a woman without her consent. The simple

question, expressed in the briefest form, is. Was the woman willing

or unwilling ? The earlier and more weighty authorities show that

the words "against her will," in the standard definitions, mean

exactly the same thing as "without her consent;" and that the

distinction between these phrases, as applied to this crime, which

has been suggested in some modern books, is unfounded.

The most ancient statute upon the subject is that of Westm. I.

<:. 13, making rape (which had been a felony at common law) a

199
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:pr iding judge to rule that the evidence introduced wa not suf:ficient to warrant a verdict of guilty. The in truction given were
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anu incapable of con enting and with such force as wa nece ary
io e:ff ect the purpo e.
11 the tatute of England and of 1\Ia achu ett and all the
-text book of authorih: which have undertaken to define the
crime of rape, have defined it a the having carnal know ledge of
a woman b:y force and again t her will. The crime con i ~ t in
the enforcement of a woman without h er con ent. The . imple
que ti on, expre ed in the briefe t form, i , \Ya the woman willing
or unwilling? Th earlier and more weighty authoritie how that
th word "again t her will," in the tandarl definition , mean
exactly the ame thing a "without her con ent; and that th
di tin tion betw en the e phra e , a . . appli c1 to thi crim which
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The mo t ancient. tatute upon the ubj t i that of \f e tm. I.
c. 13, making rap (which had been a felony at ·omrnon hrn·) a
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niisdemeanor, and declaring that no man should ^'ravish a maiden

within, age, neither by her own consent, nor without her consent,

nor a wife or maiden of full age, nor other woman, against her

will," on penalty of fine and imprisonment, either at the suit of a

party or of the king. The St. of Westm. II. c. 34, ten years

later, made rape felony again, and provided that if a man should

"ravish a woman, married, maiden, or other woman, where she

did not consent, neither before nor after,'' he should be punished

with death, at the appeal of the party; "and likewise, where a

man ravisheth a woman, married lady, maiden, or other woman,,

with force, although she consent afterwards," he should have a.

similar sentence upon prosecution in behalf of the king.

It is manifest upon the face of the Statutes of Westminster,,

and is recognized in the oldest commentaries and cases, that the

words "without her consent" and "against her will" were used

synonymously; and that the second of those statutes was in-

tended to change the punishment only, and not the definition of

the crime, upon any indictment for rape — leaving the words

"against her will," as used in the first statute, an accurate part
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of the description. Mirror, c. 1, § 12 ; c. 3, § 21 ; c. 5, § 5. 30

& 31 Edw. I. 529-532. 22 Edw. IT. 22. Staunf. P. C. 24 a.

Coke treats the two phrases as equivalent; for he says: "Eape is

felony by the common law declared by parliament, for the unlaw-

ful and carnal knowledge and abuse of any woman above the age

of ten years against her will, or of a woman child under the age

of ten years with her will or against her will;" although in the

latter case the words of the St. of Westm. I. (as we have already

seen) were "neither by her own consent, nor without her con-

sent." 3 Inst. 60. Coke elsewhere repeatedly defines rape as

"the carnal knowledge of a woman by force and against her will."

Co. Lit. 123 b. 2 Inst. 180. A similar definition is given by

Hale, Hawkins, Comyn, Blackstone, East and Starkie, who wrote

Avhile the Statutes of Westminster were in force; as well as by the

text writers of most reputation since the St. of 9 Geo. IV. c. 31,

repealed the earlier statutes, and, assuming the definition of the

crime to be well established, provided simply that "every person

convicted of the crime of rape shall suffer death as a felon." 1

Hale P. C. 628. 1 Hawk. c. 41. Com. Dig. Justices, S. 2. 4 BL

Com. 210. 1 East P. C. 434. Stark. Crim. PL (2d ed.) 77, 431.

1 Eussell on Crimes, (2d Am. ed.) 556; (7th Am. ed.) 675. 3

misdemeanor, and declaring that no man should " ravish a maiden
within age, neither by her own consent, nor without her consent,
nor a wife or maiden of full age, nor other woman, against her
will," on penalty of fine and imprisonment, either at the suit of a
party or of the king. The St. of Westm. II. c. 34, ten year
later, made rape felony again, and provided that if a man should
" ravish a woman, married, maiden, or other woman, where she
did not consent, neither before nor after," he should be punished
with death, at the appeal of the party; "and likewise, where a
man ravisheth a woman, married lady, maiden, or other woman,.
with force, although she consent afterwards/' he should have a.
similar . entence upon pro ecution in behalf of the king.
It is manifest upon the face of the Statutes of Westminster,.
and is r ecognized in the oldest commentaries and ca es, that the·
words "without her consent" and "again t her will" were used
synonymously ; and that the econcl of tho e statutes was intended to change the punishment only, and not the definition of
the crime, upon any indictment for rape-leaving the words.
" against her will/ ' a ~ u eel in the fir t tatute, an accurate part
of the description. lifirror, c. 1, § 12; c. 3, § 91; c. 5, § 5. 30·
& 31 Edw. I. 529-532. 22 Edw. IV. 22. Staunf. P. C. 24 a.
Coke treats the two phrases a equivalent; for he says: "Rape i
felony by the common law declared by parliament, for the unlawful and carnal knowledge and abuse of any woman above the age
of t en years again t her will, or of a woman child under the age
of t en year with her will or against h er will;" although in the
latter case the words of the St. of Westm. I. (as we have already
seen) wer e "neither by her own con ent, nor without her consent." 3 Inst. 60. Coke el ewhere r peatedly defines rape as
"the carnal knowledge of a woman by force and against her will."
Cc. Lit. 123 b. 2 Inst. 180. A similar definition is given by
Hale, H awkins, Com yn, Blackstone, Ea st and Starkie, who wrote
while the Statutes of Westmin ter were in force ; as well as by the
t ext writers of most r eputation since the St. of 9 Geo. IV. c. 31,
r epealed the earlier statutes: and, a sum ing the definition of the
crime to be well established, provided simply that " every person
convict ed of the crime of rape shall suffer death a a felon." 1
Hale P. C. 628. 1 Hawk. c. 41 . Com. Dig. Ju tices S. 2. -± BL
Com. 210. 1 E a ~ t P. C. 434-. Stark. Crim. Pl. ( 2d ed.) 77, 431.
1 Rmsell on Crim e:::, ( 2d Arn. ed.) 556 ; ( 7th Am. ed.) 675. 3
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Chit. Crim. Law, 810. Archb.. Crim. PL (10th ed.) 481. 1

Gabbett Crim. Law, 831. There is authority for holding that it

is not even necessary that an indictment, which alleges that the

defendant "feloniously did ravish and carnally know" a woman,

should add the words "against her will." 1 Hale P. C. 632.

Ilarman v. CornmonweaWi, 12 S. & E. 69. Conimonwealth V.

Fogerty, 8 Gray, 489. However that may be, the office of those

words, if inserted, is simply to negative the woman's previous

consent. Stark. Crim. PI. 431 note.

In the leading modern English case of The Queen v. Camplin,

the great majority of the English Judges held that a man who

gave intoxicating liquor to a girl of thirteen, for the purpose, as

the jury found, "of exciting her, not with the intention of render-

ing her insensible, and then having sexual connection with her,"

and made her quite drunk, and, while she was in a state of in-

sensibility, took advantage of it, and ravished her, was guilty of

rape. It appears indeed by the judgment delivered by Patte-

son, J. in passing sentence, as reported in 1 Cox Crim. Cas. 220,

and 1 C. & K. 746, as well by the contemporaneous notes of Parke,
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B., printed in a note to 1 Denison, 92, and of Alderson, B., as

read by him in Tlie Queen v. Page, 2 Cox Crim. Cas. 133, that the

decision was influenced by its having been proved at the trial that,

before the girl became insensible, the man had attempted to pro-

cure her consent, and had failed. But it further appears by those

notes that Lord Denman, C. J., Parke, B., and Patteson, J.,

thought that the violation of any woman without her consent,

while she was in a state of insensibility and had no power over

her will, by a man knowing at the time that she was in that state,

was a rape, whether such state was caused by him or not; for

example, as Alderson, B., adds, "in the case of a woman insen-

sibly drunk in the streets, not made so by the prisoner." And in

the course of the argument this able judge himself said that it

might be considered against the general presumable will of a

woman that a man should have unlawful connection witli lier.

The later decisions have established the rule in England that un-

lawful and forcible connection with a woman in a state of uncon-

sciousness at the time, whether that state has been produced by

the act of the prisoner or not, is presumed to be without her con-

sent, and is rape. The Queen v. Ryan, 2 Cox Crim. Cas. 115.

Anon, by Willes, J., 8 Cox Crim. Cas. 134. Regina v. Fletcher^

Chit. Crim. Law
10. Archb. . rim. Pl. (10th ed.) 4c 1. 1
Gabbett Crim. Law, 31. There i authorit ' for holding that it
i ~ not even nece . ar that an indictment, which allege that the
defendant "f Jloniou.J did ravi h and carnall.) know' a woman,
. . hould add the word "again t her will." 1 Hale P. C. 63'>.
Harman v. Commonwealth, 1
.
R. 69. Commonwealth
Fogerty, 8 Gra.) 489. However that may be the office of tho e
words if in erted, i imply to negative the wo111an'3 previou
consent. Stark. Crim. Pl. 431 note.
In the leading modern Engli h case of Th e Queen v. Camplin,
the great majority of the Engli h judge held that a man who
gave intoxicating liquor to a girl of thirteen, for the purpo e a ~
the jury found, "of exciting her, not with the intention of rendering her in en ible, and then having exual connection with her,
and made her quite drunk, and, while he wa in a state of insen. ibility, took advantage of it, and ravi hed h er, wa guilty of
rape. It appears ind eed by the judgment delivered by Patteon J. in pa sing sentence, a reported in 1 Cox Crim. Ca, . 920
::md 1 C. & K . -!6, a well by the contemporaneou note of Parke,
B., printed in a note to 1 Deni on, 92, and of Alder on, B. a
r ad by him in Th e Queen v. Page, 2 Cox Crim. Ca . 133, that the
decision was influenced by its having been prov d at the trial that,
before the girl became insensibl , the man had attempted to proure her con . . ent, and had failed. But it further appears by tho e
note that Lord Denman, C. J ., Parke B., and Patte on J.:
thought that the violation of any woman without her con ent
\rhile she was in a tate of in en ibility and had no power oyer
her will, by a man h.-nowing at the time that he wa in that tate
wa a rape, whether sucsh state wa cau ed b:) him or not; for
example, as Alder on, B., add "in the ca e of a woman in ensibly drunk in the treets, not made o by the pri oner." An l in
the cour e of the arrrument thi able judg him elf aid that it
might be con..,id reel again t the general pre umable will of a
woman that a man hould have unlawful connection with h r.
The later deci ion . . have e..,tabli hed the rule in England that unl::rn ful and forcibl connection with a woman in a state of 1111 onciou n . at the time wheth r that tat ha been produ c1 hy
the act of the pri oner or not, i pr urned to be without h r ·onent, and i rape. Th e Qiu~e n v. Ryan ,
ox rim. a . 115.
Anon. by Will . J.,
ox rim. Ca . 134. R egina v. Fl: tcher>
T
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lb. 131; S. C. Bell, 63. Regina v. Jones, 4 Law Times (N. S.)

154. The Queen v. Fletcher, Law Eep. 1 C. C. 39; S. C. 10 Cox

Crim. Cas. 248. The Queen v. Barrow, Law Eep. 1 C. C. 156;

S. C. 11 Cox Crim. Cas. 191. Although in Regitia v. Fletcher,

uhi supra. Lord Campbell, C. J., (ignoring the old authorities and

the repealing St. of 9 Geo. IV.,) unnecessarily and erroneously

assumed that the St. of Westm. 11. was still in force; that it

defined the crime of rape ; and that there was a difference between

the expressions "against her will" and "without her consent,"

in the definitions of this crime; none of the other cases in Eng-

land have been put upon that ground, and their judicial value is

not impaired by his inaccuracies.

The earliest statute of Massachusetts upon the subject was

passed in 1642, and, like the English Statutes of Westminster,

used "without consent" as synonymous with "against her will,"

as is apparent upon reading its provisions, which were as follows :

1st. "If any man shall unlawfully have carnal copulation with

any woman child under ten years old, he shall be put to death,

whether it were with or without the girl's consent." 2d. "If any
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man shall forcibly and without consent ravish any maid or woman

that is lawfully married or contracted, he shall be put to death."

3d. "If any man shall ravish any maid or single woman, com-

mitting carnal copulation with her by force, against her will, that

is above the age of ten years, he shall be either punished with

death, or with some other grievous punishment, according to cir-

cumstances, at the discretion of the judges." 2 Mass. Col. Eec.

21. Without dwelling upon the language of the first of these

provisions, which related to the abuse of female children, it is

manifest that in the second and third, both of which related to the

crime of rape, strictly so called, and differed only in the degree of

punishment, depending upon the question whether the woman

was or was not married or engaged to be married, the legislature

used the words "without consent," in the second provision, as

precisely equivalent to "against her will," in the third. The

later revisions of the statute have abolished the difference in pun-

ishment, and therefore omitted the second provision, and thus

made the definition of rape in all cases the ravishing and carnally

knowing a woman "]:)j force and against her will." Mass. Col.

Laws, (ed. 1660) 9; (ed. 1672) 15. Mass. Prov. Laws, 1692-3

(4 W. & M.) c. 19, § 11; 1697 (9 W. IIL) c. 18; (State ed.)

lb. 131; S. C. Bell, 63. Reginav. Jones, 4 Law Times (N. S.)
15-±. The Queen v. Pletcher, Law Rep. 1 C. C. 39 ; S. C. 10 Cox
Crim. Cas. 248. The Queen v. Barrow, Law Rep . 1 C. C. 156 ;
S. C. 11 Cox Crim. Cas. 191. Although in R egina v. Fletcher,
ubi supra, Lord Campbell, C. J., (ignoring the old authorities and
the repealing St. of 9 Geo. IV.,) unneces arily and erroneously
assumed that the St. of Westm. II. was still in force; that it
defined the crime of rape; and that there was a difference between
the expressions "against her will" and "without her con. ent,"
in the definition ~ of this crime; none of the other cases in England have been put upon that ground, and their judicial va1ue is
not impaired by his inaccuracies.
The earliest statute of Massachusetts upon the subject was
1)assed in 16~- ?, ancl; like the Engli h Statute of We tminster,
u sed ':without consent" a synonymous with "again t her will,"
as i apparent upon r eading its provi ions, which were as follows :
1st. :'If any man shall unlawfully have carnal copulation with
any woman child under ten year . . ol<l, he hall be put to death,
whether it were with or without the girl's consent." 2d. "Tf any
man shall forcibly and without con ent ravi h any maid or woman
that is lawfully married or contracted, he shall be put to death."
3d. "If any man shall ravish any maid or single woman, committing carnal copulation with her by force, against her will, that
is above the age of ten years, he shall be either punished with
death, or with some other grievou punishment, according to circumst::mces, at the di cr etion of the judges." 2 Mass. Col. Rec.
21. \Vithout dwelling upon the language of the first of the c
provisions, which related to the abuse of female children, it is
manifest that in the second and third, both of which related to the
crime of rape, strictly o called, and differed only in the degree of
punishment, depending upon the question whether the woman
wa or was not married or engaged to be married, the lcgis1ature
used the words "without consent," in the second provision, as
precisely equivalent to "against her will," in the third. The
later r evisions of the tatute have abolj shed the difference in punishment, and therefore omitted the second provLion, and thus
made the definition of rape in all case's the ravishing and carnally
knowing a woman ''by force and against her will." Mas . Col.
Laws, ( ed. 1660) 9; (ed. 1672) 15. Ma . Prov. Laws, 1692-3
(4 W. & M.) c. 19, § 11; 1697 (9 Vil. III.) c. 18; (State ed.)
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m, 296. St. 1805, c. 97, § 1. Eev. Sts. c. 125, § IS. Gen. Sts.

c. 160, § 26. But they cannot, upon any proper rule of construc-

tion of a series of statutes hi pari materia, be taken to have

changed the description of the offence. CommonwealtJi v. Sug-

land, -1 Gray, 7. Commonwealth v. Bailey, 13 Allen, 5-41, 545.

We are therefore unanimously of opinion that the crime, which

the evidence in this case tended to prove, of a man's having car-

nal intercourse with a woman, without her consent, while she was

as he knew, wholly insensible so as to be incapable of consenting,

and with such force as was necessary to accomplish the purpose,

was rape. If it were otherwise, any woman in a state of utter

stupefaction, whether caused by drunkenness, sudden disease, the

blow of a third person, or drugs which she had been persuaded to

take even by the defendant himself, would be unprotected from

personal dishonor. The law is not open to such a reproach.

Exceptions overruled.

False Imprisonment and Kidnapping.

Clich V. State, 3 Texas, 2S2. (ISItS.)

The appellant was indicted upon a charge of kidnapping, at
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the Fall Term, lS-47. The indictment charges that the defend-

ant, "on the first day of June, in the year of our Lord eighteen

hundred and forty-seven, with force and arms, in said county,

•one Samuel Hinton, in the peace of God and of the State, then

.5G, 296. St. 1 05, c. 9,, § 1. Rev. St . c. 125 § 1
Gen. St .
c. 160, § 26. But the3 cannot, upon any proper rule of on.Jruction of a erie of tah1te in pari materia, b taken to have
chang c1 the de cription of the offence. Commonwealth v. ugZand, -± Gray, 1.
omrnonwealth v. Bailey, 13 All n 5±1, 545.
We are therefore unanimou 1y of opinion that the crime, which
the vidence in this case t ended to prove, of a man' having carnal intercourse with a woman without her consent, while he wa
a he knew, wholly insen ible o a" to be incapable of con enting,
and with uch force as wa nece ary to accompli h the purpose,
wa rape. If it were otherwise, any woman in a state of utter
tupefaction, whether caused by drunkennes , udden disease, the
blow of a third person, or drugs which she had been per uaded to
-take even by the defendant him elf, would be unprotected from
t>er onal di honor. The law is not open to uch a r eproach.
Exceptions overruled.

and there being, did forcibly seize, steal, take and carry away,

and kidnap, contrary to the statutes in such cases made and pro-

vided, and against the peace and dignity of the State."

At the Spring Term, 1848, the accused was arraigned and

pleaded not guilty. At the Fall Term thereafter, he moved the

FALSE l:M:PRI ONl\IE_ T .AXD hIDN L\.PPING.

court to quash the indictment for causes specified in the motion.

But the court refused the motion. There was a trial and verdict

of guilty. The defendant then moved in arrest of judgment, and

Click v. State, 3 Texas , 282.

{1848.)

assigned the following causes :

"1st. No assault is avcred to have been committed upon the

said Hinton.

"2d. There is in the indictment no allegation that said Hinton

was taken against his will, or without his consent.

The appellant was indicted upon a charge of kidnapping, at
the ·Fall Term, 1847. The indictment charge that the defend.ant, "on the fir t day of .Tune, in the year of our Lord eighteen
hundred and forty-seven, with force and arms, in said county,
-one Samuel Hinton, in the peace of Goel and of the State. then
and there being, did forcibly eize, steal, take and carr:y away .
.and kidnap, contrary to the statute in uch cases mac~e and provided, and against the peace and dignit3r of the State."
At the Spring Term, 1848, the accused was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty. At the Fall Term ther eafter, he moved the
.court to quash the indictment for cau es pecified in the motion.
But the court refu eel the motion. Ther e wa a trial and verdict
of guilty. The def ndant then moved in arre t of judgment, and
a .. igned the following causes:
"1 t. No a .. a ult i averecl to have been committed upon the
said Hinton.
"9d. There i · in the inc1ictm nt no alle rrati on that aiLl IIinton
wa taken again t hi will. or without hi~ ron. nt.
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"3(1. There is no allegation that the taking was unlawful, or

without process of law.

"^'ith. The purpose or ohject for which said Hinton was taken^

is not set forth.

"5th. The facts and circumstances which constitute the offence

of kidnapping are not set forth in said indictment; Init only the

generic term of kidnapping is used.

"6th. The indictment is double, uncertain and repugnant."

The motion in arrest of judgment was overruled, and the de-

fendant appealed.

Mr. Justice Wheeler, after stating the facts, delivered the

Opinion of the Court. Justice Lipscomb not sitting.

For the appellant, it is insisted that the court erred:

1st. In refusing to quash the indictment.

2d. In overruling the motion in arrest of judgment.

1. As the motion in arrest of judgment appears to embrace

all the grounds which could l)e available to the defendant upon

a revision of the motion to quash, it is unnecessary to consider

the latter, except to observe, that a motion to quash an indict-
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ment is always addressed to the discretion of the court. (1 Chit.

Cr. L., 299, 301; Whart. Cr. L. 131.) And the court will grant

or refuse the motion, as in its discretion it may deem proper;,

being guided in the exercise of that discretion by certain rules.

(1 Chit. C. L. 299.)

Where the application is made on the part of the defendant,,

the English courts, it is said, have almost uniformly refused to

quash an indictment when it appeared to he for some enormous

crime ; and they have also, in a great many instances, refused

to quash indictments for minor offences. (Whart. Am. Cr. L.

131.) It is in the discretion of the court to quash an indictment

for insufficiency, or put the party to a motion in arrest of judg-

ment. But when the question is doubtful, the court will refuse

to quash the indictment. (lb.) The court will not quash an

indictment except in a very clear case, (lb.; 4 Yeates, 69; 1

Murph. 213), but will put the party to a demurrer, or motion in

arrest of judgment. "The court is under no legal obligation to

quash a defective indictment on motion before the trial is con-

cluded, as the party indicted has his remedy by a demurrer, or

by a motion in arrest of judgment." (10 Shep. 191.)

"When the motion is made on the part of the defendant, says-

"3d. There is no allegation that the taking was unlawful, or
without process of law.
"4th. The purpose or object for which said Hinton was taken,.
i not et forth.
"5th. The facts and circumstances which constitute the offence
of kidnapping are not set forth in said indictment; but only the
generic term of kidnapping i used.
"6 th. Th e indictment is double, uncertain and repugnant."
The motion in arre t of judgment wa overruled, and the defenda11t appealed.
l\Ir. Justice WHEELER, after tating the facts, delivered the
Opinion of the Court. Justice LIPSCOMB not itting.
For the appellant, it is in isted that the court erred:
1st. In refusing to qua h the indictment.
2d. In overruling the motion in arre t of judgment.
1. As the motion in arrest of judgment appear to embrace
all th.e grounds which could be available to the defendant upon
a revision of the motion to quash, it i unnecessary to con id r
tbe latter, except to observe, that a motion to quash an indictment is always addressed to the c1i"'cretion of the court. (1 ChiL
Cr. L., 299, 301; Whart. Cr. L. 131.) And the court will grant
or refu e the motion, a in it discretion it may deem proper;.
being guided in the exerci e of that di cretion by certain rule .
( 1 Chit. C. L. 299 .)
\Vhere the application is made on the part of the defendant,.
the English courts, it i aid, have almost uniformly refused to·
quash an indictment when it appeared to ];e for some enormou .
crime; and they ha ve also, in a great many in tance , refu ed
to qua h indictments fo r minor offence . (\Yhart. Am. Qr. L.
131.) It is in the discretion of the court to quash an indictment
for insufficiency, or put the party to a motion in arrest of judgment. But when the question is doubtful, the court will refus
to quash the indictment. (Ib.) The court will not quash an
indictment except in a very clear case, (Ib.; 4 Yeates, G9; 1
Murph. 213), but will put the party to a demurrer, or motion in
arrest of judgment. " The court i under no legal obligation to.
quash a defective indictment on motion before the trial is concluded, as the party indicted has his remedy by a demurrer, or
by a motion in arre t of judgment." ( 10 Shep. 191.)
" When the motion is made on the part of the defendant, say
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Mr. ChittYj the rules by which the court is guided are more strict,

and their objections are more numerous; because, if the indict-

ment be quashed, the recognizances will become ineffectual; and

the courts usually refuse to quash on the application of the de-

fendant when the indictment is for a serious offence, unless upon

the clearest and plainest ground, but will drive the party to a

demurrer, or motion in arrest of judgment, or writ of error."'

(1 Chit. C. L. 300.)

The application, it is said, if made on the part of the defend-

ant, must be made before plea. (^Yhart. Cr. L. 132.) But in some

of the American courts, the practice is always to permit the plet>

of not guilty to be withdrawn, in order to hear a motion to quash.

(2 South. 539.) This, however, is a matter entirely within the

discretion of the court; it being a rule which the discretion of

the courts has adopted for their guidance, and from which, of

course, they may vary. (1 Chit. C. L. 303.)

2d. In order to determine the sufficiency of the indictment,

to which alone the motion in arrest of judgment is directed, it

becomes necessary to recur to the definition and description of
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the offence charged.

At the time of the alleged commission of the offence, and of

the finding of this indictment, there was no statutory definition,

or express recognition of the crime of kidnapping. It is to the

Common Law alone, therefore, that we must look to test the suf-

ficiency of the definition and description of the offence contained

in this indictment.

Kidnapping is defined to be, "the forcible abduction and con-

Yeying away of a man, woman or child, from their own country,

and sending them to another." (2 Tom. L. Die, 335; 4 Bl.

Com. 219; 1 East. P. C. 430, S. 4.)

This offence is treated as an aggravated species of false im-

prisonment. (Eoscoe on Ev. 465; 1 East. P. C. 430.) And all

the ingredients in the definition of the latter offence are neces-

sarily comprehended in the former.

These are: "1. The detention of the person. 2d. The un-

lawfulness of such detention. Every confinement of the person

is an imprisonment." 'TJnlawful, or false imprisonment con-

sists in such confinement or detention without sufficient author-

ity." 3 Bl. Com. 127 ; 1 Tom. L. Die. 755. These essential ele-

ments in the definition of the offence must enter into the descrip-

lir. hi tty~ the rule by which th ·ourt is g~1ic1e l arc mor trict,
and th ir obje tion , are more numerou · b cau c if the indictment be qua::.h cl the recognizance will become in :ffectual · and
the court usualh refuse to qua h on th applic:ation of the defendant when the indictment i for a erious offence unl
upon
the clearest and plaine t ground, but will chi \'e the party to a
demurrer or motion in arre t of judgment, or writ of rror.n
( 1 hit. c. L. 300.)
The application it i .. aid if made on the part of the lef nc.1ant, mu 't be made b fore plea. ("\Yhart. Cr. L. 13'2.) But in "omc
of the American court , the practice is alway to permit the ple~1
of not guilt:· to he withdrawn, in order to hear a motion to qua h.
(2 outh. 539.) Thi. however, i a matter ntirely within the
<li...:cretion of the court; it being a rule which the di cretion of
the court, has a lopted for their guiclance, and from which, of
<;our e, they may vary.
(1 Chit. C. L. 303 .)
2d. In order to determine the u:fficiency of the indictment,
to which alone the motion in arre t of judgment i directed, it
become nece , ~ary to recur to the definition and de cription of
the offence charged.
At the time of the alleged commis ion of the offence, and of
the finding of thi indictment, there wa no tatutor , definition,
or expre..,~ recognition of the crim of kidnapping. It i to the
Common L aTI' alone.• therefore, that we mu t look to te t the ufficiency of the definition and de cription of the offence contained
in thi indictment.
Kidnapping i defined to be, "the forcible abduction and con-veYing awa) of a man, woman or child, from their own countr) .
and ending them to another." (2 Tom. L. Die., 335; 4 Bl.
Com. 219; 1 Ea t. P. C. -±30, . 4.)
Thi offence i treated a an aggravated species of false impri onment. (Ro coe on Ev. 465; 1 Ea t. P . C. 430.) And all
the ingredient in the definition of the latter offence are nece ~ 
arily comprehen le 1 in the former.
T he e are: '1. The d tcntion of the per on. 2d. The unl awfulne of uch detention. Every confin ment of the µer 011
is an impri onment." '· nlawful, or fal
impri onment coni t in uch confinement or detention without ufficient authorit) .
3 Bl. Com. 1· · 1 Tom. L. Die. 75 . The e " ential 1 m nt~ in th dennition of th off nee m1L t ent r into th cl ::. rip-
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tiou of it in the indictment. And to constitute it the offence of

kidnapping, proper at Common Law, another circumstance would

seem to be necessary, viz. : that of sending away the person, upon

whom the offence is committed, from his own country into an-

other. In East's Pleas of the Crown, p. 430, it is said "the forci-

ble abduction, or stealing and carrying away of any person is

greatly aggravated lij sending them away from their own country

into another, properly called kidnapping f If this latter be an es-

sential ingredient in the offence of kidnapping, the present indict-

ment must be defective in not containing this averment. The

only precedents of indictments for kidnapping at Common Law,

to which we have had reference, contain this averment. And so

far as the precedents may be regarded as furnishing evidence of

what was deemed necessary, or at least proper, in an indictment

for this offence at the Common Law, the requisites as deducibl,e

from them would seem to be: 1st. An averment of an assault.

3d. The carrying away or transporting of the party injured from

his own country into another, unlawfully, and against his will.

(1 Tremaine's Pleas of the Crown, 21G.)
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But if this transportation, or carrying away from his own

country into another, be not necessary to constitute the offence,

or if the offence intended to be charged in the present indictment,

be not properly kidnapping, but that of the abduction or "steal-

ing and carrying away, or secreting of the person upon whom it

is alleged to have been committed, sometimes called kidnapping,"

still it amounts to, at least, an aggravated species of false imprison-

ment (lb.), and the indictment must contain every averment nec-

essary to the description of that offence.— The unlawfulness, or

the want of lawful authority, we have seen is one of the circum-

stances necessary to constitute the offence, and it is no where

averred in the present indictment. The omission cannot be sup-

plied by the conclusion of the indictment ''contrary to the form

of the statutes/' for it is founded on no statute and can only be

sustained as a good indictment at Common Law, by rejecting the

conclusion as surplusage, (Whart. Am. Cr. L. 105, 6, no. 3; 1

Chit. Cr. L. 290.)

To constitute the crime of kidnapping, the asportation or con-

veying away must have been against the will and without the

consent of the party injured, and without any lawful warrant or

authority therefor, and these essential circumstances descriptive

tion of it in the indictment. And to con titute it the offence of
kidnapping, proper at Common Law, another circumstance would
~ ccm to be necessary, viz.: that of sending away the person, upon
whom the offence is committed, from his own country into :mother. In East's Pleas of the Crown, p. -±30, it i said "the forcible abduction, or stealing and carr ying away of any person i ~
greatly aggravated by sending th em au;ay f ram, th eir own country
into anothe r, properly called bd1Lappin g." If thi latter be an essential ingredient in the offence of kidnapping, the present indictment must be c1efectiYe in not containing this averment. The
only precedent of indictment for kidnapping at Common Law,
to which we have had r efer ence, contain this averment. And so
.far as the precedents may be regarded as furni hing evidence of
what was deemed nece ary, or at lea t proper, in an indictment
for this offence at the Common Law, the requisite as deducibl~
from them would seem to be: 1 t. An a-verment of an assault.
:?d. The carrying away or tran porting of the party injured from
his own country into another, unlawfully, and again t his will.
(1 Tremaine's Pleas of the Crown, '~ lG.)
But if thi tran porb.tion, or carrying away fr0m his own
country into another, be not nece ·sary to constitute the offence,
or if the offence intended to be charged in the present indictment;
be not properly kidnapping, but that of the abduction or "stealing and carrying away, or secreting of the person upon whom it
i;-; alleged to haYc been committed, sometimes called kidnapping.'
still it amounts to, at least, an aggrarnted ._ pecies of false imprisonm8nt (lb.) , and the indictment mu t contain every a\'erment n ecessary to the de cription of that o:ffence.-The unlawfulnes"', or
the want of lawful authority, we have cen i one of the circumstances neces ary to constitute the offence, and it is no where
<Wcrr d in the present indictment. The orni ion cannot be supplied by the conclusion of the indictment "con trary to the form
of the statutes," for it is founded on no tatute and can only be
:::u tained as a gcod indictment at Common Law, by r ejecting th<~
conclusion as surplusage, (Whart. Am. Cr. L. 105, 6, no. 3; 1
Chit. Cr. L. 290. )
To constitute the crime of kidnapping, the asportation or conveying away must have been again t the will and without the
con sent of the party injured, and without any lawful warrant or
authority therefor, and the~e essential circumstances de criptive
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of the offence charged, should appear by averment in the indict-

ment. (3 Chit. C. L. 835 to 8-il.) Under the present indictment^,

the defendant could not have been convicted of the less offence

of an assault, for the reason that no assault is charged to have

Ijeen committed by him. "The rule, it has been said, that a man

shall not be charged with one crime and convicted of another, may

sometimes cover real guilt, but its observance is essential to the

preservation of innocence." (7 Cranch, 389.)

The words employed in this indictment are not descriptive of

the offence of kidnapping at Common Law, however they might

be of the offence inhibited by some of the numerous statutes in

England enacted for the punishment of the abduction, stealing

or secreting of men, women and children. It is not sufficient to

charge the defendant in this case with Tcidnapping generally, for

he cannot be thereby apprised of the facts he will be required to

answer. But the indictment should state specifically the facts and

circumstances which- constitute that offence. This not having been

done in the case before us, we are of opinion that the indictment

is defective and insufficient, and does not support the conviction
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had, or authorize a judgment of condemnation upon it; and that

the motion in arrest of judgment, for this cause, ought to have

been sustained.

The judgment must therefore be reversed, and the cause re-

manded for further proceedings.

Assault and Battery.

Kirland v. State, 43 Ind. U6. (1873.)

BUSKIRK, J.:

This was a prosecution for an assault and battery commenced

before a justice of the peace. The affidavit charges the appellant

with having, at Marion count}^ on the 28th day of February, 1873,

unlaM'fulh^ and in a rude, insolent, and angry manner, touched,

etc., Charles Bein.

The appellant was tried and found guilty by the justice. The

case was appealed. It was tried on appeal in the Marion Criminal

Court, where the State again obtained a verdict. The appellant

of the offence charged, should appear by aYerm nt in the indictment. ( 3 Chit. C. L. 835 to -±1.) Under the pre ent indictment,
the def ndant could not have been convicted of the le s offence
of an a ault, for the reason that no a ault i charged to have
l en committed by him.
The rule, it ha been aid, that a man
,hall not be charged 11ith one crime and conYictec.1 of another, may
ometimes cover real t;uilt, but it obsenance i e ~ ential to the
pre ervation of innocence. ' ( Cranch, 3 9.)
rrhe word employed in thi indictment are not descriptive of
the offence of kidnapping at Common Law, however they might
be of the offence inhibited by some of the numerou statutes in
England enacted for the punishment of the abduction, tealing
or ecreting of men, women and children. It is not ufficient to
charge the defendant in thi.._ ca e with kidnapping generally, for
he cannot be thereb3 appri ed of the facts he will be required to
answer. But the indictment should state specifically the fact and
circum tances which· con titute that offence. This not having been
done in the case before u , we are of opinion that the indictment
is defective and insufficient, and does not ,,upport the conviction
had, or authorize a judgment of condemnation upon it; and that
the motion in arrest of judgment, for this cau e, ought to have
been sustained.
T he judgment must therefore be rever ed, and the cau e remanded for further proceedings.

ASSA LT .AND BATTERY.

Kirland v.
BUSKIRK,

1

tate_. 43 Ind. 146. {1873.)

J.:

This wa a pro ecution for an as ault and battery commenced
before a ju tice of the peace. The affidavit charge the appellant
with having, at Marion county, on the 28th day of February, 18 3,
unlawfully, and in a rude, insol nt, and angry manner, touch cl,
tc., Charles B in.
The appellant wa tried and found guilty bv the justice. The
ca wa appealed. It wa tried on appeal in th Marion riminal
Court, where the tate again obtained a verdict. Th app llant
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moved for a new trial, which was overruled, and the judgment was

rendered on the verdict.

The error assigned is the overruling of the motion for a new

trial. A reversal of the judgment is asked mainly upon the ground

that the court gave an erroneous instruction to the jury.

The instruction complained of as erroneous is as follows:

"3. To constitute a batter}^, the touching need not be of great

force; a mere touching is sufficient, if it be unlawful and be done

in a rude, or an insolent, or angry manner. But this touching

must be unlawful. A man may defend the possession of his estate

and of his chattels by such reasonable force as may be necessary to

that end; and if, in this case, you believe from the evidence, that

at the time of the alleged assault and battery, Charles Bein was

trespassing upon the lands of the defendant, and engaged in car-

rying away without right the corn of the defendant, the defendant

had the right, after requesting Bein to depart, and a refusal on

his part to leave the property and premises, to use such reasonable

force as was necessary to eject him from the premises and protect

his personal property ; and if the defendant, in thus protecting his
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property and possession, touched Bein or assaulted him only so

much as was reasonably necessary to secure the object aforesaid, he

is not guilty, and you should so find. But if the jury believe from

the evidence, that defendant rented the fields referred to in the

evidence, no certain time being fixed for the termination of the

lease, to Charley Bein, to be cultivated in corn, upon the shares,

to be gathered by Bein, one-half to be delivered to defendant, and

the other to be retained by the renter or tenant for his share, the

m.ere fact that an agreement was made in the fall after, by which

it was agreed that the tenant (Bein) take for his share of the corn

the south field, and defendant the north field as his share, except

three acres in the south field, this would not terminate the lease of

itself, unless it was agreed between the parties that the lease should

terminate. JSTor would such facts authorize the defendant to for-

cibly eject Bein from the field because he was gathering more corn

for his own use than he was entitled to by such agreement ; and if,

under such circumstances, the defendant struck or beat Bein, while

he was gathering corn in the field, or while Bein was driving his

team in the field in the act of gathering the corn, the defendant

struck and beat his horses in a rude and angry manner with a

stick, the defendant is guilty of an assault and battery.*'

m oved for a n ew trial, which was overruled, and the judgment waF:
rendered on the verdict.
The error assigned is the ove;rruling of the motion for a new
trial. A reversal of the judgment is asked mainly upon the ground
that the court gave an erroneous instruction to the jury.
T he instruction complained of as erron eous is as follows:
"2. To con tltute a battery, the touching need not be of great
force; a mere touching is sufficient, if it be unlawful and be done
in a rude, or an insolent, or angry manner. But this touching
must be unlawful. A man may defend the possession of his estate
and of his chattels by such reasonable force as may be necessary to
that end; and if, in this case, you believe from the evidence, that
at the time of the alleged a sault and battery, Charles Bein was
t rc passing upon the lands of the defendant, and engaged in arr ying away without right the corn of the defendant, the defendant
had the righ t, after r equesting Bein to depart, and a refurnl on
his part to leave the property and premises, to use such reasonable
force as was n ecessary to ej ect him from the premises and protect
his persona] property ; and if the defendant, in thus protecting his
property and po session, touched Bein or assaulted him only o
much as was reasonably necessary to secure the obj ect aforesaid, he
is not guilty, and you should so find. But if the jury believe from
the evidence, that defendant rented the fields r eferred to in the
evidence, no certain time being fixed for the t ermination of thE:t
lease, to Charley Bein, to be cultivated in corn, upon the shares,
to be gathered by Bein, one-half to be delivered to d fendant, and
the other to be retained by the renter or tenant for his Rhare, the
mere fact that an agreement was made in the fall after, by which
it was agreed that the tenant (Bein) take for his share of the corn
the south field, and defendant the north field as his share, except
three acres in the south fielcl, this would not t erminate the lease of
it elf, unless it was agreed between the parties that the lease should
terminate. Nor would such facts authorize the defendant to forcibly ej ect Bein from the field because h e was gathering more corn
for his own use than h e was entitled to by such agreement; and if,
under such circumstances, the def endant struck or beat Bein, while
h e was gathering corn in the field, or while Bein was driving hi
team in the field in the act of gathering t he corn, the defendant
struck an d beat his horses in a rude and angry manner with a
stick, the defendant is guilty of an as ault and battery."'
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The Statute says: "Every person who in a rude, insolent or

angry manner, shall unlawfully touch another, shall be deemed

guilty of an assault and battery," etc. 2 G. & H. 459.

It is quite clear, therefore, that no assault and battery can be

committed, unless one person touches another person unlawfully,

and in a rude, or insolent, or angry manner. The affidavit charges

that the appellant thus touched Charles Bein. To sustain this

charge, the evidence must show .the unlawful touching, etc., of

Charles Bein. The charge excepted to, however, instructs the jur\-,

"that, if the defendant struck Charles Bein's horses with a club, in

a rude and angry manner, while Bein was driving his team, in the

act of gathering corn, etc., the defendant is guilty of an assault

and battery. In this instruction the court deems the touching of

Bein wholly immaterial and unimportant; to strike Bein's horses

is to strike him, that is, if they were struck with a club, and it

was done while he was driving his team in the field, in the act of

gathering corn. To strike the horses of Bein was in no legal or

logical sense to strike him. True, if the blow touched both Bein

and his horse, the touching would be an assault and l^attery on
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Bein, not because of the touching of his horse, however, but for the

reason that it touched him.

And if the appellant struck and drove Bein's horse, or any other

horse, against him violently, unlawfully, and in a rude, etc., man-

ner, then he would be guilty, not because he struck the horse, but

for the reason that he struck Bein by running or pushing the

horse against him. If Bein was so connected with his horses when

they were struck, that the blow took effect on his person as well

as that of the horses, then the person striking the blow would be

guilty.

Bishop, in his work on Criminal Law, in sec. 72, vol. 2, says:

*The slightest unlawful touching of another, especially if done in

anger, is sufficient to constitute a battery, for example, spitting

in a man's face, or on his body, or throwing water on him, is such.

And the inviolability of the person, in this respect, extends to ever}-

thing attached to it."

Eussell, on Crimes, vol. 1, p. 751, says: "The injury need not

be effected directly by the hand of the party. Thus there may

be an assault by encouraging a dog to bite. * * * And it

seems that it is not necessary that the assault should be immediate ;

as where the defendant threw a lighted squib into a market-place,

14

The Statute . ay : 'E-rnry per on who in a rude, insolent or
.angry manner, hall unlawfully touch another, hall be deemed
guilty of an a ault and battery," etc. 2 G. & H. -!59.
It is quite clear, therefor , that no a sault and batter3 can be
committed, unle one per on touche another per on unlawfully,
and in a rud , or in olent: or angry manner. The affida it charge
that the appellant thus touched Charle Bein. To u tain thi
charge, the evidence must show .the unlawful touching_, etc., of
Charle Bein. The charge excepted to however, in truct the jury
that, if the defendant truck Charle Bein's horse with a club, in
a rude and angry manner, while Bein was driving hi team, in the
act of gathering corn, etc., the defendant is guilty of nn a sault
and battery. In this invtruction the court deem the touching 0£
J3ein wholly immaterial and unimportant; to strike Bein'.. , hor e~
i to strike him, that i , if they were truck with a club, and it
wa done while he was driving his team in the field, in the act of
gathering corn. To strike the horses of Bein was in no legal or
logical sense to strike him. True, if the blow touched both Bein
and hi hor e, the touching would be an assault and batter on
B ein, not hecau e of the touching of his horse, however, but for the
reason that it touched him.
And if the appellant truck l}TICl drove B ein' horse, or any other
hor .. e, again t him violently, unlawfully, and in a rude, etc., manner, then he wonld be guilt}, not becau e he struck the hor e but
for the rea on that he struck Bein by running or pushing the
hor e again t him. If Bein was so connected with hi horse whrn
they -were truck, that the blow took e:ffect on hi person a well
as that of the hori;:e , then the per on triking the blow would be
guilty.
Bi hop, in hi work on Criminal Law, in ec. 72, vol. 2_, a3 :
uThe lighte t u:::llawful touching of another, e pecially if done in
anger, i ufficient to constitute a battery. For example, spitting
in a man face, or on hi body, or throwing water on him, i uch.
And the inviolability of the per on, in thi re pect, extend to every
thing attached to it."
Ru ell, on rime , vol. 1, p. 51, ..,ay : "The injury need not
be effected directly by the hand of the part . Thu there may
ncl it
be an a ault by encouraging a dog to bite. * * *
eem that it i not nece ary that the a ault hould be imm diat ;
as where the defendant threw a lighted quib into a mark t-place,
14
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which, being tossed from hand to hand, by different persons, at last

liit the pLiintiff in the face, and put out his eye, it was adjudged

that this was actionable as an assault and battery. And the same

lias been holden where a person pushed a drunken man against

another."

Greenleaf on Evidence, in discussing the question of battery,

says : "A battery is the actual infliction of violence on the person.

This averment will be proved by evidence of any unlawful touch-

ing of the person of the plaintiff, whether by the defendant him-

self, or by any substance put in motion by him. The degree of

violence is not regarded in the law; it is only considered by the

jur}', in assessing the damages in a civil action, or by the judge in

passing sentence upon indictment. Thus, any touching of the

person in an angry, revengeful, rude, or insolent manner; spitting

upon the person: jostling him out of the way; pushing another

against him ; throwing a squib or any missile, or water upon him ;

striking the horse he is riding, whereby he is thrown ; taking hold

of his clothes in an angry or insolent manner, to detain him, is a

battery. So. striking the skirt of his coat or the cane in his hand,
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is a battery. For anything attached to his person partakes of its

inviolability."

Blackstone dt'fines a battery as follows:

'■■'3. By battery, w^hich is the unlawful beating of another. The

least touching of another's person wilfully, or in anger, is a bat-

tery; for the law cannot draw the line between different degrees

of violence, and therefore totally prohibits the first and lowest

stage of it; every man's person being sacred, and no other having

a right to meddle with it in any the slightest manner." 3 Cooley's

Blackstone, l-?0.

Note 4 by Judge Coolcy, on same page, reads as follows: "A

battery is an unlawful touching the person of another by the

aggressor himself, or any other substance put in motion by him.

1 Saund. 29, b. n. 1.; id. 13 and 14, n. 3. Taking a hat off the

head of another is no battery. 1 Saund. 14. It must be either

wilfully committed, or proceed from want of due care: Stra. 596;

Hob. 134; Plowd. 19; otherwise it is damnum absque injuria,

and the party aggrieved is without remedy: 3 Wils. 303; Bac.

Ab. assault and battery, B. ; but the absence of intention to com-

mit the injury constitutes no excuse, where there has been a want

of due care. Stra. 596. Hob. 134. Plowd. 19. But if a person

which, being to sed from hand to hand, by different persons, at last
hit the plaintiff in the face, and put out his eye, it was adjudged
that this was actionable as an assault and battery. And the same
has been holden where a person pushed a drunken man against
another."'
GreenleE1.f on Evidence, in di cussing the question of battery:
ays : "A battery is the actual infliction of Yiolence on the person.
Thi · averment will be proved by evidence of any unlawful touching of the person of the plaintiff, whether by the defendant himself, or by any substance put in motion by him. The degree of
violence is not regarded in the law; it is only considered by the
jury, in a sessing the damages in a civil action, or by the judge in
passing sentence upon indictment. Thus; any touching of the
person in an angry, revengeful, rude, or insolent manner; spitting
upon the person; jostling him out of the way; pushing another
against him; throwing a quib or any missile, or water upon him;
striking the horse he is riding, whereby he is thrown; taking holcJ
of his clothes in an angry or insolent manner, to detain him, is a
battery. So; triking the skirt of hi coat or the cane in his hand,
is a battery. For anything attached to his person partakes of its
inviolability."
Blackstone defines a battery as fo llows :
a3 . By battery.: which i the unlawful beating of another. The
least touching of another' per on wilfully, or in anger, is a battery; for the law cannot draw the line between different C!egr e
of violence, and therefore totally prohibits the first and lowest
stage of it; every man's per on being acred, and no other having
a right to medclle with it in any the slighte t manner." 3 Cooley's
Black tone, 1 '20.
Rate -t by Judge Cooley, on ame I age read a follows : "A
ba ttcry is [ln unla wf u 1 touching the person of another by the
aggrC'ssor him elf, or any other sub tanc put in motion by him.
1 Sauncl. 29, b. n. I.; id. 13 and 14, n. 3. Taking a hat off the
head of another i no battery. 1 Saund. 14. It mu t be either
wilfully committed, or proceed from want of due care : Stra. 596;
Hob. 13±; Plowd. 19; otherwise it is claninum absque injuria_.
and the party aggrieved i without remedy : 3 \\ ils. 303; Bae.
Ab. assault and batter3, B.; but the absence of intention to commit the injury constitutes no excuse, where there has been a want
of due care. Stra. 596. Hob. 134. Plowd. 19. But if a person
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unintentionally jdusIi against another in the street, or if without

any default in the rider a horse runs away and goes against an-

other, no action lies. 4 Mod. 405: Every battery includes an

assault: Co. Litt. 253; and the plaintiff may recover for the

assault only, though he declares for an assault and battery. 4 Mod.

405."

Counsel for appellee have referred us to the following adjudged

cases as supporting the instruction under examination; Respuhlica

V. De Longcliamps, 1 Dallas, 111; Tlie State v. Davis, 1 Hill S.

C. 46; Duhuc De MarentiUe v. Oliver, Penning, 379; The United

States V. Ortega, 4 Wash. C. C. 531.

The case referred to in Dallas was a prosecution under the laws

of nations for an assault and battery upon the Minister cf the

French Government resident in this country. It was proved upon

the trial that the defendant struck with a cane the cane of the

French Minister. The court say: "As to the assault, this is, per-

haps, one of the kind, in which the insult is more to be considered

than the actual damage; for though no great bodily pain is suffered

by a blow on the palm of the hand, or the skirt of the coat, yet
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these are clearly within the legal definition of assault and battery,

and among gentlemen, too often induce duelling, and terminate

in murder. As, therefore, anything attached to the person, par-

takes of its inviolability; De Longchamps' striking Monsieur

Marbois' cane, is a sufficient justification of that gentleman's sub-

sequent conduct."

The case referred to in Pennington, supra, was a civil action

for a trespass committed by the defendant on the property of the

plaintiff", by striking with a large club the plaintiff's horse, which

was before a carriage in which the plaintiff was riding. The court

say: "To attack and strike with a club, with violence, the horse

before a carriage, in which a person is riding, strikes me as an

assault on the person; and if so, the justice had no jurisdiction

of the action. But if this is to be considered as a trespass on

property, unconnected with an assault on the person, I think it

was incumbent on the plaintiff below, to state an injury done to

the horse, whereby the plaintiff suffered damage; that he was in

consequence of the blow bruised or wounded, and unable to per-

form service; or that the plaintiff had been put to expense in

curing of him or the like."

The above case being an action of trespass for an injury to the

unintentionally pu ~h again t another in the street, or if without
any default in the rider a hor e runs away and goe again t another, no action lie . 4 Mod. 405 : Every batteT} include an
a sault: Co. Litt. 253 ; and the plaintiff may recover for the
a ault only, though he declar for an a ault and battery. 4 Iod.
405."
Counsel for appellee have referred u to the following adjudged
cases a. supporting the in truction under examination; Respublica
v. D e Longchamps, 1 Dalla , 111; Th e State v. Davis, 1 Hill S.
C. 46; Dubuc D e M arentille v. Oliver, P enning, 379; Th e United
States v. Ortega, 4 Wash. C. C. 531.
The case referred to in Dallas was a prosecution under the laws
of nations for an assault and battery upon the M:ini ter cf the
French Government re ident in this country. It wa proved upon
the trial that the defendant struck with a cane the cane of the
French Minister. The court ay: "A to the assault, thi iB, perhaps, one of the kind, in which the insult i more to be con "ider ed
than the actual damage; for though no great bodily pain is uffered
by a blow on th palm of the hand, or the kirt of the coat, yet
the e are clearl.Y within the legal definition of assault and battery,
and among gentlemen, too often induce duelling, and terminate
in murder. As, therefore, anything attached to the person, partakes of it inviolability ; De Longchamps' striking Ion ieur
lifarbois' cane, i a sufficient ju tification of that gentleman'. ubsequent conduct."
The case referred to in P ennington, supra, was a civil action
for a trespass committed by the clefcndant on the property of the
plaintiff, by striking with a large clul> the plaintiff's hor e, which
wa before a carriage in which the plaintiff wa riding. The court
a3 : "To attack and strike with a club, with violence, the hor e
before a carriage, in which a per on i riding, strikes me as an
n a ult on the person; and if o, the ju tice had no juri diction
of the action. But if thi is to be considered as a tre pas on
property, unconnected with an a ault on the per on, I think it
wa. incumbent on the plaintiff below, to state an injury don to
the hor~e, wher by the plaintiff suffered damage; that he wa in
con equence of the blow bruised or wound cl, and unabl to perform ervice; or that the plaintiff had been put to exp n e in
curing of him or the lik . '
The above cas h in<Y an action of tre pa . . for an injury to the
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liorse of the plaintiff and not a prosecution for an assault, or an

assault and battery upon the person of the plaintiff, we think that

hut little importance should be attached, or weight given to the

loose remark of the judge, that the striking of a horse attached

lo a carriage was an assault upon the person riding in the carriage.

The case of The State v. Davis, stipm, was a prosecution for

an assault upon an officer, in releasing from his custody a negro.

The facts will sufficiently appear from the quotation which we

make from the opinion of the court. The court say:

"The general rule is, that any attempt to do violence to the

person of another, in a rude, angry, or resentful manner, is an

assault; and raising a stick or fist, within striking distance,

pointing a gun within the distance it will carr\% spitting in one's

face, and the like, are the instances usually put by way of illustra-

tion. No actual violence is done to the person in any one of these

instances; and I take it as very clear that that is not necessary to

an assault. It has, therefore, been held that beating a house in

which one is, striking violently a stick, which he holds in his hand,

or the horse on which he rides, is an assault ; the thing in these

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t39z97p86
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

instances partaking of the personal inviolability. Eespuhlica v.

De Longcliamps, 1 Dall. 114; Wamhough v. Shank, Penning.

229, cited in 2 part Esp. Dig. 173.

"What was the case here ? Laying the right of property in the

negro out of the question, the prosecutor was in possession, and

legally speaking, the defendants had no right to retake him with

force. As far as words could go, their conduct was rude and vio-

lent, in the extreme. They broke the chain with which the negro

was confined to the bed-post, in which the prosecutor slept, and

out the rope by which he was confined to his person, and are clearly

within the rule. The rope was as much identified with his person,

as the hat or coat which he wore, or the stick which he held in his

hand. The conviction was therefore right."

We are inclined to the opinion that the chain and rope so con-

nected together the prosecutor and negro, as to make the identifica-

tion as complete as the hat or coat on the person or the stick in the

hand. The ruling in the above case was based upon the close and

intimate connection which existed between the prosecutor and the

neo-ro; but no such identity or connection between the prosecutor

and his horses in the case in judgment is shown.

The caso of The United States v. Ortega, supra, Avas a prosecu-

hor e of the plaintiff and not a pro ecution for an assault or an
:assault and battery upon the person of the plaintiff) we think that
but little importance should be attached) or weight given to the
loo e remark of the judge) that the striking of a hor e attached
', o a carriage wa ~ an a a ult upon the per on riding in the carriag .
The ca e of The Stat e v. Dav is, supra, was a prosecution for
nn assault upon an officer) in r eleasing from hi cu tody a negro .
The facts will sufficiently appear from the quotation which we
make from the opinion of the court. The court ay :
''The general rule is) that any attempt to do violence to the
pn on of another) in a rude_, angry) or r e entful manner) is an
a sault; and raising a stick or fist within triking di. tance,
pointing a gun within the di . . tance it will carry, spitting in one'
face, and the like, are the in tances u ually put by way of illustration. No actual -violence is done to the per on in any one of the e
instances; and I take it as very clear that that i not neces"ary to
an assault. It ha8, therefore been held that beating a hou e in
which one is) striking violentl:v a stick, which he holds in his hand,
or the horse on which he rid , i an a ault; the thing in the e
in::::tance partaking of the personal inviolability. R espublica v.
De Longchamps, 1 Dall. 11-±; ll'ambough v. Shank, Penning.
229, cited in 2 part E ~ p. Dig. 173.
"What was the case h ere? Laying the right of property in the
negro out of the question, the pro ecutor was in po e ion and
legally speaking, the defendants had no right to retake him with
force. A far as word could go, their conduct wa rude and violent, in the extreme. They broke the chain with which the negro
was confined to the bed-po t, in which the pro ecutor slept, and
cut the rope by whi h he was confined to hi per on, and are clearly
within the rule. The rope wa as much identified with hi per on,
as the hat or coat which h e wore or th "tick which he held in his
hand. The conviction was therefore right."
\Ye are inclined to the opinion that the chain and rnpe so connected together the prosecutor and negro, as to make the identification as complete as the hat or coat on the person or the tick in the
ll:rnd. The ruling in th above ca e wa ba eel upon the clo e and
intimate connection which exi ted betw en the prosecutor and the
negro; hut no uch identity or connection between th prosecutor
and his h or es in the case in judgment is hown.
'rhe cas0 of TlzC' United i..:. tate v. Ortega, s1.lpra, wa a pro ecu-
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tion instituted by the United States, for the purpose of vindicating

the law of nations and of the United States, offended, as was

alleged, in the person of h foreign minister, by an assault com-

mitted on him by the defendant. The proof was, that the defend-

ant seized hold of the breast of the coat of Mr. Salmon, the

prosecuting witness, and retained his hold while he enumerated

his cause of grievance, and until a third person came up and com-

pelled him to release his hold.

The court said : "It was argued by the counsel for the defendant,

that, to constitute an assault, it must be accompanied by some act

of violence. The mere taking hold of the coat, or laying the hand

gently upon the person of another, it is said, does not amount to

this offence; and that nothing more is proved in this case, even

by Mr. Salmon. It is very true that these acts may be done, very

innocently, without offending the law. If done in friendship, for

a benevolent purpose, and the like, the act would certainly not

amount to an assault. But these acts, if done in anger, or a rude

and insolent manner, or with a view to hostility, amount, not only

to an assault, but to a battery. J]ven striking at a person, though
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no blow be inflicted, or raising the arm to strike, or holding up

one's fist at him, if done in anger, or in a menacing manner, are

considered by the law as assaults."

It is very obvious that the above cases do not support the posi-

tion assumed by the counsel for appellee, but are in entire accord

with the elementary writers from whom we have quoted.

The most accurate and complete definition of a battery that

wc have met with is that given by Saunders, and which has l)een

adopted by most subsequent writers, and that is: "A batter}' is

an unlawful touching the person of another by the aggressor him-

self, or any other substance put in motion by him." By this defini-

tion, it is an essential pre-requisitc that the person must either be

touched by the aggressor himself or by the substance put in motion

by him. There must be a touching of the person. One's wearing

apparel is so intimately connected with the person, as in law to

be regarded, in case of a battery, as a part of the person. So is

a cane when in the hand of the person assaulted.

But in the case under consideration, the court ignores all these

things and instructs the jury to convict on proof alone of the

striking of the horses of the prosecuting witness. It is not even

necessary, according to this charge, that the prosecuting witness

tion in tituted by the United tate . . , for the purpo e of vindicating
the law of nation and of the Unit d States, offended, as wa
alleged, in the person of a foreign minister, by an a ault ommitted on him by the defendant. The proof was that the defendant eized hold of the brea t of the coat of Ur. Salmon, th
prosecuting witne"s, and retained hi hold while he enumeratecl
his cause of grievance and until a third person cam up and compelled him to release his hold.
The court aid: "It was argued by the counsel for the defendant,
that, to constitute an a sault, it must be accompanied by some act
of violence. The mere taking hold of the coat, or laying the hancl
gently upon the person of another, it i said, doe not amount to
this offence; and that nothing more i proved in this case, even
by Mr. Salmon. It i very true that these acts may be done, very
innocently, without offending the law. If done in friend hip, for
a b nevolent purpo e, and the like, th e act would certainly not
amount to an assault. But these acts, if done in anger, or g_ rude
and in olent manner, or with a view to hostility, amount, not only
to an a sault, but to a battery. Even striking at a person.• though
no blow be inflicted, or rai ing the arm to trike, or holding up
one' :fi t at him, if done in anger, or in a menacing manner, are
con idered by the law a assaults."
It is very obvious that the above ca es clo not support the po ition as u~ed by the counsel for appellee, but are in entire accord
with the elementary writers from whom we have quoted.
The most accurate and complete definition of a battery that
we· have met with i that given by Saunders and which has been
adopted by most subsequent writers, and that is: "A battery i
an unlawful touching the per on of another by the aggressor himself, or any other sub tance put in motion by him." By this definition, it is an es . . ential pre-requi ite that the person must either be
touched b) the aggre or him elf or by the ubstance put in motion
by him. There must be a touching of the person. One's wearing
apparel i ~O intimately connected with the person, a in law to
be regarded, in ca e of a l attery, a a part of the person.
o J
a cane when in the hand of the p r on a ... saulted.
But in the ca e under consideration, the court i;nore all th s
thing and in tructs the jury to convict on proof alone of th
triking of the hor e of the pro ecutin<r witne . It i not v n
nece sar~', Hccording to thi harg : that the pro. cutin<r wiln

21-1

Ass .\.ULT AND BATTERY

214 Assault and Batter's

should have been iu the wagon or holding the lines, or connected

with or attached to the horses in any way. That Bein was driving

his team and gathering his corn does not necessarily so connect

him with the horses that the touching of the horses would be an

assault and battery on him. He may have been, as is frequently

done, driving his horses from one pile of corn to another, by words

of command, without being in the wagon or having hold of the

lines.

The law was correctly stated by the court in the first charge

given to the jury. It was as follows : "Before you will be justified

in finding the defendant guilty, the evidence must satisfy you

beyond a reasonal:)le doul)t that the defendant, at, etc., * * *

in a rude, or an insolent, or an angry manner, touched Charles

Bein."

In placing a construction upon the instruction complained of,

it is our duty to look at all the instructions given on the same sub-

ject; and, if the instructions taken togetlier present the law

correctly and are not calculated to mislead the jury, we should

affirm the judgment.
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On the other hand, if the two charges are inconsistent with

each other, if they were calculated to confuse and mislead the jury,

or if they must have left the jury in doubt or uncertainty as to

what was the law as applicable to the facts of the case, then the

judgment should be reversed. Somers v. Pumphrey, 34 Ind. 231.

The above rules have been applied by this court in civil cases.

The rule laid down in criminal causes is as follows: "'An erro-

neous instruction to the jury in a criminal case cannot be corrected

by another instruction, which states the law accurately, unless

the erroneous instruction be thereby plainly withdrawn from the

jury." BradlcAj v. The mate, 31 Ind. 492.

Construing these charges together, how do they stand? The

jury are first told that, to justify a finding of guilty, they must

be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant touched

Charles Bein : and then, in the second charge, the court continues,

that the defendant might lawfully employ reasonable force, etc.,

in defence of his possession or property, but that under circum-

stances hypothetically put l)y the court, Charles Bein had the

right to be on the defendant's premises gathering corn," and if

under such circumstances, etc., while Bein was driving his team

in the field in the act of gathering the corn, the defendant struck

should haYe been in the wagon or holding the line , or connected
with or attached to the hor es in any 1ray. That Bein wa driving
his team and gathel'ing his corn does not n cessarily so connect
him with the horse. that the touching of the horses would be an
assault and battery on him. He may have been, as is frequently
done, driving hi hor e from one pile of corn to another, by words
of command, without being in the wagon or having hold of the
lines.
The law was correctly tated by the court in the first charge
given to the jury. It was as follows: "Before you will be justified
in finding the defendant guilty, the evidence must satisfy you
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, at, etc., * * *
in a rude, or an insolent, or an angry manner, touched Charles
Bein."
Jn placing a construction upon the instruction complained of,
it is our duty to look at all the instructions given on the same subj ect; and, if the instructions taken together present the law
correctly and are not calculated to mislead the jury, we should
affirm the judgment.
On the other hand, if the two charges are inconsistent with
each other, if they were calculated to confuse and mi lead the jury,
or if they must have left the jury in doubt or uncertainty as to
what was the law as applicable to the facts of the case, then the
judgment should be reversed. Soniers v. Pumphrey, 24 Ind. 231.
The above rules have been applied by this court in civil cases.
The rule laid down in criminal causes i as follows: '(An erroneous instruction to the jury in a criminal case cannot be corrected
by another in struction, which states the law accurately, unless
the erroneous irn;truction be thereby plainly withdrawn from the
jury." Bradley Y. Tli e State, 31 Ind. -±92.
Construing the e charge together, how do they stand? The
jury are :first told that, to justify a finding of guilty, they must
be <::atis:fied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen lant touched
Charles Bein; an 1 then, in the second charge, the court continues,
that the defendant might ]awfully employ reas~mable force, etc.,
in defence of hi~ possession or property, but that under circumstances hypothetically put by the court, Charle Bein had the
right to be on the defendant's premises gathering corn," and if
under such circumstances, etc., while Bein was driving his team
in the field in the act of gathering the corn, the defendant struck
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and beat his horses in a rude and angr}^ manner, with a stick, the

defendant is guilty of an assault and battery."

Phiinly, then, the charge is that the evidence must show the

touching of Charles Bein by the defendant, but that if Bein is

driving his team, etc., and the defendant strikes his horses (that

is Bein's horses) with a stick, in a rude and angry manner, then,

such touching of the horses is, in law, a touching of Bein, and the

defendant is guilty of an assault and battery. Logically the charge

states the law thus : Generally, to sustain a charge of assault

and l)attery on A., it is essential to prove a touching of A. by the

defendant, but under certain circumstances, such as if A. is driving

his team, etc., and the defendant touches the horses of A., then,

in that case, such touching of the horses is a touching of A., and

if such touching of the horses is unlawfully done and was made,

etc., then the defendant may be found guilty of an assault and

battery on A,

There was evidence tending to prove that the defendant struck

Charles Boin. He and his two sons. Edward and Frank, so swear.

The defendant swears he did not.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t39z97p86
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

The following is briefly the evidence tending to prove the

assault and battery upon the horses :

Charles Bein testified : "He hit my horses on the head with a

big club about three feet long. * * * He struck my horses

two or three times. * * * jjg ^^g ^lad. * * * j ^^gg

loading corn out of the piles; was loading up corn when he struck

the horses."

Same witness on cross-examination testifies : "When he struck

the horses, he struck them on the head, and they stopped, etc.

Don't know who held the lines. Maybe my little boy held one

and me the other. * * * jj^ struck the horse next to

mc. * * * The team was made to stand when defendant

struck the horses. * * * j ^^.^g j-^q^ j^-, ^^q wagon when he

struck them."

Edward Bein testified : "Kirland hit the horses on the head,

and they stopped. We were just going to drive out. My father

was then standing on the ground near the wagon. Defendant put

his hands on the horses to unhitch them from the wagon; tried

to unhitch the traces. Just before that he struck the horses, when

father was standing on the other side of the wagon."

ancl beat his hor e in a rude and angry mann r, with a tick, the
defendant is guilty of an a sault and battery.
Plainly, then, the charge i that the vidence mu t show the
touching of Charle Bein by the defendant, but that if B in i
driving his team etc. and the defendant trikes his horse (that
i l5 in's horses) with a stick, in a rude and angry manner, then,
such touching of the horses is, in law, a touching of Bein and the
def ndant is guilty of an as ault and battery. Logically the charge
fate the law thus: Generally, to su tain a charge of a ault
and battery on A., it is essential to prove a touching of A. by the
defendant, but under certain circumstances, such as if A. is driving
hi team, etc., and the defendant touches the horses of A., then,
in that case, such touching of the horses i a touching of A., and
if such touching of the hor es i unlawfully done and wa made,
et·., then the defendant may be found guilty of an as anlt and
battery en A,
'rhere was evidence tending to prove that the defendant struck
Charles Bein. H e and his two sons_. Edward and Frank, so . wear.
The defendant swears he did not.
The following i briefly the evidence tending to prove the
a sault and battery upon the hor es:
Charle Bein testified: "He hit my hor e on the head with a
big ·lub about three feet long. -~ * * He struck my hor es
two or three time . * * * He was mad. * * * 1 wa ·
lo:-: cling corn out of the piles; was loading up corn when he struck
the horses."
Sarne witne on cross-examination testifie : "When he ~truck
th hor. es, he truck them on the head, and they stopped, etc.
Don't know who held the line . faybe my little boy hell one
and me the other. :j· * * He struck the horse next to
me. ':' * * The team was made to tand when defendant
truck the horses. * * * I was not in the wagon wh n he
truck them."
Edward Bein t e ti:fied : "Kirland hit the hor
on the head,
an 1 they stopped. We were ju t going to drive out.
1y father
wa then tanding on the ground near the wagon. Defendant put
hi hanr1s on the hor es to unhitch them from the wagon; tried
to unhitch the trace . Ju t before that he tru k the hor. e , when
father was tanding on the other side of the wagon.'
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Frank Bein testified: "At the time the horses were struck,

father was in the wagon."

The defendant testifies, that he "didn't touch the horses, except

that he attempted to unhitch them from the wagon."

It is apparent that there was evidence in the case to whicli the

second instruction was applicable. The verdict being general we

are unable to determine whether he was convicted for touching the

person of Bein or for striking his horses. It may be that the jury

found the defendant guilty of striking the horses of Bein, for the

defendant admitted that he attempted to unhitch the horses from

the wagon, and consequently must have touched them, while he

positively denies that he touched the person of the prosecuting

witness. Besides, there was evidence tending to impeach the char-

acter of Bein. The jury may, therefore, have doubted, reasonably^

the guilt of the defendant in the striking of Bein, and found him

guilty only of having "in a rude and angry manner struck the

horses of Bein with a stick," while '"lie was driving his team in.

the act of gathering corn."

The second instruction was inapplicable to the evidence and
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was calculated to mislead the jury, and being erroneous, the judg-

ment should be reversed.

The judgment is reversed; and the cause is remanded, for a

new trial in accordance with this opinion.

Mayhem.

State V. Johnson, 58 Ohio St. W. (1898.)

MiNSHALL, J. :

David Johnson was prosecuted on an indictment presented by

the grand jury of the county, framed on the provisions of section

G819, Revised Statutes. The section, so far as it is applicable to

this case, is as follows : "Whoever with malicious intent to maim

or disfigure, cuts, bites, or slits the nose, ear or lip. cuts or disables

the tongue, puts out or destroys an eye, cuts off or disables a limb

or any member of another person" is declared guilty of an offence

punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiari'. The indictment

Frank Bein testified: "At the time the hor es were struck,.
father was in the wagon."
The defendant testifies, that he "didn't touch the horse , except
that he attempted to unhitch them from the wagon."
It is apparent that there was evidence in the case to which the
second instruction was applicable. The verdict being general we:
arr unable to determine "·hether he was convicted for touching the
person of Bein or for striking his horses. It may be that the jury
found the defendant guilty of striking the horses of Bein, for thedefendant admitted that he attempted to unhitch the horses from
the wagon, ::md consequently must have touched them, while he
po itively denies that he touched the person of the pro ecuting
witness. Beside ..; there was evidence tending to impeach the charact r of Bejn. The jury may, therefore, have doubted, reasonably,
the guilt of the defendant in the ·triking of Bein, and found him
guilty only of having "in a rude am1 angry manner truck the
horses of Bein with a sti ·k, ., "·hile ,_.he was driving hi team in
th e act of gathering corn."
The 5econc1 instruction wa inapplicable to the evidence and
was calcubted to mislc:iad the jury, and being erroneou , the judg1nent should be reversed.
The judgment i rever ed; and the a use is remanded, for a.
new trial in accordance with thL opinion.

contained two counts. In the first it was charged that he mali-

ciously "did bite the ear of one Eeuben Mitchell with intent to

MAYHEM.

State v. Johnson, 58 Ohio
MINSHALL,

t . 417.

{1898.)

J.:

David John on wa pro ecuted on an indictment presented by
the granc1 jury of the count:L framed on the proYi ions of section
6819, Revised tatutes. The "'ection, o far a . . it i applicable to
thi case, is as follows: "\Yhoever "ith malicious intent to maim
or c1i -figure, cuts, bites, or lits the no . . e, ear or lip. cut or disables
the tongue, puts out or de . . troys an eye. cuts off or disables a limr
or any mern her of another person" i"' declared guilty of an offence
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary. The indictment
contained two counts. In the fir t it was charged that he maliciously "did bite the ear of one Reuben Mitchell with intent to
f
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disfigure," and, in the second, that he maliciously "did bite the ear

of one Reuben Mitchell with intent to maim." A demurrer was

sustained to the second count, and, on a plea of not guilty, he was

acquitted on the first count. The prosecuting attorney took a bill

of exceptions to the ruling on the demurrer to the second count,

and prosecutes the same here under the provisions of the statute

in that regard, to test the accuracy of the ruling.

The demurrer presents the question whether the malicious biting

of the ear of another can be charged as done with intent to maim.

There is no question, we think, but that maim as a noun, and

mayhem are equivalent words, or that maim is but a newer form

of the word mayhem — the difference being in the orthography and

not in the sense. Webster's Unabridged Dictionary: "Maim," as

a noun, is there defined the same as mayhem : "The privation of

the use of a limb or member of the body by which one is rendered

unable to defend himself or to annoy his adversary." This is the

definition of mayhem at common law. 1 East, P. C. 393 ; 1 Whar.

Cr. Law, section 581. Hence the verb "to maim" is accurately

defined in Anderson's Law Dictionary, as follows: "To commit
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mayhem." So, at common law, whatever the injury to any mem-

ber of the body might be, if it did not permanently affect the

physical ability of the person to defend himself or annoy his

adversary, it did not amount to mayhem. Neither the biting of an

ear nor the slitting of the nose was regarded as an injury of this

character. Clark's Cr. Law, 182; 3 Bl. Com. 121. The outrage

upon Sir John Coventry, who had been set upon in the street and

his nose slit, for words spoken in Parliament, led to the adoption

of what is known as the Coventry Act, 22 and 23 Char. 11. This

act made it a felony without benefit of clergy, where any one un-

hiwfully cut out or disabled the tongue, put out an eye, slit the

nose, cut off the nose or lip, or cut off or disabled any limb or mem-

ber of any other person, with intent to maim or disfigure him. 4

Bl. Com. 20G. Our statute is substantially the same. Any of the

injuries there named, done with the intent "to maim or disfigure"

is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary. Whether it

be the biting of an ear, or the putting out of an eye, or the cutting

off of a hand, each is alike regarded as a crime and punished the

same way; or, in other words, each is of the same degree of crim-

inality. "^ Section 731G, Revised Statutes.

The question in the case is, whether the second count in the

disfigure, ' and, in the second, that he maliciou ly ' did bite the ear
of one Reuben Mitchell with intent to maim." A demurrer wa
··ustained to the i::econd count, and, on a pl a of not guilty, he was
acquitted on the first count. The prosecuting attorney took a bill
of exception to the ruling on the demurr r to th second count,
and prosecut s the ame h re under the provision of the tatut .·
in that regard, to test the accuracy of the ruling.
The demurrer pre ents the question whether the malicious biting
of the ear of another can be charged as done with intent to maim.
There i no que tion, we think, but that maim as a noun, and
mayhem are equivalent words, or that maim is but a newer form
of the word mayhem-the difference being in the orthography and
not in the "'ense. 'Webster's Unabridged Dictionary: "Maim," a
a noun, is there defined the same as mayhem: "The privation of
the u e of a limb or member of the body by which one is rendered
unable to defend himself or to annoy his adversary." Thi i th
definition of mayhem at common law. 1 East, P. C. 393; 1 Whar.
Cr. Law, section 581. Hence the verb "to maim" is accurately
defined in Ander on's Law Dictionary, as follows: "To commit
mayhem." So, at common law, whatever the injury to any member of the body might be, if it did not permanently affect the
physical ability of the person to defend himself or annoy hi
adversary, it did not amount to mayhem. Neither the biting of an
ear nor the slitting of the nose was regarded a an injury of thi
character. · Clark' Cr. Law, 182; 3 Bl. Com. 121. The outrage
upon Sir John Coventry, who had been et upon in the street an 1
his nose slit, for words spoken in Parliament, 1 d to the adoption
of what is known as the Coventry Act, 22 and 23 Char. II. Thi
act made it a felony without benefit of clergy, where any one unlawfully cut out or disabled the tongue, put out an eye, lit the
no e, cut off the nose or lip, or cut off or di abled any limb or member of any other per on, with intent to maim or di figur hjrn. +
Bl. Com. 206. Our statute i ubstaniially the ame. Any of the
injuries there named, done with the intent "to maim or di figure"
i puni hable by impri onment in the penitentiary. Whether ]t
be th biting of an ar, or the putting out of an y , or the uttinb'
off of a hand, ea h is alike regarded a a rime and punished th
. am way; or, in other words, ach is of the same degr of criminality.
ection 73 16, Revi ed tatute ·.
Th que. tion in the as i , wh th r th , second count m th
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indictment charges an offence against the laws of the State? It

does not for reasons stated charge a maiming. Then does it charge

the offence of hiting the ear with intent to disfigure ? Such intent

is not averred in the count; and, unless the intent to maim in-

cludes the intent to disfigure, there can be no conviction on the

second count for such an offence. Evidence of an intention to

disfigure would he a fatal variance from the intent laid in the

count. The intent in this case must depend upon the nature of

the injury, in connection with the character of the member on

which it is inflicted. If the member be not one of use to the per-

son in defending himself, an injury to it cannot be said to have

been done with intent to maim. It is provided, among other things,

in section 731G, Eevised Statutes, that: "When the indictment

charges an offence including different degrees, the jury may find

the defendant not guilty of the degree charged and guilty of an

inferior degree." In Barber v. State, 39 Ohio St. 660, it was held

that the offence of cutting with intent to Icill and that of cutting

with intent to wound are offences of the same degree, under the

provisions of section 6820, Eevised Statutes, making it an offence
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for any one to cut another person "with intent to kill, wound or

maim." The indictment charged a cutting with intent to kill ; the

verdict of the jury was, "guilty of cutting with intent to wound."

The court held that the indictment was not supported by the

verdict, for the reason that the offence of cutting with intent to

wound is not an offence inferior in degree to that of cutting with

intent to kill. By a parity of reasoning it follows that the unlaw-

ful biting of the ear with intent to disfigure is not an offence

inferior to that of biting it with intent to maim; and an indict-

ment charging the biting to have been done with intent to maim,

would not be supported by evidence of an intent to disfigure —

there would in such case, be a material variance between the proof

and the allegation.

But this does not exhaust the inquiry, for the question remains,

does the count charge any offence against the laws of the State,

if so the court erred in sustaining a demurrer to it. Now, it

seems apparent that the malicious biting of the ear of another,

whether to maim or disfigure, amounts to an assault and battery —

an offence inferior in degree to an assault with intent to maim or

disfigure — the offence charged being simply an aggravated form

of assault and batterv of which the defendant could have been

indictment charges an offence against the la-ws of the State? It
does not for rea on tated charge a maiming. Then doe it charge
the offence of biting the ear with intent to disfigure ? Such intent
i not averred in the count ; and, unle s the intent to maim includes the intent to di figure, there can be no conviction on the
second count for such an offence. Evidence of an intention to
disfigure ·would he a fatal variance from the intent laid in the
count. The intent in this ca e must depend upon the nature of
the injury, in connection with the character of the member on
which it is inflicted. If the member be not one of u se to the peron in defending :1imself, an injury to it cannot be said to have
been done with intent to maim. It i proYidcd, among other thing ,
in section 7310, Revised Statutes, that: " \Yhen the indictment
charges an offence including different degrees, the jury may find
the defendant not guilty of the degree charged and guilty of an
inferior degree." In Barb er v. State, 39 Ohio St. 660, it was held
that the offence of cutting with intent to kill, and that of cutting
with intent to wound arc offences of the same degree, under the
provi ions of section 6820, Revi eel Statute , making it an offence
for any one t o cut another per on " with intent to kill, wound or
maim." The indictment charged a cutting with intent to kill; the
verdict of the jury was, "guilty of cutting with intent to wound."
The court held that the indictment was not supported by the
verdict, for the r ea on that the offence of cutting with intent to
wound i not an offence inferior in degree to that of cutting with
intent to ~<:ill. By a parity of reasoning it follow s that the unlawful biting of the ear with intent to di figure i not an offence
inferior to that of biting it with intent to maim; and an indictment charging the biting to have been done with intent to maim,
would not be supported by evidence of an intent to di fignrethere would in such case, be a material variance between the proof
and the allegation.
But this doe not exhaust the inquiry, for the que tion remain ,
doe the count charge any offence again t the law of the State,
if so the court erred in sustaining a demurrer to it. Now, it
cem apparent that the malicious biting of the ear of another,
whether to maim or disfigure, amounts to an as ault and batteryan offence inferior in degree to an assault with intent to maim or
disfigure-the offence charged being imply an aggravated form
of assault and battery of which the defendant could have been
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convicted on the count demurred to, on proof of such an offence.

Heller v. State, 23 Ohio St. 582; Barber v. State, supra, 3 Bl.

Com. 121.

For this reason the court erred in sustaining a demurrer to it.

Exceptio7is sustained.

Criminal Libel.

Commonicealth v. Chapman, IS Met. (Mass.) 68. (lSJf7.)

Shaw, C. J. :

convicted on the count demurred to, on proof of uch an offence.
Heller v. tate, 9 3 Ohio t. 5 '2 · Barber Y. tate, upra, 3 Bl.
Com. 1'21.
For thi rea ,on the court erred in "'u taining a demurrer to it.
Exceptions sustained.

This was an indictment against the defendants for a false and

malicious libel, tried before the court of common pleas, and, upon

RI HK AL LIBEL.

a conviction there, the case is brought before this court, upon an

exception which has been most elaborately argued by the learned

counsel for the defendants, and which, if sustained, must go to

the foundation of the prosecution; namely, that there is no law

Commonwealth

Y.

hapman 13 Jl et. (Mass.) 6 .

{1847.)

of this Commonwealth by which the writing and publishing of a

malicious libel can be prosecuted by indictment, and punished as

an offence. The proposition struck us with great surprise, as a

most startling one ; but as it was seriously presented and earnestly

urged in argument, we felt bound to listen, and give it the most
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careful consideration; but after the fullest deliberation, we are

constrained to say, that we can entertain no more douljt upon the

point than we did when it was first offered.

It is true that there is no statute of the Commonwealth declar-

ing the writing or publishing of a written libel, or a malicious

libel by signs and pictures, a punishable offence. But this goes

little way towards settling the question. A great part of the muni-

cipal law of Massachusetts, both civil and criminal, is an unwritten

and traditionary law. It has been common to denominate this

"^•'the common law of England," because it is no doubt true that

a large portion of it has been derived from the laws of England,

either the common law of England, or those English statutes

passed before the emigration of our ancestors, and constituting

a part of that law, l)y which, as English subjects, they were gov-

erned, when they emigrated; or statutes made afterwards, of a

general nature, in amendment or modification of the common

law, which were adopted in the colony or province by general

consent.

C. J.:
Thi wa an indictment against the defendant for a fal e and
maliciou libel, tried before the court of common plea , and, upon
a conviction there, the ca e i brought before thi court, upon an
exception which ha been mo t elaborately argued by the learned
coun el for the defend.ants, and which, if u tained, mu t cro to
the foundation of the pro ecution; namely, that there i no law
of thi Commonwealth bj which the writing and publishing of a
maliciou libel can be pro ecuted bj indictment, and puni heel a
a.n offence. The propo ition truck u with great urpri e, a a
most tartling one; but as it wa eriously pre ented and earne tly
urged in argument, we felt bound to li ten, and give it the mo t
careful con ideration; but after the fulle t deliberation we are
con trained to ay, that we can entertain no more doubt upon the
point than we did when it wa fir t offered.
It i true that there i. no statute of the Commonwealth declaring the writing or publishing of a written lib 1, or a maliciou
libel by ign ~ and picture , a puni hable offence. But thi ~ goe
little wa) toward ettling the que tion. A great part of the municipal law of :J1a achu etts, both civil and criminal, i an unwritten
and traditionary law. It ha been common to denominate thi ,
"the common law of England/' because it i. no doubt tru that
a large portion of it ha been derived from the law of Eno-land.
ither the common law of England, or tho e Eno-li h tatute
pa ed h fore th emigration of our ance . . tor and con titutincr
a part of that law, by whi h, a .. Engli h ubje t , they w r e overned when they emigrated; or tatute mad afterward of a
general nature, in amendment or modification of the ommon
law which were adopted in the colony or province by general
con ent.
HAii,
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lu addition to these sources of unwritten law, some usages,

growing out of the peculiar situation and exigencies of the earlier

settlers of Massachusetts, not traceable to any written statute or

ordinance; but adopted by general consent, have long had the

force of law; as, for instance, the convenient practice, by which^

if a married woman join with her husband in a deed conveying

land of which she is seized in her own right, and simply acknowl-

edge it before a magistrate, it shall be valid to pass her land, with-

out the more expensive process of a fine, required by the common

law. Indeed, considering all these sources of unwritten and tradi-

tionary law, it is now more accurate, instead of the common law

of England, which constitutes a part of it, to call it collectively

the common law of Massachusetts.

To a very great extent, the unwritten law constitutes the basis

of our jurisprudence, and furnishes the rules by which public and

private rights arc established and secured, the social relations of

all persons regulated, their rights, duties, and obligations deter-

mined, and all violations of duty redressed and punished. With-

out its aid, the written law, embracing the constitution and statute
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laws, would constitute but a lame, partial, and impracticable sys-

tem. Even in many cases, where statutes have been made in

respect to particular subjects, they could not be carried into effect^

and must remain a dead letter, without the aid of the common law.

In cases of murder and manslaughter, the statute declares the

punishment; but what acts shall constitute murder, what man-

slaughter, or what justifiable or excusable homicide, are left to be

decided by the rules and principles of the common law. So, if

an act is made criminal, but no mode of prosecution is directed,

or no punishment provided, the common law furnishes its ready-

aid, prescribing the mode of jDrosecution by indictment, the com-

mon law punishment of fine and imprisonment. Indeed, it seems

to be too obvious to require argument, that without the common

law, our legislation and jurisjDrudence would be impotent, and

wholly deficient in completeness and symmetry, as a system of

municipal law.

It will not be necessary here to consider at large the sources of

the unwritten law, its authority as a binding rule, derived from

long and general acquiescence, its provisions, limits, qualifications,

and exceptions, as established by well authenticated usage and

tradition. It is sufficient to refer to 1 Bl. Com. 63 cf- seq.

In addition to the"e ource of unwritten law ...,omc usages..
gr°'ving out of the peculiar ituation and exigenci of the earlier
ettler" of lifa .. sachusett , not traceable to any written statute or
ordinance; but adopted by general consent, have long had the
force of law; a , for in tance, the convenient practice, by which,.
if a married woman join with her hu band in a deed conYeying·
land of which he is eized in her own right, and imply acknowledge it before a magistrate, it shall be Yalid to pa her land, without the more expensive process of a fine, required by the common
la 1r. Indeed; considering :ill these ource of unwritten and traditionary law, it i now more accurate instead of the common law
of England, which con titute a part of it, to call it collectively
the common law of ~fas achu etts.
'fo a very gr nt extent, the unwritten law con titute the basi
of our juri, prudence, :mcl furni hes the rules by which publjc and
priYate right arc e tabli hed and ecured, the ocial relation of
all persons regulated, their right , dutie and obligations determined, and all violation of duty redressed and punished. Without its aid, the written law, embracing the con titution and statute
law , would con titute but a lame, partial and impracticable y tern. Even in many ca e , where tatute haY been made in
re~pect to particular subje ts, they could not be carried into effect,.
and mu t remain a dead letter, without the aid of the common l aw~
In case of murder and man laughter, the tatute declare the
puni hment; but what act. hall con titute murder what manlaughter, or what ju tifiable or excu able homicide, are left to be
clecided by th rule ::ml principle of the common law. So, if
an act i made criminal, but no mode of pro ecution i directed,
or no puni hment proYid d, the common law furnishes it ready
aid, pre crihing the mode of prosecution by indictment, the common la\v punU1ment of fine and imprisonment. Ind ed, it eern
to be too obYiou to require argument, that without the common
law, our legi lation and jurisprudence would be impotent, and
·wholly deficient in corn1 leteneu and symmetry, a a ~ Y tern of
municipal law.
It "ill not he nece ' Sary here to consid r at large the , ource of
the unwritten law, it authority as a binding rule, derived from
long and general ncql1ie cence, it provision.. , limit , qualification ..
and exception , a.. establi hed hy well authenticated u age and
tradition. It i sufficient to refer to 1 Bl. Com. 63 ct: eq.
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If it be asked, "how are these customs or maxims, constituting

the common law, to be known, and by whom is their validity to

he determined ?" Blackstone furnishes the answer : "hj the judges

in the several courts of justice. They are the depositaries of the

laws, the living oracles, who must decide in all cases of doubt, and

who are bound by oath to decide according to the law of the land.

Their knowledge of that law is derived from experience and study,''

''and from Ijeing long personally accustomed to the judicial de-

cisions of their predecessors." 1 Bl. Com. 69.

Of course, in coming to any such decision, judges are bound to

resort to the best sources of instruction, such as the records of

courts of justice, well authenticated histories of trials, and books

of reports, digests,, and brief statements of such decisions, prepared

by suitable persons, and the treatises of sages of the profession,

whose works have an established reputation for correctness.

That there is such a thing as a common or unwritten law of

Massachusetts, and that, when it can be authentically established

and sustained, it is of equal authority and Ijinding force with the

statute law, seem.s not seriously contested in the argument before
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US. But it is urged that, in the range and scope of this unwritten

law, there is no provision, which renders the writing or publishing

of a malicious libel punishable as a criminal offence.

The stress of the argument of the learned counsel is derived

from a supposed qualification of the general proposition in the

constitution of ]\[assachusetts, usually relied on in proof of the

continuance in force of the rules and principles of the common

law, as they existed before the adoption of the constitution. The

clause is this : Chap. 6, Art. 1, Sect. G : "All the laws which

have been adopted, used and approved in the province, colony or

state of Massachusetts Bay, and usually practiced on in the courts

of law, shall still remain and be in full force until altered or

repealed by the legislature; such parts only excepted as are repug-

nant to the rights and liberties contained in this constitution."

It is then argued, that it is in virtue of this clause of the con-

stitution, that the common law of England, and all other laws

existing before the revolution, remain in force, and that this

clause so far modifies the general proposition, that no laws arc

saved, but those which have been actually applied to cases in judg-

ment in a court of legal proceeding; and unless it can be shown

affirmatively that some judgment has been rendered, at some time

If it be a ked, 'how are the e cu toms or maxims, constituting
the comrnon law, to be known, and by "·hom i their valiaity to
be d termined ?" Blackstone furnishes the answ r: "by the judge"'
in the ·eyeral court of justice. They are the depo itaries of the
la,1-..., the liYing oracle , who mu t decid e in all cas of doubt; and
who are bound by oath to leeide according to the law of the land.
Th ir knowledge of that law i derived from experience and study''
''and from being long p e r ~onally accu tomed to the judicial decisions of th ir predecessors." 1 Bl. Corn . 69.
Of course in coming to any uch deci ion, judges are bound to
rernrt to the be3t Nource of instruction su h as the records of
court. of ju -tice, well authenticated historie of trial , :md book::,
of report , dige ts; and brief statements of uch deci ions, prepared
by suitable persons, and the treati es of sages of the profp sion,
who e work have an established reputation for correctness.
That th ere iN such a thing as a common or unwritten law of
J\iiassachusetL and that, when it can be authentically stablished
and sustained, it is of equal authority and binding force with the
tatute law, seems not seriously contested in the argument before
us. But it is urged that, in the range an l scope of this unwritten
Jaw, there is no provi ion, which renders the writing or publishing
of a malicious libel puni hable as a criminal offence.
The stre s of the argument of the learned counsel is derived
from a supposecl qualification of the general proposition in the
constitution of Massachusetts, usually relied on in proof of the
continuance in force of the rules and principles of the common
law, a they existed before the adoption of the constitution. The
clau e is thi : Chap. 6, Art. 1: Sect. 6: "All the laws which
have been adopted, u ed and approved in the province, colony or
tate of Mas achusetts Bay, and usually practiced on in the courts
of law, hall ._till remain and be in full force until ~1ltere1 or
repealed by the 1 gi. lature; such parts only xcepted as are repugnant to the rights and libertie containe l in this constitution."
It i then argu d, that it i in virtue of this clause of the contitution, that the common law of England, and all other law
exi . ting b fore the revolution, r emain in force, and that i.hi
·lau e o far modifies th e general propo ition, tha.t no laws arc
_aYed, but those which have b n actua1ly appli d to ca e in judgment in a court of 1 gal proc eding; and unl
it can b J1 wn
affirmatively that ome judgment ha be n r nd r d, at om time
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before the adoption of the constitution, affirmative of any particu-

lar rule or principle of the common law, such rule is not brought

within the saving power of this clause, and cannot therefore be

shown to exist. We doubt the soundness of this proposition, and

the correctness of the conclusion drawn from it.

We do not accede to the proposition, that the present existence

and effect of the whole body of law, which existed before the con-

stitution, depends solely upon this provision of it. We take it to

be a well settled principle, acknowledged by all civilized States

governed by law, that by means of a political revolution, by which

the political organization is changed, the municipal laws, regu-

lating their social relations, duties and rights, are not necessarily

abrogated. They remain in force, except so far as they are repealed

or modified by the nevv^ sovereign authority. Indeed, the existence

of this body of laws, and the social and personal rights dependent

upon them, from 1776, when the Declaration of Independence

was made, and our political revolution took place, to 1780, when

this constitution was adopted, depend on this principle. The

clause in the constitution, therefore, though highly proper and
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expedient to remove doubts, and give greater assurance to the

cautious and timid, was not necessary to preserve all prior laws

in force, and was rather declaratory of an existing rule, than the

enactment of a new one. We think, therefore, it should have such

a construction, as best to carry into effect the great principle it

was intended to establish.

But further; we think the argument is unsound in assuming

that no rule of the common law can be established under this

clause of the constitution, without showing affirmatively, that in

some judicial proceeding, such rule of law has been drawn in ques-

tion and affirmed, previously to the adoption of the constitution.

During that time there were no published reports of judicial pro-

ceedings. The records of courts were very imperfectly kept, and

afford but little information in regard to the rules of law dis-

cussed and adopted in them. And who has examined all the rec-

ords of all the criminal courts of Massachusetts, and can declare

that no records of such prosecutions can be found ? But so far as

it regards libel, as a criminal offence, we think it does appear, from

the verv full and careful examination of the late Judge Thacher

(Commonwealth v. Whitmarsli, Thacher's Crini. Cases, 441), that

many prosecutions for libel were instituted in the criminal courts

before the adoption of the constitution, affirmative of any particular rule or principle of the common law, such rule is not brought
within the i;:aving power of this clause, and cannot therefore -be
shown to exist. We doubt the soundness of this proposition, and
the correctness of the conclusion drawn from it.
We do not accede to the proposition, that the present existence
and effect of the whole body of law, which existed before the constitution, depends solely upon this provision of it. We take it to
be a well settled principle, acknowledged by all civilized State ~
governed by law, that by :means of a political r evolution, by which
the political organization is changed, the municipal laws, regulating their social relations, duties and rights, are not necessarily
abrogated. They remain in force, except so ·far as they are repealecl
or modified by the new sovereign authority. Indeed, the existence
of thi hody of laws, and the social and personal right dependent
upon them, from 1776, when the Declaration of Independence
\Vas made, and our political revolution took place, to 1. 80; when
this constitution wa adopted, depend on this principle. The
clan c in the constitution, therefore, though highly proper and
expedient to remove doubts, and give greater as urance to the
cautious and timid, was not necessary to pre erve all prior laws
in force, and was rather declaratory of an existing rule, than the
enactment of a new one. We think, therefore, it houlcl have such
a construction, as best to carry into effect the great principle it
was intended to establish.
But further; we think the argument is unsound in assuming
that no rule of the common law can be establishe l under this
clause of the constitution, without showing affirmatively, that in
some judicial proceeding, such rule of law has been drawn in question and affirmed, previou ly to the adoption of th constiLntion.
During that time there were no published reports of judi cial proceedings. The rerords of courts were very imperfectly kept, an.cl
afford but little information in regard to the rules of law di cussed and adopted in them. And who has examined all the records of all the criminal court of J\Iassa ·husetts, and can declare
that no records of uch prosecutions can be found? But so far a
it regards libel, as a criminal offence, we think it does appear, from
the very full and careful examination of the late Judge Thacher
(Commonwealth v. Whitmarsh~ Thacher's Crim. Cases, 441), thai.
many prosecutions for lib ~l were instituted in the criminal court
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before the revolution, and none were ever quaslied or otherwise

disposed of, on the ground that there was no law rendering libels

punishable. In the case of the indictments returned against Gov-

ernor Gage and others, very much against the will of the judges,

those indictments were received and filed, and remained, until

non prossed by the king's attorney general. This investigation

of the history of the common law of Massachusetts is so thorough,

complete and satisfactory, that it is sufficient to refer to it, as a

clear elucidation of the subject.

But we think there is another species of evidence to prove the

existence of the common law, making libel an offence punishable

by law, clear satisfactory and decisive; and that is, these rules of

law, with some modification, caused by the provisions of the con-

stitution, have been affirmed, declared, and ratified by the judiciary

and the legislative departments of the existing government of

Massachusetts, by those whose appropriate province and consti-

tutional duty it was to act and decide upon them; so that they

now stand upon a basis of authority which cannot be shaken, and

must so stand until altered or modified by the legislature.
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When our ancestors first settled this country, they came here

as English subjects; they settled on the land as English territory,

constituting part of the realm of England, and of course governed

by its laws; they accepted charters from the English government,

conferring both political powers and civil privileges; and they

never ceased to acknowledge themselves English subjects, and

never ceased to claim the rights and privileges of English subjects,

till the revolution. It is not, therefore, perhaps, so accurate to

say that they established the laws of England here, as to say, that

they were subject to the laws of England, When they left one

portiop of its territory, they were alike subject, on their transit

and when they arrived at another portion of the English territory;

and therefore always, till the Declaration of Independence, they

were governed and protected by the laws of England, so far as

those laws were applicable to their state and condition. Under

this categorj^ must come all municipal laws regulating and secur-

ing the rights of real and personal property, of person and per-

sonal liberty, of habitation, of reputation and character, and of

peace. The laws designed for the protection of reputation and

character, and to prevent private quarrels, affrays and breaches of

peace, by punishing malicious libel, were as important and as

before the revolution, and none were ever quashed or otherwi ~ e
<li posed of, on the ground that there wa no law rendering lib ls
puni ha ble. In the case of the indictments returned against Govrnor Gage and others. very mu h against the will of the judge ,
those indictments were received and :fil cl, and remained, until
non pros ed by the king' attorney gen ral. Thi investigation
of the hi tory _of the common law of Ma sachusett i so thorough,
complete and satisfactory, that it is sufficient to r efer to it, as a
clear elucidation of the subject.
But we think there is another species of evidence to prove the
existence of the common law, making lib 1 an offence punishable
by law, clear satisfactory and decisive; and that is, these rules 0£
law, with some modification, caused by the provisions of the contitution, have been affirmed, declared, and rati:fi cl by the judiciary
and the legislative J epartments of the existing government of
:Ma achusetL, by those whose appropriate province~ and constitutional duty it was to act and decide upon them; so that they
now stand upon a basis of authority which cannot be shaken, and
must so stand until altered or modi:fi d by the legislature.
When our ancestors :first settled this country, they came here
as English subject. ; they settled on the land a English territory,
constituting part of the realm of England, and of course governed
by its laws; they accepted charters from the English government,
conferring l oth political powers and civil privileges; and they
never ceased to acknowledge them elve Engli h sub jects, and
never ceased to claim the rights and privileges of English subjects,
till the revolution. It is not, therefore, perhaps, so accurate to
say that they e tablished the law of England here, as to say, that
they wer subject to the laws of England. When the.v left one
portio11 of its t erritory th y were alike ubj cct, on their transit
and when they arrived at another portion of the Engli h territory;
and therefore always, till the Declaration of Independence, they
were governed and protect c1 by the laws of England, so far as
those laws were applicable to their state and condition. Under
this category must come all municipal laws regulating and s curing the rights of real and per onal prop rty, of person and peronal liberty, of habitation, of reputation and character, and of
peace. The laws de ·igned for the protection of reputation and
character, and to prev nt privat quarrel , affrays and breachc of
pAace, hy puni. hing malicjous lib 1, wcr a important an rl :1
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applicable to the state and condition of the colonists, as the law

punishing violations of the rights of property, of person, or of

habitation; that is, as laws for punishing larceny, assault and

battery, or burglary. Being part of the common law of England,

applicable to the state and condition of the colonists, they neces-

sarily applied to all English subjects and territories, as well in

America as in Great Britain, and so continued applicable till the

Declaration of Independence.

This, therefore, would be evidence, a priori, that they were in

force, and were adopted by the clause cited from the constitution,

except so far as modiiied by the excepting clause.

That the law of libel existed, at the first migration of our an-

cestors, and during the whole period of the colonial and provin-

cial governments, is proved by a series of unquestionable authori-

ties; and we are now to inquire, whether by the acts done since

the adoption of the constitution — acts of the judiciary and legis-

lature — these laws, with some modification, have not been affirmed

and declared in such a manner as to bring them within the pro-

vision of the constitution, and make them absolutely binding, nntil
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repealed by the legislature.

A trial occurred soon after the adoption of the constitution, in

1791, against Edmund Freeman, a printer in Boston, on an indict-

ment for a libel upon Mr. John Gardiner, then a barrister at law,

a justice of the peace, and a member of the house of representa-

tives. It was before there were any regular reports of judicial

proceedings; but, being a cause which excited much interest, it

was reported for the newspapers and magazines, from which a

pretty satisfactory account, of it can be obtained. A good abstract

of it may be found in Judge Thacher's able judgment already

cited. This case, in its various aspects, throws much light- on the

subject of inquiry. The prosecution by indictment was instituted

and conducted by Sullivan, attorney general, who had studied and

practiced the law before the revolution, was a member of the

convention that framed the constitution, and was appointed a

judge of the supreme judicial court, at its first organization. The

trial took place before a full court, composed of Sargeant, chief

justice, and Paine, Dana, Sumner and Gushing, justices. The

first two must have entered on the study and practice of the law

not much later than the middle of the last century, and the others

Imt a few years later, and were men of mature years, and practisers

applicable to the state ancl con<lition of the coloni ts, as the law
punishing violations of the right of property, of per on, or of
habitation; that is, as law for punishing lar eny, assault and
battery, or burglary. Being part of the common law of England,
applicable to the stat e ancl condition of th coloni ts; they necessarily applied to all Engli h subj ect, and territorie , as well in
America a in Great Britain, and so continued applicable till the
Declaration of Indep ndence.
'rhi , th erefore, would be evidence, a priori~ that they were in
force, and were adopted by the clause citecJ. from the constitut1on,
except so far as modified by the excepting clau e.
'I1hat the law of libel exist ed, at the first migration of our ancestors, and during the whole period of the colonial and provincial government , is proved by a serie of unquestionable authorities ; and we are now to inquire, whether by the acts done since
the adoption of t he con titution-acts of the judiciary and legi lature-the. . e laws, with om e modification, have not been affirm ed
and declared in such a manner a to bring them within the provision of the con titution, and make them absolutely l inding, until
r epealed by the legi lature.
A trial occurred oon after the adoption of the constitution, in
17Dl, against Edmund Freeman, a printer in Boston, on an indictment for a libel upon M:r. John Gardiner then a barrister at law,
a justice of the peace, and a m mber of the house of r c: pre~e nta
tives. It was befor e there were any r egular r eport of judicial
proceeclir.g ; but, being a cau e which excited much inter est, it
was reported for the newspaper and mao-azines, from which a
pretty ati factory account. of it can be obtained. A good abstract
of it may be found in Judge Thacher's able judgment already
cited. Thi case, in its various aspects, throws much ligh on the
ubject of inquiry. The prosecution by indictment wa in tituted
and ronducte-:1 by Sullivan, attorn ey general, who had tudied and
practiced the law before the r evolution, was a member of the
convention that framed the constitution, and wa appointed 3
judge of the supreme judicial court, at its fir t organization. The
trial took place before a full court, compo ed of Sargeant, chief
justice, and Paine, Dana, Sumner and Cu. hing, justices. The
first two must have entered on the study and practice of the law
not much later than the middle of the last century, and the others
hnt a frw year later, and were men of mature years, and practi er
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of long experience in the law, under the provincial government.

Three of these judges had been members of the convention. Their

construction, therefore, of this provision, had the force and effect

of a contemporaneous exposition. They were eminently within

the description of Blackstone, already cited, of judges whose

knowledge of that law — the unwritten or customary law — is de-

rived from experience and study, and from being "long personally

accustomed to the judicial decisions of their predecessors,"' and of

course qualified to expound and declare the common law. The

defence was conducted by Mr. Amory and Mr. Otis, eminent for

their learning and talents as lawyers. It is not necessary to state

minutely the particulars of this trial. It is sufficient that all the

judges regarded the English common law of libel as in force here,

and cited freely Blackstone, Hawkins, Cowper's Eeports, and other

ante-revolutionary writers and cases, as the true and authoritative

expounders of the existing law of Massachusetts. Xor was the law

contested by the learned counsel for the accused, in their vigorous

defence; but they also cited and commented upon similar English

authorities.
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But we have already suggested that in sanctioning the principles

of the common law of libel, as a criminal offence, the court did

it with some qualification. Dana, J., in his address to the jury,

mentioned that it had been objected to the doctrine of libel, that

the truth of the charges cannot be given in evidence, because it

is no justification, if it is true. He says this is undoubtedly the

rule of law, as established by the courts of Great Britain, yet per-

haps the courts here may lay down a different principle; but this

must depend upon the construction which they will give to the

sixteenth article in the bill of rights, relative to the liberty

of the press, and which declares that it "ought not to be

restrained in this Commonwealth." But he expressly reserves his

opinion upon that subject, because, it did not arise in that case,

there being no offer to prove the truth of the charges, in defence.

This reserve was manifestly founded in this consideration, viz.,

that the clause of the bill of rights might be so construed as to

sanction the publication of every thing true, however much it

might tend to provoke quarrels and breaches of the peace. Should

it be so construed, then it would, to that extent, modify and abro-

gate the common law, which, it was conceded, prohibited giving

the truth in evidence, in defence. It would then be brought within

15

{)f long experience in the law, under the proYincial government.
Three of the e judg had been member of the conv ntion. Their
con truction, therefore, of thi I rovi ]on had the fore and eff ct
of a contemporaneou expo ition. Th y were eminently within
the de cription of Black tone, already cited, of judge who e
knowledge of that law-th unV\ ritten or cu tomary law-i ~ derived from experience and tudy, and from being 'long per onally
.accu tomed to the judicial deci ion of their predece or.,' and of
cour e qualified to expound and declare the common law. The
defence wa conducted by :Jir. mory and J\Ir. Oti , eminent for
their learning and talent a law:; er . It L not nece ary to tate
minutely the particular of thi trial. It i u:fficient that all the
judge regarded the Engli h common law of libel a in force here,
and cited freely Black tone, Hawkin , Cowper' Report and other
ante-revolutionary writer and ca e...,, a the true and authoritative
expounders of the existing law of :Jias achu ett . ~or wa the law
contested by the learned counsel for the accu ed, in their vigorous
defence; but they al o cited and commented upon similar English
authoritie .
But we have already sugge ted that in sanctioning the principles
of the common law of libel: as a criminal offence, the court did
it with some qualification. Dana, J ., in hi address to the jury,
mentioned that it had been objected to the doctrine of libel, that
the truth of the charges cannot be given in evidence, becau e it
i no ju ti:ficati0n, if it is true. He ay this i undoubtedly the
rule of law, a establi heel by the courts of Great Britain, yet perhaps the court here may lay down a different principle; but thi ·
mu t depend upon the con tru ·tion which they will give to the
ixteenth article in the bill of right , relative to the J.iberty
of the pre , and which declare that it "ought not to be
re trained in thi Commonwealth." But he expressly re erve his
opinion upon that ubject, becau e. it did not ari .. e in that ca e,
there being no offer to prove the truth of the charge , in d fence.
Thi re .. erve wa manife tly founded in thi con ideration, viz.,
that the clau e of the bill of right might be o con trued a to
anction the publication of ever} thing tru , however much it
might tend to provoke quarrels and breache of th peace.
hould
it be o con~trued then it would, to that extent modify an 1 abroo-ate the common law which it wa conceded prohibit d g:iving
th truth in evidence in defence. It would then be brought within
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the excepting clause of that other article of the constitution, de-

claring that all laws heretofore adopted, used and approved, and

usually practiced on, shall remain in force, such parts only ex-

cepted as are repugnant to the rights and liberties contained in

the same constitution. In the case supposed, that part of the

English common law of libel, which, on a criminal prosecution

for that offence, prohibits the giving of the truth in evidence, will

be abrogated, because repugnant to the constitution relative to

the liberty of the press. But the conclusion would be, that the

residue of the common law of libel would remain in force.

Afterwards, and after the constitution had been a subject of

further judicial consideration, this exception, founded on the

clause declaring the liberty of the press, to some extent, though

not to the extent intimated by Mr. Justice Dana, was judicially

declared, in the case of Commomvealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163. This

case was decided by a court composed of Parsons, Sedgwick,

Sewall, Thatcher and Parker, every member of the bench being

changed since 1791. In this case it was held, that when a man

shall consent to be a candidate for a public office, conferred by
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the election of the people, he must be considered as putting his

character in issue, so far as it may respect his fitness and qualifica-

tions for the office, and that publications of the truth on this

subject, with the honest intention of informing the people, are not

libels. And every man holding a public office may be considered

as within the principle. But the publication of a libel maliciously,

and with intent to defame, is clearly an offence against law.

This case of Commonwealth v. Freeman, affirmed by the later

case cited, is a striking illustration of the maxim, that the excep-

tion proves the rule. If there were no law making libel a criminal

offence, there would be no question of defence. The adjudication,

that a particular clause of the criminal law of libel is excepted

by the clause in the constitution, proves conclusively that the

general law, subject to such exception, was adopted and affirmed

by it.

These decisions have been followed by a long course of prose-

cutions for libel, as a criminal offence, extending through more

than half a century, in which the existence of this rule of common

law has never before been doubted by any judge called, in the

course of official duty, to act on the subject.

We have suggested that there is another and distinct species of

the excepting clause of that other article of the constitution, declaring that all laws heretofore adopted, u ed and approved, and
lrually practiced on, shall remain in force, such parts only excepted :is are repugnant to the right and liberties contained in
the same constitution. In the case supposed, that part of the
English common law of libel, which, on a criminal pro ecutio11
for that offence, prohibits the giving of the truth in evidence, will
be abrogated, because repugnant to the constitution relative to
the liberty of the press. But the conclusion would be, that the
residue of the common law of libel would remain in force.
Afterwards, and after the constitution had been a ubject of
further judicial consideration, this exception, founded on the
clause declaring the liberty of the pre s, to some extent, though
not to the extent intimated by Mr. Justice Dana, wa judicially
declared, in the case of Conimonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163 . This
case was decided by a court composed of Par ons, Sedgwick,
Sewall, Thatcher and Parker., every member of the bench being
changed since 1791. In this case it wa held, that when a man
hall consent to l e a candidate for a public office, conferred by
the election of the p ople, he must be considered as putting his
character ]n i sue, o far a it may respect hi fitne and qualifications for the office, and that publication of the truth on this
subject, with the honest intention of informing the people, are not
libels. And every man holding a public office may be considered
as within the principle. But the publication of a libel maliciously,
and with intent to defame, i clearly an offence against law.
This case of Co11imonu·ealth v. Freeman, affirmed by the later
case cited, is a triking illu tration of the maxim, that the exception prove the rule. If there were no law making libel a criminal
offence, there would be no qu stion of defence. The adjudication,
that a particular clause of the criminal law of libel is excepted
by the clause in the con titution: proves conclusively that the
general law, subject to such exception, wa adopted and affirmed
by it.
Thes8 decisions have been followed by a long cour e of prosecution for libel, a a criminal offence, extending through more
than half a century, in which the existence of this rule of common
law has never before been doubted by any judge called, in the
course of official duty, to act .on the subject.
We have suggested that there is another and distinct species of
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evidence, arising after the constitution, showing that the common

law, making libels criminal, and punishing them by indictment,

was adopted and continued in force. We alluded to the acts and

declarations of the legislature. An act regulating the mode of

prosecution and defence, in criminal proceedings for libel, is as

clear an admission and declaration of the existence of the law on

which such prosecutions are founded, as can possibly arise upon

implication. By the Rev. Sts. c. 82, § 28, and c. 86, §10, an appeal

to this court ie allowed to any person convicted in the court of

common pleas or municipal court, upon indictment for a libel.

This law, it is true, was afterwards repealed by St. 1839, c. 161;

but that does not impair the force of the implication. That

implication is just as strong, by providing that on such criminal

prosecution there shall be no appeal.

But a more striking declaration, of the same sort, is found in

Eev. Sts. c. 133, § 6, following, nearly in terms, the St. of 1826,

c. 107, § 1. The provisions are, that "in every prosecution for

writing or for publishing a libel, the defendant may give in evi-

dence, in his defence, upon the trial, the truth of the matter con-
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tained in the publication charged as libellous; provided, that such

evidence shall not be deemed a sufficient justification, unless it

shall be further made to appear on the trial, that the matter

charged to be libellous was published with good motives and for

justifiable ends."'

These provisions, recognizing the existence of the law of libel,,

and directing the mode of prosecution and defence, are as distinct

a declaration and affirmance of that law, on the part of two dis-

tinct legislatures, at an interval of ten years from each other, as

a statute expressly reciting the adoption and existence of this law.

A declaration like this, on the part of the legislature, embracing,,

as it must, the authority of the governor, as well as the senate and

house of representatives, not made to serve a turn, but in the ordi-

nary course of legislation, is entitled to great weight, as evidence

of the preexisting common law.

In Common IV calth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 167, it was stated by the

attorney general, Bidwell, that it was the constant practice of the

court, in their charges to the grand juries, to mention libels as a.

proper subject for their inquiry; and as there was no statute

animadverting on this species of offence, he drew the natural con-

clusion, that it must be in virtue of the common law, that tbe}^

evidence; ari,jng after the constitution, hawing that the commoru
law making libel criminal, and punishing them by indictment,.
wa adopted and continued in force. We alluded to the acts and
declarations of the legi lature. An act regulating the mode of
prosecution and defence, in criminal proceedings for libel, is as
clear an admission and declaration of the existence of the law on
which such prosecutions are founded, a can possibly arise upon
implication. By the Rev. St . c. 82_, § 28, and c. 86, §10, an appeal
to this court :iss allowed to any person convicted in the court of
common pleas or municipal court, upon indictment for a libeL
This law, it is true, was afterwards repealed by St. 1839, c. 161 ;
but that does not impair the force of the implication. That
implication is just as strong, by providing that on such criminal
prosecution there shall be no appeal.
But a more striking declaration, of the same sort, is found in
Rev. Sts. c. 133, § 6: following, nearly in t erms, the St. of 1826,
c. 107, § 1. The provisions are, that " in every prosecution for
writing or for publishing a libel, the defendant may give in evidence, in his defence, upon the trial, the truth of the matter contained in the publication charged as libellous; provided, that such
evidence shall not be deemed a sufficient justification, unless it
shall be further made to appear on the trial, that the matter
charged to be libellous was published with good motives and for
ju ti:fia ble ends."
These provisions, recognizing the existence of the law of libel,.
and directing the mode of pro ecution and defence, are :is distinct
a declaration and affirmance of that law, on the part of two distinct legislature , at an interval of ten year s from each other, as
a statute e:xpres ly reciting the adoption and existence of this law.
A declaration like this, on th part of the legislature, embracing,.
as it must, the authority of the gov rnor, as well as the senate and
house of representativ s, not made to serve a turn, but in the ordinary course of legi lation, is entitled to great weight, as evidence
of the preexi ting common law.
In Commonw ealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 167, it was stat d by the
attorney general, Bidwell, that it was the constant practice of the·
court, in their charge to the grand juries, to mention libels as a.
proper subject for their inquiry; and as there wa no statute
animadverting on this pecies of offence, he drew the natural onclu ion, that it mu t be in virtue of the common law, thnt th "':/
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were so charged. The fact, that it was the practice, so long as

grand Juries attended the supreme judicial court, so to charge

them, is probabty still within the recollection of many of the

older practitioners.

These declarations of the legislature, and the contemporary

exposition of the constitution by the older judges, immediately

after its adoption, together with an uninterrupted course of judicial

practice to the present time, form a body of proof that the common

law, making the publication of a malicious libel a criminal offence,

has been adopted in this Commonwealth, entirely conclusive and

irrefragable; and he must be a bold judge, who should venture

to decide that there is not now, and never has been, any such

law, and that all the judgments which have been pronounced by

the courts of this State, on convictions for this offence, have been
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erroneous. Exceptions overruled.

·were so charged. The fact, that it was the practice, so long as
grand juries attended the supreme judicial court, so to charge
them, is probably still within the recollection of many of the
older practitioners.
These declarations of the legislature, and the contemporary
exposition of the constitution by ihe older judges, immediately
after its adoption, together with an uninterrupted course of judicial
practice to the present time, form a body of proof that the common
law, making the publication of a malicious libel a criminal offence,
has been adopted in this Commonwealth, entirely conclusive and .
irrefragable; and he mu t be a bold judge, who should venture
to decide that there is not now, and never has been, any such
law, and that all the judgments which have been pronounced by
the courts of this State, on convictions for this offence, have been
erroneous.
Exceptions overruled.

CHAPTER X.

OFFENSES AGAINST THE HABITATION.

Arson.

The Burning.

Woolsey v. State, 30 Tex. App. 346. (1891.)

Appeal from the District Court of Johnson. Tried below be-

fore Hon. J. M. Hall.

CHAPTER X.

This appeal is from a conviction of arson, the punishment as-

sessed being five years in the penitentiary. The opinion sufficiently

states the facts.

OFFENSES AGAINST THE HABITATION.

White^ Presiding Judge:

Appellant was tried and convicted in the court below on an in-

ARSON.
dictment containing three counts charging him with arson. These

counts differed only in the allegations as to the owner of the house

burned. In the third count the allegation was: "Did then and

The Burning.

there unlawfully and willfully set fire to and burn the house of

J. E. Truelove, there situate, which said house was then and there

Woolsey v. State, 30 Tex. App. 346.

(1891.) ·

occupied by the said H. P. Woolsey and M. E. Hawkins as tenants."

In his charge submitting the case to the jury the learned trial judge

confined them to the above count as quoted, and the conviction was
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had upon this count.

It is insisted by appellant's counsel, in a very able and earnest

brief, that the evidence does not support the conviction under this

count, because all the proof shows that the house belonged to

Truelove; that Truelove rented it alone to Woolsey, this defend-

ant ; that M. E. Hawkins was not a party to the renting by True-

APPEAL from the District Court of Johnson. Tried below before Hon. J. M. Hall.
This appeal is from a conviction of arson, the punishment assessed being five years in the penitentiary. The opinion sufficiently
states the facts.

love to Woolsey, and consequently was not a tenant of TTuelove.

It is insisted that the word "tenants," being descriptive of tlie

identity of the offense, must be proved as alleged, even though

it migM be unnecessary that the pleader should have so used it.

This proposition is perhaps correct. Rogers v. The State, 26 Texas

Ct. App. 404. Had there been no such allegation descriptive of

the offense, the rule would have been that this court would not

229

WHITE,, Presiding Judge:
Appellant war:; tried and convicted in the court below on an indictment containing three counts charging him with arson. These
counts differed only in the allegations as to the owner of the house
burned. In the third count the allegation was: "Did then and
there unlawfully and willfully set fire to and burn the house of
J. R. Truelove, there situate, which said house was then and there
occupied by the said H. P. Woolsey and M. E. Hawkins as tenants."
In his charge submitting the case to the jury the learned trial judge
confined them to the above count as quoted, and the conviction was
had upon thi count.
It is insi...,ted by appellant's counsel, in a very able and earnest
brief, that the evidence do s not support the conviction under thi .;
count, because all the proof shows that the house belonged to
Truelove; that Truelove rented it alone to Woolsey this defendant; that M. E . Hawkins was not a party to the renting by Truelove to Woolsey, and cons quently wa not a tenant of T'ruelove.
It is insi ted that the word "tenants," being descriptive o.£ th '
identity of the offense, mu t be proved a alleged, v n though
it might be unnecessary that the plead r should hav o used it.
This proposition i perhaps correct. Rogers v. Th e State, 26 T xas
Ct. App. 404. Had there been no uch allegation d scriptivc of
the offens ; the rule would have been that thi ourt would not
229
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inquire into the tenure or ownership of the occupier or the person

in possession of the house, if in fact it was the dwelling of such

person. Tuller v. The State, 8 Texas Ct. App. 501. The question

then is, Does the proof fail to support the allegation ? The com-

mon acceptation of the word "tenant" means: "One who holds

or possesses lands by any kind of right; one who has an occupa-

tion or temporary possession of lands or tenements, whose title is

in another; one who has possession of any place; a dweller; an

occupant." Web. Die. And this is substantially the legal defini-

tion. Bouv. Die, "Tenant."

It will be observed that the allegation in the third count of the

indictment is that the house was occupied by Woolsey and Hawkins

iis tenants. It is not alleged that Hawkins was a tenant of True-

love, the alleged owner of the house, and it is true that she did

not unite in and was not a party to the original agreement between

Truelove and Woolsey for the renting of the house. The proof,

however, does show that she occupied the house under an agree-

ment with Woolsey, and was in fact a tenant of Woolsey. She is

therefore shown by the proof to have been a tenant and occupier
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of the house at the time of the alleged offense, and it was not neces-

sary, under the allegation, to show that she was a joint tenant with

Woolsey in renting from Truelove.

Again, it is insisted that the evidence is insufficient to establish

arson— that is, arson under our statute. Three of the witnesses

for the State testified that the wall of the house was scorched and

smoked, but that they could not say that the wall or ceiling had

caught fire. They also say that the floor was burned or charred in

one place— a burnt place on the floor, where the fire burned partly

through the floor. Two other witnesses testified that the wall of

the house was scorched or smoked, but was not burnt, and did not

catch on fire. They say that coal oil had been poured on the bed,

and had been set on fire, and that it was burning up by the wall to

the ceiling, but that they did not put out any fire in the house, but

simply carried out the bed and bed-clothing into the yard, and

extinguished the fire, which was confined to the bed-clothing, which

was almost entirely destroyed. Under our statute with regard to

arson, it is declared that the burning necessary to constitute the of-

fense is complete when the fire has actually communicated to the

house, though it may be neither destroyed nor seriously injured

(Penal Code, art. 653), and the court so instructed the jury in its

inquire into the tenure or ownership of the occupier or the person
in pos ession of the house, if in fa ct it was the dwelling of such
person. Tuller v. Th e S tatP.~ 8 T exas Ct. App. 501. The question
then is, Does the proof foil to support the allegation? The common acceptation of the word "tenant" means : " One who holds
or possesses lands by any kind of right; one who has an occupat ion or temporary possession of lands or t enement , whose title i
in another; one who has po ~ session of any place ; a dweller; an
occupant." Web. Die. And thi ~ is substantially the legal definit ion. Bouv. Die., " Tenant."
It will be ob..erved that the allegation in the third count of the
i ndictment is that the house was occupied by Woolsey and Hawkins
.as tenants. It is not alleged that Hawkins was a tenant of Truelove, the alleged owner of the house, and it i true that she did
not unite in and was not a party to the original agreement between
T ruelove and Wool. ey for the renting of the hou e. The proof,
h owever, does show that she occupied the house under an agreement with Woolsey, and wa s in fact a t enant of Wool ey. She is
therefore shown by the proof to have been a t enant and occupier
of the house at the time of the alleged offense, and it was not necesary, under the allegation, to show that she was a joint t enant with
'\Vool. ey in renting from Truelove.
Again, it is insist ed that the evidence is insufficient to e tabli h
a rson-that is, arson under our statute. Three of the witnesse8
for the State testified that the wall of the house wa scorched and
smoked, but that they could not say that the wall or ceiling had
caught fire. They also say that the floor was burned or charred in
one place-a burnt place on the floor, wher e the fire burned partly
through the floor. Two other witnesses t estified that the wall of
the house was scorched or smoked, but was not burnt, and did not
catch on fire. They say that coal oil had been poured on the bed,
and had been set on fire, and that it was burning up by the wall to
the ceiling, but that they did not put out any fire in the house, but
simply carried out the bed and bed-clothing into the yard, and
€xtinguish ed the fire, which was confined to the bed-clothing, which
was almost entirely destroyed. Under our tatute with regard to
a rson, it is declar ed that the burning n ecessary to constitute the off ense is complete when the fire has actually communicated to the
house, though it may be neither destroyed nor seriou ly injured
( P enal Code, art. 653) , and the court so instructed the jury in its
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■general charge. The court refused to give the defendant's special

instruction number 2, to the effect that "if they found that the

house was simply scorched or smoked, then this would not be suffi-

cient, and they should acquit the defendant." If the house was

simply scorched or smoked, and the fire was not communicated to

the building, then the offense was not complete under our statute.

If the fire had burnt a hole in the floor, as testified to by some of the

witnesses, then the offense was complete. The conflict as to

whether the fire had actually communicated to the house was one

which arose on the testimony of the State's witnesses.

Whether or not the fire was communicated to the house was an

essential fact to be determined by the jury under appropriate in-

structions from the court. To constitute arson at common law it

must be proved that there was an actual burning of the house, or

some part of it, though it is not necessary that any part of it should

b)e wholly consumed, or that the fire should have any continuance.

1 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 760, and note 1. So, on a

charge of arson, it appeared that a small faggot was set on fire

on the board floor of a room and the faggot was entirely consumed ;
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but the boards of the floor were scorched black, but not burned,

and no part of the wood of the floor was consumed. Creswell, J.,

said : "Regina v. Parker, 9 Carrington & Payne, 45, is the near-

est case to the present, but I think it is distinguishable. * * *

I have conferred with my Brother Patteson, and he concurs with

me in thinking that as the wood of the floor was scorched, but no

part of it consumed, the present indictment can not be supported.

We think that it is not essential to this offense that the wood should

be in a blaze, because some species of wood will bum and entirely

consume without blazing at all." Regina v. Russell, Car. & M. 541.

The crime of arson is consummated by the burning of any, the

smallest, part of the house; and it is burned, within the common

law definition of the offense, when it is charred; that is, when

the wood is reduced to coal, and its identity changed, but not

when merely scorched or discolored by heat. The State v. Hall,

93 X. C. 571 ; The People v. Haggerty, 4G Cal. 355. We are of

opinion that the court erred in refusing the special requested

instruction.

Again, we are of opinion that the evidence, which was purely

circumstantial, does not establish the guilt of the defendant with

that conclusive probative force which would warrant us in per-

general charge. The court refu ed to give the defendant -pecial
in~truction number 2, to the effect that "if they found that the
house was simply scorched or , moked, then this would not be sufficient, and they should acquit the defendant." If the house wa
imply corched or , moked, and the fire was not communicated to
the building, then the offense was not complete under our tatute.
If the fire had burnt a hole in the floor, as te tified to by some of the
witne ses, then the offense was complete. The conflict a to
whether the fire had actually communicated to the hou e wa one
which aro e on the testimony of the State's witnes e .
Whether or not the fire was communicated to the house was an
essential fact to be determined by the jury ·under appropriate intructions from the court. To constitute arson at common law it
must be proved that there wa an actual burning of the house, or
ome part of it, though it i not necessary that any part of it hould
be wholly consumed, or that the fire should have any continuance.
1 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 760, and note 1. So, on a
charge of arson, it appeared that a mall faggot was set on fire
on the board floor of a room and the faggot was entirely consumed;
but the boards of the floor were scorched black, but not burned,
and no part of the wood of the floor was consumed. Creswell, J.,
·s aid: «Regina v. Parker, 9 Carrington & Payne, 45, is the nearest case to the present, but I think it is distinguishable. * * *
I have conferrer!. witl:i my Brother Patteson, and he concurs with
me in thinking that as the wood of the floor was scorched, but no
part of it consumed, the present indictment can not be supported.
We think that it is not essential to this offense that the wood should
be in a blaze, becau e some species of wood will burn and entirely
·Consume without blazing at all." Regina v. Russell, Car. & M. 541.
The crime of arson is consummated by the burning of any, the
mallest, part of the house; and it is burned, within the common
law de:finiiion of the offen e, when it is charred; that i, when
the wood i reduced to coal, and it identity changed, but not
when merely scorched or discolored by heat. The State v. Hall,
93 N. C. 571; Th e P eople v. Haggerty, 46 Cal. 355. We arc of
opinion that the court erred in refu ing the pecial reque ted
instruction.
Again, w are of opinion that the evidence, which was purcJy
circumstantial, doe not e tabli h the guilt of the defendant with
ihat conclu ive probative force which would warrant u in p r-
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niitting the verdict and judgment to stand as a precedent; and on.

account of the insufficiency of the evidence, we are further of the

opinion the court erred in not granting defendant a new trial.

For the errors pointed out the judgment is reversed and the

cause remanded. Reversed and remanded.

Judges all present and concurring.

Character of Premises.

State v. McGowan, 20 Conn. 2Jk5. (1850.)

mitting the verdict and judgment to stand as a precedent; and on
account of the insufficiency of the evidence, we are further of the
opinion the court erred in not granting; defendant a new trial.
For the errors pointed out the judgment is reversed and the
cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
Judges all present and concurring.

This was an information for setting fire to and burning a

dwelling-house. The prisoner pleaded Not guilty; on which issue

the cause was tried, at Hartford, January term, 1850.

On the trial, it appeared, that the building burned was built by

Character of Premises.

Norman Warner, and designed for a dwelling-house; was con-

structed in the usual manner of a dwelling-house, in all particu-

lars; and was finished, except that it was not painted, as it was

intended to be, and the glass was not set in the sash which had

State v. llf cGowan, 20 Conn. 245.

{1850.)

been placed in the upper half of one of the outer doors. The

building stood by itself, and was not appurtenant to any other

building; but it had not been occupied.
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Upon these facts the prisoner's counsel claimed, and asked the

court to instruct the jury, that the prisoner could not be convicted.

The court did not so instruct the jury; but left the question

whether the building w^as a dwelling-house, for their determination,

as a matter of fact.

The jury found the prisoner guilty; and he thereupon moved

for a new trial.

Church^ Ch. J. :

The statute of this state prescribes the punishment of arson,

but it does not define the crime. We look to the common law for

its definition.

Arson, by the common law, is the wilful and malicious burning

of the house of another. The word house, as here understood, in-

cludes not merely the dwelling-house, but all outhouses which are

parcel thereof. 1 Hale, 570. 4 Bla. Com. 221. 2 Euss. on

Crimes, 551.

This was an information for setting fire to and burning a
dwelling-house. The prisoner pleaded Nat guilty .: on which issue
the cause was tried, at Hartford, January term, 1850.
On the trial, it appeared, that the building burned was built by
Norman Warner, and designed for a dwelling-house ; was constructed in the usual manner of a dwelling-house, in all particulars; and was finished, except that it was not painted, as it wa
intended to be, and the gla~s was not set in the sash which had
been placed in the upper half of one of the outer doors. The
building stood by itself, and was not appurtenant to any other
building; but it had not been occupied.
Upon these facts the prisonet''s counsel claimed, and asked the
court to instruct the jury, that the prisoner could not be convicted.
The court did not so instruct the jury; but left the question
whether the building was a dw lling-house, for their determination,.
as a matter of fact.
The jury found the pri oner g·uilty ,; and he thereupon moved
for a new trial.

J. :
The tatute of this state prescribes the punishment of arson,
but it does not define the crime. We look to the common law for
its dcfini ti on.
Arson, by the common law: is the wilful and malicious burning
of the house of another. The word house, as here understood, includes not merely the dwelling-house, but all outhouses which are
parcel thereof. 1 Hale: 5 1 0. -± Bla. Com. 221. 2 Russ. on
Crimes, 551.
CHURCH, CH.

ST.ATE

v. McGow.A

233
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This information charges the accused with burning a dwelling-

house, and the question in the case, is, whether the building, which

was in fact burned by him, was a dwelling-house, within the

meaning of the common law on this subject ? That it was a dwell-

ing-house, as distinguished from a building of any other kind, is

certain.

The building is described to be one built and designed for a

dwelling-house constructed in the usual manner. It was designed

to be painted, but was not yet finished, in that respect, and not

quite all the glass were set in one of the outer doors. The building

had never been occupied, and it was not parcel nor an appurtenant

of any other.

We think this was not a dwelling-house in such a sense, as

that, to burn it, constituted the crime of arson. In shape and

purpose, it was a dwelling-house, but not in fact, because it had

never been dwelt in — it had never been used, and was not con-

templated as then ready for the habitation of man.

Arson, as understood at the common law, was a most aggra-

vated felony, and of greater enormity than any other unlawful
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burning, because it manifested in the perpetrator, a greater reck-

lessness and contempt of human life, than the burning of any

other building, and in which no human being was presumed to be.

Such seems to be the spirit of the English cases on this subject,

and especially the late case of Elsmore v. The Hundred of St.

Briavells, 8 B. & C. 461. (15 E. C. L. 266.) 2 Euss. on Crimes,

556. In that case, Bayley, J., in speaking of the building therein

described, says, "It appeared to have been built for the purpose

of being used as a dwelling-house, but it was in an unfinished state,

and never was inhabited. There cannot be a doubt, that the build-

ing in this case, was not a house in respect of which burglary or

arson could be committed. It was a house intended for residence,

though it was not inhabited. It was not therefore a dwelling-

house, though it was intended to be one."

A dwelling-house once inhabited, as such, and from which the

occupant is but temporarily absent, would not fall within the fore-

going principle.

It may not be necessary to determine another question, made

in this case — whether it appertained to the court or the jury to

determine the character of the building? But we think it was the

duty of the court to have instructed the jury as to the law of

This information charges the accu ed with burning a dw llinghou e: and the question in the ca e, i , whether the building, which
was in fact burned by him, wa a dwelling-house, within the
meaning of the common law on thi ubj ect? That it wa a dw 11ing-hou e, as di tingui hed from a building of any other kind, is
certain.
The building i described to be one built and designed for a
dwelling-house con tructed in the usual manner. It wa de igned
to be painted, but was not yet :finished, in that respect, and not
quite all the gla s were set in one of the outer doors. The building
had never been occupied, and it was not parcel nor an appurtenant
of any other.
We think this was not a dwelling-house in uch a en e, a
that, to burn it, con tituted the crime of arson. In shape and
purpose, it was a dwelling-hou e, but not in fact, because it had
never been dwelt in-it had never been used, and was not contemplated as then ready for the habitation of man.
Ar son, as understood at the common law, was a most aggravated felony, and of greater enormity than any other unlawful
burning, because it manife ted in the perpetrator, a greater r ecklessness and contempt of human life, than the burning of any
other building, and in which no human being was presumed to be.
Such seems to be the spirit of the English case on thi subject,
and especially the late case of Elsmore v. Th e Hundred of 1.. t.
Briave lls, 8 B. & C. 461. ( 15 E. C. L. 266.) 2 Russ. on Crimes,
556. In that case, Bayley, J., in speaking of the building ther in
de~cribed, says, "It appeared to have been built for the purpose
of being used as a dwelling-hou e, but it was in an unfini hed tate,
and never was inhabited. There cannot be a doubt, that the building in thi, ca e: wa not a house in r espect of which burglary or
arson could be committed. It was a hou e intended for re idence,
though it was not inhabited. It wa not therefore a dwcllinghouse, though it wa intended to be one."
A dw elling-hou ~ e once inhabit cl, a uch, and from which th
occupant is but temporarily ab ent, would not fall within th foregoing principle.
It may not be neces ary to det rmine another question, made
in thi ca e-whcther it appertained to th court or the jury to
determine the character of the building? But we think it wa th
duty of the court to have in tructed the jury as to th law of'
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the matter, and leave it to them to say from the proof, whether the

building was a house, wdthin the meaning of the law thus ex-

plained.

The considerations we have now expressed, induce us to grant

-a new trial of this cause.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

New trial to be granted.

Ownership.

Snyder v. People, 26 Mich. 100. (1S72.)

COOLEY, J. :

the matter, and leave it to them to say from the proof whether the
building wa a hou e, within the meaning of the law thu explained.
The considerations we have now expressed, induce us to grant
a new trial of thi ca u e.
In this opinion the other judge concurred.
New trial to be granted.

The plaintiff in error was informed against for arson, which is

charged to consist in the felonious burning, in the night time,

of the dwelling-house of Mary A. Snyder. On the trial it appeared

that Mary A. Snyder was his wife, and defendant (below) insisted

Ownership.

that he could not be guilty of arson in burning her house. He

also claimed to be the owner of the house, in fact, and this claim

was submitted to the jury, who found against him. The prosecu-

Snyder v. People, 26 Mich. 106.

tion, on the other hand, gave some evidence tending to show that

(1872.}

defendant had separated himself from his wife, and given up his
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residence in the state. This evidence, however, did not become

COOLEY,

J.:

important on the trial, as the court instructed the jury that a

husband might be convicted of arson in burning his wife's dwell-

ing-house, though residing with her, and defendant w^as convicted

accordingly.

The statute provides that, "Every person who shall willfully and

maliciously bum in the night time, the dwelling-house of another,"

etc., shall be punished, etc.: Comp. L., § 5745. There are nu-

merous decisions as to what is meant by the divelUng-honse of

another, as well at the common law as under like statutes to our

own. Arson is an offense against the habitation, and regards the

possession rather than the property: State v. Toole, 29 Conn.

344. The house, therefore, must not be described as the house of

the owner of the fee, if in fact at the time another has the actual

•occupancy, but it must be described as the dwelling-house of him

whose dwelling it then is: 2 East P. C. 1034; 4 Bl. Com. 220;

IVhart. Cr. L., § 1638; 2 Bish. Cr. L. 2d ed., § 24; Holmes' Case,

The plaintiff in error wa informed against for ar on, which is
charged to con i t in the feloniou burning, in the night time,
of the dwelling-house of Mary A. Snyder. On the trial it appeared
that Mary A. Snyder was hi wife, and defendant (below) in, i ted
that he could not be guilty of arson in burning her hou e. He
al o clajmed to be the owner of the house, in fact, and this claim
was submitted to the jury, who found against him. The prosecution, on the other hand, gave some evidence tending to show that
defendant had separated himself from hi wife, and given up hi
re idence in the state. This evidence, however, did not become
important on the trial, a the court in tructed the jury that a
husband might be convicted of arson in burning his wife's dwelling-house, though residing with her, and defendant was convicted
accordingly.
The statute provides that, "Every per on who hall willfully and
maliciously burn in the night time, the dwelling-house of another,"
etc., shall be punished, etc.: Comp. L., § 5745. There are numerous decisions as to what is meant by the dwelling-hoiLse of
another, as well at the common law a under like statutes to our
own. Arson i an offen e against the habitation, and regards the
possession rather than the property : State v. Tool e, 29 Conn.
3-t4. The house, therefore, must not be described as the house of
the owner of the fee, if in fact at the time another ha the actual
.occupancy, but it mu t be described a the dwelling-house of him
whose dwelling it then is: 2 East P. C. 1034; 4 Bl. Com. 220 ·
·whart. Cr. L., § 1638; 2 Bish. Cr. L. 2d ed., § 24; Holmes' Case,

SNTTIEil
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PEOPLE

Snyder v. People 235

Cro. Cas. 376; Spaulding's Case, 1 Leach, 217; Commonwealth

V. Wade, 17 Pick. 395- Even, it seems, though the occupation be

wrongful: Rex v. Wnllis, 1 Mood. C. C. 344; State v. Toole, 29

Conn. 344. It follows that a lessee could not be guilty of the

felony in burning the premises occupied by him as such: 2 East

P. C. 1029; 2 Euss. on Cr. 550; McNeal v. Woods, 3 Blackf. 485;

State V. Lyon, 12 Conn. 487 ; State v. Fish, 3 Dutch. 323 ; State

V. Sandy, 3 Ired. 570; 3 Greenl. Ev., § 55, while the landlord,

during such occupation, might be: 2 East P. C. 1023-4; Sullivan

V. State, 5 Stew. & Port. 175. A jail, it has been held, may be

described as the dwelling-house of the jailer living with his family

in one part of it : People v. Van Blarcuni, 2 Johns. 105 ; Stevens

V. Commonwealth, 2 Leigh, G83. And it seems that the wife,

because of the legal identity with the husband, cannot be guilty

of the offense in burning the husband's dwelling, even though at

the time living separate from him : March's Case, Mood. C. C.

182. This would doubtless be so held whenever the wife's domicil

is regarded in law as identical with the husband's, which for many

purposes is no longer the case when they live separate.
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It must be evident from this summary of the law on this subject,

that if the husband, living with his wife, has a rightful possession

jointly with her of the dwelling-house which she owns and they

both occupy, he cannot, by common-law rules, be guilty of arson

in burning it. It remains to be seen whether the statutes have

introduced any changes which would affect the case.

The statutes upon which the question arises, are those for the

protection of the rights of married women. But it is to be ob-

served, that those do not in terms go beyond the ensuring to the

wife such property as she may own at the marriage, and acquire

afterwards, and the giving to her the power to protect, control and

dispose of the same in her own name, and free from the inter-

position of the husband. None of them purports to operate upon

the famiily relations; none of them takes from the husband his

marital rights, except as- they pertain to property, and none of

them relieves him from responsibilities, except as they relate to

tlie wife's contracts and debts. He is still under the common-law

obligation to support the wife, and the services of the wife, which

at the common law were regarded as the consideration for this sup-

port, are still supposed to be performed in his behalf and in his

interest, except where they are given to her individual estate, or

Cro. Ca . 3 6; Spaulding' Ca e, 1 Leach, 1 ; Cornmonwealth
v. Wade, 17 Pick. 89._ . Even, it seems, though the occupation be
wrongful: Rex v. Wallis, 1 Mood. C. C. 344; State v. Tool e, 29
Conn. 3±4. It follows that a les ee could not be guilty of the
felony in burning the premises occupied by him a uch: 2 Ea t
P. C. 1029; 2 Russ. on Cr. 550; M cN eal v. Woods, 3 Blackf. 485;
State v. Lyon, 12 Conn. 487; ta.te v. Fish, 3 Dutch. 323; State
v. Sandy, 3 Ired. 570; 3 Greenl. Ev., § 55, while the landlord~
during uch occupation, might be: 2 East P. C. 1023-4; Sullivan
v. State, 5 Stew. & Port. 175. A jail, it has been held, may be
described as the dwelling-house of the jailer living with bis family
in one part of it: P eople v. Van Blarcum, 2 Johns. 105; Stevens
v. Cornmonwealth, 2 Leigh, 683. And it eems that the wife,
because of the legal identity with the husband, cannot be guilty
of the offense in burning the husband's dwelling, even though at
the time living separate from him: March's Case, Mood. C. C.
182. This would doubtless be so held whenever the wife's domicil
is regarded in law as identical with the husband's, which for many
purposes is no longer the case when they live separate.
It must be evident from this summary of the law on this subj ect,
-that if the husband, living with his wife, ha a rightful po session
jointly with her of the dwelling-house which she owns and they
both occupy, he cannot, by common-law rules, be guilty of arson
in burning it. It remains to be seen whether the statutes have
introduced any changes which would affect the case.
The statutes upon which the question arises, are those fo r the
protec6on of the rights of married women. But it is to be ob. erved, that those do ~ot in terms go beyond the ensuring to the
wife such property as she may own at the marriage, and acquire
afterwards, and the giving to her the power to protect, control and
dispose of the same in her own n ame, and free from the interposition of the husband. None of them pur ports to operate upon
the family r elation ; none of them takes from the husband his
marital rights, except as· they perfain to property, and none of
them relieves him from responsibilities, except as they relate io
the wife's contracts and deb t~. H e is still under th common-law
-0bligation to support the wife, and the serYicc of the wif , whi h
at the common law were regarded as the con id ration for thi upport, are still suppos· d to be performed in his behalf and in hi
interest, except where they are given to h r individual e~tate, or
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separate business. The wife has a right to receive her support at

the liusband's domicil, unless she has lost it by misbehavior,

and husband and wife together have a joint interest in and control

of the children, which they cannot of right sever, and which are

not, even in contemplation of law, regarded as distinct, though

the courts are sometimes compelled to treat them as if they were so,

when difficulties arise which make legal intervention essential to

the protection and welfare of the children. As regards her indi-

vidual property, the law has done little more than to give legal

rights and remedies to the wife, where before, by settlement or

contract, she might have established corresponding equitable rights

and remedies, and the unity of man and woman in the marriage

relation, is no more broken up by giving her a statutory ownership

and control of property, than it would have been before the statute,

by such family settlement as should give her the like ownership

and control. At the common law, the power of independent action

and judgment was in the husband alone; now it is in her also,

for many purposes; but the authority in her, to own and convey

property, and to sue and be sued, is no more inconsistent with
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the marital unity, than the corresponding authority in him. She

is still presumptively his agent to provide for the household, and

he is not deprived of the rights, or relieved of the obligations of

head of the household, except as by their dealings an intent to

that effect is indicated.

So far from an intent having been manifested on the part of

the legislature to regard the family as simply a voluntary associa-

tion of two persons, legally independent of each other, witli their

progeny, several of the changes have been in the direction of a

unification of interests. Thus, the husband is deprived of all

authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise charge the homestead with-

out the wife's consent, though his title thereto may be complete

and absolute: Const., Art. XVI., §§ 2, 3; Dye v. Mann, 10 Mich.,

291; McKee v. Wilcox, 11 Mich., 3oS; Eing v. Burt, 17 Mich.,

■165. He is also precluded from selling or encumbering such per-

sonal chattels as are exempt by law from execution, unless with her

assent (Comp. L., § -4165) ; and if he shall attempt to do so, she

may bring action to recover the same in her own name : Comp. L.,

§ 3294. These powers and privileges in respect to the husband's

property are not conferred on the wife for her own benefit exclu-

sively, or in order to give her interests independent of the husband ;

separate business. The wife has a right to receive her upport at
the husband' domicil, unles she has lost it by misbehavior,
and husband and wife together have a joint interest in and control
of the children, which they cannot of right sever, and which are
not, even in contemplation of law, r egarded as distinct, t hough
the courts are sometimes compelled to treat them as if they were so,.
when difficulties arise which make legal intervention essential to
the protection and welfare of the children. A regard her indiYidual property, the law has done little more than to give legal
rights and r emedies to the wife, where before, b3 settlement or
contract, she might have established corresponding equitable right
and remedies, and the unity of man and woman in the marriage
r elation, is no more broken up by giving her a tatutory ownership
and control of property, than it would have been before the statute,,
by such family settlement as should give her the like ownership
and control. At the common law, the power of independent action
and judgment was in the husband alone; now it i in her al o,,
for many purposes; but the authority in her to own and convey
property, and to sue and be sued, is no more inconsistent with
the marital unity, than the corresponding authority in him. She
i still presumptively his agent to provide for the hou ehold, and
he i not deprivea of the rights, or r elieved of the obligations of
h ead of the household, except as by their dealings an intent to
that effect is indicated.
So far from an intent having been manifested on the part of
the legislature to r egard the family a imply a voluntary a sociation of two per _ons, legally independent of each other, with their
progeny, several of the change h ave been in the direction of n
unification of interests. Thu , the hu band is deprived of all
authority to ell, mortgage or otherwi e charge the h ome tead without the wife' con ~ent, though his title thereto may be complete
and absolute: Const., Art. XYI., ~§ 2, 3; Dye \. JiannJ 10 Mich.,
291; ]1 cK ee v. lYilcnxJ 11 ~Iich. , 35 ; Ring 1 . Burt 17 :M:ich.,
-±65 . He is also precluded from selling or encumbering such personal ch attel as are exempt by law from execution, unle with h er
a ._ ent (Comp. L., ~ -±-±65) ; and if he shall attempt to do o, he
may bring action to recover the same in her 011n n ame : Comp. L.t
: 3294. These powers and privilege in re pect to the husband'.
propert y are not conferred on the wife for her own benefit exclusively, or in order to give h er interests independent of the hu band;
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but they are given her for the benefit of the whole family, in order

that they may not be deprived of the reasonable means of support

which the law has endeavored to save to them, and to the end that

they may be kept together as a family, if such shall be their desire.

And after the death of the husband and father, the family unity is

still regarded in the protection which is given to the homestead:

Const., uhi supra.

We have said that the wife is entitled to support at the husl)and's

domicil, and, as we have seen, she may prevent his disposing of it.

The statute has not given him a corresponding right to impede or

preclude conveyances or encumbrances by the wife, but neverthe-

less, so long as they occupy together, he is not to be considered as

being upon the premises by sufferance merely. He is there by

right, as one of the legal unity known to the law as a family ; as

having important duties to perform, and responsibilities to bear

in that relation, which can only be properly and with amplitude

performed and liorne while the legal unity represents an actuality;

as having rights in consort and offspring which can only be valu-

able reciprocally while the one spot, however owned, shall be the
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home of all; and in many ways he still represents the family

in important relations of society and government. Some of the

legislation on the subject is exceedingly crude ; some of it has in-

judiciously given powers to the wife in the disposition of property

which it has prudently denied to the husband; but none of it

makes the husband a stranger in law in the wife's domicil. The

property is hers alone, but the residence is equally his ; the estate

is in her, but the dwelling-house, the clomus, is that of both.

If, therefore, the husband shall be guilty of the great wrong to

his wife and family, of setting fire to the house they inhabit, he

is no more guilty of arson in so doing than the wife was at the.

common law for a like wrong to the dwelling-house of the husl)and.

The case is a very proper one for a penal statute, but none has yet

been enacted to meet it. The house, in legal contemplation, as

rep-ards the offense under consideration, is the dwelling-house of

the husband himself.

But, in so holding, we do not decide that if the family relation

is broken up in fact, and husband and wife are living apart from

each other, whether, under articles of separation or not, the same

exemption from criminal liability can exist. There is much

reason for holdiDg that the wife's dwelling-house can be considered

but they are given h r for the benefit of th whole family, in order
that the3 may not be deprived of the rea onabl mean of upport
which the law has endeavored to ave to them and to the end that
they may be kept together a a famih, if uch hall b their d ire.
And after the d ath of the hu"band and father, the familj unity i '
... till regarded in the protection which i giv n to the home tead:
Con t. itbi supra.
\Y hav ail that the wife i . . entitled to upport at the hu hand ~
domicil, and. a we have een, he may prevent hi di po ing of it.
The tatute ha not given him a corresponding right to imped or
preclude conveyance or encumbrances by the wife, but nevertheless, o long a they occupy together, he i not to be considered a
being upon the premi e by ufferance merely. H e is there by
right, a one of the legal unity known to the law a a family · a
having important duties to perform, and r sponsibilities to bear
in that relation which can only be properly and with ampl~tude
performed and borne while the legal unity r epre ents an actuality;
a having right in con ort and offspring which can only be valuable reciprocally while the one spot, however ownEd hall be the
home of all; and in many ways he still represents the family
in important r elations of society and government.
ome of the
legi lation on the subj ect is exceedingly crude; some of it has injudiciously given powers to the wife in the di position of property
which it ha prudently denied to th hu band; but none of it
makes the bu ·band a stranger in law in the wife's domicil. The
property i her alone, but the r esidence is equally hi ; the e tate
i in her, but the dwelling-hou e, the domus, i that of both.
If, therefore, the husband shall be guilty of the great wrong t o
l1i. wi'fe and family of setting fir to the house they inhabit, he
is no more guilty of arson in so doing than the wife was at the
common law for a like wrong to the dwelling-house of the husband.
The case is a very proper one for a y>enal tatute, but none has yet
been enact cl to meet it. The house, in legal contemplation, a
regard the offense under consiC!erntion, is the dwelling-hou e of
the husband himself.
But, in so holding, we do not decide that if the family :::-elation
L broken up in fact, and hu band and wife ar living apart from
each other, whether, under articles of ... eparation or not, the am
exemption from criminal liability can exi t. Th re i much
rea. on for hol ling that the wife' dw lling-hou e can be con id red
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that of the husband, only while he makes it such in fact, and that

there is no such legal identity as can preclude her house being

considered, in legal proceedings against him, as the dwelling of

"another," when it is no longer his abode. That case was not fairly

l^resented upon this record, and was barely alluded to on the argu-

ment; and it must be left for proper consideration when it be-

comes necessary to decide it. We confine our attention now to the

case of a husband in the practical exercise of the right to reside

with his family in the wife's dwelling-house, which the wife, at the

same time, practically concedes. In such a case, the dwelling-

house cannot be said not to be that of the husband.

It follows that the judgment was erroneous, and it must be

reversed, and a new trial ordered.

The other justices concurred.

The Intent.

Luke V. State, J^9 Ala. 30. (1873.)

B. F. Saffold, J.:

The appeal is from a conviction of arson, in setting fire to

or burning the jail of Wilcox County. The appellant was confined
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in jail under a charge of assault with intent to murder, together

with jSTettleS; who was under indictment for rape. The two at-

that of the husband, only while he make it such in fact, and that
there is no uch legal identity a can preclude heT house being
con idered, in legal proceedings against him, a the dwelling of
"another," when it is no longer his abode. That case was not fairly
presented upon this record, and was barely alluded to on the argument; and it must be left for proper consideration when it becomes neces ary to decide it. We confine our attention now to the
case of a hu band in the practical exercise of the right to reside
with his family in the wife's dwelhng-hou e, which the wife, at the
same time, practically concede . In such a ca e, the dwellinghouse cannot be said not to be that of the husband.
It follow that the judgment wa erroneous, and it must be
reversed, and a new trial ordered.
The other ju tices concurred.

tempted in concert to break prison, by burning a hole through

the floor of their apartment. They had burned the floor about

six inches deep, l)ut not entirely through, when they were detected

by the jailer and others, who extinguished the fire. While com-

The Int ent .

mitting the burning, they controlled the fire with water saved

from their allowance. The questions involved in the charges given

Luke v.

and refused are : ^\liether the burning for the purpose of escape,

tate, 49 Ala. 30.

{1873.)

and without the intention of consuming the building, would. con-

stitute arson; and whether, both being prisoners, and each en-

deavoring to escape, they can be said to have assisted each other

to escape, which is made a felony by E. C. § 3573.

The indictment was maintained under E. C. § 3698, which de-

clares that "any person who wilfully sets fire to, or bums, any

church, meeting-house, court-house, town-house, college, academy^

jail, or other building erected for public use," is guilty of arson

B. F.

SAFFOLD,

J.:

The appeal i from a conviction of arson, in setting fire to
or burning the jail of Wilcox County. 'The appellant was confined
in jail under a charge of a .. ault with intent to murder_, together
with Kettles; who was under indictment for rape. The two attempted in concert to break pri . on, l-,y burning a hole through
the floor of their apartment. They had burned the floor about
.. ix inches deep, but not entirely through when they were detected
by the jailer and others, who extinguished the fire. While committing the burning, they controlled the fire with water aved
from their allowance. The que tion involved in the charge given
and refrn~ed are: Whether the burning for the purpo e of e cape,.
and without the intention of consuming the building, would .constitute arson; and whether, both being pri oner , and each endeavoring to escape, they can be said to have a isted each other
to escape, which is made a felony by R. C. § 35 3.
The indictment wa maintained under R. C. § 3698, which declares that aany person who wilfully sets fire to, or burns, any
church, meeting-house, court-house, town-house, college, academy
jail, or other building er ected for public use." i guilty of ar on

LUKE \.

TATE

23~

Luke v. State 23J>'

in the second degree. The setting fire to, or burning, was suffi-

ciently done. Any destruction of the material of the house, no

matter how slight, is a burning within the prohibition. Graham

Y. The State, 40 Ala. 659. ^Yas it done wilfully? This term

means less than maliciously, and more than intentionally or de-

signedly. It means unlawfully, and to some extent wickedly. A

setting fire to a house for any unlawful purpose cannot be inno-

cent, though the purpose is not accomplished. If a person from

the outside should set fire to a house, with the intention of burning

a hole through which he might enter and steal, he would not be

guilty of burglary, unless he succeeded in making the hole and

entering. Unless he would be guilty of arson, this dangerous

crime could scarcely ever be proved, because the perpetrator would

truly have some other purpose to be accomplished by the burning.

Breaking jail, by the common law, is a felony, or a misde-

meanor, according as the cause of the imprisonment belongs to

the one grade or the other. 2 Bish. Crim. Law, § 1031. We

have no statute declaring and punishing the offence of breaking

jail by one charged with felony, but not convicted. As a mis-
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demeanor, which it includes, it is punishable under E. C. § 3754.

recognizing and providing the punishment of all misdemeanors

at common law not enumerated in the Penal Code. Imprisonment

for crime gives no immunity to the prisoner to commit crime. He

remains subject to all of the restraints imposed on other persons.

The least privilege of escape conceded to a prisoner would carry

with it the right to use any means he could command. It is a

misdemeanor if, without any obstruction, he merely walk away.

2 Bish. Crim. Law, § 1063. The causeless setting fire to a house,

by a person of responsible mind, is arson, because the necessary

intention is presumed from the act. The same act, done with

the intention of committing a crime, whether felony or misde-

meanor, must also be held to be arson, because the very reckless-

ness of the deed supplies the wilful intention.

2. The case is aggravated, so far as the intention is concerned,

if the defendant and Nettles can be said to have assisted each

other, for then they were in the commission of a felony. E. C.

§ 3573. Is it possible to separate the idea of assistance from the

single design of each to effect his escape? If so, any combination

of prisoners to effect their escape, no matter how formidable, or-

how destructive in its results, is no more criminal than the single

rn the econd degree. The etting fire to or burning, wa uffiiently done. Any de truction of the material of t he house no
matter how slight, i a burning within t h e prohibition. Graham
. The StateJ -±0 Ala. 659 . \\a it done wilfully? Thi term
means le.. than maliciou 13, and more than intentionall3 or deignedly. It mean unlawfully, and to ome extent wickedl~ .
etting :fire to a hou e fo r any unlawful purpo e cannot be innocent, though the purpo e i not accomplished. If a per on from
the out ide should et :fire to a hou e, with the intention of burning
a hole through which he might enter and teal, h e would not be
guilty of burglary, unle s h e ucceeded in making the hole and
entering. 1 nle~s he would be guilty of ar on, thi dangerou..,
crime could carcely ever be proved, because the perpetrator would
truly have ome other purpose to be accomplished by the burning.
Breaking jail by the common law, is a felony, or a misdemeanor, according a the cau e of the imprisonment belongs to
the one grade or the other. 9 Bi h . Crim. Law, § 1031. We
have no statute declaring and punishing the o:ff ence of breaking
jail by one charged with felony, but not convicted. As a mi demeanor, which it include , it is punishable under R. C. § 37547
r ecognizing and providing the punishment of all misdemeanor
at common law not enumerated in the Penal Code. Imprisonment
for crime give no immunity to the pri oner to commit crime. He
r emain ubj ect to all of the r e traint impo ed on other person .
The least privilege of escape conceded to a prisoner would carry
with it the right to u e any means he coull command. It i a
misdemeanor if, without any ob truction, he merely walk away.
2 Bi h. Crim. Law, 1063. The cau sele s setting :fire to a house,
by a per on of r e pon ible mind, i arson, becau e the nece ary
intention i pre urned from the act. The ame act, done with
the intention of committing a crime, whether felony or mi demeanor, mu t al o be held to be arson, because the very reckle ne of the deed supplie the wilful intention.
2. The ca. e is aggravated, o far as the intention is concerned,
if the defendant and Nettles can be aid to have as isted each
other, for then they were in the commi ion of a felony. R. C.
§ 35 '3. I it po~ ible to eparate the idea of a i tance from th
ingle de ign of each to effect hi escape ? If o any combination
of prisoner to effect their escape, no matter how formidable, r
how de tructive in it re_ult i no more criminal than th ingle
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effort of one who could, perhaps, have accomplished no mischief.

In The People v. Rose (13 Johns. E. 339), the defendant at-

tempted to escape by breaking the prison, in consequence of Avhich

a fellow-prisoner, confined for felony, was enabled to escape. The

court said the case was clearly within the mischief which the

statute was made to prevent. The indictment was for aiding a

prisoner confined for felony to escape.

The two authorities cited by the appellant. State v. Mitchell

(5 Iredell, 350), and People v. Catteral (18 Johns. 115), assert

the doctrine, that if a prisoner in a jail set fire to it with the de-

sign of merely breaking a hole through to effect his escape, and

not of burning it down for that purpose, it is not arson. Bishop

dissents from such a proposition, holding it not necessary that the

intent should be to commit a felony. 2 Bish. Crim. Law, § 41.

All of the authorities agree, that where the firing is done with

the intention of commiting any felony, it is arson. Our Penal

Code very properly omits to graduate the offence of breaking jail

by the character of the offence for which the accused is imprisoned,

because the mischief is the same no matter by whom committed.
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The guilt or innocence of this defendant is not dependent upon

whether he was in the commission of a different felony or not.

He intentionally and designedly set fire to the jail, in order to

accomplish an unlawful purpose, and consequently the burning

was wilfully done. It would not be safe to graduate his offence

by the extent of the burning he intended to do, because, as far as

intention constitutes the crime, the criminality is the same whether

the house is burned slightly or consumed. The lives and property

of other persons cannot be made dependent upon his supposition

of how much burning he can do without consuming the house.

3. The court administered to the jury the proper oath. E. C.

§ 4092.

4. The indictments introduced were the best evidence of the

causes for which the accused were imprisoned. They were also

relevant in proof of the corrupt intention with which the burning

was done.

The judgment is affirmed.

effort of one who could, perhaps, have accomplished no mischief.
In Th e People v. Rose (12 Johns. R. 339), the defendant att empted to escape by breaking the prison, in consequence of which
a fellow-prisoner, confined for felony, was enabled to escape. The
court said the case was clearly within the mischief which the
statute was made to prevent. The indictment was for aiding a
prisoner confined for felony to escape.
The two authorities cited by the appellant, S tate v. Mitchell
(5 Iredell, 350), and P eople v. Ca tteral (18 John . 115), assert
the doctrine, that if a prisoner in a jail set fir e to it with the deign of merely breaking a hole through to effect his escape, and
not of burning it down for that purpose, it is not arsori. Bishop
dissents from such a proposition, holding it not necessary that the
intent should be to commit a felony. 2 Bish. Crim. Law, § 41.
All of the authorities agree, that where the firing is done with
the intention of commitlng any felony, it is arson. Our Penal
Code very properly omits to graduate the offence of breaking jail
by the character of the offence for which the accused is imprisoned,
because the mischief is the same no matter by whom committed.
The guilt or innocence of this defendant is not dependent upon
whether he was in tbe commission of a different felony or not.
He intentionally and designedly set fire to the jail, in order to
accomplish an unlawful purpose, and consequently the burning
was wilfully done. It would not be safe to graduate his offence
by the ext ent of the burning he intended to do, because, as far as
intention constitutes the crime, the criminality is the same whether
the house is burned slightly or consumed. The lives and property
of other persons cannot be made dependent upon his supposition
of how much burning he can do without consuming the house.
3. The court administered to the jury the proper oath. R. C.
§ 4092.
4. The indictments introduced were the best evidence of the
causes for which the accused were imprisoned. They were also
r elevant in proof of the corrupt intention with which the burning
was done.
The judgment is affirmed.

STATE
State v. Boon ^ 341

v.
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BOOJ:

burglabt.

The Brealing.

State V. Boon, IS Ired. (N. C.) 2U- (1852.)

Appeal from the jSuperior Court of Law of Sampson County,

BURGLARY.

at the Spring Term 1852, his Honor Judge Ellis presiding.

The prisoner was indicted for a burglarious entry into the dwell-

The Breaking.

ing house of one John Owen, in the county of Sampson. The

indictment contained two counts. In the one, it was alleged, that

the intent was to commit a rape upon Sarah Ann, the daughter of

State v .

said Owen ; and in the other, to commit a rape upon Sarah Eliza

Boon~ 1u

Ired. (I'V . C.) 244.

(1852.)

Owen, the grand-daughter of said Owen.

Sarah Ann swore, that she retired early to bed in a shed room

of the dwelling house of her father, in company with her niece,

Sarah Eliza, on the night of the 21st of December, 1851. The

girls slept in the same bed. Previous to retiring they examined

the room, and were satisfied no one else was there. Shortly after

getting to sleep, she was awakened by feeling some one touch her

foot, and saw some person in a stooping position by the bed side.

The person grasped her ancle, when she screamed, and recognised
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the prisoner retreating and escaping by the window. She was well

acquainted with him. He had married a servant of her father's,

who lived on the premises; but she had not seen him for some

days. There had been fire in the room, and the embers on the

hearth gave sufficient light to enable her to distinguish an indi-

vidual. She had locked the door. The window was down when

she went to bed, but the fastenings were not on. It was usual to

fasten it down with a nail, which would prevent any one from

without from raising it. When she arose the window was up, and

was held by a stick. It was not the usual sleeping apartment of

the witness. She had not slept there for six months previous. It

was usually occupied by one Mrs. Faircloth.

Sarah Eliza Owen testified in all respects as her aunt, except

that she was not well acquainted with the prisoner, although she

had seen him often. She was not positive, but said she tool- the

person to be the prisoner.

John Owen swore, that he was awakened on the night in ques-

16

Appeal from the uperior Court of Law of Samp on County,
at the Spring Term 1852, his Honor Judge ELLIS pre iding.
The pri oner wa indicted for a burglariou entry into the dwelling house of one John Owen, in the county of Samp~on. The
indictment contained two count . In the o:u , it was alleged, that
-the intent wa to commit a rape upon Sarah Ann, the daughter of
said Owen; and in the other, to commit a rape upon Sarah Eliza
Owen, th e grand-daughter of said Owen.
Sarah Ann wore, that "'he retired early to bed in a .. hed room
of the dwelling hou e of her faiher, in company with her ni ce_,
Sarah Eliza, on the night of the 21 t of December, 1851. The
girl . lept in the ame bed. Previou to retiring they examined
the room, and were ati fied no one el e wa there. Shortly after
getting to sleep, she wa awakened by feeling some one touch her
foot, and "'aw ome per on in a tooping po"'ition by the bed ide.
T he per on gra ped her ancle_, when he creamed, and recogni ed
the pri oner r etreating and e caping by the window.
he wa well
acquainted with him. He had married a ervant of her father's,
who lived on the premi e ; but she had not seen him for some
day . There had been fire in the room, and the embers on the
hearth gave ufficient light to enable her to di tingui h an individual. She had locked the door. The window wa down when
he went to b d but th fa tening were not on. It "as u ual to
fa ten it down with a nail which would prevent any one from
without from rai ing it. When he aro e the window wa up, and
was h eld b a stick. It wa not the u ual leeping apartment of
the witne .
he had not lept there for ix months previou . It
wa u ually occupied by one l\1r . Faircloth.
arah Eliza Owen te tified in all re p ct a her aunt, except
that he wa not well acquaint d with the pri oner although h
had een him often.
he wa not po._itive, but aid he took the
per on to be the pri oner.
John Ow n . -n'ore, that he wa awakened on th night in que 16
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tion, about ten o'clock, by tlie screams of his daughter, and, upon

going to her room, received substantially the account of the affair,

as testified to above. He took a light and searched the premises;

but could not find the prisoner nor any one else. He did not go

to the prisoner's wife's house to see who was there — all was dark

and silent. He did not afterwards see the prisoner until he was

tion, about ten o'clock, by the screams of his daughter, and, upon
going to her room, received substantially the account of the affair,
as testified to above. H e took a light and searched the premise ;
but could not find the prisoner nor any one else. He did not go
to the prisoner's wife's house to see who was there-all was dark
and silent. He did not afterwards see the prisoner until he w::i s
arrested.
His Honor cha1gec1 the jury, that they must be satisfied, that it
was the prisoner, who entered the dwelling house of Owen, and that
he enterrcl with an intent to commit a rape upon the person of
Sarah Ann Owen_, or of Sarah Eliza Owen; and that, if they were
satisfied of one or both of these allegations, they should find the·
pri oner guilty. The prisoner's c·ounsel prayed the Court to charge
the jury, that there was no evidence of either intent, as charged in
the bill of indictment; that if the window was usually fastened
by a nail or otherwise, and that upon the night in question such
fastening was omitted, although the window might have been down
the entry would not have been burglarious, and the prisoner would
be entitled to their verdict.
His Honor refu eel so to charge. There was a verdict of guilty;
and a rule fol' a new trial was had and discharged; and, judgment having been pronounced, an appeal was prayed and alJowed.
1

arrested.

His Honor charged the jury, that they must be satisfied, that it

was the prisoner, who entered the dwelling house of Owen, and that

he entered with an intent to commit a rape upon the person of

Sarah Ann Owen, or of Sarah Eliza Owen; and that, if they were

satisfied of one or both of these allegations, they should find the

jorisoner guilty. The prisoner's counsel prayed the Court to charge

the jury, that there was no evidence of either intent, as charged in

the bill of ijidictment; that if the window was usually fastened

by a nail or otherwise, and that upon the night in question such

fastening was omitted, although the window might have been down,

the entry Avould not have been burglarious, and the prisoner would

be entitled to their verdict.
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His Honor refused so to charge. There was a verdict of guilty,

and a rule for a new trial was had and discharged; and, judg-

ment having been pronounced, an appeal was prayed and allowed.

Pearson, J. :

The exception, in reference to the breaking, is settled against the

prisoner by the authorities. Passing an imaginary line is a

'^jreaking of the close," and will sustain an action of Trespass

quare clausum frcgit. In Burglary more is required — there must

be a breaking, removing, or putting aside of something material,

which constitutes a pai't of the dwelling house, and is relied on as

a security against intrusion. Leaving a door or window open

shows such negligence and want of proper care, as to forfeit all

claim to the peculiar protection extended to dwelling houses. But.

if the door or window be shut, it is not necessary to resort to locks,,

bolts, or nails; because, a latch to the door, and the weight of tho

window, may well be relied on as a sufficient security. Chimnies

are usually left open, yet, if an entry is effected by coming down a

chimney, the breaking is burglarious.

The motion in arrest of judgment, based on the distinction be-

tween felonies at common law and those created by statute, cannot

J.:
The exceptiou, in reference to the breaking, is settled against the
pri oner by the authorities. PassiDg an imaginary line is a
"breaking of the close," and will sustain an action of Trespa s
qiwre clavsurn frcgit. In Burglary more -is required-there mu t
be a breaking, remoYing: or putting aside of something material,
which constitutes a part of the dwelling house, and is relied on as
a ecnrity against intrusion. Leaving a door or window open
shows such negligence and want of proper care, a to forfeit all
c]aim to the peculiar protection extended to dwelling houses. But.
if the door or window be shut, it is not necessary to r e ort to lock ,
bolts, or nails; because, a latch to the door, and the weight of th,;
window, may well be relied on as a sufficient security. Chimnies
are usually left op n, yet, if an entry is effected by coming down a
chimney, the breaking is burglarious.
'rhe motion in arrest of judgment, based on the distinction between felonies at common law and tho ~ e created by statute, cannot
PEARSON,
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be sustained. There seems to have been a doubt upon the ques-

tion at one time, but the later authorities do not leave it open to

discussion.

The exception, in reference to the want of evidence of the felo-

nious intent, presents the only question, as to which we have had

any difficulty. The evidence of the intent charged is certainly very

slight, but we cannot say there is no evidence tending to prove it,

The fact of the breaking and entering was strong evidence of some

bad intent — going to the bed and touching the foot of one of the

young ladies, tended to indicate, that the intent was to gratify lust.

Taking hold of — "grasping" (as the case expresses it) the ancle,

after the foot was drawn up, and the hasty retreat without any

attempt at explanation, as soon as the lady screamed, was some

evidence, that the purpose of the prisoner, at the time he entered,

was to gratify his lust by force. It was, therefore, no error to

submit the question to the jury. Whether the evidence was suffi-

cient to justify a verdict of guilty is a question, about which the

Court is not at liberty to express an opinion.

Per Curiam. Judgment affirmed.
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Entry.

State V. McCall 4 Ala. 6^3. (ISJ^S.)

The defendant was indicted for burglary, at a term of the

Circuit Court of Mobile, commencing on the sixth Monday after

the fourth Monday in September, 1842.

The cause was tried on the plea of not guilty, and certain ques-

tions of law reserved, which are referred to this Court as novel

and difficult. These questions are thus stated, "In this case it

was proved by the State, that the supposed burglary was com-

be ustained. There seem to have been a doubt upon the qu tion at one time, but the later authorities do not 1 ave it open to
di cussion.
The exception, in reference to the want of evidence of the felonious int nt, present the only que tion, as to which we have had
any diffic'...uty. The evidence of the intent charged is certainly very
light, but we cannot say there i no evidence tending to prove it.
The fact of the breaking and entering wa trong evidence of some
bad intent-going to the bed and touching the foot of one cf the
young ladi , tended to indicate, that the intent was to gratify lust.
Taking hold of-" grasping," (as the case expresses it) the ancle,
after the foot was drawn up, and the hasty r etreat without any
attempt at explanation, a soon as the lady screamed, wa orne
vidence, that the purpose of the prisoner, at the time he entered,
was to gratify his lust by force. It was, therefore, no error to
ubmit the question to the jury. Whether the evidence was sufficient to ju tify a verdict of guilty is a que tion, about which the
Court is not at liberty to express an opinion.
PEn LTRIAM.
Judgment affirmed.

mitted by the defendant, in the mansion house of Mrs. Ann Vin-

cent, in the city of Mobile. That between eleven and twelve

o'clock at night, Mrs. Vincent had retired, and heard a noise at

the window, indicating that force was being used to open the

Entry.

shutters, or blinds — that the window itself was fastened down, in

such a manner that it could not be opened from without — that the

shutters were also fastened in the ordinary way before Mrs. V.

State v. McCall, 4 A la. 643. (1843 .)

retired — that after hearing the noise without, alarm was given to

a lodger in the house, who upon going out, found the defendant

The defendant wa indicted for burglary, at a term of the
Circuit Court of Mobile, commencing on the sixth Monday after
the fourth Monday in S ptember, 18-±2.
'rhe cause was tried on the plea of not guilty, and certain questions of law reserved, which are referred to this Court a novel
and difficult. These que tions are thu stated, "In thi case it
wa proved by the State, that the supposed burglary was committed by the defendant, in the man ion house of l\Ir . Ann Vincent, in the city of fobil . That between eleven an 1 twelve
o'clock at night, Mr . Vincent had retired, and h ard a noi e at
the window, indicating that force wa being u l to open the
hutter , or blind -that th window it elf was fastened down in
uch a manner that it could not be opened from with ut-that th
._ hutt r were al o fa ._ten d in the ordinary way b fore Mr . . V.
retired-that after hearing the nois without alarm wa. giv n to
a lodg r in th - house, who upon oing out, f unc1 the cl .f n lant
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in the yard;, near the window, the shutters of which had been

opened, and were then standing open. After the witnesses had

been examined, and the arguments of counsel on both sides con-

cluded, defendant's counsel asked the Court to allow defendant to

make a statement to the jury — this the Court declined. The

Court then charged the Jury, that if tliey believed from the testi-

mony, that the defeaidant, by the application of force, wrested open

the window shutters, and his hands protruded beyond the line

made by the shutters when shut, that that in law, was an entry,

notwithstanding the sash remained down and the glass was un-

broken."

The prisoner was found guilty, and sentenced to imprisonment

in the Penitentiary for the space of ten years.

Collier, C. J. :

The crime of burglary may be defined to be, the breaking and

entering a dwelling house in the night time, with intent to com-

mit a felony. For the purposes of this offence, it is said the term

"dwelling house," comprehends all buildings within the curtilage

or inclosure, &c. (1 Hale's P. C. 358, 559; Hawk. P. C. Ch. 38,
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§ 12; East's P. C. 492; id. 493, 501, 508.) The offence consists

in the yard, near the window, the shutter ~ o.f which had been
opened, and were then standing open. After the witnesses had
been examined, and the arguments of counsel on both sides concluded, defenclant's couooel aJrnd the Court to allow defendant to
make a statement to the jury-this the Court declined. The
Court then charged tlte jury, that i.f they believed from the te timony, that the defendant, by the application of force, wrestecl open
the window shutters, and his hands protruded beyond the line
made by the hutters when shut, that that in law, was an entry,
notwithstanding the sa h remained down and the glas was unbroken."
The prisoner wa.., found guilty, and sentenced to imprisonment
in the Penitentiary for the space of ten year .

then in violating the common security of the dwelling house in the

night time, for the purpose of commiting a felony. (Common-

wealtli V. Stephenson et al., 8 Pick. Pep. 354.) But what is a

violation, is not in all cases entirely clear; the authorities dis-

covering a great want of harmony. It is not our purpose now, to

notice the many adjudications with which the books abound; but

only to consider a few of those most pertinent to the case in hand,

and then state the principle which must control our decision.

In Eex V. Bailey and another, (Russ. and E. C. C. 341,) it

appeared that a sash window belonging to a dwelling house, was

fastened in the usual way, by a latch, from the bottom of the

upper sash to the top of the lower one ; and that there were inside

shutters, which were fastened. One of the prisoners broke a pane

of glass in the upper sash of the window, and introduced his hand

within, with the intention to undo the latch by which the window

was fastened. While he was cutting a hole in the shutter with a

centre bit, and before he had undone the latch of the windo\7, he

was seized. All the Judges were of opinion, that the introduction

COLLIER,

c.

J.:

The crime of burglary may be defined to be, the breaking ancl
entering a dwelling house in the night time, with intent to commit a felony. For the purposes of this offence, it is said the term
udwelling house," comprehends all buildings within the curtilage
or inclosure, &c. (1 Hale's P. C. 358, .559; Hawk. P. C. Ch. 38,
§ 12; East's P. C. 492; id. 493, 501_, 508.) The offence consi ts
then in violating the common security of the dwelling house in the
i1ight time, for the purpose of commiting a felony. (Comnionu:ealth v. Stephenson et al.J 8 Pick. Rep. 354.) But what i a
violation, is not in all cases entirely clear; the authorities discovering cl great want of harmony. It is not our purpose now, to
notice the many adjudications with which the books abounr1; but
only to consider a few of those most pertinent to the case in hand,
and then state the principle which must control our decision.
In Rex v. Bailey and another, (Russ. and R. C. C. 341,) it
appeared that a sash window belonging to a dwelling house, was
fastened in the usual way, by a latch, from the bottom d the
upper sash to the top of the lower one; and that there were inside
shutters, which were fastened. One of the prisoner broke a pane
of glass in the upper sash of the window, and introduced his hand
·w ithin, with the intention to undo the latch by which the window
"·as fastened. While he was cutting a hole in the shutter with a
centre bit, and before he had undone the latch of the window, he
was seized. All the Judge were of opinion, that the introduction
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of the hand between the window and the shutter to undo the win-

dow latch, was a sufficient entry to constitute a burglary.

In Bex V. Bust and Ford (1 Moody's C. C. 183), the facts were

these : the glass sash window was left closed down, but was thrown

up by the prisoners ; the inside shutters were fastened, and there

was a space of about three inches between the sash and the shut-

ters, and the shutters themselves were about an inch thick. It

appeared that after the sash was thrown up, a crow-bar had been

introduced to force the shutters, and had been not only within the

sash, but had reached to the inside of the shutters, as the mark

of it was found on the inside of the shutters. The Judges were of

opinion that this was not a case of burglary, as it did not appear

whether any part of the hand was within the window, although the

aperture was large enough to admit it.

Any, the least entry, is sufficient by means of the hand, or foot,

or even by an instrument with which it is intended to commit a

felony. (East's P. C. 490; Foster's C. L. 107; 1 Hawk. P. C.

Ch. 38, § 7; 1 Hale's P. C. 555.) But the entry, it is said, must

appear to have been made with the immediate intent to commit a
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felony, as distinguished from the previous intent to procure admis-

sion to the dwelling house. Where it appeared that a centre-bit had

penetrated through the door, from chips found in the inside of the

house, yet as the instrument had been introduced for the purpose

of breaking, and not for the purpose of taking the property or

committing any other felony, it was held the entry was incomplete.

(1 Leach's C. L. 452; East's P. C. 491.)

The citations from the crown cases, it must be admitted, lend

their support to the charge of the Circuit Judge to the jury. The

only difference being, that there was a breach and entry of the sash,

while here, the breach and entry was of the blinds, which were the

outer protection. This, it is conceived, cannot require the applica-

tion of a different principle. It cannot be, that the common

security of the dwelling house is violated by breaking one of the

shutters of a door or window which has several. True, it weakens

the security which the mansion is supposed to afford, and renders

the breach more easy; but as additional force will be necessary

before an entry can be effected, tliere can, under such circum-

stances, be no burglary committed.

Suppose the shutter of a door made by placing plank upon

each other until it is two or three double, if the tliickness of one

of th hand between th window and the hutter to undo the window latch, wa. a ufficient entry to con titute a burglary.
In Rex v. Rust and Ford ( 1 Moody' C. C. 1 3), the facts were
a h window wa left clo ed down, but wa thrown
these: the gla
up by the prisoners; the inside hutter were fa tened, and there
was a . pace of about three inche between th a b and the butters, and the hutter themselves were about an inch thick. It
appeared that after the sash was thrown up, a crow-bar had be n
introduced to force the shutters, and bad been not only within the
sash, but had reached to the inside of the butters, as the mark
of it was found on the inside of the hutters. The Judges were of
opinion that this was not a case of burglary, as it did not appear
whether any part of the hand was within the window, although the
aperture was large enough to admit it.
Any, the least entry, is ufficient by means of the hand, or foot,
or even by an instrument with which it i intended to commit a
felony. (East' P. C. 490; Foster's C. J.;. 107; 1 Hawk. P. C.
Ch. 38, § 7; 1 Hale', P . C. 555.) But the entry, it is said, must
appear to hav been made with the immediate intent to commit a
felony, as di tingui. hed from the previou intent to procure admission to the dwelling house. Where it appeared that a centre-bit had
penetrated through the door, from chips found in the in ide of the
hou e, yet a the in trument had been introduced for the purpose
of breaking, and not for the purpo e of taking the property or
committing any other felony, it was held the entry wa incomplete.
( 1 Leach's C. L. 452; East's P. C. 491.)
The citation from the crown case , it must be admitted; lend
their support to the charge of the Circuit Judge to the jury. The
only difference being, that there wa a breach and entry of the a h,
while her e, the breach and entry was of the blinds, which were the
outer protection. This, it i conceived, cannot require the application of a different principle. It cannot be, that the common
ecurity of the dwelling hou e is violated by hr aking one of the
butters of a door or window which has several. Tru , it weaken
the ecurity which the man ion is suppo ed to afford, and ren l r
the breach more a y; bnt as additional fore will be nee . ary
before an entry an b effected, ther can, und r u h ircum~tance , be no burglary com~itted.
Suppose the hutter of a door made by pla .ino- plank up n
of n
each other until it i two or thr e double, if the thi ·kn
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of the plank be removed by one intending to commit a burglary,

and an entry thus far made, can it be said that the offence was

completed ? What, in point of principle, is the difference between

such a case, and one where there are several shutters, an inch or

two apart from each other. In neither case can such an entry be

made as will enable the aggressor to commit a felony. In such

cases the entry may be said to be made with the intent rather to

jyrocure admission into the dwelling house, than to commit a felony.

which we have seen is an indispensable constituent of the crime

of burglary.

To constitute burglary, an entry must be made into the house

with the hand, foot, or an instrument with which it is intended

to commit a felony. In the present case there was nothing but a

hreach of the blinds, and no entry beyond the sash window. The

threshold of the window had not been passed, so as to have enabled

the defendant to consummate a felonious intention; and accord-

ing to the principle we have laid down, the charge to the jury was

erroneous.

The constitution guarantees to every one charged with the com-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:03 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t39z97p86
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

mission of a crime, the right to be heard by himself and counsel,

but it does not permit the accused to make a statement of facts to

the jury, unless it be authorized by the evidence adduced. Here

the reasonable inference perhaps is, that the statement proposed

to be made was not in the course of a legal defence; at any rate

the leave of the Court was not asked for that purpose, until, accord-

ing to the regular course of procedure, the arguments for the State

and the prisoner had l)een concluded. Taking this to be true, the

Court might very well have refused to allow the defendant to make

the statement he desired.

For the error in the first question considered, the judgment is

reversed, and the defendant is directed to remain in custody to

await a trial de novo, unless in the interim he be discharged by due

course of law.

of the plank be removed by one intending to commit a burglary
and an entry thu far made: can it be aid that the offence wa
completed? What, in point of principle, i. the difference between
uch a case, and one where there are several shutters, an inch or
two apart from each other. In neither case can uch an entry be
made as will enable the aggressor to commit a felony. In such
ca~es the entry may be aid to be made with the intent rather to
procure admission into the dwell1:ng house, than to commit a f elony.
which we have seen is an indi pensable constituent of the crime
of burglary.
To constitute burglary, an entry mu t be made into the hou ('
with the hand, foot, or an instrument with which it i intended
to commit a felony. In the present ca e there wa nothing but a
breach of the blinds, and no entry beyond the sash window. The
threshold of the window had not been pa ed, so a to have enabled
the defendant to consummate a feloniou intention; and arcording to the principle we have laid down, t~1e charg to the jury w:i .
erroneous.
The constitution guarantee to every one charged with the commi. sion of a crime, the right to be heard by himself and counsel,
but it does not permit the accused to make a statement of facts to
the jury, unless it be authorized by the evidence adduced. Here
the reasonable inference perhaps is, that the statement proposed
to be made was not in the cour se of a legal defence; at any rate
the leave of the Court was not a ked for that purpose, until, according to the regular course of procedure, the arguments for the State
.and the prisoner had been concluded. Taking this to be true, the
Court might very well have refused to allow the defendant to make
the statement he desired.
For the error in the first question considered, the judgment is
Teversed, and the defendant is directed to remain in custody to
await a trial de nova, unless in the interim he be discharged by due
course of law.

ST.ATE

v.

1\1EERCHO

24

E

State v. Meekciiouse 2-17

Character of Premises.

'State V. Meerchouse, SJf. Mo. 3U. (lS6Jf.)

Bay, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

At the May term, 1863, of the Osage Circuit Court, the de-

Character of Premises.

fendant was indicted for burglary and larceny, and at the No-

Tember term following tried and convicted. The usual motions

'State v. Meerchou e, 34 Mo . 344.

for new trial and in arrest were made and overruled, and the case

(1864.}

is brought here by writ of error. No objections have been urged

to the instructions given on the part of the State. The defendant

asked five instructions, and it is insisted by the Attorney General

that all were given, while it is contended by defendant's counsel

that his fifth instruction was refused. The difficulty grows out of

the imperfect manner in which the record is made up. From all,

however, that we can gather from the record, it appears that the

instruction, as asked by defendant, was in the following words :

*'A dwelling-house is a house in which the occupier and his family

usually reside at the time the burglary was charged to have been

■committed,"

The court gave the instruction with the following words added :
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"That is, the building was a dwelling-house, and not an out-

house."

• During the argument of the case, and while defendant's counsel

was addressing the jury, some altercation took place between the

court and counsel as to the meaning and interpretation that should

be given to the instruction, whereupon the court withdrew the

instruction and gave the following in lieu of it:

"A dwelling-house is a house in which the occupier and his

family usually reside, and in this case it is not necessary that any

person should be actually in the house."

We see in this no ground for reversing the judgment. The

instruction, as finally given, is subject to no legal objection, and

substantially contains the principle embraced in the instruction,

as asked by defendant.

It has, however, been very ingeniously argued, that the build-

ing alleged to have been broken open was not a dwelling-liouse,

and, therefore, the offence is not burglary. The proof upon this

Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.
At the May term, 1863, of the Osage Circuit Court, the de-fendant was indicted for burglary and larcen3, and at the No-vember term following tried and convicted. The usual motion
for new trial and in arre.. , t were made and overruled, and the case
i s brought here by writ of error. No obj ctions have been urged
to the instruction given on the part of the State. The defendant
asked five in tructions, and it is insi ted by the Attorney Gen rfi;l
that all were given: while it is contended by defendant' couns 1
i:hat his fifth instruction wa refused. The difficulty grows out of
the imperfect manner in which the record i made up. From all,
bowever, that we can gather from the record, it appears that the
instruction, as asked by defendant, was in the following word :
"A dwelling-house is a house in which the occupier and his family
u sually reside at the time the burglary was charged to have been
·Committed."
The court gave the instruction with the following words added :
" 1'hat is, the building was a dwelling-house, and not an out11ouse."
· During the argument of the case, and while defendant's counsel
wa s addres ing the jury, some altercation took place between the
court and counsel as to the meaning and interpretation that should
be given to the in truction, whereupon the court withdrew the
instruction and gave tb e following in lieu of it:
"A dwelling-house is a house in which the occupi r and hi
family u ually re ide, and in thi ca e it i.. , not necessary that any
per on . hould be actually in the house."
W see in thi no ground for reversing the judgm nt. Th
in truction, as finally given, is subject to no legal objection, and
sub tantially contains the principle embrace i in the in truction
a a k i by defendant.
It ha ·, however, been very ingeniously argu d, that the building alleged to have been broken open wa not a dw lling-hou
.and, ther fore_, the offence i not burglary. The proof upon thi"
BAY,
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jjoiiit shows that the premises belonged to one Frans Hutchmeyer.

Hutchmeyer was a witness on the part of the State, and testified

that he was the owner of a dwelling-house in Osage county; that

he had lived in the house, but moved out of it some time in the

spring of 1862, and went about four or five miles off to live with

his brother, leaving a j^art of his furniture in the house; that he

returned in three or four months; that at the time he left he

locked the house up, and that during his absence no person had

lived in it; that on his return to the house he discovered that it

had been broken open and some things stolen.

As this indictment is for burglary in the second degree, it is

not necessary to show that any person was in the house at the time

of the breaking and entering; but it is necessary that the house

should l)e a dwelling-house. In Eoscoe's criminal evidence, (5th

Am. Ed.,) p. 350, reference is made to many of the leading English

cases, from which it appears that a temporary locking up of the

house, or absence of the proprietor and his family, does not make

it any the less a dwelling-house. The following cases are par-

ticularly cited:
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If A, says Lord Hale, has a dwelling-house, and he and his

family are absent a night or more, and in their absence a thief

breaks and enters the house, to commit felony, this is burglary..

(1 Hail, P. C. 556; 3 inst. 64.)

So if A have two mansion-houses, and is sometimes with his

family in one and sometimes in the other, the breach of one of

them, in the al^sence of his family, is burglary. (Id. 4 Eep. 40,,

a.)

So if A have a chamber in a college or inn of court, where he

usually lodges in term time, and in his absence in vacation his

chamber or study is broken open, this is burglary. (1 Hale, P. C.

556.)

Again, the prosecutor being possessed of a house in Westminster,

in which he dwelt, took a journey into Cornwall, with intent to

return, and move his wife and family out of town, leaving the

key with a friend, to look after the house. After he had been

absent a month, no person being in the house, it was broken open

and robbed. He returned a month after with his family. This

was adjudged burglary. (2 East, P. C. 496.)

In this country it has been held, that if A have a residence in

the city and one in the country, residing with his family during

point shows that the premises belonged to one Frans H utchmeyer .
Hutchmeyer was a witness on the part of the State, and testified
that he was the owner of a dwelling-house in Osage county; that
he had lived in the house, but moved out of it some time in the
spring of 1862, and went about four or five miles off to live with
his brother, leaving a part of his furniture in the house; that he
r e turned in three or four months; that at the time he left he
locked the house up, and that during his absence no person had
lived in it; that on hi return to the house he discovered that it
had been broken open and some things stolen.
As this indictment is for burglary in the second degree, it is
not necessary to show that any person was in the house at the time
of the breaking and entering; but it is necessary that the house
hould he a d·w elling-house. In Roscoe's criminal evidence, (5th
Am. Ed.:) p. 350, r eference i made to many of the leading English
cases, from which it appear that a temporary locking up of the
house, or absence of the proprietor and his family, does not make
it any the less a dwelling-house. The following cases are particularly cited:
If A, says Lord Hale, has a dwelhng-house, and he and hi
family are absent a night or more, and in their absence a thief
breaks anc1 enters the house, to commit felony, this is burglary~
( 1 Hall_, P. C. 556; 3 in t. 6-±.)
So if A have two mansion-houses, and is sometimes with bis
family in one and sometimes in the other, the breach of one of
them, in the absence of his family, is burglary. (Id. 4 Rep. 40,.

a. )
So if A have a chamb er in a college or inn of court, where he
u sually lodges in term time, and in hi absence in vacation his
chamb er or study i broken open, this is burglary. (1 Hale, P. C.
556.)
Again, the prosecutor being· possessed of a house in Westminster
in which h e dwelt, took a journey into Cornwall, with intent to .
. return, and move his wife and family out of town, leaving the
key with a friend, to look after the h ou se. After he had been
absent a month, no per son being in the house, it was broken open
and robbed. H e r eturned a month after with his family . Thi ,
was adjudged burglary. (2 East, P. C. 496.)
In this country it has been h eld, that if A have a r e idence in
the city ~n d on e in the country, r esiding with hi family during
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the summer in one, and in the winter in the other, the breach of

either, during the absence of A and his family, (though no person

may be sleeping in it,) for the purpose of committing a felony, is

burglary.

It is equally well settled, that if the owner locks up his house

and leaves it, with a settled purpose not to return, it ceases to be

his dwelling-house, in the sense necessary to make an unlawful

breaking a burglary. To continue it his mansion-house, he must

have quitted it animo revertendi.

In the case at bar, we think it apparent that the owner of the

premises had no intention to remain away permanently. He left

most of his furniture in the house; made no effort to rent it or

make any disposition of it whatever, and returned to it after an

absence of three or four months at his brother's, who resided in the

same county.

The other judges concurring, the judgment will be affirmed.

Night time.

State V. Bancroft, 10 N. H. 105. (1839.)

Indictment for burglary, in breaking and entering the dwelling-
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house of one William Stickney, about the hour of twelve, in the

night time of the ninth of November, A. D. 1837, with intent to

steal, and stealing therefrom one butter firkin, and thirty pounds

of butter.

the ummer· in one, and in the winter in the other, the breach of
either, during the absence of A and his family, (though no person
may be sleeping in it,) for the purpose of committing a felony, i~
burglary.
It is equally well settled, that if the owner lock up hi hou e
and leaves it, with a ettled purpo e not to return, it cease to be
his dwelling-house, in the ense necessary to make an unlawful
breaking a burglary. To continue it his man ion-hou e, he must
have quitted it an.imo revertendi.
In the case at bar, we think it apparent that the owner of the
premises had no intention to remain away permanently. He left
most of his furniture in the house; made no effort to rent it ormake any disposition of it whatever, and returned to it after an
absence of three or four months at his brother' , who resided in th
~ ame county.
The other judges concurring, the judgment will be affirmed.

The only direct evidence to show that the entry and taking of

the property was in the night time, was the testimony of the wife

of said William, that she saw the firkin of butter, in the back room,

on the ninth of November, after dark; and that in the morning,

when she got up, it was gone.

Night time.

The defendant's counsel contended that there was not sufficient

evidence that an entry was made in the night time; but the court

submitted the evidence to the jury, with instructions that it was

State v. Bancroft, 10 N. II. 105. {1839.}

competent for them to consider; and that if they were satisfied,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant entered after day-

light was gone, and before daybreak the next morning, they might

find an entry in the night time.

The jury having found the defendant guilty of entering in the

Indictment for burglary, in breaking and el).tering the dwellinghouse of one William Stickney, about the hour of twelve, in the
night time of the ninth of November, A. D. 1837, with intent to
steal, and stealing therefrom one butter :firkin, and thirty pounds
of butter.
The only direct evidence to show that the entry and taking of
the property wa in the night time, wa the testimony of the wife
of said William, that she saw the :firkin of butter, in the back room,
on the ninth of November, after dark; and that in the morning,
when he got up, it was gone.
The defendant' counsel contended that th re was not suffi i nt
evidence that an ntry was made in the night time; but the ourt
ubmitted the evidenc to the jury, with in tructions that it wa
competent for tbem to con ider; and that if they were atisficcl
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant ent red aft r laylight wa gone, and befor daybr ak the n xt morning, they might
:find an entry in the night time.
'.!'he jury having found th d f ndant guilty of ntering in tb
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night time, without breaking, with intent to steal, his counsel

moved for a new trial.

Parker, C. J. :

night time, without breaking, with intent to steal, his counsel
moved fo r a new trial.

The evidence in this case was sufficient to authorize the jury to

find that the entry was made in the night. Such a fact may be

shown by circumstantial evidence, like other facts; and the testi-

mony that the butter was seen in the house after it was dark, and

was missing the next morning when the witness got up, led very

strongly to the conclusion that it was taken in the course of the

night; although the precise hour when the witness called it dark,

did not appear, and the time when she arose in the morning was

not stated. At whatever time in the morning the loss was dis-

covered, the jury might well weigh the probability whether the

article would have been taken from the house in the day time, in

connection with the other evidence. It was sufficient that, upon

the whole case, they had no reasonable doubt that the act was done

in the night time.

The direction as to what constituted the night time was correct.

'T:t hath been anciently held, that after sunset, though daylight be
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not quite gone, or before sunrising, is noctanter, to make a bur-

glary." 1 Hale's P. C. 550. "But it is now generally agreed, that

if there be daylight enough begun or left, either by the light of

the sun or twilight, whereby the countenance of a person may

reasonably be discerned, it is no burglary: but that this does not

extend to moonlight; for then many midnight burglaries would

go unpunished." 2 East's P. C. 509; 1 Hale's P. C. 550. If the

rule laid down in the charge to the jury was not precisely the same

as that found in the authorities just cited, it was substantially the

same, and quite as favorable for the prisoner. There is no inter-

vening time between the night and the clay ; and when the light of

the latter is entirely gone, and the great characteristic which dis-

tinguishes it from night no longer exists, the day terminates with

it. The next day commences with the earliest dawn, and the night

of course ends at that time. That the matter does not depend upon

the degree of light, and the ability to distinguish objects at the

time, is evident, because the light of the moon, however bright it

mav be, makes no difference.

p .A.RICER, C. J. :
The evidence in this case was sufficient to authorize the jury t o
fi nd that the entry was made in the night. Such a fact may be
~ h own by circum tantial evidence, like other fact ; and the te tirnony that the butter was seen in the hou e after it wa darl-, and
w a~ mi sing the n ext morning when the witnes got up, led v ry
trongly to the conclusion that it was t aken in the cour e of the
night; although the precise hour when the witne called it dark,
did not appear, and the time when she aro e in the morning wa
net stated. At whatever time in the morning the los was di covered, the jury might well weigh the probability whether the
article would have been taken from th e house in the day time, in
connection with the other eviden ce. It wa ufficient that, upon
the whole (;a e, they had no r easonable doubt that the act was done
in the night tim .
The direction as to what constituted the night time was correct.
''It hath been anciently held, that after sunset, though daylight be
not quite gone, or before ~unrising, is noctant er, to make a burglary." 1 Hale's P. C. 550. "But it is now generally agreed, that
if there be daylight enough begun or left, either by the light of
the sun or twilight, whereby the countenance of a per son may
r easonably be di cern ed, it i no burglary : but that this doe not
extend to moonlight; for then many midnight burglaries would
go unpunished." 2 East's P. C. 509; 1 Hale's P . C. 550. If the
rule laid down in the charge to the jury was not preci ely the amc
as that found in the authorities just cited, it was sub tantialh the
same, and quite as favorable for the prisoner . Ther e is no intervening tim e between the night and th e day ; and when the light o [
the latter is entirely gone, and the great characteri tic which distinguishes it from night no longer exi ts, the day t erminates with
it. The next day commence with the earliest dawn, and the night
of course ends at that time. That the matter does not depend upon
the degree of light, and the ability to distingui h objects at the
time, is evident, because the light of the moon, however bright it
may be, makes no difference.
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Intent.

State V. Cooper, 16 Yt. 551. (18U.)

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Williams, Ch. J . :

I NTENT.

The respondent was indicted for burglary, and was convicted on

the second count, — which charges him, in substance, with breaking

tate v. Cooper, 16 rt. 551 . (1 44 .)

and entering a dwelling house in the night time, with intent to

•commit adultery.

Our statute makes it burglary for any one, in the night time, to

break and enter any dwelling house, &c., with intent to commit

The opinion of the court wa delivered by

the crime of "murder, rape, robbery, larceny, or any other felony."

Adultery was not a felony at common law, nor a crime to be pun-

W ILLIA:MS

h. J . :

ished in the common law courts. Xeither does our statute make it

felony. Nor does it come within any definition of felony, which

€an be found. Until the legislature think proper to declare the

transaction, of which the respondent was found guilty, an offence,

we cannot determine it so to be.

The judgment of the county court is reversed, and judgment
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arrested.

The re pondent wa indicted for burglary, and wa convicted on
-the econd count,- which charge him, in ubstance, with breaking
.and entering a dwelling house in the night time, with intent to
commit adultery.
Our statute make it burglary for any one in the night time, to
break and enter any clwelling hou e, &c. with intent to commit
the crime of 'murder, rape, robbery, larceny, or any other felo ny."
Adultery was n ot a felony at common law, nor a crime to be puni bed in the common law court . Neither doe our statute make it
felon . Nor doe" it come within any definition of felony which
can be found .
ntil the legislature think proper to declare the
tran action, of which the r espondent was found guilt3, an offence,
we cannot determine it so to be.
'rhe judgment of the county court is reversed, and judgment
a rrested.

CHAPTER XI.

OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY.

Larceny.

Property That May Be Stolen

Haywood v. State, U Ark. Jf79. (1883.)

English, C. J. :

Horace Haywood was indicted in the circuit court of Sebastian

county, Fort Smith district, for larceny. There were three counts

CHAPTER XI.

in the indictment. The first count charged, in substance, that

said Horace Haywood, on the twenty-ninth of April, 1883, at, etc.,,

one reclaimed and tame mocking bird, of the value of twenty-five

OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY.

dollars, and one bird cage of the value of one dollar, of the prop-

erty, goods and chattels of Ellen Lane, etc., did steal, take and

carry away, etc.

LARCENY.

The second count was for receiving the mocking bird and cage,,

knowing them to have been stolen.

Property That May Be Stolen

The third count was for stealing the cage.

The court overruled a demurrer to the indictment interposed by

defendant ; he was tried by a jury on the plea of not guilty, found

Haywood v. State, 41 Ark. 479.

guilty on the first count of the indictment, sentenced to the peni-

(1883 .)
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tentiary for one year, refused a new trial, took a bill of exceptions

and prayed for an appeal, which Avas granted by one of the judges

ENGLISH,

c.

J.:

of this court.

On the trial it was proved that appellant, at some time during

the night of the twenty-ninth of April, 1883, stole the mocking

bird and cage from the front portico of Miss Ellen (Nellie) Lane,

their owner, in Fort Smith, and sold them about one o'clock of

the same night for $4.25 to a gentleman at the Southern Hotel of

that city, who was about to leave for Van Buren, and who had

previously requested appellant to procure him a mocking bird, and

he had promised to do so.

Missing her l)ird and cage next morning, the lady pursued the

252

Horace Haywood was indicted in the circuit court of Sebastian
county, Fort Smith district, for larceny. There were three rounts.
in the indictment. The first count charged, in substance, that
said Horace Haywood, on the twenty-ninth of April, 1883, at, etc.,,
one reclaimed and tame mocking bird, of the value of twenty-five
dollars, and one bird cage of the value of one dollar, of the property, goods and chattels of Ellen Lane, etc., did steal, take and
carry away; etc.
The second count was for receiving the mocking bird and cage,.
knowing them to have been stolen.
The third count was for stealing the cage.
The court overruled a demurrer to the indictment interposed by
defendant; he was tried by a jury on the plea of not guilty, found
guilty on the first count of the indictment, sentenced to the penitentiary for one year, refused a new trial, took a bill of exception.:;
and prayed for an appeal, which was granted by one of the judge
of this court.
On the tr~al it was proved that appellant, at some time during·
the night of the twenty-ninth of April, 1883, stole the mocking
bird. and cage from the front portico of Miss Ellen (Nellie) Lane,
their owner, in Fort Smith, and sold them about one o'clock of
the same night for $4.25 to a gentleman at the Southern Hotel of
that city, who was about to leave for Van Buren, and who had
previously requested appellant to procure him a mocking bird, and
he had promised to do so.
Missing her bird and cage next morning, the lady pursued the
252
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geutlcman to Van Buren, where she foiind them in his possession,

and he surrendered them to her. He offered her twenty-five dollars

for the hird, which she declined, saying no money could buy it. It

was three years old and a very fine songster.

The gentleman who had purchased the bird of appellant, testi-

fied that it was a very fine songster, one of the finest he had ever

heard. He had purchased mocking birds before, but never paid

over three dollars for a bird. He did not know whether they were

fine singers or not, as they died soon after he bought them.

C. H. Boyd, a druggist of Fort Smith, who had dealt in birds,

testified that he had sold mocking birds at from five to ten dollars.

Pine singers were quoted in the New York market at from fifteen

to twenty-five dollars. He knew Miss Lane's bird; it was a fine

singer and worth in the Fort Smith market from fifteen to

twenty-five dollars. Mocking birds improve in singing qualities

up to three years of age. Such as he had sold from five to ten

dollars were only a year old. The cage was worth from one dollar

to one dollar and a half. It cost about fifty cents a month to keep

a mocking bird.
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Another witness testified that he had known mocking birds sold

in other markets at from ten to twenty-five dollars.

Defendant moved the court to instruct the jury : —

"1. That mocking birds in this State are not the subject of

larceny, and the jury must return a verdict of not guilty as to

taking of the bird.

"2. If the jury find that the bird was confined in the cage

taken, the bird imparted its value to the cage, and a verdict of not

guilty must be returned, both as to the bird and the cage."

These iiistructions the court refused and charged the jury as

follows : —

"That mocking birds were such property as to be the subject of

larceny in this State, and that in ascertaining the value of such

birds, the criterion of valuation should be the value of fine singing

mocking birds in this market."

Larceny, at common law, is defined to be "the felonious taking

and carrying away of the personal goods of another." — Blachstone.

By the common law there can, be no larceny of animals ferae

naturae, or wild animals, unreclaimed. When reclaimed they be-

come the subject of this offense, provided they are fit for food, not

otherwise.

gentleman to -an Buren where he found them in hi Io e ion,
and he surrendered them to her. H e offered her twenty-five dollar ,
for the bird, which he declined, aying no money could buy it. It
was three years old and a very fine ong ter.
The gentleman who had purchased the bird of appellant, te tined that it wa a very fine ong ter, one of the fine t he had ever
heard. He had purcha ed mocking birds before, but nev r paid
over three dollars for a bird. He did not know whether th y were
fine singers or not, as they died soon after he bought them.
C. H. Boyd, a druggist of Fort Smith, who had dealt in bird _,
testified that he had sold mocking birds at from five to ten dollar .
Fine singer were quoted in the New York market at from :fifteen
to twenty-five dollars. He knew :Mis Lane's bird; it wa a fine
singer and worth in the Fort Smith market from fifteen to
-twenty-five dollars. Mocking birds improve in singing qualitie ·
up to three years of age. Such as he had sold from five to ten
dollars were only a year old. The cage was worth from one dollar
to one dollar and a half. It cost about fifty cent a month to keep
a mocking bird.
Another witness t estified tbat he had known mocking birds sold
in other market s at from ten to twenty-five dollars.
Defendant moved the court to instruct the jury : "l. That mocking birds in this State are not the subject of
larceny, and the jury must return a verdict of not guilty a t o
taking of the bird.
"2. If the jury find that the bird was confined in the cage
taken) the bird imparted its value to the cage, and a verdict of not
guilty must be returned, both as to the bird and the cage."
The e instructions the court refused and charged the jury as
follows : " That mocking bird were such property as to be the subject of
larceny in this State, and that in ascertaining the value of uch
birds, the criterion of valuation shoulcl be the value of fine inging
mocking bird ~ in thi market."
Larceny) at common law, i defined to be "the feloniou taking
and carrying away of the personal good of another."-BZack tone.
By the common law there can . be no larceny of animals fera e
naturae, or wild animaL, unreclaimed. When reclaimed th y b come the subject of thi offcn c, provided th y are :fit for food, not
otherwise.

254 Larceny

?5-±

LARCENY

But the English courts made exceptions to the rule, that re-

claimed animals, to be the subject of larceny, must be fit for food.

Thus the tamed hawk was held to be the subject of larceny, though

unfit for food, because it served to amuse the English gentlemen

in their fowling sports. So reclaimed honey bees were made an

exception, because, though not fit for food themselves, their

honey is.

Under decisions of English and American courts, made upon

the common law definition of larceny, Mr. Bishop classes the fol-

lowing animals, when reclaimed, as the subjects of the offense:

Pigeons, doves, hares, conies, deer, swans, wild boars, cranes,

pheasants, partridges and fish suitable for food, including oysters.

To which might be safely added wild turkeys, geese, ducks, etc.,

when reclaimed.

Of those animals of which there can be no larceny, though re-

claimed, he puts down the following: Dogs, cats, bears, foxes,

apes, monkeys, polecats, ferrets, squirrels, parrots, singing birds^

martins and coons.

In the South, squirrels are in common use as food animals, and
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the hunters of all climates regard bears as good food.

Iowa is credited with the decision {Warren v. State, 1 Green

106) that coons are unfit for food, and therefore by the common

law, not the subject of larceny, when reclaimed.

Among the colored people of the South the coon when fat in

the fall and winter, is regarded as a luxury, and the Iowa decision

would not be regarded by them as sound law or good taste.

On the whole subject, see 2 Bishop on Criminal Law (6th Ed.),

sees. 757, 781 and notes.

Every species of personal property was not the subject of larceny

at common law. For example, dogs were treated as personal prop-

erty, and on the death of their owner, if not disposed of by will,

went to his executor or administrator as such. So the owner of

a dog could bring a civil action against one who injured or took the

animal.

So choses in action, as bonds, bills, notes, etc., were classed as

personal property, and subjects of the action of detenue, etc., but

larceny could not be committed of them.

Under the technical rules of the ancient common law, says Mr.

Bishop, prevailing still, except as expanded by statutes, larceny

was restricted, as to the property of which it could be committed.

But the English courts made exceptions to the rule, that r eclaimed animals, to be the ~ ubject of larceny, mu t be fit for food.
Thu the tamed hawk wa" held to be the ubject of larceny, though
unfit for food, because it served to amuse the Engli h gentlem n
in their fowling port . So reclaimed honey bee were made an
exception, becau e, though not fit for food themselve , their
honey i .
"Gnder deci ion . . of Engli h and American court , made upon
the common la\\ definition of larceny, Ir. Bishop clas es the following animal , when r eclaimed, as the ubject of the offen e :
Pigeon , do-\e . . , hares, conie , deer, \\an wild boar., crane ,
pheasants, partridges and :fi h suitable for fo od, including oyster .
To which might be safely added wild turkeys gee e, duck , etc.,
when reclaimed.
Of those animals of which there can be no larceny, though reclaimed, he put down the followina : Dog..,, cat , bear , foxe
apes, monkey , polecat , ferrets, squirrel , parrot~, inging bird ,.
martin and coon .
In the South, quirrel are in common u e a ... food animaL, and
the hunters of all climate regard bear a good food.
Iowa i credited with the decision (Warren v. tate, 1 Green
106) that coon are unfit for food . and therefore by the common
law, not the ubject of larceny, when reclaimed.
Among the colored people of the South the coon when fat in
the fall and winter, i" regarded a.., a luxury and the Iowa deci ion
would not be regarded bv them a sound la\\ or good ta te.
On the whole ubject, ee 2 Bishop on Criminal La\\ (6th Ed.),
ec . '5 , 7 1 and note .
Every specie of per onal property wa not the . ubject of larceny
at common law. For example, dog were treated a per 0nal property, and on the death of their owner, if not di posed of by will,
o the owner 0£
went to his executor or admini trator a uch.
a c1og could bring a civil action again . . t one who injured or took the
ar..imal.
So chose~ in action, as bond , bill . notes, etc. \\ere clas ed a p r onal property and uubject of the action of detenue, etc., but
larceny could not be committed of them.
Under the technical rule of the ancient common law, say Mr.
Bishop, prevailing till, except as expanded by tatute , larceny
wa restricted; a to the property of which it could be committed
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•as well as in some other respects, within limits too narrow to meet

the requirements of a more refined and commercial age. Conse-

quently statutes in England and in the United States have greatly

enlarged the common law doctrine. — lb., sec. 761.

The provisions of the larceny statute of this State are very broad

and comprehensive. The first section defines the crime thus:

"Larceny is the felonious stealing, taking and carrying, riding or

driving away the personal property of another." This perhaps is

not more comprehensive than the common law definition.

The second section declares that "larceny shall embrace every

theft which unlawfully deprives another of his money or other

personal property, or those means and muniments by which the

right and title to property, real or personal, may be ascertained."

The third section makes any bank note, bond, bill, note, re-

ceipt, or any instrument of writing whatever, of value to the owner,

the subject of larceny.

The fourth section declares that "the taking and removing away

any goods or personal chattels of any kind whatever, with intent

to steal the same, whether the articles stolen be in the immediate
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possession of the owner or not, unless it shall appear that the owner

has abandoned his claim thereto, shall be deemed larceny." —

Gantt's Digest, sees. 1352-7.

Under similar statutes of New York and Tennessee, it has been

decided that dogs are the subject of larceny. — Mullalley v. People,

86 New York (Court of Appeals), 365; State v. Brown, 9 Baxter

(Tenn.), 53. Though in the States where the common law has not

been enlarged by statute, the rulings have been otherwise.

In MuJlalhj v. People, it was well said by Justice Earle, who de-

livered the opinion of the court, that "in nearly every household

in the land can be found chattels kept for the mere whim and

pleasure of its owner; a source of solace after serious labor, exer-

cising a refining and elevating influence; and yet they are as much

under the protection of the law as chattels purely useful and

absolutely essential."

The reclaimed mocking bird in question was no doubt personal

property. The owner could have brought trespass against the

thief, who invaded her portico at night, and deprived her of the

possession of her songster, which she prized above price; and she

could have maintained replevin against the person to whom he sold

it, had he refused to surrender it to her.

a well a in some other re pect ', withm limit too narrow to meet
the requirement of a more refinecl and commercial age.
on equ ntl3 ~tatute in England and in the Unit d tate have greatlv
nlarged the common law doctrine.-Ib., sec. 61.
The provi ion of the larceny statute of thi tate are Yery broad
and comprehen ive. 'rhe fir t ection defines the crime thu :
' Larceny is the feloniou stealing, taking and carrying, riding or
driving away the p rsonal property of another.
Thi perhap i~
not more comprehen ive than the common law definition.
The second section declares that "larceny shall embrace ev ry
theft which unlawfully deprives another of his money or oth r
per onal property, or those mean and muniments by which the
right and title to property, rea] or personal, may be ascertained."
The third section makes any bank note, bond, bill, note receipt, or any in trument of writing whatever, of value to the owner,
the subject of larceny.
The fourth ection declares that "the taking and removing away
any goods or per"onal chatt 1 of any kind whatever, with intent
to t al the same) whether the articles tolen be in the immediate
po ses ion of the owner or not, unless it shall app ar that the owner
has abandoned hi claim thereto, shall be deemed larceny."Gantt' Digest: secs. 1352-7.
Under similar tatutes of ~ew York and Tennes ee, it ha been
d('cicled that dogs are the . ubject of larceny.-Mullalley v. P eople,
86 New York (Court of Appeals), 365; tat e v. Brown, 9 Baxter
(1'enn.) , 53. Though in the States where the common law ha not
been enlarged by ta tu te, the ruling have been otherwi e.
In Mullally v. People, it was well said by Justice Earle, who delivered the opinion of the court, that "in nearly every household
in the land can be found chattel kept for the mere whim and
pleasure of its owner; a source of olace after serious labor, exercising a refining and elevating influence; and yet they are a much
under the protection of the law a chattel purely useful and
ab olutely e ential."
The reclaimed mocking bird in question was no doubt p ronal
propertv. The owner could have brought tr pa
again t the
thief, who invaded her portico at night, and d prived her of the
po es ion of her ong ter, which she priz d abov pri · and he
could have maintain d repl vin again "'t th p r on to whom h old
it, had h e refu e~ to urren for it to her.

256 Larceny

256

LAR CENY

The market value of the bird was, perhaps, more than ten times

greater than that of the cage, which was the subject of petit lar-

ceny. To hold that larceny might be committed of the cage, but

not of the bird, would be neither good law nor common sense.

Affirmed.

Holly V. State, 5If Ala. 238. (1875.)

By the act of February 30th, 1875, the stealing of "any part

of an outstanding crop of corn or cotton" was made grand larceny,

The market value of the bird wa s, perhap , more than ten times
greater than that of the cage, which was the sub ject of petit larceny. To hold that larceny might be committed of the cage, but
not of the bird, would be neither good law nor common sense.
Affirmed.

without regard to the value of the part stolen. Under this act

the defendant was indicted for "feloniously taking and carrying

away fifteen ears of corn, a portion of an outstanding crop, the

Holly v. State, 54 Ala. 238. (1875.)

personal property of William Eussell," &c., and upon a verdict of

guilty, sentence was pronounced upon him. The rendition of sen-

tence upon the verdict, is now assigned as error.

Bricrell, C. J. :

The most approved definition of larceny, at common law, is that

given by Mr. East, in his Crown I^aws : "The fraudulent or wrong-

ful taking and carrying away by any person of the mere personal

goods of another, from any place, with a felonious intent to convert
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them to his (the taker's) own use, and make them his own prop-

erty, without the consent of the owner." — 2 East, 524; 3 Green.

Ev. § 150. An indispensable constituent of the offense thus de-

fined, is, that the thing taken must be of goods personal, and not

of chattels real, or such as are annexed to the freehold. Corn,

By the act of F ebruary 20th, 1875, the stealing of "any part
Qf an outstanding crop of corn or cotton" was made grand larceny,
without rega rd to t~ e value of the part stolen. Under this act
the defendant -vva indicted for " feloniously taking and carrying
away fift een ear of corn, a portion of an outstanding crop, the
p ersonal property of William Russell," &c., and upon a verdict of
guilty, sentence was pronounced upon him. The r endition of senteince upon t he verdict, is now assigned as error.

grass, trees, and the like, adhering to the freehold, were not the

subjects of larceny, but the severance of them (according to Black-

stone) "was, and in many things is still, merely a trespass which

depended on a subtility in the legal notions of our ancestors.

These things were parcels of the real estate, and, therefore, while

they continued so, could not by any possibility be the subject of

theft, being absolutely fixed and immovable." As to the time

intervening between the severance and the asportation, which would

make them separate acts, instead of one continuous act, nice dis-

tinctions were made. Sometimes it was held a day must intervene

between the severance and the asportation, to make them separate

acts, because the law does not recognize a fraction of a day. The

better doctrine, however, is, as stated by Mr. Bishop, that no par-

C. J.:
The most approved definition of larceny, at common law, }s that
given by l\1r. East 1 in his Crown T.1aws: "The fraudulent or wrongful taking and carrying away by any per on of the mere personal
goods of another, from any place, with a feloniou intent to convert
them to his (the taker's) own use, and make them hi own property, without the consent of the owner ."- 2 Ea t, 524 ; 3 Green.
Ev. § 150. An indispensablE) constituent of the offense thus denned, is, that the thing taken must be of g ood~ personal, and not
of chattels real, or uch a are unne:xed to the freehold. Corn.
grass, trees: and the ]i]ce, adhering to the freehold, were not the
subjects of larceny, but the severance of them (according to Blackstone) " was, and in many things is still, merely a trespass which
depended on a subtility in the legal notions of our ancestors.
These things were parcels of the real e tate, and, therefore, while
they continued so, conld not by any possibility be the subject of
theft, being ab ~ olutely fixed and immovable." As to the time
intervening between the severance and the asportation, which would
make them separate acts, instead of one continuous act, nice distinctions were made. Sometimes it wa held a day must intervene
between the severance and the asportation, to make them separate
act s, because the law does not recognize a fraction of a day. The
better doctrine, however, is, as stated by Mr. Bishop, that no parBRICKELL,
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ticular space of time is necessary, only the two acts must bo so

separated as not to constitute one transaction. — 2 Bish. Cr. Law,

§ G79. When by one act tlie thing was severed from the freehold,

and by another distinct act it was carried away with the criminal

intent, though before severance it was part of the freehold, it was

the subject of larceny. This rule of the common law has been

modified from time to time in England, by acts of parliament, so

as to afford protection to things fixed to the freehold, as they

became the objects of criminal severance and asportation, and were

from their nature exposed to it. The rule was never satisfactory,

and the courts in modern times, were inclined to confine it within

the narrowest limits.— Iloslins v. Torrcnce, 5 Black. 417; Jackson

V. State, 11 Ohio St. 104.

The statutes of this State do not define larceny; the stealing

of certain things, or of any property other than that particularly

enumerated beyond a certain value, is declared grand larceny. The

stealing of property of any value from any building on fire, or

which was removed in consequence of an alarm of fire; or, the

stealing from designated places, of any personal property exceed-
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ing in value fifty dollars, is also declared grand larceny. — E. C.

§§ 3706-7. The stealing of any other personal property, under

other circumstances, is declared petit larceny. — E. C. § 3708. At

the last session of the General Assembly, the statutes were amended

so as to convert the stealing of "any part of an outstanding crop

of corn or cotton," into grand larceny, without regard to the value

of the part taken. The frequency of such depredations on out-

standing crops, rendered legislation for their protection neces-

sary; as such legislation was rendered necessary in England, and

in other States of the Union.

Under this amended statute, an indictment was preferred

against the appellant, charging that he "feloniously took and

carried away fifteen ears of corn, a portion of an outstanding

crop, the property of William Eussell," &c. It is now urged the

indictment is insufficient to support a conviction, because it does

not aver the corn taken was not previously severed from the free-

hold — because there is no averment that it was the personal prop-

erty of William Eussell — because it is not averred the corn was

part of an outstanding crop. The indictment pursuing the words

of the statute describes the thing taken, as a portion of an out-

standing crop. It varies from the exact words of the statute only

17

ticular space of time i nece ary only the two act mu t b o
eparated a not to con..: titute one transaction. - Bish. r. Law,
§ 679. When by one act the thing \\'a . cYer cl from the fre hold
and by another di tinct act it wa carri d away with the criminal
intent, though before everance it wa part of the fre hold, it wa,
the ubj ect of larceny. Thi rule of the common law ha b en
modifi ed from time to time in England, by acts of parliament, o
a to afford prot ction to things fixed to the freehold, a.. the3
became the object" of criminal severance and asportation and w re
from their nature expo ·ed to it. The rule wa never satisfactory,
.aud the courL in modern times, were inclined to confine it w]thin
the narrowest limiL.-IJ oskins Y. Torrence, 5 Black. 417; Ja ckson
v. State, 11 Ohio t. 10.J:.
The statutes of thi State do not define larceny; the tealing
·of certain things, or of any property other than that particularly
enumerated beyond a certain value, is declared grand larceny. The
stealing of property of any value from any building on fire, or
which was removed in con . . equence of an alarm of fire; or, the
· tealing from designated places, of any personal property exceeding in value fifty dollars, is also . declared grand larceny.-R. C.
~§ 3.706-7. The stealing of any other personal property, under
other circumstances; is declared petit larceny.-R. C. § 3708. A t
the last session of the General Assembly, the statutes were amended
-so as to convert the stealing of "any part of an outstanding crop
of corn or cotton," into grand larceny, without regard to the value
-of the part taken. The frequency of such depredations on outtanding crops, r endered leg]slation for th ir protection necessary; as such legislation was rendered n ecessary in England, and
in other States of the Union.
Under this amended statute, an indictment was preferred
against the appellant, charging that he "feloniously took and
{;arried away fifteen ear2 of corn, a portion of an out tanding
<Crop, the property of William Russell," &c. It is now urged the
indictment i insuffici nt to support a conviction, because it do not aver the corn taken wa not previously sever d from the fr hold-because th er 1' no averment that it wa th per onal prop.
erty of William Russell-because it i not averr d th corn wa
part of an out. tanding crop. The indictment pur uing the word ·
of the statute dec:::crib th thing tak n, a a portion of an outtanding crop. It vari from the exact word of the tatute only
17
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in substituting the word portion for part. We see no reason for

the substitution of the one word for the other. It is the better

practice to follow the exact words of the statute, though in the

particular instance their equivalents may be sufficient. Portion,.

as here employed, is the equivalent of the statutory word part, and

equally with it, describes the act in which the offense consists.

A distinct averment that the corn was not, at the time of the

felonious taking, severed from the freehold, was not necessary.

The statute makes it larceny to steal a thing, not the subject of

larceny at common law. The general rule is, that in an indict-

ment under such a statute, the statutory term must be used, and

is sufficient.— 2 Bish. Cr. Pr. 731. The purpose of the statute

was to convert the severance and asportation of a standing crop —

a crop not severed from the freehold — into a criminal offense.

Before the statute, under the common law, it was a mere trespass.

The felonious taking and carrying away corn, or other produce of

the soil, which the owner had severed from the freehold, was lar-

ceny at common law. It was personal property, and as essentially

the subject of larceny, as any species of personal property. The
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allegation that the corn stolen was part of an outstanding crop,

excludes the idea of its severance. It involves the fact that it was

not severed; and that there was severance and asportation as one

continuous act, constituting the trespass of the common law. Proof

of nothing less will satisfy the averment.

Nor was it necessary to describe the corn as personal property.

Such a description of it would perhaps have been improper. It is

properly described as the property of the supposed owner, and

thereby it is shown to be the subject of larceny under the statute.

The last objection, that the corn is not averred to be part of an

outstanding crop, is unfounded in fact.

We find no error in the record, and the judgment must be

affirmed.

The Trespass and Carrying Away.

Eclels V. State, 20 Ohio St. 508. (1870.)

Error to the court of common pleas of Hamilton county.

At the June term, 1870, of the court of common pleas of Ham-

ilton county, the plaintiff in error was indicted for stealing one

in substituting the word portion for part. We see no reason for
the substitution of the one word for the other. It is the better
practice to fo1low the exact words of the statute, though in the
particular im:tance their equivalents may be sufficient. Portion,.
as here employed, is the equivalent of the statutory word part, and
equally with it, describes the act in which the offense consists.
A distinct averment that the corn was not, at the time of the.
felonious taking, severed from the freehold, was not necessary.
The statute makes it larceny to steal a thing, not the ubject of
larceny at common law. The general rule is, that in an indictment under ,_uch a statute, the statutory t erm must be used, and
is sufficient.-2 Bi.J1. Cr. Pr. 731. rrhe purpose of the statute
wa. to convert the severance and asportation of a standing cropa crop not severed from the freehold-into a criminal offense.
Before the statute, under the common law, it was a mere trespa s.
The felonious taking and carrying away corn, or other produce of
the soil, which the owner had severed from the freehold, was larceny at common law. It wa personal property, and as essentially
the ubject of larceny, a any specie of personal property. The
allegation that the corn stolen was part of an outstanding cror,
excludes the iuea of its everance. It involves the fact that it wa
not sever ed; and that there was severance and asportation as one
·ontinuous act, constituting the trespas of the common law. Proof
of nothing less will satisfy the averment.
Nor was it necessary to de cribe the corn as personal property.
Such a description of it would perhaps have been improper. It i ~
properly de cribecl as the property of the supposed owner, and
thereby it is shown to be the subj ect of larceny under the statute.
The last objection, that the corn is not averred to be part of an
outstanding crop, is unfounded in fact.
We find no error in the record, and the judgment must b
affirmed.

Th e Trespass and Carrying Away.
Eckels v. State, 20 Ohio St . 508.

{1870.}

to the court of common pleas of Hamilton county.
At the June term, 1870, of the court of common pleas of Hamilton county, th e plaintiff in error was indicted for stealing one
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hundred and twenty-five dollars in money of Christian Koehler.

On the trial it was proved that the prisoner went into the boot

and shoe store of Koehler in Cincinnati, and, passing about forty

feet to the back part of the store where Koehler was cutting out

work on a counter, asked the price of a pair of boots in the front

show window, and took a seat in front of the counter. Koehler

went to the window to get the boots, and, looking back while he

was there, he discovered the prisoner behind the counter, with his

hands down behind the counter where the money-drawer was situ-

ated. As Koehler started towards the prisoner, he returned to his

seat in front of the counter. He was immediately arrested, and

asked why he went behind the counter; to which he replied, that

he "saw a rat run behind there." There were one hundred and

twenty-one dollars in the drawer in bills of different denomina-

tions, which, shortly before the prisoner came, Koehler had assorted

and arranged in three piles. The drawer was closed when Koehler

went to the front window. When he returned it was partly open,

and the money had been disturbed. It "was in a bunch in one

corner of the drawer," with one bill partly out hanging over the
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drawer. No one but the prisoner had been at the drawer. "The

money had the appearance of having been crumpled up in his

hand," but was all found in the drawer. The prisoner was handed

over to a police ofhcer, to whom he stated that he was a stranger

in the city, and that "this was the first job he tried on," etc.

The counsel for the prisoner requested the court to give the

following charges to the jury, which were refused :

1. "That unless the proof shows affirmatively that money was

taken out of the drawer, and in possession of the prisoner abso-

lutely, the verdict must be not guilty. And that the circumstance

that the drawer was found closed, or half open, even, or open

entirely, and the money disordered, while it would strengthen di-

rect testimony, is not sufficient in itself to warrant the jury in

finding that the prisoner had the money in his possession."

3. "That the taking must be proved by the best evidence, which

would be the possession of the money alleged to be taken, or the-

testimony of persons who actually saw the prisoner remove the-

money from the drawer and replace it."

3. "That the prosecutor must prove every fact which enters intO'

the statement of the charge; and while it may be true that the

prisoner entered that store with a felonious intent, and went to-

hundred and twenty-five dollar in money of Chri tian o hl r.
On the trial it wa proved that the pri"'oner went into the boot
and shoe tore of Koehler in incinnati, and pa ing about fort ·
feet to the back part of the tore where Koehler wa utting out
work on a counter, a"'ked the price of a pair of boot in the front
how window, and took a eat in front of the counter. Ko hler
went to the window to get the booL, and looking back while h
wa there he di covered the pri oner behind the counter, with hi
hands down behind the counter where the money-drawer wa"' itua ted. A Ko hler started toward the pri oner, he returned to hi ·
seat in front of the counter. He wa immediately arre ted, and
a ked why he went behind the counter; to which he replied, that
he 'saw a rat run behind there." There were one hundred and
twenty-one dollar in the dra\\ er in bill of different denomination , which, hortly b fore the pri oner came, Koehler had a orted
and arranged in three pile . Tb drawer wa clo ed when Koehler
went to the front window. Wh n he returned it was partly open,
and the money had been disturbed. It "wa in a bunch in one
corn r of the drawer,' with one bill partly out hanging over the
drawer. ~ o one but the prisoner had been at the drawer. "The
money had the appearance of having been crumpled up in hi
hand," but was all found in the drawer. The pri oner wa handed
over to a police officer to whom he stated that he wa a tranger
in the city, and that 'thi wa the fir t job he tried on," etc.
The counsel for the pri oner requested the court to give the
following charg s to the jury, which were refused :
1. "That unles the proof how affirmatively that money wa
taken out of the drawer and in po e sion of the pri oner ab olutely, the verdict mu t be not guilty. And that the circum tan
that the drawer was found clo ed, or half open, even, or open
ntirely, and the mone3 di ordered, while it would tre:cgthen direct te"'timony, i not ufficient in it elf to warrant the jury in
finding that the prisoner had the money in hi po e ion."
2. 'That the taking mu t be proved by the best evidence, whi h
would be the po e ion of the mon y alleg d to be taken, or th
t 'timony of per on who actually aw the pri oner r move the·
mon y from the drawer and replace it."
3. "That the pro cutor mu t prove every fa t which nt r into
th' tatem nt of the charg ; and while it may b tru that th
prj oner ent red that tore with a f loniou int nt, and w nt to.
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the drawer with a felonious intent, still it is incumbent on the

prosecutor to show, by affirmative evidence, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that the prisoner actually took the money in his hand and

removed it from the place it was placed by the owner."

The part of the charge of the court to the jury complained of is

as follows:

"If the defendant removed the money from the place where Mr.

Koehler had placed it, with the intention of stealing it, he would

be guilty of larceny, even if he did not actually get it out of the

drawer before being discovered. If he had actually taken the

money into his hand, and lifted it from the place where the owner

had placed it, so as to entirely sever it from the spot where it was

so placed, with the intention of stealing it, he would be guilty of

larceny, though he may have dropped it into the place it was lying,

upon being discovered, and never have had it out of the drawer."

To the refusal of the court to charge as requested, and to the

charge as given, the counsel for the prisoner excepted.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty; thereupon the counsel

for the prisoner moved for a new trial, on the ground that the
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verdict was against the law and the evidence, and for error in the

charge of the court to the jury. The court overruled the motion,

and exceptions were taken.

Judgment and sentence were rendered upon the verdict, to re-

verse which this writ of error is prosecuted.

Day, J. :

It is claimed on behalf of the plaintiff in error that the charge

given to the jury was erroneous; and that the court erred in re-

fusing to charge as requested, and in refusing to grant a new trial.

These are the alleged errors chiefly relied on for a reversal of the

judgment.

The material question made under each of these assignments of

error is, where there is an intent to steal goods, "what is a suffi-

cient taking and carrying away to constitute tlie crime of larceny ?"

"In order to constitute the offence of larceny, there must be an

actual taking, or severance of the thing, from the possession of

tlie owner, for, as every larceny includes a trespass, if the party

the drawer with a felonious intent, till it is incumbent on the
prosecutor to show, by affirmative evidence, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the prisoner actually took the money in his hand and
removed it from the place it wa placed by the owner."
The part of the charge of the court to the jury complained of is
as follows :
"If the defendant removed .the money from the place where Mr.
Koehler had placed it, with the intention of stealing it, he would
be guilty of larceny, even if he did not actually get it out cf the
drawer before being discovered. If he had actually taken the
money into his hand, and lifted it from the place where the owner
had placed it, o a to entirely sever it from the pot where it was
o placed, with the intention of stealing it, he would be guilty of
larceny, though he may have dropped it into the place it was lying,
upon being discovered, and never have had it out of the drawer."
To the r efusal of the court to charge as requested, and to the
charge as given, the counsel for the prisoner excepted.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty; thereupon the counsel
for the pri$oner moved for a new trial, on the ground thnt the
verdict was against the law and the evidence, and for error in the
charge of the court to the jury. The court overruled the motion,
and exceptions were taken.
Judgment and sentence were rendered upon the verdict, to reverse which this writ of error i prosecuted.

l)e not guilty of a trespass in taking the goods, he cannot be guilty

of a felony in carrying them away." Eoscoe's Crim. Ev. 587; 2
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Euss. on Crimes, 5.

It is claimed on behalf of the plaintiff in error that the charge
g iven to the jury wa erroneous; and that the court erred in r efusing to charge as requested, and in refu ing to grant a new trial.
These are the alleged errors chiefly relied on for a r eversal of the
judgment.
The material question made under each of the e assignments of
ierror is, where there is an intent to st eal goods, "what is a suffi·cient taking and carrying away to constitute the crime of larceny?"
" In order to constitute the offence of larceny, there must be an
actua l taking, or everance of the thing, from the pos ession of
the owner, for, as every larceny include a trespa s, if the party
be not guilty of a trespass in taking the goods, he cannot be guilty
of a felony in carrying them away." Roscoe's Crim. Ev. 587; 2
Russ. on Crimes_, 5.
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There must also be a carrying away of the goods taken. When

this is done the offence is complete, — the crime is committed, — and

cannot be purged by a return of the goods, though the possession

be retained but for a moment. 3 Greenleaf's Ev. sec. 156 ; 2 Kuss.

on Crimes, 6.

The felony lies in the very first act of removing the property;

therefore the least removing of the entire thing taken, with an

intent to steal it, if the thief thereby, for the instant, obtain the

entire and absolute possession of it, is a sufficient asportation,

though the property be not removed from the premises of the

owner, nor retained in the possession of the thief. Thus, where

the defendant, with a felonious intent, lifted a bag from the bottom

of the front boot of a coach, but, before getting it completely out

of the space it had occupied, he was detected; yet as each part of

it had been removed from the space which that specific part occu-

pied, the asportation was held to be complete. Rex v. Walsh, 1

Moody, 14. So where the prisoner moved a parcel of goods from

the fore-part to near the tail of a wagon, when he was detected;

it was held that, as the prisoner had removed the property from
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the spot where it was placed, with an intent to steal, the asporta-

tion was sufficient to constitute the offence. 2 East P. C. 556.

Also where a lady's ear-ring was torn from her ear, and at the

same time lost in her hair; inasmuch as it was, for an instant, in

the possession of the prisoner, separate from the owner's person,

it was held that the asportation was complete. 2 East P. C. 557.

See also 2 Wat. Arch. [380] ; Eosc. Crim. Ev. [588, 589], and 3

Greenleaf's Ev. sees. 154 and 155.

On the other hand, there is a class of cases, where the property

taken is not entirely moved from the spot where it was placed by

the owner, or where it is attached to some other thing not moved,

or to the person of the owner. In this class of cases it has been

held that there was no asportation, since there was no complete

severance of the property from the possession of the owner. 2

East P. C. 556; 1 Hale P. C. 508. "In these cases," says Bishop,

in his work on Criminal Law (vol. 2, sec. 804 [699]), "tht pris-

oner's control over the thing was not for an instant perfect; if

it had been, it would have been sufficient, even though the control

had the next instant been lost. So the court held, where a man's

watch and chain were forced from his pocket, but the key of the

watch immediately caught and fastened itself upon a button, the

There must al o be a carrying away of the goods taken. \"\hen
thi_ i done the offence i complete,-the crim i ommitt d,-and
cannot be purged b; a return of the good .. , though the po e ion
be retained but for a moment. 3 Greenleaf' Ev. ec. 156; 2 Ru ~ :s.
on Crime. , 6.
The felony lie in the very first act of removing th propert ;
therefore tl1e least removing of the entire thing taken, with an
intent to steal it, if the thief thereby, for the in tant, obtain the
entire and absolute posse sion of it, i a uffi.cient a portation.
though the property be not removed from the premise of the
owner, nor retained in the posse ion of the thief. Thus, where
the defendant, with a felonious intent, lifted a bag from the bottom
of the front boot of a coach, but, before getting it completely out
of the pace it had occupied, be wa detected; yet as each part of
it bad been removed from the pace which that specific part occupied, the asportation was held to be complete. Rex v. Walsh; 1
Moody, 14. So where the pri oner moved a parcel of good8 from
the fore-part to near the tail of a wagon, when he wa detected ;
it wa held that, a the pri ·oner bad removed the property from
the spot where it was placed, with an intent to steal, the asportation was sufficient to constitute the offence. 2 East P. C. 556.
Al o where a lady's ear-ring was torn from her ear, and at the
same time lost in her hair; ina much a it was for an jn tant, in
the po session of the prisoner, separate from the owner'" person,
it was held that the asportation was complete. 2 Ea t P. C. 557.
See al o 2 Wat. Arch. [380]; Rose. Crim. Ev. [588, 589], and 3
Greenleaf's Ev. secs. 154 and 155.
On the other hand, there i a clas of cases, where the property
taken i not entirely moved from the spot where it was placed by
the owner, or where it is attached to some other thing not moved,
or to the person of the owner. In this clas of cases it has been
held that there wa no asportation, since ther was no ompl te
severance of the property from the posses ion of the owner. 2
Ea t P. C. 556; 1 Hale P. C. 508. "In the e ca e ," ay Bishop,
in hi work on riminal Law (vol. 2, sec. 04 [699]), "ths pri oner' control over the thing was not for an in tant pcrf t · if
it had been, it would have been sufficient, even though th ontrol
o the court h ld, wh r a man'
had the next in tant been lo t.
watch and chain wer forced from hi pock t but th key of the
watch immediat ly caught and fast ned it elf upon a button, the
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larceny was complete.'" 29 Eng. L. & Eq. 530. So also where

the prisoner drew a pocket-book out of the inside breast-pocket of the

prosecutor's coat, about an inch above the top of the pocket, and,

being then suddenly apprehended, let go the pocket-book, and it

fell back again into the pocket, the asportation was held sufficient

to constitute the crime of larceny. Ecx v. Thompson, 1 Moody, 78.

So it is said that "drawing a sword partly out of the scabbard will

constitute a complete asportavit." 2 Euss. on Crimes, 6.

It would seem, then, that the test as to the felonious asportation

of property is not the fact that it has been taken out of the place

of its deposit, but rests in the removal of the entire property by

the thief, however slight, while it is in his absolute possession.

Let us apply the principles thus settled by the authorities to

the case before us. If it stood alone upon the first sentence of the

charge in question, while it is correct as a general proposition, it

may be regarded as too general if nothing further had been added ;

for, possibly, the defendant might have moved the money in the

drawer without having obtained the entire and absolute possession

of it. But the court immediately proceeded to exclude this pos-
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sibility from the meaning of the first sentence, by adding a clear

and more definite statement of the same proposition, defining what

kind of a taking and removal of the money was necessary to con-

stitute the offence. The first sentence is merely a general state-

ment of the law, with a denial of what had been claimed on the

part of the defendant, that there could be no larceny unless the

money was taken out of the drawer. We do not think its generality

could mislead the jury, being, as it is, but a part of the charge

which clearly controlled the general language, so as to exclude the

idea that any removal of the money would be sufficient to constitute

the offence, unless the defendant feloniously obtained the entire

and absolute possession of it.

The court charged the jury that, "If he had actually taken the

money into his hand, and lifted it from the place where the owner

had placed it, so as to entirely sever it from the spot where it was

so placed, with the intention of stealing it, he would be guilty of

larceny, though he may have dropped it into the place it was lying,

upon being discovered, and never have had it out of the drawer."

The charge recognizes the necessity of a felonious taking of the

property, that it must be severed, and lifted or carried, from the

place Avhere it was left by tlie owner, and bo, for the instant, at

larceny was complete.'' 29 Eng. L. & Eq. 530. So also where
the prisoner drew a pocket-book out of the inside breast-pocket of the
prosecutor's coat, about an inch above the top of the pocket; and,
being then suddenly apprehended; let go the pocket-book, and it
fell back again into the pocket the a portation wa held ufficient
to constitute the crime of larceny. Rex v. 'Thompson~ 1 Moody, 78.
So it i said that "drawing a word partly out of the scabbard will
constitute a complete asportavit." 2 Russ. on Crimes, 6.
It would seem_, then that the te t a to the felonious a portation
of property is not the fact that it ha been taken out of the place
of its deposit, but rest in the removal of the entire property by
the thief, however light, while it is in hi ab olute po ession.
Let u apply the principles thus ettled by the authorities to
the case before u . If it stood alone upon the first sentence of the
charge in que tion, while it i correct as a general proposition, it
may be regarded a too general if nothing further had been added;
for, pos ibly, the defendant might haYe moved the money in the
drawer without having obtained the entire and ab olute possession
of it. But the court immediately proceeded to exclude thi , po sibility from the meaning of the first sentence, by adding a clear
::md more definite statement of the ame proposition, defining what
kind of a taking and removal of the money wa necessary to constitute the offence. The first sentence i merely a general statement of the law, with a denial of what had been claimed on the
part of the defendant, that there could be no larceny unless the
money was taken out of the drawer. We do not think its generality
could mislead the jury: being, a it i , but a part of the charge
which clearly controlled the general language, so a to exclude the
idea that any removal of the money would be ufficient to constitute
the offence~ unles the defendant feloniou ly obtained the entire
and absolute possession of it.
The court charged the jury that, "If he had actually taken the
money into his hand, and lifted it from the place where the owner
had placed it, o as to entirely sever it from the spot where it wa,
so placed, with the intention of stealing it, he would be guilty of
larceny, though he may have dropped it into the place it wa lying,
upon being discovered, and never have had it out of the drawer."
The charge recognize the necessity of a felonious taking of the
property, that it must be severed, and lifted or carri d, from the
place where it wai:: left by the o'rner, ancl br, for the instant at
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least, in the entire and absolute possession of the party accused:

this, according to the authorities, constitutes hircen}-, thougli the

money may have been dropped where it was found, and never

taken out of the drawer; for it is "well settled that the felony

lies in the very first act of removing the property." 2 Russ. on

■Crimes, 5.

This view of the case goes far to dispose of the questions made

on the refusal of the court to instruct the jury as requested on

behalf of the prisoner. The charges requested were contained in

three distinct propositions, neither of which, as a whole, was cor-

rect, and, therefore, according to the well-settled rule in this State,

might be properly refused. The first might be refused because it

requested the court to instruct the jury that they must acquit the

prisoner unless the proof showed that the money was taken utd of

the drawer. The second might be rejected for the same reason,

and, also, for the further reason, that it precluded a conviction

■except upon direct evidence, or evidence of the possession of the

money by the prisoner. There was no error in refusing to charge

as requested in the third proposition, for it was embraced in the
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charge given to the jury, unless by the words, "affirmative evi-

dence," it was intended to request a charge that a conviction could

not be produced without direct or positive evidence that the

prisoner took the money in his hands and removed it. From the

context, and the use of the term "affirmative" in other parts of

the requests, it would seem that this was the sense in which it was

used : if so, the request was properly refused, for it excluded the

possibility of finding the facts that constitute the offence charged

upon circumstantial evidence, which may be equally satisfactory

and certain as that of a direct character.

It remains to determine whether the court erred in overruling

the motion for a new trial. This raises the question whether the

evidence was sufficient to warrant a conviction. The felonious

intent of the accused is not questioned. Xor are we prepared to

say that the jury were not warranted in finding, from the evi-

dence, that he took the money into his entire and absolute posses-

sion, severed it from the possession of the owner, for the moment

at least, and removed it from the place where it was before. We

cannot say the jury could not fairly find that the money was

taken, and that the "first act of removing" it was complete. The

■case is a close one. Between innocence and guilt tliere is, in law.

lea t, in th e entire and ab olut po
ion of the I arty accu ed:
-th~s, according to the authoritic con titutes larc ny, though the
money may have be n dr ppc 1 wher it wa found, and n ver
taken out of the drawer ; for it i "well ettled that the felony
li in the very first a t of removing th pr perty." 2 Rm . on
·
·Crime , 5.
Thi view of the ca . . e goes far to dispo. e of the que tion made
-0n the refusal of the court to instruct th jury a reque tvcl on
behalf of the pri oner. The charges r eque tec.1 ·were contain c1 in
three c1istin t propositions neither of which, a . . a 'vhole wa correct, and, therefore, according to the well-settled rule in thi ~ tate,
might be properly refu ~ e d. The first might be refu d becau e it
reque t d the court to instruct the jury that they must a quit th
pri ... oner unle...,s the proof howecl that the mon y wa tak n oul of
-the drawer. The secom1 might be r eject ed for the ame r a on
and, also, for the further reason, that it precluded a conYi tion
-except upon direct evidence, or evidence of the possession of the
money by the pri oner. There was no error in refusing to charge
-as requested in the third proposition, for it was embraced in the
-charge given to the jury, unless by the words, "affirmativ evi-0.ence," it wa intended to requ st a charge that a conviction could
not b produced without dir ect or positive evidence that the
prisoner took th money in his hands and removed it. From the
context, and the u e of the term "affirmative" in other parts of
-the requests, it would seem that this was the ense in which it was
u ed: if so, the request was properly refused, for it excluded the
po sibility of finding the facts that constitute the offence charged
upon circumstantial evid ence, which may be equally satisfa ctory
and certain as that of a direct character.
It remains to determine whether the court erred in overruling
-the motion for a new trial. This raises the question whether the
-evidence wa sufficient to warrant a conviction. The feloniou
intent of the accused i not que tioned. Nor are we prepared to
say that the jury were not warranted in finding, from th evi<lence, that he took the mon y into hi entire and ab olut po e ion, evered it from the po se . . ion of th e owner, for th mom nt
at lea t, and removed it from the plac wher it wa b fore. W '
cannot say the jur ' could not fairl y find that th money wa
taken, and that th 'fir t act of r emoving' it wa
mpl te. The
-ca" i a close one. B tween inno ence and guilt tl1 r ' :", in law,
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but a line: the jury found that the defendant had crossed it.

From the evidence, we cannot say he had not. Nor could the

court below. It was a case, therefore, where the court might

properly refuse to grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict

was not sustained by the evidence.

There are some minor questions made upon the record, in which^

however, we sec no error; but, as they are not urged here, they

need not be further noticed.

It folloM'S that the judgment of the common pleas must be

affirmed.

Scott, C. J., and Welch, White, and McIlvaine, J. J., con-

curred.

The Intent ond Purpose.

State V. SUngerland, 19 Nev. 135. (1885.)

By the Court, Leonard, J. :

Appellant was convicted of the crime of grand larceny. He

appeals from the judgment, and the order overruling his motion

but a line: the jury found that the defendant had crossed it.
From the evidence, we cannot say he had not. Nor could the
court below. It was a case, therefore, where the court might
properly refuse to grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict
was not sustained by the evidence.
There are some minor <]Uestions made upon the record, in which,.
hO\.vever, we sec no error; but, as they are not urged here, they
nC!ed not be further noticed.
It follows that the judgment of the common pleas must be
affirmed.
ScoTT, C. J., and WELCH, WHITE, and MclLvAINE, J. J., concurred.

for new trial. He was accused and found guilty of stealing twa

horses, two saddles, and a pair of spurs. He admitted that he
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took the property, and removed it about five miles away. He said

his object was to put the owner to all the expense and trouble

Th e Int ent ond Purpose.

possible in order to find the property; that he had no idea of

benefiting himself in any way, his only object having been to get

revenge.

State v. Slingerland, 19 Nev. 135.

{1885.)

I. The court instructed the jury that if they believed beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant took the property, as alleged

in the indictment, with the intent to permanently deprive the

owner of the property, and without an intention to return the same,

it was a felonious intent, and the defendant was guilty. It is

claimed that this instruction is erroneous in stating that the crime

of grand larceny may be committed, although the taker of the

property alleged to have been stolen derives no benefit, and does

not intend or expect to be benefited therefrom. If one of the essen-

tial elements of larceny is an intention to profit by the conversion

of the property, then the instruction under consideration was in-

correct. A court cannot instruct a jury that certain facts consti-

tute a certain offense, unless every essential fact necessary to

By the Court, L EONARD, J.:
Appellant was convicted of the crime of grand larceny. He
Hppeal from the judgment, and the order overruling his motion
for new trial. He was accused and found guilty of stealing two
horses, two . addles, and a pair of spur . He admitted that he
took the property, and removed it about :five miles away. He said
his object wa. to put the owner to all the expen e and trouble
possible in order to :find the property; that he had no idea of
benefiting him elf in any way, his only object having been to get
revenge.
I. The court instructed the jury that if they believed beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant took the property, as alleged
in the indictment, with the intent to permanently deprive the
owner of the property, and without an intention to return the same,
it was a feloniou ~ intent, and the defendant wa guilty. It i
claimed that this instruction is erroneou in tating that the crime
of grnnd lnrccny may be committed, although the taker of the
property alleged to have been stolen derive no benefit, and does
not intend or expect to be benefited therefrom. If one of the essentinl elements of larceny is an intention to profit by the conver ion
of the property, then the instruction under con ideration wa incorrect. A court cannot instruct a jury that certain facts constitu~e a certain offense, unle
every essential fact necessary to
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constitute the offense be included in the statement. {Weston v.

U. S., 5 Cranch C. C. 494.) Although the authorities upon this

question are somewhat conflicting, those sustaining the instruction,

greatly preponderate, and in our opinion they are upheld by good

sense and sound reason.

In State v. I^yan, 12 jSTev. 403, this court acknowledged the

correctness of the principle that where the intent is to deprive the

owner of his property, it is not essential that the taking should be

with a view to pecuniary profit.

In Dignowitty v. State, 17 Tex. 530, the court said: "But to

constitute the felonious intent, it is not necessary that the taking

should be done lucri causa; taking with an intention to destroy

will be sufficient to constitute the offense, if done to serve the of-

fender, or another person, though not in a pecuniary way."

And, said the court, in Hamilton v. State, 35 Miss. 219 : "The

rule is now well settled that it is not necessary, to constitute lar-

ceny, that the taking should be in order to convert the thing stolen

to the pecuniary advantage or gain of the taker, and that it is

sufficient if the taking be fraudulent, and with an intent wholly
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to deprive the owner of the property. (Eoscoe, Cr. Ev., 533, 2d

ed.; Cabbage's Case, Russ. & R. 292; Rex v. Morfit, Id. 308.) And

it is said by the commissioners of criminal law in England that

'the ulterior motive by which the taker is influenced in depriving

the owner of his property altogether, whether it be to benefit him-

self or another, or to injure any one by the taking, is immaterial.'

The rule we consider to be in accordance with the principle on

which the law of larceny rests, which is to punish the thief for

wrongfully and feloniously depriving the owner of his property.

The reason of the law is to secure a man's property to him, and

that is to be carried out, rather by punishing the thief for felo-

niously depriving him of it, than for wrongful gain he has made

by the theft. The moral wrong is founded in the wrongful and

felonious deprivation."

Sustaining the same doctrine in Warden v. State, 60 Miss. 640,

the court said : "It seems to meet the approval, also, of most of

the modern writers on criminal law, and to be sanctioned by many

cases, both English and American."

In State v. South, 28 N. J. Law, 28, the question was, whether

tlie fraudulently depriving the owner of the temporary use of a

chattel is larceny at common law ; whether the felonious intent or

constitute the offense be included in the 'tatement. (Weston v.
U. S., 5 Cranch C. C. 494.) Although th authoritie upon thiquestion are omewhat conflicting those ustaining the in tru tion
greatly preponderate, and in our opinion they are uph ld b~· good
ense and sound r ea..,on.
In S tate v. Ryan, 12 Nev. 403, thi court acknowledged the
correctnes of the principle that where the intent is to depriv the
owner of his property, it is not essential that the taking hould be
with a view to pecuniary profit.
In Dignowitty v. State, 17 Tex. 530, the court said : "But to
constitute the felonious intent, it is not necessary that the taking
should be clone lucri causa _; taking with an intention to de troy
will be sufficient to constitute the offense, if done to serve the offender, or another person, though not in a pecuniary way."
And, said the court, in Hamilton v. State, 35 1iss. 219: "The
rule is now well ettled that it js not nece sary, to constitute larceny, that the taking should be in order to convert the thing tol n
to the pecuniary advantage or gain of the taker, and that it is
ufficient if the taking be fraudulent, and with an int nt wholly
to deprive the owner of the property. (Roscoe, Cr. Ev., 533, 2d
ed.; Cabbage' Ca e; Russ. & R. 292; R ex v. Morfit, Id. 308.) And
it is said by the commissioner of criminal law in England that
'the ulterior motive by which the taker is influenced in depriving
the owner of his property altogether, whether it be to benefit himelf or another, or to injure any one by the taking is immaterial.'
The rule we consider to be in accordance with the principle on
which the law of larceny rests, which is to punish the thief for
wrongfully and feloniously depriving the owner of hi property.
The reason of th law is to ecure a man' property to him, and
that i to be carried out, r ather by puni hing the thief for feloniously depriving him of it, than for wrongful gain he has mane
by the theft. The moral wrong i founded in the wrongful and
feloniou deprivation."
Sustaining th . ame doctrine in Warden v. tate, 60 Mi ~ · 640,
the court said: 'It eem to m et the approval, also, of mo t of
th modern writ r on criminal law, and to be anctioned by many
ca , l oth Engli h and American."
In tate v. 1 outh, 2
. J. Law, 28, th qu tion wa, whet.h r
th e fraudul ntly cl priving th owner of i.h t mporary u of a
hatt l i. larceny at ommon law; wheth r th f loni us int nt or
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nnimus furandi may consist with an intention to return the chattel

to the ov/ner. It was held that if the property is taken witli the

animus furandi mav con i t with an intention to return the chattel
to the owner. It was held that if the property i taken ,,·ith the
intention of using it temporarily only, and then returning it to
the owner) it is not larceny; but if it appear that the goods were
i:aken with the intention of permanently depriving the owner
thereof, then it is larceny. And in State Y. Dav is, 3 N . J. Law,
1 77, the same court allher ed to the doctrine announced in South's
Case, and said: "There has been no ca e decided in this tate that
l1a held that where the taker had no intention to return the goods,
that the taking was merely temporary. Nor is there anything that
hould control the action of the jury, or the court acting as such
under the statute, when they find that the party having no uch
intent is guilty of larceny. It would be a most dangerous doctrine
to hold that a mere stranger may thus use and abuse the property
-0f another, and leave him the bare chance of recovering it by careful pursuit and earch, without any criminal re pon ibility in the
taker."
In B erry v. tate, 31 Ohio St. 219, and Com. v. Mason, 105
~Ma s . 166, it wa held that the wrongful taking of the property of
another, without hi consent, with intent to conceal it until the
owner offered a r eward for it r eturn, and for the purpose of obtaining the r eward, was larceny of the property taken. (And see
also P eople v. Juarez, 28 Cal. 380; tate v. Brown, 3 Strobh. 516;
K eely v. State, 14: Ind. 3G; R ex v. Cabbage, Russ. & R. 292; R ex
v. M orfit, Id. 307; note a to Holloway's Case, 1 Denison Cr. Cas.
316.) Counsel for appellant places great r eliance upon State v.
Haw kins, 8 Port. (Ala.) -±61, wher ein it was held that taking a
slave in order to set her free wa not larceny; but th e doctrine of
that ca e has been repudiated by the ame court in the case of
vVilliarns v. S tate, 52 Ala. -±13, decided in 1875, wherein it was
aid: " The second charge was also properly refused. To constitute the offense of larceny, it is not necessary the taking should
11ave been with an intent to appropriate the good to the use or
benefit of the per on taking. The criminal intent con ists in the
purpose to deprive th e owner of his property. No benefit to the
.,guilty agent may be sought, but only injury to the owner."
Heliance is al o placed upon section 1783 of \Vharton's Americean Criminal L aw, where the author say : "In thi country there
11a been some reluctance to accept thi supposed modification of
±he comrnon-hrw definition of larceny, and in one or two ca e it
I

intention of using it temporarily only, and then returning it to

the owner, it is not larceny ; but if it appear that the goods were

taken with the intention of permanently depriving the owner

thereof, then it is larceny. And in State v. Davis, 38 N. J. Law,

177, the same court adhered to the doctrine announced in Soutlrs

€ase, and said : "There has been no case decided in this state that

has held that where the taker had no intention to return the goods,

that the taking was merely temporary. :N'or is there anything that

should control the action of the jury, or the court acting as such

under the statute, when they find that the party having no such

intent is guilty of larceny. It would be a most dangerous doctrine

to hold that a mere stranger may thus use and abuse the property

of another, and leave him the bare chance of recovering it by care-

ful pursuit and search, without any criminal responsibility in the

taker."

In Berry v. State, 31 Ohio St. 219, and Com. v. Ma^on, 105

Mass. 166, it was held that the wrongful taking of the property of
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another, without his consent, with intent to conceal it until the

owner offered a reward for its return, and for the purpose of ob-

taining the reward, was larceny of the property taken. (And see

also People v. Juarez, 28 Cal. 3^80; State v. Brotvn, 3 Strobh. 516;

Keehj v. State, 14 Ind. 36; Rex v. Cabbage, Kuss. & E. 292; Rex

V. Morfit, Id. 307 ; note a to Holloway's Case, 1 Denison Cr. Cas.

376.) Counsel for appellant places great reliance upon State v.

Eawhins, 8 Port. (Ala.) 461, wherein it was held that taking a

slave in order to set her free was not larceny ; but the doctrine of

that case has been repudiated by the same court in the case of

Williams v. State, 52 Ala. 413, decided in 1875, wherein it was

said : "The second charge was also properly refused. To consti-

tute the offense of larceny, it is not necessary the taking should

have been with an intent to appropriate the goods to the use or

henefit of the person taking. The criminal intent consists in the

purpose to deprive the owner of his property. No benefit to the

^ilty agent may be sought, but only injury to the owner."

Reliance is also placed upon section 1783 of Wharton's Ameri-

can Criminal Law, where the author says: "In this country there

has been some reluctance to accept this supposed modification of

the common-law definition of larceny, and in one or two cases it

•

STATE
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has been expressly rejected. Thus it has been declared not to be

larceny, but malicious mischief, to take the horse of another, not

lucri causa, but in order to destroy him;" citing State v. Council,

1 Tenn. 305 ; Com. v. Leach, 1 jMass. 59 ; People v. Smith, 5 Cow.

258; and State v. Wheeler, 3 Vt. 344, as authorities for the state-

ment.

It will be found, upon an examination of those cases, that no

one of them sustains the text.

Mr. Stephen, in his General View of the Criminal Law of Eng-

land, 127, says : "It is larceny to take and carry away a personal

chattel from the possession of its owner with intent to deprive him

of the property."

Mr. Eoscoe, in his Criminal Evidence, 631, says: "Eyre, C. B.,

in the definition given by him, says, 'Larceny is the wrongful tak-

ing of goods with intent to spoil the owner of them lucri causa/

and Blackstone says> 'The taking must be felonious; that is^ done

animo furancli, or, as the civil law expresses it, lucri causa/ The

point arrived at by these two expressions, animo furandi and lucri

causa, the meaning of which has been much discussed, seems to be
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this : that the goods must be taken into the possession of the thief

with the intention of depriving the owner of his property in them.

* * * Property is the right to the possession, coupled with an

ability to exercise that right. Bearing this in mind, we may per-

haps safely define larceny as follows: The wrongful taking pos-

session of the goods of another with intent to deprive the owner of

his property in them." (And see Archb. Crim. Pr. & PL, Pom-

eroy's notes, 1185; Barb. Crim. Law, 174; 2 Bish. Crim. Law,

848.)

Ao-ainst these authorities, besides Hawkins's case and Wharton,

above cited, we are referred to four cases, viz.: People v. Wood-

ward, 31 Hun, 57; Smith v. Schultz, 1 Scam. 490; Wilson V.

People, 39 N. Y. 459; and U. S. v. Durlcce, 1 McAll. 196. In

Woodward's case there was an able and exhaustive disscmting

opinion by one of the three justices, and no authorities are cited in

support of the majority opinion except Whart. Crim. Law, sec.

1784, and certain cases therein referred to, which do not sustain

ihc text. In Smiih v. Schultz, the court only says: "Every

taking of the property of another without bis knowledge or consent

does not amount to larcenv. To make it sueli, tbe taking must be

has been expressly rejected. Thu it ha been declared not to be
larceny, but malicious mischief, to take the hor e of another, not
lucri cau a, but in order to de troy him;" citing State v. Cowicil,
1 Tenn. 305; Com. v. L each 1 Ma . 59; P eople v. mith, 5 O'W.
258; and State v. Wh eeler, 3 Vt. 344, as authorities for the tatement.
It will be found, upon an examination of tho e cases, that no
one of them sustains the text.
Mr. Stephen, in his General View of the Criminal Law of England, 127, says: "It is larceny to take and carry away a personal
,chattel from the possession of its owner with intent to deprive him
of the property."
Mr. Ro coe, in his Criminal Evidence, 631, says : "Eyre, C. B.,
in the definition given by him, says, 'Larceny is the wrongful taking of goods with intent to spoil the owner of them litcri causa/
and Blackstone says, 'The taking must be feloniou ; that is, done
animo fiirandi_, or, as the civil law cxpres e it, lucri causa.' The
point arrived at by these two expressions, animo furand i and lucri
causa, the meaning of which has been much discus ed, seem to be
thi : that the goods must be taken into the possession of the thief
with the intention of depTiving the owner of hi property in them.
* * :;: Property is the right to the possession, coupled with an
ability to exercise that right. Bearing thi in mind, we may perhaps afely define larceny as follow s : The wrongful taking pos.sesS'ion of the goods of another with intent to deprive the own r of
his property in them." (And see Archb. Crim. Pr. & PL, Pomeroy's notes, 1185; Barb. Crim. Law, 1 f'4; 2 Bish. Crim. Law.,
-848.)
Against th2 e authoriti e , besid e Hawkins's ca e and Wharton~
.above cited, we are referred to four cases, viz.: P eople v. Woodward, 31 Hun, 57 _; 1 'rnith v. Schultz, 1 Scam. 49 0; Wil 'On v.
P eople , 3!) N. Y. ±5~); and U. S . v. Ditrkce, 1 McAll. 196. In
Woodward's case ti1ere was an able and exhaustive l1i Pnting
-0pinion by one of the three justices, and no authorities are cit d in
. upport of the majority opinion except \Vhart. Crim. Law, c.
1'84, and certain ca ~ es therein referred to, which 1o not u tain
i:hc text. In niilh v. 1_ chultz, the ·ourt only ays : " 'v ry
taking of the prop rty of anoth r without hi knowl dg or on · nt
does not amount to larceny. To make it uch i.hc i.aking mu t be
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accompanied by circumstances which demonstrate a felonious

intention."

But the court does not say there can be no felonious intent except

there be a taking lucri causa. In Halloway's Case, Parke, B.;,

defined "felonious" to mean that there is no color of right or excuse

for the act, and the intent must be to deprive the owner, not tern-

porarilif, but permoMenthj, of the property. In Wilson's Case it

was only decided that the felonious intent must exist at the time

of the taking. In Durkee's Case the court instructed the jury as

follows: "1. That if you believe, from the evidence, that the

prisoner took and carried away the arms with the intent to appro-

priate them, or any portion of them, to his own use, or permanently

deprive the owner of the same, then he is guilty. 2. But if you

shall believe that he did not take the arms for the purpose of

appropriating them, or any part thereof, to his own use, and only

for the purpose of preventing their being used on himself or his

associates, then the prisoner is not guilty."

There is nothing in the instructions quoted opposed to the doc-

trine we are endeavoring to maintain, although there is much in
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the address to the jury which does not accord with our ideas of the

law. To constitute larceny the taking must be felonious, and it is

so when the intent is to permanently deprive the owner of his

property against his will. The court did not err in giving the

fourth instruction.

2. Objection is made to the third instruction, which is substan-

tially the same as was given in King's Case, 16 Nev. 310. (See

also People v. Cronin, 34 Cal. 203, and People v. Morroiu, 60 CaL

147.) When a defendant in a criminal case offers himself as a

witness in his own behalf, it is the duty of the jury to give to his

evidence all the credit to which it is entitled; but in ascertaining

the extent of its credibility, it is proper and necessary to consider

the situation in which he is placed. A person accused of a crime

may speak the truth, and it is for the jury to say, in view of all

the facts, whether or not he has done so, in the whole or in part.

They should give proper weight and effect to all of his evidence, if

they are convinced of its truth, or so much thereof as, in their best

judgment, is entitled to credit. Such, we think, is the natural

construction to be placed upon the instruction under consideration.

3. The second instruction was correct. {People v. Cronin, 34

Cal. 191; State v. Nelson, 11 Nev. 341.)

ace om panied by circumstances which demonstrate a f eloniou
intention."
But the court does not say there can be no felonious intent except
there be a taking lucri causa. In Halloway's Ca e, Parke, B.,
defined "feloniou " to mean that there is no color of right or excuse
for the act, and the intent must be to deprive the owner, not temporarily, but permanently, of the property. In \\il on' Case it
was only decided that the felonious intent must exi t at the time
of the taking. In Durkee's Ca e the court instructed the jury a
follows: "l. That if you believe, from the evidence, that the
prisoner took and carried away the arm with the intent to appropriate them: or any portion of them, to hi own use, or permanently
deprive the owner of the same, then he i guilty. 2. But if you
shall believe that he did not take the arm for the purpose of
appropriating them, or any part thereof, to hi own use, and only
for the purpose of preventing their being u .ed on himself or his
associates, then the pri oner is not guilty.'
There is nothing in the in tructions quoted oppo ed to the doctrine we are endeavoring to maintain, although there i much in
the addre to the jury which doe not accord with our ideas of the
law. To constitute larceny the taking mu t be felonious, and it i
so when the intent is to permanently deprive the owner of his
property against his will. The court did not err in giving the
fourth instruction.
2. Objection i made to the third in truction, which is substantially the same as was given in Hing' Case, 16 ev. 310. (See
also People v. Cronin, 3-± Cal. 203, and People v. Marrow_, 60 Cal.
14 7.) "When a defondan t in a criminal ca..,e off er him elf a a
witne. in his own behalf, it i the duty of the jury to give to hi.
evidence all the credit to which it i entitled; but in ascertaining
the extent of it credibility, it i proper and nece ary to consider
the situation in which he is placed. A person accu ed of a crime
may speak the truth, and it is for the jury to ay, in view of all
the fact , whether or not he has done o, in the whole or in part.
They should give proper weight and effect to all of his evidence, if
they are convinced of it truth, or so much thereof a , in their best
judgment, is entitled to credit. Such, we think, i the natural
con truction to be placed upon the instruction under con ideration.
3. The second instruction was correct. (People v. Cronin, 34.
Cal. 191; State v. Nelson, 11 Nev. 341.)

TATE V.
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State v. Slingerland 2G9

4. The first instruction given on behalf of the state is as fol-

lows; ''The court instructs the jury that the good character of

the defendant can onh' be taken into consideration when the jury

liave a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant is the person

who committed the offense with which he is charged; and if you

believe from the evidence that the defendant is guilty, then if the

defendant has proved a previous good character, such good char-

acter would be of no avail to him, and would not authorize an

acquittal.*'

The first part of this instruction was copied from that given in

People V. Gleason, 1 N"ev. 176, and in that case upheld by this

€0urt. The last portion was taken from the court's instruction in

Levigne's Case, 17 Xev. -145, given in connection with two other

instructions requested by the defendant. In that case we said :

■''By the three instructions under consideration the jury were

charged to consider all the testimony admitted in the case, includ-

ing that in relation to previous good character, and if, from the

whole, they believed the defendant guilty, then they should not

acquit him, although he had borne a good character previously."
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Such we declared was the true rule. It was consonant with

reason, and upheld by the latest and best authorities.

The instruction given and upheld in Glea son's case we do not

like; and we did not say that the court's instruction in Levigne's

case would have been correct by itself alone. We only declared it

correct as it was given, in connection with the two requested by

■defendant. We do not like the first instruction given in this case.

All in all, it conveys to our minds the idea that evidence of the

defendant's good character could not be considered, unless, from

the other evidence admitted, the jury had a reasonable doubt of

the defendant's guilt. Upon the question of guilt or innocence,

they should have been charged to consider all the evidence in the

case, including that in relation to character, and if therefrom they

believed him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, previous good

character would not authorize an acquittal.

But although the instruction in question was not proper, it

ought not, in this case, to reverse the judgment, because the undis-

puted facts, his own testimony included, made him guilty, no mat-

ter how fair a character he had previously l)ornc. He admitted the

taking, and did not claim that he intended to return the property

to the owner at any time. It was not to l)e returned, and the

4. The fir r in. truction giv n on b half of the tat i as fol1ow : :The court instruct.., th jury that th aood character f
-th defendant can only be taken into con ileration when the jury
b.ave a rea onable doubt as to whether the defendant i the p r on
who committed the off en e with which he i charged; and if you
believe from the evidence that the defendant i guilty th n if the
defendant ha proved a previou good character, uch aood charader would be of no avail to him, and would not authorize ari
acquittal. '
Th fir t part of this instruction was copied from that given in
People v. Gleason~ 1 Nev. 1?'6, and in that ca e upheld by thi
-court. The last portion was taken from the court' in truction in
Levigne's Case, 17 Nev. 445, given in connection with two other
im:truction reque ted by the defendant. In that ca e we aid:
<'By the three instruction under consideration the jury were
-charged to con ider all the testimony admitted in the case, including that in relation to previous good character, and if, from the
whole, they believed the defendant guilty, then they should not
acquit him, although he had borne a good character previously."
Such we declared was the true rule. It was consonant with
reason, and upheld by the late t and best authorities.
The instruction gi"l.7en and upheld in Gleason's case we do not
like; and we did not say that the court's instruction in Levigne'
,case would have been correct by itself alone. We only declared it
correct as it was given, in connection with the two requested by
·defendant. We do not like the first instruction given in this cas .
All in all, it conveys to our minds the idea that evidence of the
defendant's good character could not be considered, unless, from
the other evidence admitted, the jury had a reasonable doubt of
the defendant's guilt. Upon the question of guilt or innocence,
they should have been charged to consider all the evidence in the
case, including that in relation to character, and if therefrom th y
believed him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, previous good
character would not authorize an acquittal.
But although the instruction in que tion was not proper, it
ought not, in this case, to reverse the judgment, becau e th nndisputed fact , hi own testimony included, mad him auilty, no matter how fair a character he had previou ly horn . He admitted tlw
taking, and did not claim that he intend d to r tum th I rop rty
to th owner at any time. It was not to 1 returned and the
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owner was not to get it back, unless, after much, trouble and

expense, he might succeed in finding it. After the larceny was

committed, he told the owner that he had taken the property, and

■where it could be found; but this was done in consideration of a

promise not to prosecute him for taking another horse, not volun-

tarily. The jury must have found that appellant intended to

deprive the owner permanently of his property, for they were

instructed to acquit him if he took it with the intent to hide the

same and make trouble for the owner, and then return it, and not

to derive any benefit therefrom. If appellant had taken the prop-

erty just as he did, for the purpose of gain to himself, rather than

out of revenge, it is conceded that he would have been guilty of

the offense charged. In that case, no amount of testimony estab-

lishing former good character could have induced a doubt of guilt.

In view of our conclusion upon the fourth instruction, the same is

true now.

Judgment and order appealed from affirmed.

Embezzlement.

Nature of the Offense.
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Commonwealtli v. Hays, U Gray (Mass.) 62. (1859.)

Indictment on St. 1857, c. 233, which declares that "if any

person, to whom any money, goods or other property, which may

be the subject of larceny, shall have been delivered, shall embezzle,

or fraudulently convert to his own use, or shall secrete, with intent

to embezzle or fraudulently convert to his own use, such money,

owner was not to get it back, unles , after much trouble and
expense, he might ucceed in finding it. After the larceny wa
committed, he told the owner that he had taken the property, and
where it could be found; but this was done in consideration of a
promise not to prosecute him for taking another horse, not voluntarily. The jury mu t have found that appellant intended to
deprive the owner perm an en tl y of hi property, for they werE:
in,Jructed to acquit him if he took it with the intent to hide the
same and make trouble for the owner, and then return it, and not
to derive any benefit therefrom. If appellant had taken the property ju t as he lid, for the purpose of gain to him elf, rather than
out of revenge, it is conceded that he would have been guilty of
the offense charged. In that case, no amount of testimony establishing former good character could have induced a doubt of guilt.
In Yicw of our conclusion upon the fourth instruction, the same is
true now.
Judgment and order appeal d from affirmed.

goods, or property, or any part thereof, he shall be deemed, by so

doing, to have committed the crime of simple larceny." The

indictment contained two counts, one for embezzlement, and one

for simple larceny.

At the trial in the court of common pleas in Middlesex, at

October term 1858, before Aiken, J., Amos Stone, called as a

EMBEZZLEME T.

\vitness by the Commonwealth, testified as follows : "I am treas-

urer of the Charlestown Five Cent Savings Bank. On the 17th.

Nature of the Offense.

day of October, 1857, the defendant came into the bank, and

Commonwealth v. Hays~ 14 Gray (Mass.) 62.

(1859.)

on St. 1 57, c. 233, which declare that "if any
per. on, to whom any money, goods or other property, which may
be the subject of larceny, shall have been deliYered, hall embezzle,
or fraudulently convert to his own use, or h all ecrete, with intent
to embezzle or fraudulently convert to hi own use, uch money,
g·oocls, or property, or any part thereof, he hall be deemed, by o
doing, to have committed the crim of simple larceny." The
jndictment contajned two count , one for embezzlement, and one
for simple larceny.
At the trial in the court of common pleas in Middlesex, at
October term 1858: before Aiken, J., Amo Stone, called a ~
witness by the Commonwealth, testified a follows: "I am treasurer of the Charlestown Five Cent Savings Bank. On the 17th
day of October, 1857: the defendant came into the bank, and
INDICTMENT

COMMONWEALTH

v.

HAYS

Commonwealth v. Hays 271

asked to draw his deposit, and presented his deposit book. T took

his book, balanced it, and handed it back to him. It was for one

hundred and thirty dollars in one item. I then counted out to

him two hundred and thirty dollars, and said, 'There are two

hundred and thirty dollars.' The defendant took the money to

the end of the counter, and counted it, and then left the room.

Soon after the defendant had left, I discovered that I had paid

him one hundred dollars too much. After the close of bank hours

I went in search of the defendant, and told him that I had paid

him one hundred dollars too much, and asked him to adjust the

matter. The defendant asked me how I knew it. He asked me if

I could read. I said Tes.' He then showed me his book, and

said, 'What does that say ?' I took it, and read in it one hundred

and thirty dollars. The defendant then said, 'That is what I got.^

He exhibited two fifties, two tens, and a ten dollar gold piece, and

said, 'That is what I got.' I then said to him, 'Do you say that

is all and precisely what I gave you?' He replied, 'That is what

I got.' I then said to him, 'I can prove that you got two hundred

and thirty dollars.' He replied, 'That is what I want; if you
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can prove it, you will get it ; otherwise you won't.' I intended to

pay the defendant the sum of two hundred and thirty dollars, and

did so pay him. I then supposed that the book called for two

hundred and thirty dollars. Books are kept at the bank, contain-

ing an account with depositors, wherein all sums deposited are

credited to them, and all sums paid out are charged to them."

The defendant asked the court to instruct the jury that the above

facts did not establish such a delivery or embezzlement as subjected

the defendant to a prosecution under the St. of 1857, c. 233, and

did not constitute the crime of larceny.

The court refused so to instruct the jury; and instructed them

"that if the sum of two hundred and thirty dollars was so delivered

to the defendant, as testified, and one hundred dollars, parcel of the

same, was so delivered by mistake of the treasurer, as testified,

and the defendant knew that it was so delivered by mistake, and

knew he was not entitled to it, and afterwards the money so de-

livered by mistake was demanded of him by the treasurer, and

the defendant, having such knowledge, did fraudulentl}', and with

a felonious intent to deprive the bank of the money, convert the

same to his own use, he would be liable under this indictment."'

asked to draw hi. deposit, and pre ented hi depo it book. T took
his book, balanced it, and handed it back to him. It wa for n
hundred and thirty dollars in one item. I then counted out to
him two hundred and thirty clollan:, ancl aid, There are two
hundred and thirty dollars.' The defendant took the mon y to
the end of the count r, and counted it, and then left the room.
Soon after the defendant had left, I di covered that I had paid
him one hundred dollars too much. After the close of bank hours
I went in search of the defendant, and told him that I had raid
him one hundred dollars too much, and asked him to adjust the
matter. The defendant asked me how I knew it. He asked me if
I could read. I said 'Yes.' H e then howed me hi book, and
aid, 'What does that . ay ?' I took it, and read in it one hundred
and thirty dollars. The defendant then said, 'That is what I got.
He exhibited two :fifties, two tens, and a ten dollar gold piece, and
aid_, 'That is what I got.' I then said to him, 'Do you say that
i all and precisely what I gave you?' He Teplied, 'That is what
I got.' I then said to him, 'I can prove that you got two hundred
and thirty dollar .' He replied, 'That is what I want; if you
can prove it, you will get it; otherwise you won't.' I intended to
pay the defendant the sum of two hundred and thirty dollars, and
did so pay him. I then supposed that the book called for two
hundred and thirty dollars. Books are kept at the bank, containing an account with depositor , wherein all urn deposited are
credited to them, and all ums paid out are charged to them."
rrhe defendant asked the court to instruct the jury that the above
facts did not establish such a delivery or embezzlement as subjected
the defendant to a prosecution under the St. of 1857, c. 233, and
did not constitnt the crime of larceny.
The court refused so to instruct the jury; and instructed them
"that if the sum of two hundred and thirty dollars wa so delivered
to the defendant, as testified, and one hundred dollar , parcel of the
same, was so deliver d by mistake of the treasurer, as testified,
and the defendant knew that it was so delivered by mistake, ancl
knew he wa not entitled to it, and afterward the mon y o delivered by mi take was demanded of him by the tr asur r, and
the defendant, having uch knowl dge, did fraudulently, and with
a felonious intent to deprive the bank of the mon y onvert i.h
ame to his own use, he would be liabl und r this indictm nt. ·

272
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The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the defendant alleged

exceptions.

BiGELOW, J. :

The jury i·eturned a verdict of guilty, and the defendant alleged
exceptions.

The statute under which this indictment is found is certainly

expressed in very general terms, which leave room for doubt as to

its true construction. But interpreting its language according to

the subject matter to which it relates, and in the light of the exist-

ing state of the law, which the statute was intended to alter and

enlarge, we think its true meaning can be readily ascertained.

The statutes relating to embezzlement, both in this country and

in England, had their origin in a design to supply a defect which

was found to exist in the criminal law. By reason of nice and

subtle distinctions, which the courts of law had recognized and

sanctioned, it was difficult to reach and punish the fraudulent tak-

ing and appropriation of money and chattels by persons exercising

certain trades and occupations, by virtue of which they held a

relation of confidence or trust towards their employers or princi-

pals, and thereby became possessed of their property. In such

cases the moral guilt was the same as if the offender had been
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guilty of an actual felonious taking; but in many cases he could

not be convicted of larceny, because the property which had been

fraudulently converted was lawfully in his possession by virtue of

his employment, and there was not that technical taking or

asportation which is essential to the proof of the crime of larceny.

The King v. Bazeley, 2 Leach (4th ed.), 835. 2 East P. C. 568.

The statutes relating to embezzlement were intended to embrace

this class of offences; and it may be said generally that they do

not apply to cases where the element of a breach of trust or con-

fidence in the fraudulent conversion of money or chattels is not

shown to exist. This is the distinguishing feature of the provisions

in the Eev. Sts. c. 126, §§ 27-30, creating and punishing the crime

of embezzlement, which carefully enumerate the classes of persons

that may be subject to the penalties therein provided. Those pro-

visions have been strictly construed, and the operation of the statute

has been carefully confined to persons having in their possession,

by virtue of their occupation or employment, the money or prop-

erty of another, which has been fraudulently converted in violation

of a trust reposed in them. Commomcealtli v. Stearns, 2 Met.

343. Commonwealth v. Lihhey, 11 Met. 64. Commomvealtli v.

J.:
The statute under which this indictment i found is certainly
expre ed in very general term , which leave room for doubt as to
it true construction. But interpreting it language according to
the subject matter to which it relates, and in the light of the exi ting state of the law, which the statute was intended to alter and
enlarge, we think it true meaning can be readily a certained.
The statutes relating to embezzlement, both in thi country and
in England, had their origin in a design to supply a defect which
was found to exist in the criminal law. By reason of nice and
ubtle distinctions, which the courts of law had recognized and
anctioned, it wa difficult to reach and punish the fraudulent taking and appropriation of money and chattels by persons exerci ing
certain trades and occupations, by virtue of which they held a
relation of confidence or tru t towards their employers or principals, and thereby became po ses ed of their property. In ·ucl1
ca e the moral guilt was the same a if the offender had been
guilty of an actual felonious taking; but in many cases he could
not be convicted of larceny, because the property which had been
fraudulently converted was lawfully in his posse ion by virtue of
his employment, and there was not that technical taking or
.asportation which is c ential to the proof of the crime of larceny.
Tlte King v. Bazeley, 2 Leach (4th ed.), 835. 2 East P. C. 568.
The statutes relating to embezzlement were intended to embrace
this class of offence ; and it ma3 be aid generally that they do
not apply to case: where the element of a breach of trust or confidence in the fraudulent conversion of money or chattels is not
shown to exist. rrhis is the distingui hing feature of the provisions
in the Rev. Sts. c. 126, §§ 27-30, creating and punishing the crime
-0f embezzlement, which carefully enumerate the classes of per on.
that may be subject to the penalties therein provided. Those provisions have been strictly construed, and the operation of the statute
has been carefully confined to person having in their possession,
by virtue of their occupation or employment, the money or property of another, which has been fraudulently converted in violation
of a trust repo. ed in them. Oomrnonu·ealth v. Stearns, 2 Met.
343. Commonw ealth v. Libb ey, 11 fet. 6-t Commomcealth v.
BIGELOW,
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3

BERRY

IVilliams, 3 Gray, 461. In the last named case it was held, that a

person was not guilty of embezzlement, nnder Eev. Sts. c. 12G,

§ 30, who had converted to his own use money which had been

delivered to him by another for safe keeping.

The St. of 1857, c. 233, was probably enacted to supply the de-

fect which was shown to exist in the criminal law by this decision,

and was intended to embrace cases where jDroperty had been

designedly delivered to a person as a bailee or keeper, and had

heen fraudulently converted by him. But in this class of cases

there exists the element of a trust or confidence reposed in a person

by reason of the delivery of property to him, which he voluntarily

takes for safe keeping, and which trust or confidence he has violated

by the wrongful conversion of the property. Beyond this the stat-

ute was not intended to go. "Where money paid or property de-

livered through mistake has been misappropriated or converted by

the party receiving it, there is no breach of a trust or violation of

ii confidence intentionally reposed by one party and voluntarily

assumed by the other. The moral turpitude is therefore not so

great as in those cases usually comprehended within the oifence
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of embezzlement, and we cannot think that the legislature intended

to place them on the same footing. We are therefore of opinion

that the facts proved in this case did not bring it within the statute,

and that the defendant was wrongly convicted.

Exceptions sustained.

Distinguished from Larceny.

Commonwealth v. Berry, 99 Mass. 4^8. (1868.)

Indictment, stated in the bill of exceptions to have been found

on the Gen. Sts. c. 161, § 41, for embezzling bank bills of the

amount and value of $950,

At the trial in the superior court, before Brigham, J., these

facts appeared: The defendant was in the employment of a firm

of furniture dealers, consisting of Daniel Shaler and George W.

Safford and others, who had a factory in South Boston and a ware-

house in the city of Boston proper. His special duty was to drive

a team; but he was liable to perform any other kind of service

1filliams, 3 Gray 4Gl. In the la t named a e it wa h eld that a
per on wa not guilty of embezzlement under Rev. t . . l 9G.
30, who· had converted to hi own u e mone) which had been
.delivered to him by another for afe keeping.
The St. of 185 c. 233, wa probably enacted to uppl) the defect which wa .Jwwn to e:xi t in the criminal law by thi deci ion
and wa" intended to embrace ca e where property had be n
de . . ignedly deliY red to a per on a a bailee or keeper, ancl ha l
been fraudulently converted by him. But in thi cla... of ca e. .
there exist the element of a tru t or confidence reposed in a per on
by reason of the delivery of property to him, which he voluntaril)
takes for safe keeping, and which tru"tor confidence he ha violate 1
by the wrongful conversion of the property. Beyond thi. the tatute was not intended to go. \Yhere money paid or property delivered through mi . . take ha been misappropriated or converted by
-the party receiving it, there is no breach of a trust or violation of
.a confidence intentionally reposed by one party and voluntarily
.as urned by the other. The moral turpitude i therefore not so
great as in tho. e ca es usually comprehended within the offence
-0f embezzlement, and we cannot think that the legislature intended
io place them on the same footing. We are therefore of opinion
-that the facts proved in this case did not bring it within the statute,
.and that the defendant was wrongly convicted.
Exceptions su. tain ed.

which might be assigned to him by his employers. On July 20.

1867. Shaler directed the defendant to get $950 from Safford

18

Distinguished f rorn Larceny.
Commonwealth v. Berry, 99 Mass. 4,..,8.

(1868.)

INDICTMENT, stated in the bill of exceptions to have been found
on the Gen. Sts. c. 161, § 41, for embezzling bank bill of the
amount and value of $950.
At the trial in the superior court, before BTigham, J., the e
fact appeaTed: The defendant wa in the employment of a firm
org \Y.
of furniture dealers, con i ting of Dani l hal r and
Safford and oth r , who had a factory in South Bo ton and a warehou e in the city of Bo ton proper. His pecial duty wa to driv
a team; but he wa liable to perform any other kind of , rvi
n July
which might be a ..i ncd to him by hi mploy r .
1 67
haler dir ctcd the def ndant to g t , 9
18
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at the warehouse, and bring the same to Shaler at the factory. In

pursuance of this direction, the defendant applied to Safford for

the money, and Safford delivered to him a package of hank bills

of the amount and value requested. The defendant never carried

the package to Shaler; but left the state; remained absent for

several weeks; and on returning reported to his employers that

after receiving the money he visited several tippling shops, became

drunk and unconscious, and did not regain his senses till the morn-

ing of July 21, when he found himself lying in a doorway on Long-

Wharf in Boston, that he lost the money during this period of

drunkenness, and that on discovering the loss his shame was such

that on the afternoon of that day he ran away without first seeing

his family or any of his friends, and without telling anybody of

his misfortune. But there was also evidence offered to show that

he left Boston on the afternoon of July 20.

The defendant asked the judge to rule "as to the defendant's

relations to his employers, and the delivery of the property to him,,

that said facts proved, if any crime, the crime of simple larceny,

and not embezzlement; that, if embezzlement, it was embezzle-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:03 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t39z97p86
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

ment within the Gen. Sts. c. 161, § 38; and that said indictment

could not be maintained under the evidence." The judge refused

so to rule ; and instructed the jury, on the contrary, "that, if the

defendant was guilty, he was guilty of embezzlement as set forth

in said indictment, and not larceny." The jury returned a verdict

of guilty; and the defendant alleged exceptions.

Hoar, J. : •

The bill of exceptions states that this indictment was found

under Gen. Sts. c. 161, § 41. It seems to be a good indictment

under that section, or under § 35 of the same chapter. Common-

iveaUJi V. Con cannon, 5 Allen, 506. Commonwealth v. Williams,

3 Gray, 461. But the more important question is, whether, upon

the facts reported, an indictment can be sustained for the crime

of embezzlement. The statutes creating that crime were all de-

vised for the purpose of punishing the fraudulent and felonious

appropriation of property which had been intrusted to the person,

by whom it was converted to his own use, in such a manner that

the possession of the owner was not violated, so that he could not

be convicted of larceny for appropriating it. Proof of embezzle-

at the warehouse, and bring the same to Shaler at the factory. In
pursuance of this direction, the defendant applied to Safford for
the money, and Safford delivered to him a package of bank bills
of the amount and value requested. The defendant never carried
the package to Shaler; but left the state; remained absent for
several weeks; and on returning reported to his employers that
after receiving the money he visited several tippling shop , became·
drunk and unconscious, and did not regain hi en es till the morning of July 21; when he found himself lying in a doorway on Long
Wharf in Boston, that he lost the money during this period of
drunkenness, and that on discovering the loss his shame was such
that on the afternoon of that day he ran away without first seeing
his family or any of his friends, and without t elling anybody of
his misfortune. But there was also evidence offered to show that
he left Boston on the afternoon of July 20.
The defendant asked the judge to rule "as to the defendant'
relations to his employers, and the delivery of the property to him,
that said facts proved, if any crime, the crime of simple larceny,
a:nd not embezzlement; that, if embezzlement, it was embezzlement within the Gen. St . c. 161, § 38; and that said indictment
could not be maintained under the evidence." The judge refused
so to rule; and in tructed the jury, on the contrary, ''that, if the
def ndant was guilty, he was guilty of embezzlement as set forth
in said indictment, and not larceny ." The jury returned a verdict
of guilty; and the defendant alleged exceptions.

ment will not sustain a charge of larceny. Commonwealth v..

J.:
The bill of exceptions states that this indictment was found'
under Gen. Sts. c. 161, § 41. It seems to be a good indictment
under that section, or under § 35 of the same chapter. Commonwealth v. Concannon, 5 Allen, 506. Commonwea lth v. Williams,
3 Gray, ±61. But the more important que tion is, whether, upon
the fact reported, an indictment can be sustained for the crime
of embezzlement. The statute cr eating that crime were all devised for the purpose of punishing the fraudulent and feloniou
appropriation of property which had been intrusted to the person ,
by whom it was converted to his own use, in such a manner that
the po session of the owner was not violated, o that he could not
be convicted of larceny for appropriating it. Proof of embezzlement will not . ustain a charge of larceny. Commonwealth v.
HOAR,

Commonwealth v. Berry 275

mnroNWEA.LTII v. BERRY

2 5

Simpson, 9 Met. 138, Common wealth v. King, 9 Ciish. 284. In

the case last cited, it is said by Mr. Justice Dewey that "the offences

are by us considered so far distinct as to require them to be charged

in such terms as will indicate the precise offence intended to be

charged." "If the goods are not in the actual or constructive pos-

session of the master, at the time they are taken, the offence of the

servant will be embezzlement, and not larceny." We see no reason

why the converse of the proposition is not true, that, if the prop-

erty is in the actual or constructive possession of the master at the

time it is taken, the offence will be larceny, and not embezzlement.

And it has been so held in England. Where the prisoner was the

clerk of A., and received money from the hands of another clerk

of A. to pay for an advertisement, and kept part of the money,

falsely representing that the advertisement had cost more than it

had; it was held that this was larceny and not embezzlement,

because A. had had possession of the money by the hands of the

other clerk. Bex v. Murray, 1 Mood. 276; S. C. 5 C. & P. 145.

The distinction is between custody and possession. A servant who

receives from his master goods or money to use for a specific pur-
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pose has the custody of them, but the possession remains in the

master.

The St. 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, § 13, provided that whenever, on

the trial of an indictment for embezzlement, it should be proved

that the taking amounted to larceny, there should not be an acquit-

tal, but a conviction might be had for larceny. We have no similar

statute in this Commonwealth.

In the present case, the defendant, who was employed as a

servant, was directed by one member of the firm who employed

him to take a sum of money from him to another member of the

firm. He had the custody of the money, but not any legal or

separate possession of it. The possession remained in his master.

His fraudulent and felonious appropriation of it was therefore

larceny, and not embezzlement. Commonwealth v. O'Malley, 97

Mass. 584. Commonwealth v. Hays, 14 Gray, 62. People v. Call,.

1 Denio, 120. United States v. Clew, 4 Wash. C. C. 702.

In People v. Hennessey, 15 Wend. 147, cited for the Common-

wealth, the money embezzled by the defendant had never come

into the possession of his master. And in People v. Dalton, 15

Wend. 581, the possession of the defendant was that of a bailee.

Exceptions sustained.

Simpson, 9 Met. 138. Oommonwealth v. King, 9 Cu h. 284.. In
the ca e last cited, it is said by Mr. Justice Dewey that ' the off nee
are by us considered o far distinct a to require them to be charg l
in such term a will indicate the preci e offence intended to b
charged." " H the goods are not in the actual or con tructive po ' session of the ma ter, at the time th y are taken the offence of the
servant wil1 be embezzlement, and not larceny. ' We see no rea on
why the conver . . e of the propo ition is not true, that, if the property i' in the actual or con tructive possession of the master at the
time it is taken, the offence will be larceny, and not embezzlern nt.
And it has been so held in England. Where the prisoner wa the
clerk of A., and received money from the hands of another clerk
of A. to pay for an advertisement, and kept part of the money,
fal ely representing that the advertisement had co t more than it
had; it was held tha t this was larceny and not embezzlement,
becau e A. had had posses ion of the money by the hands of the
other clerk. R ex v . Murray, 1 Mood. 276; S. C. 5 C. & P . 1-15.
The distinction is between custody and pos ession. A servant who
receive from hi master good or money to use for a specific purpose has the custody of them, but the possession remain in the
master.
Th St. 1-± & 15 Viet. c. 100, § 13, provided that whenever, on
the trial of an indictment for embezzlement, it should be proved
that the taking amounted to larceny, there should not be an acquittal, but a conviction might be had for larceny. We have no similar
statute in thi Commonwealth.
In the pre ent case, the defendant, who was employed as a
servant, was directed by one member of the firm who employed
him to take a um of money from him to another member of the
firm. H e had the custody of the money, but not any legal or
separate posse sion of it. The possession remained in his master.
Hi fraudulent and felonious appropriation of it was therefore
larceny, and not embezzlement. Commonwealth v. O'Malley, 97
Ma .... 584. Commonwealth v . Hays, 14 Gray, 62. P eople . all,
1 Denio, 120. United States v. Clew, 4 Wash. . C. 70 .
In People v . Hennessey, 15 Wend. 147, cited for the Commonwealth, the money mbezzled by the defendant had never com
into the pos e ion of his master. And in People v. Dalton, 15
Wend. 581, the po e ion of the defendant wa that of a hail e.
Exceptions u ·lained.

EMBEZZLEME T
27 G Embezzlement

Intent.

People Y. Hurst, 62 Mich. 276. (1886.)

Exceptions from recorder's court of Detroit. (Swift, E.)

Argued June 23, 1886. Decided July 1, 1886.

Intent.

Embezzlement. Eespondent was convicted. Conviction quashed,

and court advised to discharge the prisoner. The facts are stated

in the opinion.

People v. H'llrst, 62 Mich.

76.

(1886.)

Campbell, C. J. :

Respondent was convicted of embezzling $275, alleged to have

been put in his hands by one Lena J. Smith as her agent. Respon-

dent was a lawyer, and also engaged more or less in renting houses.

Mrs. Smith formed his acquaintance while seeking to rent a house.

She got him to lend $400 for her, which he did on mortgage She

further said she had $1,100 more to lend. He said he had a place

for $700, which he actually lent on first mortgage. He also

Exception from recorder's court of Detroit.
( wift, R.)
Argued June 23, 1886. Decided July 1, 1886.
Embezzlement. Respondent wa convicted. Conviction qua hed,
.and court ad.vised to di charge the prisoner. The facts are stated
in the opinion.

showed her a letter from a man who had a parcel of 40 acres of

land to sell, and he wanted her to give him the money to buy it,

as he knew of a purchaser who would buy at an advance. She

handed him $400 to buy the land, and said he might have the
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profit. He told her where the land was, but she could not remem-

ber, and did not testify upon that point. This was on March 31,

1882. The embezzlement is charged as of that day.

About the middle of April she saw him at his house, intoxicated.

She asked him for her papers, and if he had invested the money,

and he shook his head, and said he had been "on a drunk." She

asked for her money, and he gave her $100, and a chattel mortgage

which he owned for $25. She asked him if that was all he had,

and he said it was, and promised to pay the balance in a month or

two, and asked her to wait on him. She called on him frequently,

and in the fall he conveyed to her 40 acrees of land in Cheboygan

county as security until he could pay her. He said he was selling

some land for a lady in Springwells; and, if he succeeded, his

commissions would exceed his debt to her, and he would pay her,

and she could return the deed, which she need not record, but he

would pay for recording. She agreed to wait on him, and hold

the deed as security a little longer, until he could sell the 25 acres

CAl\IPBELL,

c. J.:

Respondent wa convicted of embezzling $275, alleged to have
been put in hi hands by one Lena J. Smith a her agent. Respondent wa a lawyer, and also engaged more or le in renting hou e .
Mrs. Smith formed his acquaintance while eeking to rent a hou e.
She got him to lend $400 for her: which he did on mortgage She
further said he had $1,100 more to lend. He aid he had a place
for $700, which he actually lent on fir t mortgage. He al o
showed her a letter from a man who had a parcel of 40 acres of
land to ~ell, and he wanted her to give him the money to buy it,
as he knew of a purchaser who would buy at an advance. She
handed him $400 to buy the land, and said he might have the
})rofit. He told her where the land wa , but "he could not remember, and did not te tify upon that point. This wa on March 31,
1882. The embezzlement is charged as of that day.
About the middle of April he ~ aw him at hi'" hou e, intoxicated.
She asked him for her paper , and if he had invested the money,
and he shook his head, and said he had been "on a drunk." She
asked for her money, and he gal'e her $100, and a chattel mortgage
which he owned for . 25. She a ked him if that wa all he had,
and he said it wa , and promi ed to pay the balance in a month or
two, and asked her to wait on him. She called on him frequently,
.and in the fall he conveyed to her 40 acrees of land in Cheboygan
county as security until he could pay her. He said he was selling
..:ome land for a lady in Springwells; and, if he succeeded, his
commis ion would exceed his debt to her, and he would pay her,
and she could return the deed, which he need not record, but he
would pay for recording. She agreed to wait on him, and hold
the deed as ecurity a little longer, until he could ell the 25 acres

.....

.' '

Commonwealth v. Dkew '^TT

referred to. She sul)sequently (limned him frequently, and, find-

ing he had an interest in a patent right, asked him to assign that

to her as security, which he did.

There was some other testimony which was material, in favor

of defendant, on which his counsel made some points, which we

do not now think it necessary to decide.

In our opinion, the testimony did not make out a case of em-

bezzlement. Before that offence can be made out, it must distinctly

appear that the respondent has acted with a felonious intent, and

made an intentionally wrong disposal, indicating a design to cheat

and deceive the owner. A mere failure to pay over is not enough

if that intent is not plainly apparent. This was decided in People

V. Galland, 55 Mich. 628. See, also. Beg. v. Norman, 1 Car. &

M. 501; Reg. v. Creed, 1 C. & K. 63; Bex v. Hodgson, 3 Car.

& P. 422; 2 Euss. Cr. 182; 2 Bish. Crim. Law, §§ 376, 377.

In this case there was nothing indicating concealment or a

felonious disposition. A candid admission was made at once on

inquiry, and partial payment was made and security given at

different times, when asked. The debt was admitted and recog-
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nized as a debt on both sides. Whatever wrong may have been

done, there was no embezzlement proven.

The conviction must be quashed, and the court below advised

to discharge the prisoner.

The other Justices concurred.

False Pretenses.

Commonwealth v. Drew, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 179. (1837.)

The defendant was tried, before Morton, J., upon two indict-

ments, in each of which he was charged with having procured

money from the Hancock bank in Boston, by false pretences and

with intent to defraud the bank, upon two several occasions.

The pretences alleged were, 1. that the defendant assumed the

name of Charles Adams; 2. that he pretended that he wished to

open an honest and fair account with the Hancock bank, and

to deposit and draw for money in the usual manner and ordinary

course of business ; and 3. that he pretended that two checks, de-

referred to. 1 he . ubsequently dunned him frequ ntl · and finding he had an intere t in a patent right, a..,ked him to a "'ign that
to her as ecurity which he did.
There wa ome other te timony which wa material in fa or
of defendant, on which hi coun el mad some points, which we
do not now think it nece ary to decide.
In our opinion the te timony did not make out a ca e of mbezzlement. Before that offence can be made out, it mu t di tinctly
appear that the re pondent ha acted with a feloniou intent, and
made an intentionally wrong di posal, indicating a design to cheat
and deceive the owner. A mere failure to pay over i not enough
if that intent i not plainly apparent. Thi wa decided in People
v. Galland, 55 Mich. 628. See, al o, Reg. v. orman, 1 Car. &
l\1. 501; Reg. v. Creed, 1 C. & K. 63; Rex v. Hodgson, 3 Car.
& P. 422; 2 Ru . Cr. 182; 2 Bi h. Crim. Law, §§ 316, 377.
In this case there was nothing indicating concealment or a
felonious disposition. A candid admission wa made at once on
inquiry, and partial payment was made and security given at
different time , when asked. The debt wa admitted and recognized as a debt on both sides. Whatever wrong may have been
clone, there was no embezzlement proven.
The conviction mu"' t be quashed, and the court below ad vi ed
to discharge the prisoner.
The other Ju tice concurred.

scribed in the indictment, were good, and that he had in deposit

the amount for which they were drawn.
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ommonwealth v. Drew, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 179.

(1837.)

'rhe defrndant wa tried, before Uorton, J., upon two indictment , in each of which he wa. charged with having procurea
money from the Hancock bank in Bo ton, by fal e pretence and
with intent to defraud the bank, upon two sev ral occa ion .
The pretence alleged were, 1. that the defendant a um cl the
name of harle Adam ; 2. that he pretend d that he wi h0d to
op n an hone t and fair account with the Hancock bank an 1
i.o depo it and draw for money in the u ual mann r and orc.linan
cour e of bu ine "'; and 3. that he pretend d that two che k , decribed in the indictment, were good, and that he had jn depo it
the amount for which they were drawn.
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It was proved, among other things, that the defendant began to

deposit money in the bank early in December, 1835, and that he

continued to deposit and draw, at various times and in various

sums, until the 2Tth of January, 1836, on which day, having only

$10 deposited to his credit, he drew a check for $100, which was

paid at the bank.

On the 30th of January, 1836, a check for $350 was drawn by

the defendant and paid at the bank, he having made no deposit

since the payment of the check presented on the 27th of January.

The defendant deposited and drew his checks by the name of

Charles Adams, and there was another person named Charles

Adams who deposited at the bank at the same time; but it was

not contended on the part of the Commonwealth, that the checks

were paid because of the assumption by the defendant of the name

of Charles Adams, nor that any mistake was made as to which

person of that name drew the check.

Samuel B. Dyer, a witness on the part of the Commonwealth,

testified that he was the paying and receiving teller of the bank;

that the defendant first did business at the bank on the 12th of
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December, 1835 ; that he asked to have a large bill of the United

States bank exchanged for small bills, which was done; that

before he left the bank he made a deposit of a considerable sum,

including the bills just before received as above; that being asked

in what name he wished to deposit, he said, in the name of Charles

Adams ; that he saw the defendant several times afterwards, when

he presented his checks for payment; that the defendant usually

drew his checks in the bank, at the desk kept for that purpose, and

presented them himself, and that this was usually done by him

about 12 o'clock, the most busy time in the forenoon; that the

witness had no recollection of the presentation or payment of

either of the two checks in question, which were overdrafts; that

lie knew they were paid out of his drawer, and by his money,

because he found the checks in his drawer and missed sums of

money corresponding with the amount of the checks; that he be-

lieved that the check of January 27th was not paid by himself, but

by the bank messenger for him, who took his place a few minutes

at the counter, the messenger having told him he had paid a check

of Charles Adams; that the witness paid checks of the defendant

unhesitatingly, because he had deposited for some time, and the

witness presumed his checks to be good, from the general chai-

It was proved, among other things, that the defendant began to
d eposit money in the bank early in December, 1835, and that he
continued to deposit and draw, at various times and in various
sums, until the 27th of January, 1836, on which day, having only
*10 Jeposited to his credit, he drew a check for $100, which wa
paid at the bank.
On the 30th of January, 1836, a check for $350 was drawn bjthe defendant and paid at the bank, he having made no deposit
since the payment of the check presented on the 27th of January.
The defendant deposited and drew his checks by the name of
Charles Adams, and there was another person named Charles
Adams who deposited at the bank at the same time ; but it was
not contended on the part of the Commonwealth, that the checks
were paid hecam:e of the assumption by the defendant of the name
of Charles Adams, nor that any mistake was made as to which
person of that name drew the check.
Samuel B. Dyer, a witness on the part of the Commonwealth,
t estified that he was the paying and receiving t eller of the bank;
that the defendant first did business at the bank on the 12th of
December, 1835 ; that he asked to have a large bill of the United
States bank exchanged for small bills, which was done; that
before he left the bank he made a deposit of a considerable sum,
including the bills just before received as above; that being asked
in what name he wished to deposit, he said, in the name of Charles
Adams; that he saw the defendant several times afterwards, when
h e presented his checks for payment; that the defendant usually
drew his checks in the bank, at the desk kept for that purpose, and
presented them himself, and that this was usually done by him
about 12 o-'clock, the most busy time in the forenoon; that the
witness had no recollection of the presen tation or payment of
,either of the two checks in question, which were overdrafts; that
h e knew they were paid out of hi drawer, and by hi..: money,
lJecause he found the checks in his drawer and mi sed sums of
money corresponding with the amount of the checks ; that he believed that the check of January 27th wa not paid by himself, but
by the bank messenger for him, who took hi place a few minutes
at the counter, the messenger having told him he had paid a check
of Charles Adams; that the witness paid checks of the defendant
unhesitatingly, because he had deposited for some time, and the
witness presumed his checks to be good, from the general cha1-
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acter of his account, and having seen him conversing with the

president of the bank, the witness presumed he was acquainted

with the president; that if the witness paid either of the two

■checks in question, without inquiring at the desk of the book-

keeper, or looking at the balance-sheet, to ascertain whether the

defendant had money to that amount deposited, it was upon these

grounds that he so paid.

It was in evidence, that the book-keeper's desk was a few feet

from the teller's counter ; that when the teller doubted whether a

check should be paid, he inquired of the book-keeper, or looked

at the balance-sheet kept b}^ the book-keeper, which was made up

to the end of every day, and lay upon the desk for the inspection

of the teller or book-keeper at all times.

It was testified by the teller, that the overdraft of the 2Tth

■of January was not reported for some days after it happened;

and the balance-sheet showed that it did not appear upon that

hook until the 1st of February.

Tn order to show that the defendant overdrew with a fraudu-

lent intent, it was proved, amongst other things, that he overdrew,
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about the same time, at the Bunker Hill bank in Charlestown,

and the Traders' bank in Boston.

The counsel for the defendant contended, that there was no

evidence of the procuring of money by any false pretence; that

the mere drawing a check and presenting it at the counter of the

l)ank to the teller for payment, no words being spoken and no false

appearance or token presented or held out, although the drawer

knew he had no funds deposited there, was not a "false pretence,"

within the meaning of the statute upon that subject; and that

such presentation of a check, with intent to defraud the bank,

and receiving the money upon the check, did not constitute the

crime of obtaining money by false pretences, as defined by the

statute; that it was no more than an appeal to the books of the

bank, kept by the proper officer, and an offer to receive what should

there be found due. But the judge overruled these objections, and

instructed the jury, that if they believed that the defendant became

a depositor at the bank under a pretence of doing business there in

the usual manner, but with the fraudulent design to obtain the

money of, and cheat the bank, and drew the checks and presented

them at the bank for payment, knowing that he had not funds

deposited sufficient to pay them, and that he did this intending to

:act r of hj account, and haYing een him conver ing with th
pre ident of the bank, th witn
pre um d he wa acquaint cl
with the pre ident ; that if the witne paid either of the two
check in que~tion, without inquiring at th de k of the bookkeeper, or looking at the balance- heet, to a certain wheth r th
defendant had mone) to that amount depo ited, it wa upon th
ground that he o paid.
It wa in evidence, that the book-keeper' de k wa a few fe t
from the teller' counter; that when the teller doubted whether a
check hou]d be paid he inquired of the book-keeper, or Jooked
at the balance- heet kept by the book-keeper which wa made up
-to the end of every day, and lay upon the de k for the in pection
-0f the teller or book-ke per at all time .
It wa te ti:fied by the teller, that the overdraft of the 2 th
·of January was not reported for ome day after it happened;
.and the balance- heet howed that it did not appear upon that
book until the Lt of F bruary.
i:n order to how that the defendant overdrew with a fraudulent intent_. it w;i proved, amongst other things, that he overdrew
.about the same time, at the Bunker Hill bank in Charle tmrn,
.and the Trader ' bank in Boston.
The counsel for the defendant contended, that there wa no
€·\idence of the procuring of money by any false pretence; that
the mere drawing a check and presenting it at the counter of the
bank to the teller for payment, no words being '"pok n and no fah~
appearance or token pre ented or held out, although the drawer
knew he had no fund ~ depo ited there, wa not a "fal e pretence '
within the meaning of the statute upon that ubj ct; and that
such presentation of a check, with intent to defraud the bank,
and receiving the mon y upon the check, did not con titute the
crime of obtaining money by fal e pretence a defined by the
statute; that it wa no more than an appeal to the book of the
bank, kept by the proper officer and an offer to receive what hould
there be found due. But the judge overrul d the e objection and
in tructed the jury, that if they b lieved that the def ndant b am
.a depo itor at the bank und r a pr tence of dojng bu ine i.h r jn
the u ual manner, but with the fraudul nt cle-ign to obtain th
money of, and cheat the bank, and drew the ch ck and pr nl cl
them at the bank for payment, knowing that he had not fond
<lepo ited ufficient to pay them, and that h lid thi intending to

280

F ..1.LSE

PRETE r SES

280 Falsk Pketenses

del'raud the bank of the sums so overdrawn, although no word?

were spoken and no other token exhibited, and if he actually got

the money, he was guilty of the crime of obtaining money by false

pretences within the meaning of the statute. And it was left to

the jury to decide upon all the evidence, whether the false pre-

tences and the averments contained in the indictment were proved

to their satisfaction or not.

The jury found a verdict against the defendant upon both in-

dictments.

The defendant moved for a new trial, because of the ruling and

instructions of 'the judge, and because the verdict, as to the pres-

entation of the checks by the defendant, was not supported by the

evidence.

Morton, J., delivered the opinion of the court. These indict-

ments are founded upon St. 1815, c. 136. The first section pro-

vides, "that all persons who knowingly and designedly, by false

pretence or pretences, shall obtain from any person or persons-

money, goods, wares, merchandise or other things, with intent

to cheat or defraud any person or persons of the same, shall on
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conviction" be punished, &c., as therein specified. This section,,

which is a copy of St. 30 Geo. 2, c. 24, § 1, is revised and combined

with some provisions in relation to other similar offences, in the

Revised Stat. c. 126, § 32.

To constitute the offence described in the statute and set forth

in these indictments, four things must concur and four distinct

averments must be proved.

1. There must be an intent to defraud;

2. Theie must be an actual fraud committed;

3. False pretences must be used for the purpose of perpetrating

the fraud; and

4. The fraud must be accomplished by means of the false pre-

tences made use of for the purpose, viz., they must be the cause

which induced the owner to part with his property.

It is very obvious that three of the four ingredients of the crime

exist in the present case. The fraudulent intent, the actual per-

petration of the fraud, and the fact that some of the pretences

used were the means by which it was accomplished, are established

by the verdict of the jury. And although the prisoner's counsel

has objected to the sufficiency of the evidence, yet we see no reason

to question the correctness of their decision. It only remains for

L1efraud the bank of the um so overdrawn, although no word~.
were spoken and no other token exhibited, and if he actually got
the money, he was guilty of the crime of obtaining money by false
pretences within the meaning of the statute. And it was left to
the jury to decide upon all the evidence, whether the false pretence and the averments contained in the indictment were proved
to their satisfaction or not.
The jury found a verdict against the defendant upon both indictments.
The defendant moved for a new trial, because of the ruling and
instructions of ·the judge, and because the verdict, as to the presentation of the checks by the defendant, was not supported by the
evidence.
l\foRTON, J., delivered the opinion of the court. These indictments are founded upon St. 1815, c. 136. The first section provide , "that all person who knowingly and de ignedly, by false
pretence or pretences, hall obtain from any person or person ;
money, goods, wares, merchandi e or other things, with intent
to cheat or defraud an y per on or per ons of the same, shall on
con viction" be punished, &c., a therein specified. This section,
which is a copy of St. 30 G o. 2, c. 2±, § 1, i revi ed and combined
with some provisions in relation to other similar offences, in the
Revi ed Stat. c. 126, § 32.
To constitute the offence described in the statute and set forth
in these indictment , four things must concur and four distinct
averments must be proved.
1. There mu t be an intent to defraud;
2. 'There must be an actual fraud committed;
3. False pretences must be used for the purpose of perpetrating
the fraud; and
-1. The fraud mu t be accomplished by means of the false pret ences made use of for the purpose, viz., th y mu t be the cause
which induced the owner to part with his property.
It is very obviou that three of the four ingredients of the crime
cxi t in the pre ent case. The fraudulent intent, the actual perpetration of the fraud, and the fact that some of the pretences
used were the mean by which it wa . accompli hed, are c tablished
by the verdict of the jury. And although the prisoner's counsel
has objected to the sufficiency of the evidence, yet we see no reason
to question the correctnes of their decision. It only remains fo:r
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us to iuqui]-e, whether the artifices and deceptions practiced by the

defendant and by means of which he obtained the money, are the

false pretences contemplated by the statute.

The pretences described in the indictments and alleged and

shown to be false, are,

1. That the defendant assumed the name of Charles Adams..

2. That he pretended that he wished to open an honest and

fair account with the Hancock bank and to deposit and draw for

money in the usual manner and ordinary course of business.

3. That he pretended that the checks were good, and that he

had in deposit the am.ount for which they were drawn.

The first is clearly a false pretence within the meaning of the

statute. And had the money been obtained by means of the as-

sumption of this fictitious name, there could be no doubt of the

legal guilt of the defendant. The eminent lawyer who filled the

office of mayor of New York when the adjudication referred to

by the defendant's counsel was made, says the false pretences must

be the sole inducement which caused the owner to part with his

property. People v. Conger, 1 Wheeler's Crim. Cas. 448; People
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V. Dalton, 2 Ibid. 161. This point is doubtless stated too strongly;

and it would be more correct to say, that the false pretences, either

with or without the cooperation of other causes, had a decisive

influence upon the mind of the owner, so that without their weight,

he would not have parted with his property. People v. Ilaynes,

11 Wendell, 557. But in this case the assumed name, so far from

being the sole or decisive inducement, is clearly shown to have

had no influence whatever. The bank officers did not confound

the defendant with Charles Adams, and it does not appear that the

defendant knew that there was any other person by that name.

He never claimed any credit on account of his name, and the coin-

cidence might have been accidental. At any rate it had no in-

fluence upon the credit of either, nor any effect upon their accounts

or the payment of their checks.

2. The opening and keeping an account with the Hancock

bank might have l)een, and doubtless was, a part of a cunning

stratagem, by which the defendant intended to practice a fraud

upon that bank. But the business was done and the account kept

in the usual manner. The defendant made his deposits and drew

his checks like other customers of the bank. He made no repre-

sentation of the course he intended to pursue and gave no assurance

u · to inquire, whether the arti:fi e'"' and d c ption practic d by th
defendant and by mean of which he obtained the money, are th
false pretences contemplated by the tatute.
The pretences de cribed in the indictment and alleged and
hown to be false, are,
1. That the d fendant assumed the name of Charle ... dam .
2. That he pretended that he wished to open an hone._t and
fair account with the Hancock bank and to deposit and draw fo:rmoney :in the usual manner and ordinary cour e of bu ines .
3. That he pretended that the checks were good, and that he
had in deposit the amount for which they were drawn.
The first is clearly a false pretence within the meaning of the
statute. And had the money been obtained by means of the a umption of this fictitiou s name, there could be no doubt of the
legal guilt of the defendant. Th e eminent lawyer who filled the
office of mayor of New York when the adjudication referred to
by the defendant's counsel was made, say the £al e pretence mu t
be the sole inducement which caused the owner to part with hi
property. People v. Conger, 1 Wheeler' Crim. Cas. 448; People
v. Dalton, 2 Ibid. 161. This point is doubtles stated too trongly;
and it would be more correct to say, that the false pretence , either
with or without the cooperation of other causes, had a decisive
influence upon the mind of the owner, so that without their weight,
he would not have parted with his property. P eople v. Haynes,
11 Wendell, 557. But in this case the a sumed name, so far from
being the sole or decisive inducement, i clearly shown to have
had no influence whatever. 'l1he bank officers did not confound
the defendant with Charle Adams, and it does not appear that the
cl •fendant knew that there was any other person by that name.
H e never claimed any credit on account of his name, and th coincidence might have been accidental. At any rate it had no influence upon the credit of either, nor any ff ct upon their account ·
or the payment of their checks.
2. Th opening and keeping an account with th Han o k
bank might have been, aud doubtle s wa , a part of :i unning
tratagem, by which the defendant intended to practice a fraud
upon that bank. But the busine was don and th a count k pt
in the u. ual manner. The defendant made his d po it and dr w
his checks like oth r customers of the bank. He mad no r pr ntation of the cour eh intended to pur ue and gave no a uran
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of integrity and fair dealing. And we can see nothing in the

course of this business, constituting it a false pretence, which

Avould not involve the account of any depositor who might over-

draw, in the same category.

3. The pretence, if any such there were, that the check was

good, or that the defendant had funds in the hank for which he

had a right to draw, was false. He had no such funds. Did the

defendant make any such pretence? He made no statement or

declaration to the officers of the hank. He merely drew and pre-j

sented his checks and they were paid. This was done in the usual

manner. If then he made any pretence, it must result from the

acts themselves.

What is a false pretence, within the meaning of the statute?

It may be defined to be a representation of some fact or circum-

stance, calculated to mislead, which is not true. To give it a crim-

inal character there must be a scienter and a fraudulent intent.

Although the language of the statute is very broad, and in a loose

and general sense, would extend to every misrepresentation, how-

ever absurd or irrational, or however easily detected ; yet we think
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the true principles of construction render some restriction in-

dispensable to its proper application to the principles of criminal

law and to the advantageous execution of the statute. We do not

mean to say that it is limited to cases against which ordinary skill

and diligence cannot guard ; for one of its principal objects is to

protect the weak and credulous from the wiles and stratagems of

the artful and cunning; but there must be some limit, and it

would seem to be unrcasonal)le to extend it to those who, having

the means in their own hands, neglect to protect themselves. It

may be difficult to draw a precise line of discrimination applicable

to everv possible contingency, and we think it safer to leave it to

be fixed in eacli case as it may occur. 2 East's P. C. 828; Young

V. The King, 3 T. E. 98.

It is not the policy of the law to punish criminally mere private

wrongs. And the statute may not regard naked lies, as false pre-

tences. It requires some artifice, some deceptive contrivance, which

will be likely to mislead a person or throw him off his guard. He

may be weak and confiding and his very imbecility and credulity

should receive all practical protection. But it would be inexpe-

dient and unwise to regard every private fraud as a legal crime.

It would be better for society to leave them to civil remedies. Eos-

of integrity and fair dealing. And we can see nothing in the
conre of this bu ines , constituting it a false pretence, which
would not involve the account of any depo itor who might overdraw, in the same category.
3. The pretence, if any such there were, that the check was
good, or that the defendant had funds in the bank for which he
had a right to draw, wa fal e. He had no such fund . Did the
defendant make any uch pretence? He made no tatement or
declaration to the officer of the bank. He merely drew and pre-!
ented his check~ and they were paid. This was clone in the usual
manner. If then he made any pretence, it must result from the
acts themselves.
What is a fal e pretence, within the meaning of the statute?
It may be defined to be a representation of some fact or circumstance, calculated to mislead: which is not true. To give it a criminal character there must be a scienter and a fraudulent intent.
Although the language of the statute i very broad, and in a loose
and general sense, would extend to every misrepre entation, how€ver ab urd or irrational, or however ea ily detected; yet we think
the true principles of construction render some re 'triction indi pensable to its proper application to the principles of criminal
law and to the advantageous execution of the statute. We c.lo not
mean to say that it is limited to case again t which ordinary skill
and diligence cannot guard; for one of its principal objects is t o
protect thf.' weak and credulous from the wile and stratagem of
the artful and cunning; but there mu t be some limit, and it
would seem to be unrca onable to extend it to those who, having
the mean~ in their own hands, neglect to protect themselves. It
may be difficult to draw a precise line of di crimination applicable
to every pos ible contingenc3, and we think it safer to leave it to
be fixed in each case as it may occur. 2 East's P . C. 28; Young
v. The King, 3 T. R. 98.
It is not the policy of the law to 1_1unish criminally mere private
wrongs. And the tatutP may not regard naked lie , a fal e pretences. It require some artifice some deceptive contrivance, which
will be likely to mi ~ lead a person or throw him off hi guard. He
may be weak and confiding and his very imbecility and credulity
should receive all practical protection. But it would be inexpedient and unwise to regard every private fraud a a legal crime.
It would lJe better for society to leave them to civil remedies. Ros-
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coe on Crim. Ev. (2d ed.) 419; Goodhall's case, Euss. & Kyan,

4G1.

The pretence must relate to past events. Any representation

or assurance in relation to a future transaction, may be a promise

or covenant or warranty, but cannot amount to a statutory false

pretence. Tliey afford an opportunity for inquiring into their

truth, and there is a remedy for their breach, but it is not Ijy a

criminal prosecution. Stuyvesant's case, 4 City Hall Recorder,

156; Eoscoe on Crim. Ev. (2d ed.) 422; Eex v. Codringion, 1

Carr. & Payne, 661. The only case, Young v. The King, 3 T. R.

98, which has been supposed to conflict with this doctrine, clearly

supports it. The false pretence alleged was, that a bet had been

made upon a race which was to be run. The contingency which

was to decide the bet was future. But the making of the bet was

past. The representation which turned out to be false was, not

that a race ivculd he run, but that a l)et had heen made. The false

pretence therefore in this case related to an event already com-

pleted and certain, and not to one which was thereafter to happen

.and consequently uncertain. And the decision was perfectly con-
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sistent with the doctrine and law here laid down.

A false pretence, being a misrepresentation, may be made in any

of the ways in which ideas may be communicated from one person

to another. It is true that the eminent jurist before referied to,

in the cases cited held that it could be made only by verbal com-

munications, either written or oral. If this be correct, no acts

■or gestures, however significant and impressive, could come within

the statute. And mutes, though capaljle of conveying tlieir ideas

and intentions in the most clear and forcible manner, could hardly

be brought within its prohibition. Can it make any difference in

law or conscience, whether a false representation be made by words

or by the expressive motions of the dumb? Each is a language.

Words are but the signs of ideas. And if the ideas are conveyed,

the channel of communication or the garb in which they are

•clothed, is but of secondary importance. And we feel bound to

dissent from this part of these decisions. In this we are supported

by the English cases. Rex v. Story, Euss. & E^'an, 81 ; Eex Vr

Freeih, Ibid. 127.

The representation is inferred from the act, and the pretence

may be made by implication as well as by verlial declaration. In

the case at bar the defendant presented his own checks on a bank

coe on Crim. Ev. (2d ed.) 419; Goodhall' ca e, Ru . & Ryan,
461.
The pretence mu t relate to pa t event .
ny repre entation
·-Or a surance in relation to a future tran action, may be a promi e
·Or covenant or ·w arranty, but cannot amount to a tatutory fal
pretence. They afford an opportunity for inquiring into their
truth, and there is a remedy for their breach, but it is not by a
criminal prosecution. Stuyve ant's case, 4 City Hall Recorder,
156; Roscoe on Crim. Ev. ( 2d ed.) 422; Rex v. Codrington, 1
Carr. & Payne, 661. The only case, Young v. The King, 3 T. R.
98_, which has been supposed to conflict with thi doctrine, dearly
supports it. The false pretence alleged was, that a bet had been
made upon a race which was to be run. The contingency which
was to decide the bet was futitr e. But the making of the bet was
pa~rt.
The representation which turned out to be false wa8, not
that a race woilld be run, but that a bet had been made. The false
pretence therefore in this case related to an event already completed and certain, and not to one which was thereafter to happen
.and consequently uncertain. And the decision was perfectly consistent with· the doctrine and law here laid down.
A false pretence, being a misrepresentation, may be made in any
·of the ways in which ideas may be communicated from one person
to another. It is true that the eminent jurist before refened to,
in the cases cited held that it could be made only by verbal communications, either written or oral. If this be correct, no acts
·Or gestures, however significant and impressive, could come within
the statute. And mutes, though capable of conveying their idea
and intentions in the most clear and forcible manner, could hardly
be brought within its prohibition. Can it make any difference in
law or conscience, whether a false representation be made by word
·or by the expressive motions of the dumb? Each is a bnguage.
Words are but the signs of idea . And if the ideas are conveyed,
the channel of communication or the garb in which they are
.clothed, is but of econdary importance. And we f el bound to
di ent from this part of these deci ions. In thi we are supported
by the English ca es. Rex v. i:::tory, Rus . & RyaL, 81; Rex v ..
Preeth, Ibid. 127.
The representation is inferred from the net, an i th prctenc
may be made by implication as well a · I y v rbal cl laration. In
the ca e at bar the defendant pre ent 1 hi . wn h k on a bank

284 False Pretenses
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with which he had an account. What did this imply ? Not neces-

sarily that he had funds there. Overdrafts are too frequent to be

classed with false pretences. A check, like an order on an indi-

vidual, is a mere request to pay. And the most that can be inferred

from passing it is, that it will be paid when presented, or in other

words, that the drawer has in the hands of the drawee either funds-

or credit. If the drawer passes a check to a third person, the

language of the act is, that it is good and will be duly honored.

And in such case, if he knew that he had neither funds nor credit,

it would probably be holden to be a false pretence.

In the case of Stuyvesant, -i City Hall Eecorder, 156, it was

decided that the drawing and passing a check was not a false pre-

tence. But in Bex v. Jackson, 3 Campb. 370, it was ruled that the

drawing and passing a check on a banker with whom the drawer

had no account and which he knew would not be paid, was a false

pretence within the statute. This doctrine appears to be approved

by all the text writers, and we are disposed to adopt it. Eoscoe

on Crim. Ev. (2d ed.) 419.

But to bring these cases within the statute, it must be shown
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that the drawer and utterer knew that the check would not be paid,.

and in the cases cited it appeared that he had no account with the

banker. In these respects the case at bar is very distinguishable

from the eases cited. If the checks in question had been passed to

a third person, it could not be said that the defendant knew that

they would not be paid. On the contrary, he had an open account

with the bank, and although he knew there was nothing due to

him, yet he might suppose that they would be paid. And the fact

that he presented them himself, shows that he did not know that

they would be refused.

The defendant presented the checks himself, at the counter of

the bank. They were mere requests to pay to him the amount

named in them, couched in the appropriate and only language

known there ; and addressed to the person whose peculiar province

and duty it was to know whether they ought to he paid or not. He

complied with the requests, and charged the sums paid, to the

defendant, and thus created a contract between the parties. Upon

this contract the bank must rely for redress.

This case lacks the elements of the English decisions. And we

think it would be an unwise and dangerous construction of the

statute, to extend it to transactions like this. This case mav come

with \\'hich he had Jn account. What did this imply? Not necesarily that he had funds there. Overdrafts are too frequent to be
cla ed with false pretences. A check, like an order on an individual, is a mere request to pay. And the most that can be inferred
from pa sing it is, that it will be paid when presented, or in other
words, that the drawer has in the hand of the drawee either fund
or credit. If the drawer pa se a check to a third person, the
language of the act is, that it i good and will be duly honored.
And in . . uch ca e, if he knew that he had neither funds nor credit,
it would probably be holden to be a fal se pretence.
In the case of Stuyve ant, 4 City Hall Recorder, 156, it was
decided that the drawing and pas ing a check wa not a false pretence. But in R ex v. J ackson, 3 Campb. 3 ,o, it wa ruled that the
drawing and pa ing a check on a banker with whom the drawer
had no account and which he knew would not be paid, was a fal e
pretence within the statute. This doctrine appears to be approved
by all the text writer , and we are di posed to adopt it. Roscoe
on Crim. Ev. (2d ed.) 419.
But to bring the e case within the statute, it must be shown
that the drawer and utterer knew that the check would not be paid,.
and in the cases cit d it appeared that he had no account with the
banker. In the e re pect the case at bar i very di tinguishable
from the ca es cited. If the check n in question had been passed to
a third person, it could not be aid that the defendant knew that
they would not be paid. On the contrary, he had an open account
with the bank, and although he knew there wa nothing due to
him yet he mj o-ht suppose that they would be paid. And the fact
that he presented them him elf, shows that he did not know that
they would be r fu . ed.
The defendant pre. . ented the checks himself, at the counter of
the bank. They were mere reque"t to pay to him the amount
named in them, couched in the appropriate and onl3 language
known there ; and addressed to the person who e peculiar province
~nd dut) it wa to kno-Yv wh ther they ought to be paid or not. He
complied with the reque"ts, and charged the urns paid, to the
defendant, and thu created a contract between the partie . Upon
thi contract the bank mu t rely for redre s.
Thi case lack the elements of the Engli h deci ion . And we
think it would be an unwi e and dangerou con truction of the
tatute, to extend it to tr:m action like this. Thi ca e may come

f

T..iTE \". J ou.r-

2 5

State v. John 285

pretty near the line which divides private frauds from indictable

offences; and at first we were in doubt on which side it would

fall. But, upon a careful examination, we are well satisfied that

it cannot properly be brought within the statute.

Verdict set aside and new trial granted.

EOBBERT.

State V. John, 5 Jones Latv (N. C), 163. (1851.)

Indictment for highway robbery, tried before Manly, J., at

pretty near the line which divide private fraud ~ from indictable
offences; and at first we were in doubt on which ide it would
fall. But, upon a careful xamination, we are w ll ati,_ fi d that
it cannot properly be brought within the tatut .
Verdict set a ide and n ew trial granted.

the last Fall Term of Caswell Superior Court.

The indictment upon which the prisoner was tried, is as fol-

lows:

"State of North Carolina, Superior Court of Law,

Caswell County, Fall Term, 1857.

ROBBERY.

The jurors for the State, upon their oath present, that John,

a negro slave, the property of Samuel Watkins, in the county

State v. John, 5 Jones Law (N. C.), 163.

(1857.)

of Caswell aforesaid, on the nineteenth day of June, in the year

of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty seven, with

force and arms in the county aforesaid, in the common and public

highway of the State, in and upon one Matthew Brooks, then and
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there being in the peace of God, feloniously did make an assault,

and him, the said Matthew Brooks, in bodily fear and danger of

his life in the highway aforesaid, then and there did feloniously

INDICTMENT FOR HIGHWAY ROBRERY, tried before MA . LY, J., at
the last Fall T erm of Caswell Superior Court.
The indictment upon which th prisoner wa tried, i a follows:

put, and one pocket-book, containing divers, to wit, ten, bank-

notes, for the payment of divers sums of money, in the whole

amounting to a large sum of money, to wit, the sum of two hun-

dred and twenty-eight dollars, of the value of two hundred and

"STATE OF NORTH CAROLI "A,
Caswell County,

SUPERIOR COURT OF LAW,
Fall Term, 1857.

twenty-eight dollars, of the goods and chattels of the said Matthew

Brooks, in the highway aforesaid, then and there feloniously and

violently did steal, take and carry away, contrary to the form of

the statute, in such case made and provided, and against the peace

and dignity of the State."

There were two other counts in the Inll, of the same tenor and

cfiect, except that the second charged the stealing of the l)ank-

notes alone, and the third the pocket-l)ook alone.

The evidence upon the only point considered by this Court was,

The jurors for the State, upon their oath pre ent, that John,
a negro lave, the property of Samuel Watkin , in the county
of Caswell afore aid, on the nineteenth day of June, in the year
()f our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty seven, with
force and arm in the county afore aid, in the common and public
highway of the State, in and upon one :Jiiatthew Brooks, then and
there being in the peace of God, fc]oniou ly did make an as ault,
and him, the ai 1 :Matthew Brook , in bodily fear and danger of
11is life in the highway afore aid, then and there did feloniously
put, and one pocket-book, containing divers, to wit, ten, banknotes, for the payment of diver um of money, in the whole
-amounting to a large um of money, to wit, the um of two hundred and twenty-eight dollars, of the value of two hundred and
twenty-eight dollars, of the goods and chattel of the aid Matthew
Brooks, in the highway afore"'aid, then and there feloniou ly an 1
violently did teal, take and carry away, contrary to th form of
the tatute, in uch ca e ma le and provided, and again t th p ace
and dignity of the State."
There were two other counts in the bill, of th am t nor and
-effect, except that the econd charo-nd th . t alino- f th l anknotes alone, and the thir 1 the p ket-hook alon .
The videnc upon th only point con id r d by thi ,ourl wa ·
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that on the 19th of June last, the prosecutor, Brooks, was in Milton

in the county of Caswell, with a wagon and two horses and a por-

tion of his crop of tobacco ; that having sold the tobacco and made

some purchases, he drove out of the town intending to camp at a

cross-road about three miles distant; that at a short distance out-

side of the limits of the town, at a bridge across a small stream, he

stopped to water his horses, and while so engaged, it being then

about dark, a negro came over the bridge from the town, and en-

quired which of the two roads near by he intended to travel ; the

witness told him, and, thereupon, the negro passed on along the

road indicated; that at the same time, another person came over

the bridge and took the other road ; that the witness soon overtook

the negro, and they travelled on together in occasional conversa-

tion, the negro walking and the witness sitting in and driving

his wagon, until the negro told the witness that he had found a

bill of money in the streets of Milton, and he wanted him to look

at it, and tell him how much it was ; that the witness oljjected on

account of its being dark, but the negro insisted, and, after some

further conversation, not material, a torch light was struck from
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matches with pine wood, and the bill examined; that the amount

of the bill excited his suspicions, and he took particuluar notice

of the negro's face, his clothes, &c.; that while the witness was

examining the bill, the negro's hand was felt in his pocket upon

his pocket-book; that the witness immediately seized his arm, the

negro at the same time snatching the bill of money; that a scuffle

ensued, in which the witness was thrown out of the wagon under

the tongue, and when he arose the negro was running off, having

taken the pocket-book from his pocket, and also the bill of money

they were examining; that the pocket-book contained four fifty-

dollar bills, a ten, several fives and a two, making in all two hun-

dred and twenty-seven dollars; that the struggle occurred at a

point in the public road about a mile from Milton, at about nine

o'clock; that the negro in question, was a large and powerful-

looking man. He also testified that the prisoner was the negro

of whom he had spoken.

The case below turned chiefly upon the identity of the prisoner

with the assailant described by the witness; and many exceptions

were taken by the prisoner to the ruling upon questions as to the

evidence offered by the State, and to the charge of his Honor, but as

the consideration of this Court is entirely confined to the suf-

that on the 19th of June last, the prosecutor, Brooks, was in Milton
in the county of Ca well, with a wagon and two hor ses and a portion of hi._ crop of tobacco; that having old the tobacco and made
ome purchase , he drove out of the town intending t o camp at a
cro. -road about three mile di tant; that at a hart distance out~itle of the limits of the town, at a bridge aero s a small ~tream, he
stopped to water hi hor e and while o engaged, it being then
about dark, a negro came over the bridge from the t own, and enquired which of the two road near by he intended to travel; the
witness told him, and, thereupon, the negr o pas ed on along the
road indicated; that at the ame time, another per._on came over
the bridge and took the other road; that the witne..., soon overtook
the negro, and they travelled on together in occa ional conver sation, the negro walking and the witne s sitting in and driving
his wagon, until the nearo told the witnes that he had found a
bill of money in the treets of :Milton, and he wanted him t o look
at it, and tell him how much it wa ; that the 1ritnes objected on
account of it being dark but the negro insi ted, and, after ome
further conversation, not material a torch light wa truck from
matche with pine wood, and the bill examined; that the amount
of the bill excited hi uspicion , and he took particuluar notice
of the negro' face, hi clothe , &c.; that while the witne was
examining the bill, the negro' hand was felt in hi pocket upon
hi pocket-book; that the witne immediately eized hi arm thP
negro at the ame time natching the bill of money; that a scuffle
en ued, in which the witne wa thrown out of the wagon under
the tongue, and when he aro e the negro was running off, having
taken the pocket-book from hi pocket, and al o the bill of money
they were examining; that the pocket-book contained four fiftydollar bills, a ten several five and a two, making in all two hundred and twenty-seven dollars; that the ~truggle occurred at a
point in the public road about a mile from :Jiilton, at about nine
o'clock; that the negro in question, was a large and powerfullooking man. He al o te tified that the pri oner wa the negro
of whom he had poken.
The case below turned chiefly upon the identity of the prisoner
with the as ailant described by the witness; and many exception
were taken by the prisoner to the ruling upon question as to the
evidence offered by the State, an d to the charge of his H onor, but a
the consideration of thi Court i entirely confined to the uf-

STATE

State v. John 287

v.

JOHN

9

7

ficiency of the facts to constitute the crime charged, it is not

deemed essential to state more of the record sent to this Court.

The prisoner was convicted, and, sentence of death having heen

pronounced by the Court, he appealed.

Peaesox, J. :

Robbery is committed by force; larceny by stealth. The original

cause for making highway robbery a capital felony, without bene-

:ficiency of the facts to constitut the crime charged, it i not
deem d e ential to tate more of the record nt to thi Court.
The pri oner wa convicted, and, entence of death having been
pronounced b) the Court, he appealed.

fit of clergy, was an evil practice, in former days very common, of

meeting travellers, and by a display of weapons, or other force,

putting them in fear ("stand and deliver"), and in this way taking

their goods by force. Hence the indictment (the form is still

retained) contains this allegation: "and him (the person robbed)

in bodily fear and danger of his life, in the highway, then and

there, did feloniously put," and it was for a long time held that

the allegation must be proved.

In Foster's Criminal Law, page 128, is this passage: "The

prisoner's counsel say there can be no robbery without the circum-

stance of putting in fear. I think the want of that circumstance

alone ought not to be regarded. I am not clear that that circum-
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stance is, of necessity, to be laid in the indictment so as the fact be

charged to be done nolenter et contra voluntatem. I know there

are opinions in the books which seem to make the circumstance

of fear necessary, but I have seen a good MS. note of an opinion of

Lord Holt to the contrary, and I am very clear that the circum-

stance of actual fear at the time of the robbery, need not be strictly

proved. Suppose the true man is knocked down without any pre-

vious warning to awaken his fears, and lieth totally insensible

while the thief rifleth his pockets, is not this robbery? And yet

where is the circumstance of actual fear? Or suppose the true

man maketh a manful resistance, but is overpowered, and his

property taken from him by the mere dint of superior strength,

this, doubtless, is robbery. In cases where the true man delivereth

his purse without resistance, if the fact be attended with those

circumstances of violence and terror which, in common experience,

are likely to induce a man to part with his property for the sake

of his person, that will amount to a robbery. If fear be a neces-

sary ingredient, the law in odium spoUatoris will presume fear,

where there appeareth to be so just a ground for it."

In Foster's day it would not have occurred to any lawyer, that

J.:
Robbery i committed by force; larceny by tealth. The oriainal
cause for making highway robbery a capital felony, without benefit of clergy, was an evil practice, in former days very common, of
meeting traveller , and by a display of weapons, or other force.•
putting them in fear (" tand and deliver''), and in this way taking
their goods by force. Hence the indictment (the form i till
retained) contains this allegation: "and him (the person robbed)
in bodily fear and danger of his life, in the highway, th n and
there, did feloniously put," and it was for a long time held that
the allegation must be proved.
In Fo . . ter's Criminal Law_, page 128, is thi pa sage: "The
prjsoner's counsel say there can be no robb ery without the circumtance of putting in fear. I think the want or that circum . . tance
alone ought not to be regarded. I am not clear that that circumstance is, of necessity, to be laid in the indictment o a the fact be
charged to be done nolenter et contra voluntatem. I know there
are opinions in the book which seem to make the circum. tance
of fear nece sary, but I have seen a good MS. note of an opinion of
Lord HOLT to the contrary, and I am very clear that the circumstance of actual fear at the time of the robbery, need not be trictly
proved. Suppose the true man is knocked down without any previous warning to awaken hi fears, and lieth totally in en ible
while the thief rifleth his pockets, is not this robbery? And y t
where is the circumstance of actual fear? Or suppose th true
man maketh a manful re istance, but is overpowered, and hi..,
property taken from him by the mere dint of superior trcngth,
this, doubtless, i robbery. In cases where the tru man delivcretli
hi purse without re i . . tance, if the fact be attended with tho e
circumstance of violence and terror which in common exp rienc ,
are likely to induce a man to part with hi property for the ak
of his person, that will amount to a robbery. If f ar be a ne e ary ingredient, the law in odium spoliatori will presume f ar,
where ther appear th to be so just a ground for it."
In Fo ter' day it would not have occurred to any lawyer, that
PE.ARSOX,
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the facts set out in the record, now under consideration, made a

case of highway robbery. There was no violence — no circumstance

of terror resorted to for the purpose of inducing the prosecutor to

part with his property for the sake of his person.

Violence may be used for four purposes : 1st. To prevent re-

sistance. 2nd. To overpower the party. 3rd. To obtain possession

of the property. J:th. To effect an escape. Either of the first

two, makes the offence robbery. The last, I presume it will be

conceded, does not. The third is a middle ground. In general it

does not make the offence robbery, but sometimes, according to

some of the cases, it does. It is necessary, therefore, to see how

the authorities stand in respect to it.

After Foster's day, the idea of robbery was extended so as to

take in a case of snatching a thing out of a person's hand and

making off with it, without further violence; but in Plunket's

case, tried before Buller, J., and Thompson, B., it was held, that

snatching an umbrella out of a lady's hand as she was walking

the street, was not robbery ; and the court say, "It had been ruled

about eighty years ago, by very high authority, that the snatching
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any thing from a person, unawares, constituted robbery; but the

law was now settled, that unless there was some struggle to keep

it, and it were forced from the hand of the owner, it was not so.

This species of larceny seemed to form a middle case between

stealing privately from the person, and taking by force and vio-

lence ;" 2 East's P. C. 703. In Lapier's case, an ear-ring was so

suddenly pulled from a lady's ear that she had no time for resist-

ing, yet being done with such violence as to injure her person, the

blood being drawn from her ear, which was otherwise much hurt,

it was held to be robbery; 2 East's P. C. T08. So in Moore's case,

1 Leach, 335 : A diamond pin, which a lady had strongly fastened

in her hair with a corkscreiv twist, was snatched with so much force

as to tear out a lock of hair, it was held robbery because of the

injury to the person. Possibly the ground on which these two

cases is put may be questioned, as the injury to the person was

accidental, and seems not to have been contemplated, but they

liave no bearing on our case.

In Davies' case the prisoner took hold of a gentleman's sword,

who, perceiving it, laid hold of it at the same time, and struggled

for it. This was adjudged to be robbery ; 2 Easfs P. C. 709.

In Mason's case, 2 Euss. and Pv. 419 (in 1820). the prisoner

the fact set out in the record, now under consideration, made a
case of highway robbery. There was no violence- no circum tance
of terror resorted to for the purpose of inducing the prosecutor to
part with his property for the sake of his person.
Violence may be used for four purpose : 1 t. To prevent reistance. 2nd. To overpower the party. 3rd. To obtain po ession
of the property. ±th. To effect an escape. Either of the first
two, makes the offence robbery. The la t, I presume it will be
~onceded: doeo not. The third is a middle ground. In general it
does not make the offence robbery, but sometimes, according to
some of the cases, it doe . It is neces ary, therefore, to see how
the authoritie tand in re pect to it.
After Foster' day, the idea of robbery wa._ extended so a to
take in a ca c of natching a thing out of a persons hand and
making off with it, without further violence; but in Plunket'
case, tried before BULLER, J., and THOMPso _T, B., it was held, that
snatching an umbrella out of a lady's hand as she was walking
the street, wa not robbery; and the court say, 'It had been ruled
about eighty year ago, by very high authority, that the snatching
any thing from a per~on, unaware , con tituted robbery; but the
law was now settled, that unle s there wa ome truggle to keep
it, and it were forced from the hand of the owner it wa not o.
This species of larceny seemed to form a middle case between
stealing privately from the person, and taking by force and viol ence _;" 2 Ea t's P. C. 703. In La pier's case, an ear-ring wa so
suddenly pulled from a lady's ear that she had no time for resi ting, yet being done with such violence a to injure her person, the
blood being drawn from her ear, which wa otherwise much hurt,
it wa held to be robbery; 2 East's P. C. 708. So in Moore' case,
1 Leach, 335: A diamond pin, which a lady had strongly fastened
in her hair with a corkscrew twist, wa snatched with o much force
as to tear out a lock of hair, it wa held robbery because of the
injury to the person. Pos>;ibly the ground on which these two
ca e is put may be que tioned as the injury to the person wa ..
accidental, and seem not to have been contemplated, but they
ba ve no bearing on our case.
In Davie ' ca~ e the pri oner took hold of a gentleman's word,
who, perceiving it, laid hold of it at the ame time, and struggled
.:for it. Thi was adjudged to be robbery; 2 Ea t' P. C. 709.
In Mason's ca e, 2 Ru._ . and R:-. -t-19 (in 18'20), the pri oner

TATE V .
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took a watch out of a gentleman's pocket, but it was fastened to u

steel chain which was around his neck; the prisoner made two or

three Jerks until he succeeded in breaking the chain; P.ujk B.

instructed the jury that this was robbery; but doubts being ex-

pressed, he referred it to all the Judges, who were unanimous in

the opinion that it was robbery, because of the force used to iDreak

the chain, which was around the gentleman's neck. This is all the

Eeport says. It is short, and to me unsatisfactory, seeming to go

back to the idea of robbery that existed before Plunket's case.

In Gnosil's case, 1 Car. and Payne, 304 (11 E. C. L. Rep. 400,

1824), the prosecutor was going along the street, the prisoner laid

hold of his watch-chain, and with considerable force jerked

it from his pocket, a scuffle then ensued, and the prisoner was

secured; Gareow B., "The mere act of taking, being forcible,

will not make this offence a highway robbery. To constitute the

vrime of highway robbery, the force used must be either before,

or at the time of, the taking, and must be of such a nature as to

show that it was intended to overpower the party robbed or prevent

his resisting, and not merely to get possession of the property
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stolen. Thus, if a man, walking after a woman in the street were,

by violence, to pull her shawl from her shoulders, though he might

use considerable force, it would not, in my opinion, be highway

robbery; because the violence was not for the purpose of over-

powering the party robbed, but only to get possession of the prop-

erty." This decision was four years after Mason's case, and I

suppose Gakrow was then one of the Judges. According to this

case, which is the latest that wo have met with, our case is not

robbery, even if it be admitted to fall under the third head of

violence above enumerated. Our case is clearly distinguishable

from Davies' case, for both parties had hold of the sword and

struggled for it. If Davies had let it go, there would have been

no necessity for violence, and his holding on, and struggling for

it, could only be imputed to his determination to take it by force.

In our case, the prosecutor did not have liold of the pocket-book;

there was no struggle for it; but he had hold of the prisoner's arm.

So he could not, by letting go the pocket-book, have avoided the

necessity for violence, and the struggle in which the prosecutor

fell under the tongue of the wagon, is fairly imputable to an effort

on the part of the prisoner to get loose from his grasp and make

his escape. The only difference, between this case and that of

19

took a watch out of a gentleman pocket, but it wa fa ~tened to ·1
..steel chain which wa around hi neck; the pri oner made two or
three jerks until he ucceeded in breaking the chain;
.J..RK B.
in tructed the jury that thi" wa robbery; but doubt being xpressed1 he referred it to all the Judge , who were unanimou in
the opinion that it wa" robbery, becau e of the force u ed to br ak
the chain, which was around the gentl man' neck. Thi i all th
Report say.-. It i hort, and to me un ati factory eemina0 to 0a
back to the idea of robbery that exi ted before Plunket' ca e.
In Gnosil' ca e, 1 Car. and Payne, 30-± ( 11 E. C. L. R p. 400
1824), the prosecutor was going along the treet, the pri ~oner laid
bold of hi watch-chain, and with con iderable force jerked
it from hi pocket, R cuffie then ensued, and the pri. oner wa
secured; GA.RROW B., "The mere act of taking, being forcibl ,
will not make thi offence a highway robbery. To con titute the
~rime of highway robbery, the force used must be either before
()r at the time of, the taking, and must be of uch a nature a to
how that it was intended to overpower the party robbed or prevent
his resisting, and not merely to get posse ion of the property
stolen. Thus, if a man, walking after a woman in the street were,
by violence,' to pull her shawl from her shoulders, though he might
use considerable force, it would not, in my opinion) be highway
robbery; because the violence wa not for the purpo e of over_powering the party robbed, but only to get possession of the property." Thi. deci ion was four years after Mason' ca e, and I
suppose GARROW was then one of the Judges. According to thi
case, which is the late t that we have met with, our ca e is not
robbery, even if it be admitted to fall under the third head of
violence above enumerated. Our ca e i clearly di tingui hablc
from Davie ' case, for both parties had hold of the sword and
sfruggled for H. If Davies had let it go, there would have been
no necessity for violence, and hi holding on, and struggling for
it, could only be imputed to his determination to take it by fore .
In our case, the pro ecutor did not hm:e hold of the pock t-book;
-there was no . truagle for it; but he had hold of the prisoner'.~ arm.
So he could not, by letting go the pocket-book have avoided the
n eces ity for violence, and the truggle in which the pro cutor
fell under the tongue of the wagon, is fairly imputabl to an 0ffort
on the part of the pri oner to get loo e from hi gra p and make
hi escape. The only difference. betwe n thi
and that of
19
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Gnosil, is, that the one succeeded in getting loose and the other

was less fortunate. Suppose, in the struggle, the prosecutor had

been too strong for the prisoner, and had succeeded in arresting

him, there was a taking of the pocket-book and an asportavit, so

as to constitute larceny in "picking of the pocket," but would

any one have said it amounted to robbery ? Can the nature of the

offence be changed by the accident, that the prisoner succeeded in

getting away, because the prosecutor happened to fall on the

tongue and double tree, which broke his hold from the arm of the

prisoner ?

Our case is also clearly distinguishable from Mason's case. The

watch was fastened to a steel chain, which was around the necl- of

the prosecutor. Had Mason let the watch go, there would have

been no necessity for violence; his holding on and jerlcing until

he broke the chain, could only be imputed to a determination to

take the watch by force.

Trexler's case, 2 Car. Law Eepos. 90, was also cited in the

argument. That was an indictment for forcible trespass. The

defendant had taken a bank-note out of the pocket-book of
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the prosecutor, who tried to get it away from him. He resisted

and a struggle ensued. Seawell, J., arguendo^ expresses the

opinion that the evidence showed force enough to constitute rob-

bery, although the prosecutor did not have hold of the bank-note.

This, I suppose, was said to meet what Buller says in Plunkett's

case, "unless there was some struggle to keep it, and it were

forced from the hand of the owner." However that may be, it is

sufficient to say that was a mere dictum. It is true. Judge Sea-

well was greatly distinguished as a criminal lawyer, but a dictum

in reference to a capital offence, cannot be much relied on when

thrown out in considering a misdemeanor.

After much consideration, I am convinced that the facts set

out in this record, do not constitute highway robbery. I am,

therefore, of opinion that the Judgment ought to be reversed, and

a venire de novo awarded.

Battle, J. :

Mv associate. Judge Pearson, thinks that the facts stated in the

prisoner's bill of exceptions, do not constitute a case of robbery,

but of larceny only. After an examination of all the authorities

upon the subject, which I have been able to find, and much reflec-

Gnosil, is, that the one succeeded in getting loose and the other
was le s fortunate. Suppo e, in the struggle, the prosecutor had
been too trong for the prisoner, and had ucceeded in arresting
him, there wa a taking of the pocket-book and an asportavit, o
as to constitute larceny in "picking of the pocket," but would
any one have said it amounted to robbery? Can the nature of the
offence be changed by the accident: t hat the pri oner succeeded in.
getting away, because the prosecutor happened to fa]l on the
tongue and double tree, which broke hi hold from the arm of theprisoner?
0 LlT ca ~ e is also clearly di. tingui hable from l\fa on's case. The
watch wa fastened to a steel chain, which was around th e neck of
tlze prosecutor. H ad Mason let the watch go, there would have
been no nece sity for violence ; his holding on and j erking until
he broke the chain could only be imputed to a determination to
take the watch by force.
Trexler' ca e, 2 Car. Law Repos. 90, was also cited in the
argument. That was an indictment fo r forcible tre pa s. The
defendant had taken a bank-note out of the pocket-book of
the prosecutor, who tried to get it away from him. He r esi ted
ancl a struggle en~ucc1. SK.\. WELL, J., arguendo, expresse the
opinion that the evidence showed force enough to constitute robbery, although the prosecutor did not have hold of the bank-note.
This, I suppose, was said to meet what BULLER ay in Plunketts
ca e "unles there wa some truggle to keep it, and it were
forced from the hand of th e owner." However that may be, it i
sufficient to say that wa a mere dictum. It is true, Judge SEAWELL was greatly di tingui hed as a criminal lawyer, but a dictum
in reference to a capital offence, cannot be much relied on when
thrown out in con idering a mi demeanor.
After much con ideration, I am convinced that the fact set
out in this r ecord, do not con titute highway robbery. I am,
therefore: of opinion that the judgment ought to be reversed, anci
a venfre de nova awarded.
J.:
1fy associate_, Judge Pearson, think · that the facts tated in the
pric;oner' ~ bill of exceptions, do not con titute a ca e of robbery
but of larcenv only. After an examination of all the authorities
upon th e suhjcct: which I have been able to find, and much r eflecBATTLE,
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tion upon the principles they seem to establish, I am constrained

to say that I do not entirely agree with him. I feel, however,

that I ought not to permit my dissent to go so far as to prevent

my agreeing that the prisoner shall have a new trial. The absence

of the Chief Justice, caused by severe sickness, leaves but two

members on the bench, and my refusal to concur in reversing the

judgment and having a venire de novo awarded, would have the

effect to keep the prisoner in jail six months longer, which I am

unwilling to do. Another reason influences me to adopt the course

which I am pursuing, which is, that the attention of the Court and

counsel were so much taken up on the trial with the main defense

of the prisoner, to wit, the alleged defect in the proof of his iden-

titv, that the minute circumstances attending the taking of the

prosecutor's pocket-book, do not appear to have been brought out

with that fullness and particularity, as to make us sure that we

have the true character of the transaction before lis. That of

course can and will be done on the next trial.

I will now content myself with a brief statement of the reasons

which incline me to the opinion that, upon the facts and circum-
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stances as they now appear upon the record, the prisoner is guilty

of robbery.

All the more recent writers on criminal law concur, with singular

unanimity, in defining what is the kind of taking with violence

which is necessary to constitute robbery. Sir William Eussell says,

that "the rule appears to be well-established, that no sudden taking

or snatching of property from a person unawares, is sufficient to

constitute robbery, unless some injury be done to the person, or

there be some previous struggle for the possession of the property,

or some force used in order to obtain it." 2 Euss. on Cr. and

Mis. G8. In Archbold's C. P. 225, the same language is used.

Eoscoe's Crim. Ev. 898 (oth Am. from the 3rd Lon. Ed.), says

there must "Some injury be done to the person, or some previous

struggling for the possession of the property." Mr. Chitty in his

3rd vol. Crim. Law, 804, has it, that "there must be a struggle,

or at least a personal outrage." The language of Mr. East, in his

1 P. Cr. 708, is nearly the same with that of Eussell, "That there

m.ust be some injury to the person or some previous struggle for

the possession of the property." In his notes to 4th vol. Bl. Com.

243, Mr. Chitty says, "To constitute a robbery where an actual

violence is relied on, and no putting in fear can be expressly

tion upon the principles they ~eem to e tabli h, I am convtrainecl
to ay that I do not entirely agree with him. I feel, however,
that I ought not to permit my di ent to go o far a to pr vent
my agreeing that the pri oner hall have a new trial. The ab.,ence
of the Chief Justice, cau ed by severe sickne s, leave8 but two
members on the bench, and my refusal to concur in rever ing the
judgment and having a venire de nova awarded, would have the
effect to keep the prisoner in jail ix month longer, which I am
unwil1ing to do. Another reason influences me to adopt th cour e
which I am pursuing, which is, that the attention of the Court and
counsel were so much taken up on the trial with the main defense
of the prisoner, to wit, the alleged defect in the proof of hi identitv, that the minute circumstances attending the taking of the
pro ecutor's pocket-book, do not appear to have been brought out
with that fullne s and particularity, as to make us sure that we
have the true character of the transaction before llS. That of
course can and will be done on the next trial.
I will now content my elf with a brief statement of the reasons
which incline me to the opinion that, upon the facts and circumstances as they now appear upon the record, the pri oner i guilty
of robbery.
All the more r ecent writers on criminal law concur, with singular
unanimity, in defining what is the kind of taking with violence
which i neces"ary to con.. , titute robbery. Sir William Rus ell says,
that "the rule appear to be well-established, that no sudden taking
or natching of property from a person unaware , is sufficient to
con titute robherv, unless vome injury be done to the person, or
there be some previou struggle for the po e sion of the property,
or ome force u ed in order to obtain it." 2 Rus . on Cr. and
"Jii . GS. In Archbold' C. P. 225, the ame language i u eel.
Ro coe' Crim. E v. _t 98 (5th Arn. from the 3rd Lon. Ed.), ays
there mu t "Some injury be done to the per on, or ome pr vious
trug ling for the po e sion of the property." ilir. Chitty in hi
3rd vol. Crim. Law, 80-±, has it, that "there mu t be a trugglc,
r at lea t a per. anal outrage. ' The language of :Jir. Ea t in hi
1 P . Cr. 708, i nearly the ame with that of Ru ell, 'That th re
mu. t be some injury to the per on or om e pr viou truggle for
the po e ion of the property." In his note to 4th vol. Bl. om.
243, Mr. Chitty ay , "To constitute a robbery wher an actual
violence i relied on, and no putting in fear can b exprc ly
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shown, there must be a struggle, or at least a personal outrage.'*

All these able and eminent writers upon the criminal law agree in

this, that if there be a struggle for the possession of the property,

or a personal outrage, it is robbery, and refer, in support of their

position, to tlie cases, the most, if not all of which are cited and

commented upon in the opinion of my brother Pearson.

New, it seems to me, that in the case before us, the testimony

of the prosecutor. Brooks, shows something very much like a

struggle for the pocket-book before the prisoner succeeded in taking

it from the pocket of the prosecutor and running off with it. The

distinction between a struggle to escape and one to carry off the

property, when the prisoner did both, is in my estimation almost

too refined for practical use. I admit that the case of Bex v.

Gnosil, tried before Baron Gaerow^ is an authority against the

position that a mere struggle for the possession of the property,

is alone sufficient to make out a case of robbery. I have only to

say of that case, that it is but the opinion of a single Judge against

the whole current of the previous adjudications; and it is a little

singular that it does not seem to have been noticed by any of the
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text writers, whose works have have been published since the

decision was made. I am not inclined, therefore, to place much

reliance upon it.

Having accomplished my purpose of stating shortly the reasons

wh}' I do not altogether concur in the opinion of my associate, I

conclude with expressing again my willingness, for the reasons

above given, that the prisoner shall have another trial.

Per Curiam — Let the judgment be reversed, and this opinion

certified, to the end that the prisoner may have a new trial.

Beceiving Stolen Goods.

Murio V. State, 31 Tex. App. 210. (1892.)

Appeal from the District Court of Travis. Tried below before

Hon. James H. Eobektson.

The indictment in this case charged appellant by two separate

counts, the first for the theft of 416 pounds of coffee, and the

second for receiving and concealing said coffee, knowing it to have

been stolen. At his trial he was convicted under the second count

~hown,

there must be a struggle, or at least a personal outrage.''
All these able and emjnent writers upon the criminal law agree in
thjs, that if there be a struggle for the possession of the property,
or a personal outrage, it is robbery, and refer, in support of their
position, to the ca es, the most, if not all of which are cited and
commented upon in the opinion of my brother PEARSON.
N cw, it seems to me, that in the ca e before us, the testimony
of the prosecutor, Brooks, show something very much like a
struggle for the pocket-book before the prisoner ucceecled in taking
it from the pocket of i.he prosecutor and running off with it. The
distinction between a struggle to escape and one to carry off the
property, when the prisoner did both, is in my estimation almost
too refined for practical use. I admit that the case of Rex v.
Gnosil, tried before Baron GARROW, is an authority against the
position that a mere struggle for the po e sion of the property,
is alone sufficient to make out a case of robbery. I have only to
say of that case, that it is but the opinion of a ingle Judg~ against
the whole current of the previous adjudications; and it is a little
singular that it does not seem to have been noticed by any of the
text writers, whose works have have been published since the
decision was made. I am not inclined, therefore, to place much
reliance upon it.
Having accomplished my purpose of stating shortly the reasons
why I do not altogether concur in the opinion of my associate, I
conclude with expressing again my willingness, for the reasons
above given, that the prisoner shall have another trial.
PER CuRIAM-Let the judgment be reversed, and this opinion
certified, to the end that the prisoner may have a new trial.

RECEIVING STOLE

Goons.

Murio v. State, 31 T ex. App. 210.

{1892.)

APPEAL from the Di trict Court of Travis. Tried below before
Hon. JAMES H. ROBERTSON.
The indictment in this case charged appellant by two separate
counts, the first for the theft of 416 pound of coffee, and the
second for receiving and concealing said coffee, knowing it to have
been stolen. At his trial he was convicted under the second count

1'1URIO

v.

ST.ATE

MuRio V. State ?r)3

for receiving and concealing said property, and given as his pun-

ishment two years confinement in the penitentiary.

The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

SiMKiNs, Judge :

for receiving and concealing aid property, and given a his punishment two year confinement in the penitentiary.
T he :facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Defendant was convicted of receiving stolen property of the

value of $20, and sentenced to two years in the penitentiary, from

which he appeals.

8 IMKINSJ JUDGE :

On the night of March 30, 1892, a freight car loaded with coffee

and other products, on the International & Great Northern Railway

at Austin, was broken open and about 416 pounds of coffee taken

therefrom. On the morning of April 1 a portion of this coffee,

164 pounds, was found in defendant's house, spread on the floor,

and covering thrown over it to resemble a bed, and in the corner

was a box marked "A. Frank & Co., San Antonio." When the

coffee was found, defendant hung his head and said nothing, but

that he could not speak English nor the sheriff speak Spanish.

Three witnesses, defendant's wife being one, proved that one

Nestoro was indebted to defendant, and told him he had coffee

which he had taken on a debt, and he wanted defendant to sell
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some of it on commission and pay himself, and he delivered the

coffee to him for that purpose. That defendant is a Mexican

and can not speak English. J. Reed, a wood dealer in Austin,

testified to defendant's lionesty and industry.

The only rebutting testimony was the witness Nestoro, who

denied giving the coffee to defendant; but it was admitted that he

was under indictment for the theft of the same goods. There is no

question that the coffee found in defendant's possession had been

stolen from the freight car on the International & Great jSTorthern

Railway. It was sufficiently identified. The only question that

demands consideration is the sufficiency of the testimony to sus-

tain the conviction.

Before he received the coffee defendant was informed by Nestoro

that he, Nestoro, had taken the coffee in payment for a debt. Un-

der the statute the party receiving the stolen property must know

it was stolen (Penal Code, article 743; Wilson's case, 12 Texas

Court of Appeals, 481) ; and guilty knowledge and the receiving

of the stolen goods must concur. Arcia's case, 26 Texas Ct. App.

193; Nourse's case, 2 Texas Ct. App. 304. But guilty knowledge

can be implied if defendant received the goods under circum-

Defendant was convicted o:f rece1vmg stolen property o:f thevalue of $20, and sentenced to two year· in the penitentiary, :from
which he appeals.
On the night of March 30, 1892, a freight car loaded with coffee
and other products, on the International & Great Northern Railway
at Austin, was broken open and about 416 pounds of coffee taken
therefrom. On the morning o:f April 1 a portion of this coffee,
164 poundc:, was found in defendant's house, spread on the floor,
and covering thrown over it to resemble a bed, and in the corner
was a box marked "A. Frank & Co., San Antonio." When the
coffee was found_, defendant hung his head and said nothing, but
that he could not spenk English nor the sheriff speak Spanish.
Three witnesses, defendant's wi:fe being one, proved that one
N estoro was indebted to defendant, and told him he had coffee
which he had taken on a debt, and he wanted defendant to s 11
some of it on commission and pay himsel:f, and he delivered the
coffee t o him for that purpose. That defendant is a Mexican
and can not speak Engli. h. J. Reed, a wood dealer in Austin,
testified to defendant's honesty and industry.
The only rebutting testimony was the witness N estoro, who
denied giving the coffee to defendant; but it was admitted that he
was under indictment for the theft of the same good . There is no
que tion that the coffee found in de:fendant's possession ha 1 been
stolen from the freight car on the International & Great N orthcrn
Railway. It was ufficiently identified. The only question that
demands consideration i the ~ufficiency of the te timony to sustain the conviction.
Before he received the coffee defendant wa informcCI. by N esi.oro
that he, N estoro, had taken the coffee in payment for a debt.
nder the statute the party receiving the stolen property mu t know
it was . tolen (Penal Code, article 743; Wilson' a c, 12 '11 xa
Court of AppeaL, -1 81); and guilty knowl dg and th rec i ingof the stolen goocls mu t concur. Arcia' ca e, 26 T xa Ct. App.
193; Nour e' ca e, 2 Texa Ct. App. 304-. But guilty knowl clcr
can be implied if defendant received the ood und r fr um0
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stances sufficient to satisfy a man of ordinary intelligence and

caution that the goods were stolen. Desty's Crim. Law, 147a;

Commomuealth v. Firm, 108 Mass. 466. Conceding that defend-

ant received the goods from the witness Nestoro to sell on com-

mission, yet the fact that when Nestoro proposed to defendant to

deliver him the coffee, defendant asked where he got it, strongly

suggesting previous acquaintance with Mr. Nestoro alias Sanches

(as he is called by defendant's wife and witness), and the further

fact, and when Nestoro brings him the coffee, at night, it is un-

boxed and the j^ackages are arranged in the form of a bed and

covered, may have been regarded by the jury as ample proof of

guilty knowledge, and we can not say that they are not justified

in so finding.

The judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Judges all present and concurring.

Forgery.

Commonwealtli v. Baldwin, 11 Gray (Mass.), 197. (1858.)

Thomas, J. :
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This is an indictment for the forgery of a promissory note. The

indictment alleges that the defendant at Worcester in this county

"feloniously did falsely make, forge and counterfeit a certain false,

forged and counterfeit promissory note, which false, forged and

counterfeit promissory note is of the following tenor, that is to

say:

stances sufficient to satisfy a man of ordinary intelligence and
caution that the goods were stolen. Desty's Crim. Law, 147a;
Conimonwealth v. Ffrm, 108 Mass. 466. Conceding that defendant received the goods from the witness N estoro to sell on commission, yet the fad that when N estoro proposed to defendant to
deliver him the coffee, defendant asked where he got it, strongly
suggesting previous acquai11fance with Mr. N estoro alias Sanches
(as he is called by defendant's wife and witness), and the further
fact, and when N estoro brings him the coffee, at night, it is unboxed and the packages are arranged in the form of a bed and
covered, may ha ve been regarded by the jury as ample proof of
guilty knowledge, and we can not say that they are not justified
in so finding.
The judgment i affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges all present and concurring.

'$457.88. Worcester, Aug. 21, 1856. Four months after date

we promise to pay to the order of Russell Phelps four hundred

FORGERY.

fifty seven dollars ^'^/i,hi' payable at Exchange Bank, Boston, value

received. Schouler, Baldwin & Co.'

with intent thereby then and there to injure and defraud said

Eussell Phelps."

Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 11 Gray (Mass.), 197.

(1858.)

The circumstances under which the note was given are thus

stated in the bill of exceptions: Russell Phelps testified that the

r_rHOl\US,

J. :

note was executed and delivered by the defendant to him at the

Bay State House in Worcester, on the 21st of August, 1856, for

a note of equal amount, which he held, signed by the defendant

'rhis is an indictment for the forgery of a promissory note. The
indictment alleges that the defendant at Worcester in this county
"feloniously did falsely make, forge and counterfeit a certain false,
forged and counterfeit promissory note, which false, forged and
counterfeit promissory note is of the following tenor, that is to
say:
'$457.88. Worcester, Aug. 21, 1856. Four 111onths after date
we promise to pay to the order of Russell Phelps four hundred
fifty seven dollars 88/ 100, payable at E xchange Bank, Boston, value
received.
Schouler, Baldwin & Co.'
with intent thereby then and there to injure and defraud said
Russell Phelps."
The circumstances under which the note was given are thus
stated in the bill of exceptions: Russell Phelps testified that the
note was executed and delivered by the defendant to him at the
Bay State House in Worcester, on the 21st of August, 1856, for
a note of equal amount, which he held, signed by the defendant

Co:\Il\WXWEALTII '· BA.LDWIN"
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in his individual name, and which was overdue; and that in reply

to the inquiry who were the members of the firm of Schouler,

Baldwin & Co. the defendant said, "Henry W. Baldwin, and

William Schouler of Colum.bus." He further said that no person

was represented by the words "& Co." It appeared in evidence that

the note signed Schouler, Baldwin & Co. was never negotiated

by Eussell Phelps. The government offered evidence which tended

to prove either that there never had been any partnership between

Schouler and Baldwin, the defendant; or, if there ever had been

a partnership, that it was dissolved in the month of July, 1856.

The question raised at the trial and discussed here is whether

the execution and delivery of the note, under the facts stated, and

with intent to defraud, was a forgery.

It would be difficult perhaps by a single definition of the crime

of forgery to include all possible cases. Forgery, speaking in gen-

eral terms, is the false making or material alteration of or addition

to a written instrument for the purpose of deceit and fraud. It

may be the making of a false writing purporting to be that of

another. It may the alteration in some material particular of a
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genuine instrument by a change of its words or figures. It may

be the addition of some material provision to an instrument other-

wise genuine. It may be the appending of a genuine signature of

another to an instrument for which it was not intended. The

false writing, alleged to have been made, may purport to be

the instrument of a person or firm existing, or of a fictitious person

or firm. It may be even in the name of the prisoner, if it purports

to be, and is desired to be received as the instrument of a third

person having the same name.

As a general rule, however, to constitute forgery, the writing

falsely made must purport to be the writing of another party than

the person making it. The mere false statement or implication

of a fact, not having reference to the person by whom the instru-

ment is executed, will not constitute the crime.

An exception is stated to this last rule by Coke, in the Third

Institute, 1G9, where A. made a feoffment to B. of certain land,

and afterwards made a feoffment to C. of the same land with

an antedate before the feoffment to B. This was certainly making

a false instrument in one's own name; making one's own act to

appear to have been done at a time when it was not in fact done.

We fail to understand on what prinicple this case can rest. If

in his individual name, and which was overdue ; and that in reply
to the inquiry who were the members of the firm of Schouler,
Baldwin & Co. the defendant said, "Henry W. Baldwin, and
William Schouler of Columbu ." He further aid that no person
was represented by the words "& Co." It appeared in evidence that
the note signed Schouler, Baldwin & Co. wa never negotiated
by Ru sell Phelps. The government offered evidence which t ended
io prove either that there never had been any partnership between
Schouler and Baldwin, the defendant; or, if there ever had been
a partnership, that it wa dissolved in the month of July, 1856.
The question rai. ed at the trial and discussed here i::i whether
i:he execution and delivery of the note, under the facts stated, and
with intent to defraud, was a forgery.
It would be difficult perhaps by a single definition or the crime
of forgery to include all possible cases. Forgery, speaking in general terms, i the false making or material alteration of or addition
to a written instrument for the purpose of deceit and frau<l. It
may be the making of a fal e writing purporting to be that of
.another. It may the alteration in some material particular of a
genuine in. trument by a change of its words or figures. It may
be the additi0n of some material provision to an instrument otherwise genuine. It may be the appending of a genuine signature of
another to an instrument for which it was not intended. The
false writing, alleged to have been made, may purport to be
the in trument of a person or firm existing, or of a :fictitious person
-Or firm. It may be even in the name of the prisoner, if it purports
to be, and is desired to be received as the instrument of a third
person having the same name.
As a general rule, however, to constitute forgery, the writing
falsely made must purport to be the writing of another party than
the person making it. The mere fal e statement or implication
of a fact, not having reference to the person by whom the instrument is executed, will not constitute the crime.
An exception i.., stated to this la t rule by Coke, in the Third
In, titute, 169, where A. made a fco:ffment to B. of certain lan 1,
and afterward ~ made a feoffment to C. of the same Janel with
an antedate before the feoffment to B. This was certainly making
a false instrument in one's own name; making one' own act to
appear to have been done at a time when it was not in fact done.
We fail to understand on what prinicple thi case can rest. If
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the instrument had been executed in the presence of the feoffee

and antedated in his presence, it clearly could not have been

deemed forgery. Beyond this, as the feoffment took effect, not by

the charter of feoffment^ but by the livery of seisin — the entry

of the feoffor upon the land with the charter and the delivery of

the twig or clod in the name of the seisin of all the land contained

in the deed — it is not easy to see how the date could be material.

The case of Mead v. Young, 4 T. E. 28, is cited as another ex-

ception to the rule. A bill of exchange payable to A. came into

the hands of a person not the payee, but having the same name

with A. This person indorsed it. In an action by the indorsee

against the acceptor, the question arose whether it was competent

for the defendant to show that the person indorsing the same was

not the real payee. It was held competent, on the ground that

the indorsement was a forgery, and that no title to the note could

be derived through a forgery. In this case of Mead v. Young,.

the party assumed to use the name and power of the payee. The

indorsement purported to be used was intended to be taken as that

of another person, the real payee.
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The writing alleged to be forged in the case at bar was the

handwriting of the defendant, known to be such and intended

to be received as such. It binds the defendant. Its falsity consists

in the implication that he was a partner of Schouler and authorized

to bind him by his act. This, though a fraud, is not, we think,

a forgery.

Suppose the defendant had said in terms, "I have authority

to sign Schouler's name," and then had signed it in the presence

of the promisee. He would have obtained the discharge of the

former note by a false pretence, a pretence that he had authority

to bind Schouler. "It is not," says Sergeant Hawkins, "the bare

writing of an instrument in another's name without his privity,

but the giving it a false appearance of having been executed by

him, which makes a man guilty of forgery." 1 Hawk. c. 70, § 5.

If the defendant had written upon the note, "William Schouler

by his agent Henry W. Baldwin," the act plainly would not have

been forgery. The party taking the note knows it is not the per-

sonal act of Schouler. He does not rely upon his signature. He

is not deceived by the semblance of his signature. He relies solely

upon the averred agency and authority of the defendant to bind

' Schouler. So, in the case before us, the note was executed in the

th r in trurnent had been executed in the presence of the feoffee
and antedated in his pre"ence, it clearly could not have been
deemed forgery. Beyond this, as the feoffment took effect, not by
the charter of feoffment, but by the livery of seisin- the entry
of the feoffor upon the land with the charter and the delivery of
th - twig or clod in the name of the sei in of all the land contained
in the deed-it is not ea y to see how the date could be materiaL
The case of M ead v. Young, 4 T. R. 28, is cited a another ex-·
ception to the rule. A bill of exchange payable to A. came into·
the hands of a person not the payee, but having the same name
with A. This per on indor ed it. In an action by the indorsee
against the acceptor, the que tion arose whether it wa competent
for the defendant to shmv that the person indorsing the same was
not the r eal payee. It was held competent, on the ground that
the indor ement wa a fo rgery, and that no title to the note could
be derived through a fo rgery. In this ca e of M ead v. Young ,.
the party assumed to use the name and power of the payee. The·
indorsern ent purported to be used was intended to be taken as that
of another per on, the r eal payee.
The writing alleged to be forged in the case at bar wa the
handwriting of the defendant, known to be such and intended
t o be received as such. It binds the defendant. Its fal ity consists.
in the implication that he was a partner of Schouler and authorized
to bind him by his act. This, though a fraud, is not, we think,
a forgery.
Suppose the defendant had said in terms, "I have authority
to sign Schouler' n ame," and then had signed it in the presenc&
of the promisee. H e would have obtained the discharge of the
fo rmer n ote by a fal e pretence, a pretence that he had authority
to bind Schoulcr. " It i not," ay Sergeant H awkins, " the bare
writing of an instrument in another's name without his privity,
but the giving it a fa] e appearance of having been executed by
him, which makes a man guilty of forgery." 1 Hawk. c. 70, § 5.
Ii the defendant had written upon the note, "William Schouler
by his agent H enry W. Baldwin,'' the act plainly would no t have
been fo rgery. The party taking th e note knows it is not the per. onal act of Schoulcr. H e doe not rely upon his signature. H e
i" not deceived by the emblance of his signature. H e relies solely
upon the averred agency and authority of the defendant t o bind
· Schouler. So, in the case before us, the note was executed in the
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presence of the promisee. He knew it was not Schouler's signa-

ture. He relied upon the defendant's statement of his authority

to bind him as partner in the firm of Schouler, Baldwin & Co. Or

if the partnership had in fact before existed but was then dissolved.

the effect of the defendant's act was a false representation of its

continued existence.

In the case of Regina v. White, 1 Denison, 208, the prisoner

indorsed a bill of exchange, "per procuration, Thomas Tomlinson,

Emanuel White." He had no authority to make the indorsement,

but the twelve judges held unanimously that the act was no forgery.

The nisi prius case of Regina v. Rogers, 8 Car. & P. 629, has

some semblance to the case before us. The indictment was for

uttering a forged acceptance of a bill of exchange. It was sold

and delivered by the defendant as the acceptance of Xicholson &

Co. Some evidence was offered that it was accepted by one T.

Nicholson in the name of a fictitious firm. The instructions to

the jury were perhaps broad enough to include the case at bar,

but the jury having found that the acceptance was not writen by

T. Nicholson, the case went no further. The instructions at nisi
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prius have no force as precedent, and in principle are plainly be-

yond the line of the settled cases.

The result is that the exceptions must be sustained and a new

trial ordered in the common pleas. It will be observed, however,

that the grounds on which the exceptions are sustained seem neces-

sarily to dispose of the cause.

Exceptions sustained.

Uttering Forged Paper.

People V. Caton, 25 Mich. 388. (1872.)

COOLEY, J. :

The prisoner was convicted on an information, charging that he-

"did utter and publish as true, a certain false, forged and counter-

feited instrument and writing for the payment of money, in the

likeness and similitude of a mortgage" of lands. It is objected

that the information charges no offense, a mortgage not being

among the instruments mentioned in the statute under which it is

drawn.

The statute (Comp. L., § 5803) provides that, "Every person

presence of the promi ee. He knew it wa not Schouler's ignature. He relied upon the defendant' tatement of his authorit y
to bind him a partner in the firm of Schouler, Baldwin & Co. Or
if the partner hip had in fact before exi ted but wa then di soh·ed,
the effect of the defendant' act wa a fal e representation of it~
continued exi ·tence.
In the ca e of Regina v. White, 1 Deni on, 208, the pri oner·
indor ed a bill of exchange, "per procuration, Thomas Tomlinson,
Emanuel White.' He had no authority to make the indor ement,_
but the twelve judges held unanimously that the act was no forgery.
The nisi prius case of Regina v. Rog ers, 8 Car. & P. 699, has
ome semblance to the case before us. The indictment wa for
uttering a forged acceptance of a bill of exchange. It wa · old
and delivered by the defendant as the acceptance of Nicholson &
Co. Some evidence was offered that it was accepted ty one T ~
Nicholsen in the name of a fictitious firm. The in truction to
the jury were perhap broad enough to include the case at bar,
but the jury having found that the acceptance wa not writen by
T. Nichol on, the ca e went no further. The instruction at nisi
prius have no force as precedent, and in principle are plainly beyond the line of the "ettled cases.
The re ult is that the exceptions mu t be sustained and a new
trial ordered in the common plea . It will be observed, however,
that the grounds on which the exceptions are su tained seem nece sarily to dispose of the cause.
Exceptions sustained.
UTTERING FORGED PAPER.

People v. Caton, 25 Mich. 3 8.

{1872.)

J.:
The pri oner wa convicted on an information, charging that he"did utter and publi h a true, a certain fal e, forged and counterfeited in trument and writing for the payment of money in the
likene and ~ imilitude of a mortgage" of land . It i objected
that the information charge no often e a mortgag not being
among the in truments mentioned in the tatute under which it i"
drawn.
The ta tute (Comp. L., § 5803) provide that "Every per on
COOLEY,

298 Uttering Forged Paper

. 98

UTTERING FORGED PA.PER

who shall utter and publish as true, any false, forged, altered, or

counterfeit record, deed, instrument, or other writing mentioned

in the preceding section knowing the same to be false," etc., shall

be punished, etc.

It is not disputed that a mortgage, in the legal sense, is a

deed; but it is insisted that in common parlance a distinction is

taken between the two instruments; the term, deed, being applied

to conveyances of land, which, in this State at least, a mortgage is

not. And the argument is, that the word deed has been used in the

statute in the sense in which it is commonly used and employed;

or, at least, that the rules of strict construction applicable to

criminal statutes would require us so to hold.

We are not prepared to yield our assent to this argument. The

statute employs a general term which covers instruments given for

a o-reat variety of purposes, and it gives no indication of an intent

to confine its operation to deeds of lands ; much less to that class

■of deeds of lands which convey the legal title. There is abundant

reason to believe, on the other hand, that the word is used in the

broad legal sense in which it is understood at the common law ; for
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the purpose of the legislature has evidently been to give, hy the use

of general words, such an enumeration of the instruments likely

to be the subject of forgery as to embrace all the valuable writings,

by the false making or altering of which, innocent persons might

be in danger of being defrauded. The section preceding the one

on which the information is based, and to which it refers, enumer-

ates a public record, certificate, return, or attestation of a public

officer, any charter, deed, will, testament, bond or writing obligatory,

letter of attorney, policy of insurance, bill of lading, or discharge

for money or other property, any acceptance of a bill of exchange,

or indorsement, or assignment of a bill of exchange or promissory

note for the payment of money, any accountable receipt for money,

goods, or other property. We can not enlarge a criminal statute

by construction ; neither, where the evident purpose is, to make it

so comprehensive, are we at liberty to restrict it. "Amj deed" will

certainly include a deed of mortgage.

It is also objected that there was no evidence of the uttering

and publishing to go to the jury. We think that, on the testimony

'of Mr. Elwood, the jury would have been warranted in finding

that a negotiation for the sale of the mortgage was entered upon

with him, and that the forged paper was put into his hands as a

who hall utter and publi h as true, any fal e, forged, altered, or
counterfeit record, deed, in trument, or other writing mentioned
in the preceding '"'ection knowing the ame to be false," etc., shall
be punished: etc.
It is not disputed that a mortgage, in the legal sense, is a
deed; but it i insisted that in common parlance a di tinction i
taken between the two in trument ; the term, deed, being applied
to conveyances of land, which, in thi State at lea t, a mortgage is
not. And the argument is, that the word deed ha been used in the
statute in the sen e in which it is commonly used and employed;
or, at least, that the rule.... of strict con truction applicable t o
criminal statute would require us so to hold.
We are not prepared to yield our assent to this argument. The
tatute employs a general term which cover in truments given for
a great variety of purpose , and it give no indication of an intent
to confine its operation to deeds of lands; much le s to that cla s
of deeds of lands which convey the legal title. There i abundant
rea on to believe; on the other hand, that the word is used in the
broad legal sense in which it is under"tood at the common law; fo r
the purpose of the legislature has evidently been to give, hy the use
of general word , such an enumeration of the in trument likely
to be the subject of forgery as to embrace all the valuable writings,
by the false making or altering of which, innocent p r ons might
be in danger of being defrauded. The ection preceding the one
on which the information is based, and to which it refer._ , enumerate a public record, certificate, return, or attestation of a public
officer, any charter, deed, will, testament, bond or writing obligator;,
letter of attorney, policy of in urance, bill of lading, or discharge
for money or other property, any acceptance of a bill of exchange,
or indorsement, or as . . ignrnent of a bill of exchange or promissory
note for the payment of money, any accountable receipt for money,
good , or other property. We can not enlarge a criminal statute
by construction· neither where the evident purpose is, to make it
o comprehensive, are 1Ye at liberty to restrict it. 'Any deed" will
certainly include a deed of mortgage.
It i also objected tbat there was no evidence of the uttering
and publishing to go to the jury. We think that, on the testimony
·of Mr. Elwood, the jury would have been warranted in finding
that a negotiation for the sale of the mortgage wa entered upon
with him, and that the forged paper wa put into hi hand as a
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genuine instrument, ready for his acceptance as such, had he been

jjrepared then, on behalf of the bank, to close the transaction.

And these facts, if found, we think, would have constituted an

uttering.

To constitute an uttering, it is not necessary that the forged

instrument should have been actually received as genuine by the

party upon whom the attempt to defraud is made. To utter a

thing, is to offer it, whether it be taken or not; Jervis, Ch. J.,

Regina v. Welch, 2 Den. C. C, TS; S. C, 15 Jur., 136. It is to

declare or assert, directly or indirectly, by words or actions, that it

is good: Tilghman, Ch. J., CommonweaWi v. Searle, 2 Binn., 339.

A receipt may be uttered by the mere exhibition of it to one with

whom the party is claiming credit for it, though he refuses to part

with the possession : Eegina v. Eadforcl 1 C. & K., 707. In People

V. Eatlihun, 21 Wend., 528, Cowen, J., says, "not only a sale or

paying away a counterfeit note or indorsement, but obtaining

credit on it in any form, as by leaving it in pledge : Bex v. Birhett,

Euss. & R. C. C, 86 — or indeed offering it in dealing, though it be

refused: Bex v. Arscott, 6 C. & P., 408; Bex v. Shukard, Euss.
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■& E. C. C, 200; Bex v. Palmer, 2 Leach, 978 — amount to an

tittering and publishing." There are no decisions detracting from

the force of these. We do not think it an important circumstance

that it may have been contemplated that the board w^ould be con-

sulted by Elwood before closing the negotiation.

None of the other exceptions which were taken, seems to us to

require special discussion. There was nothing apparent on the face

of the mortgage which would invalidate it, and the rulings of the

recorder were manifestly right. It should be certified to him as the

opinion of this court that he should proceed to judgment.

The other Justices concurred.

genuine instrument, ready for hi acceptance a such, had he been
prepared then, on behalf of the bank, to close the tran action.
And the e facts, if found we think, would have constituted an
uttering.
To con titute an uttering it i not nece ary that the forged
instrument should have been actually received as genuine by the
party upon whom the attempt to defraud is made. To utter a
thing, i to offer it, whether it be taken or not; J ervi , Ch. J.,
Regina v. TVelchJ 2 Den. C. C., ~8; S. C., 15 J ur., 136. It is to
declare or assert, directly or indirectly, by words or actions, that it
is good: Tilghman, Ch. J., Commonu·ealth v. SearleJ 2 Binn., 339.
A receipt may be uttered by the mere exhibition of it to one with
whom the party is claiming credit for it, though he refuses to part
with the po session: Regina v. RadfordJ 1 C. & K., 707. In Peopl6
v. RathbunJ 21 Wend., 528, CowENJ J., says, "not only a sale or
paying away a counterfeit note or indor ement, but obtaining
credit on it in any form, a by leaving it in pledge: Rex v. BirkettJ
_Russ. & R. C. C., 86-or indeed offering it in dealing, though it be
r efused: Rex v. ArscottJ 6 C. & P., 408; Rex v. Shuka.rdJ Russ .
.& R. C. C., 200; Rex v. PalmerJ 2 Leach, 978-amount to an
uttering and publishing." There are no decisions detracting from
the force of these. We do not think it an important circumstance
that it may have been contemplated that the board would be consulted by Elwood before closing the negotiation.
None of the other exceptions which were taken, seems to us to
r equire special di ·cm3ion. There was nothing apparent on the face
of the mortgage which would invalidate it, and the rulings of the
recorder were manifestly right. It should be certified to him as the
<>pinion of this court that he should proceed to judgment.
The other Justices concurred.

CHAPTER XII.

OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE.

Perjury.

State V. Kirkpatrick, 32 Arl. 117. (1877.)

English^ Ch. J. :

Kirkwood was indicted for perjury, in the Circuit Court of Clark

CHAPTER XII.

County, at the April Term, 1876; the indictment charging in

substance :

That "said J. H. Kirkpatrick, at, etc., on the 10th day of Jan-

uary, 1876, did wilfully, corruptly, and falsely swear before R, R.

OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE.

Eoss, Deputy Clerk of Jesse A. Eoss, Clerk of the Circuit Court of

Clark County, he, the said E. E. Eoss, being authorized by law to

PERJURY.

administer oaths; that he had not thereupon had the benefit of an

Act of Congress approved May 20th, 1862, entitled *An Act to

secure a homestead to actual settlers on the public domain' ; and he,,

the said J. H. Kirkpatrick, further made oath, that he had made

State v. Kirkpatrick, 3f2 Ark. 117. {1877.)

a bona fide settlement and improvement, and was residing on cer-

tain lands for the securing of which he, the said J. H. Kirkpatrick,.

was then and there making application to secure as a homestead,,

to-wit : The southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of section
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thirty-three, and the south half of the south-west quarter of section

thirty-four, and the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of

section thirty-four, all in township five south, range twenty-two

west. Which said oath was material to secure said lands as such

homestead; and the said J. H. Kirkpatrick well knew the same

was false when he made the same as aforesaid; the truth being,

that he had theretofore made an application to homestead certain

lands ; and that said J. H. Kirkpatrick had made no settlement or

im.provement. and was not residing on said land above described.

And so the jury say, that the said J. H. Kirkpatrick, in the man-

ner above stated, committed perjury, contrary to the statute in such

case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the

State of Arkansas."

The defendant waiving arraignment, entered the plea of not
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J.:

Kirkwood was indicted for perjury, in the Circuit Court of Clark
County, at the April Term, 1876; the indictment charging in
substance:
That " said J. H. Kirkpatrick, at, etc., on the 10th day of January, 1876, did wilfully, corruptly, and falsely swear before R. R.
Ross, Deputy Clerk of J esse A. Ro s, Clerk of the Circuit Court of'
Clark County, he, the said R. R. Ross, being authorized by law to
administer oaths _; that he had not thereupon had the benefit of an
Act of Congress approved May 20th, 1862, entitled 'An Act to.
secure a homestead to actual settler s on the public domain'; and he,.
the said J. H. Kirkpatrick, further made oath, that he had made·
a bona fid e settlement and improvement, and was r esiding on certain lands for the securin g of which he, the said J. H. Kirkpatrick,.
was then and there making application to secure as a homestead,.
to-wit: The 'outheast quarter of the southeast quarter of section
thirty-three, and the south half of the south-west quarter of section
thirty-four, and the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of'
section thirty-four, all in township five south, range twenty-two
west. Which said oath was material to secure said lands as such
homest ead; and the s::tid .J. H. Kirkpatrick well knew the same
was false when he made the same as aforesaid ; the truth being,
that he had theretofore made an application to homest ead certain
lands ; and that said J. H. Kirkpatrick had made no settlement or
improvemen( and wa s not residing on said land above described.
And so the jury say, that the said J. H. Kirkpatrick, in the manner above stated, committed perjury, contrary to the statute in such
case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the
Stat e of Arkansas."
The defendant waiving arraignment, entered the plea of not
300
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guilty, and was jout upon trial. The State introduced A. M.

Crow as a witness, to prove that the defendant had made affidavit

of settlement and cultivation before the Clerk of Clark County,

in order to secure a homestead under the Laws of the United

States; whereupon the defendant moved to exclude such testi-

mony, and the court sustained the motion. The State also offered

testimony to prove that defendant had made no settlement and

cultivation at the date of said affidavit, which testimony was

excluded by the court, on motion of defendant; to each of which

rulings the State excepted. The State offering no further evidence,

the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, and judgment was entered

discharging defendant. The State appealed.

By sec. 2 of the Act of Congress, approved 20th May, 1862,

*'to secure homesteads to actual settlers on the public domain,"

(12 U. S. St. L., 392) the person applying for the benefit of the

act, is required to make affidavit before the register or receiver,

stating the facts prescribed by the act to entitle the applicant to

a homestead entry, and to file the affidavit with the register or

receiver.
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The original act contained no provision for making such affidavit

before the clerk of a state court.

But by sec. 3 of the Act of 21st March, 1864, Amendatory of the

Homestead Law (13 U. S. St. L., 35) it is provided:

"That in any case hereafter in which the applicant for the bene-

fit of the homestead, and whose family or some member thereof,

is residing on the land which he desires to enter, and upon which

a bona fide improvement and settlement had been made, is pre-

vented, by reason of distance, bodily infirmity, or other good cause,

from personal attendance at the district land office, it shall and

may be lawful for him to make the affidavit required by the original

statute, before the clerk of the court for the county in which the

applicant is an actual resident, and to transmit the same, with the

fee and commissions, to the register and receiver."

It was for making a false affidavit under this act, that appellee

was indicted for perjury.

Mr. Greenleaf, treating of proof in cases of perjury, says:

''where the oath was made to an answer in chancery, deposition,

affidavit, or other written paper, signed by the party, the original

document should be produced, with proof of his handwriting, etc."

3 Greenleaf. Ev., sec. 192.

guilty, and wa put upon trial. The State introduced A. M.
Crow a a witness, to prove that the defendant had made affidavit
of uettlement and cultivation b fore the Clerk of Clark County,
in order to ecure a homestead under the Laws of the United
tate ; whereupon the defendant moV"ed to exclude uch te timony, and the court sustained the motion. The State also offered
te timony to prove that defendant had made no ettlement and
cultivation at the date of said affidavit which te timony was
exclud d by the court, on motion of defendant; to each of which
rulings the State excepted. The State offering no further evidence,
the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, and judgment was entered
discharging defendant. The State appealed.
By sec. 2 0£ the Act of Congre , approved 20th May, 1862,
~'to ecure homestead to actual ettler on the public domain,"
(12 U. S. St. L., 392) the per on applying for the benefit of the
act, is required to make affidavit before the regi ter or receiver,
stating the fact pre cribed by the act to entitle the applicant to
a homei:;tead entry, and to file the affidavit with the register or
rec:eiver.
The origjnal act contained no provision for making uch affidavit
before the clerk of a tate court.
But by sec. 3 of the Act of '2 1st March, 1864, Amendatory of the
Homestead Law (13 U. S. St. L., .35) it i provided:
"That in any ca e hereafter in which the applicant for the benefit of tht> homestead, and whose family or some member thereof·,
is residing on the land which he desire to enter, and upon which
a bona fide improvement and ettlement had been made, is prevented, by reason of di tance, bodily infirmity, or other good cause,
from personal attendance at the di trict land office, it shall and
may be lawful for him fo. make the affidavit required by the orjginal
statute, before the clerk of the court for the county in which the
~pplicant is an actual re 1dent, and to tran mit the ame, with the
fee and commissions, to the register and receiver."
It was for making a false affidavit under this act, that appellee
was indicted for perjury.
Mr. Greenleaf, treating of proof in cases of perjury, say :
~'where the oath was made to an an wer in chancery, deposition,
affidavit, or other written paper, igned by the party, the original
document hould be produced, with proof of hi handwritjng, etc."
Greenleaf. Ev., ec. 192.
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In this case the State, it seems, neither oifered in evidence the

original affidavit, nor a certified copy from the land office, nor

made any showing that neither could be produced, but offered a

witness to prove the oath. The court below did not err in exclud-

ing the evidence so offered.

It is suggested, however, that the court excluded the evidence

offered, on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to try and punish

the offense charged in the indictment, and the Attorney General

has filed the transcript here for the purpose of having that question

decided, under sec. 2128, Gantt's Digest.

If the court below was of the opinion that it had no jurisdiction

of the offense charged, it should have quashed the indictment of its

own motion, no demurrer or motion to quash being interposed by

the defendant. It was useless to put him upon trial, on the

plea of not guilty, exclude the evidence offered by the State, and

permit a verdict of acquittal to be rendered, if the court had no

jurisdiction of the offense.

We have however, examined the question of jurisdiction, and

have no objection to expressing an opinion on the subject.
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The clerk derives his authority to take the affidavit, from the

Act of Congress, and not from any statute of the State. Whether

a deputy of the clerk can administer the oath, we have no occasion

to decide in considering the question of jurisdiction. See United

States V. Barton, Gilpin's E., 443.

There being no law of the State requiring, or imposing it as a

duty upon the clerk to take the affidavit, he being merely authorized

to do so by Congress, for the purposes of the Homestead Act, he is

at lil)erty to administer the oath, or decline it, as he may think

proper. State v. Wliittemore, 50 New Hamp., 250; United State

V. Bailey, 9 Peters, 253.

Perjury is an offense against the sovereign whose law is violated

by the making of the false oath.

The courts of no country or sovereign, execute the penal laws

of another. Story, on Confl. L., see. G21; The Antelope, 10

Wheaton, 66, 123.

In this country, where the citizens owe allegiance to two sov-

ereigns, the State and Federal governments, there are certain

crimes which are offenses against the laws of both sovereigns, and

they may be punished in the courts of either. For example, the

State has passed statutes to punish the passing of counterfeit coin,

In this case the State, it seems, neither offered in evidence the·
original affidavit, nor a certified copy from the land office, nor
made any showing that n either could be produced, but offered a
witness to prove the oath. The court below did not err in excluding the eviJence so offered.
It i uggested, however, that the court excluded the evidence
offered, on the gronnd that it had no juri diction to try and punish
the offense charged in the indictment, and the Attorney General
has filed the transcript here for the purpose of haYing that question
decided, under ec. 2128, Gantt's Digest.
If the court below was of the opinion that it had no jurisdictiqn
of the offense charged, it should have quashed the indictment of its
own motion, no demurrer or motion to quash being interposed by
the defendant. It was usele s to put him upon trial, on the
plea of not guilty, exclude the evidence offer ed by the Rtate, and
permit a verdict of acquittal to be rendered, if the court had no
jurisdiction of the offense.
We have however, examined the que tion of jurisdiction, and
ha ve no objection to expressing an opinion on the ubject.
The clerk derives hi authority to take the affidavit, from the
Act of Congress, and not from any statute of the State. Whether
a deputy of the clerk can administer the oath, we have no occasion
to decide in con idering the question of juri diction. See Uni ted
ta tes v. B arton , Gilpin's R., 443.
There being no law of the State requiring, or impo ing it as a
duty upon the clerk to take the affidavit, h e being merely authorized
to do so by Congress, for the purposes of the Homestead Act, h e is
at liberty to administer the oath, or decline it, as he may think
proper. S tate v. Whittemore, 50 N ew Hamp., 25 0; United State
v. B ailey, 9 Peter s, 253.
P erjury is an offense against the sovereign who. e law is violated
by the making of the false oath.
The courts of no country or sover eign, execute the penal laws
of another. Story, on Confl. L., ec. 621; The Antelope, 10
Wheaton, 66, 123.
In this country, where the cit izens owe allegiance to two sovereigns, the State and F ederal governments, there are certain
crimes which are offenses against the laws of both sovereigns, and
they may be punished in the courts of either. For example, the
State has passed statutes to punish the passing of counterfeit coin,
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etc., and Congress has enacted similar laws and a person passing

or uttering such coin, etc., criminally, may be punished by the

proper court of either government. Fox v. The State of Ohio, 5

Howard, 411 ; United States v. Mangold, 9 Howard 561.

Another example may be given, in the language of Mr. Justice

Grier, in Moore v. Illinois, 11 Howard, 20. Where the same act

may be an offense against both sovereigns, and punishable by both :

"Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or-

Territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns^

and may be liable to punishment for any infraction of the laws of

either." The same act may be an offense or transgression of the

laws of both. Thus an assault upon the Marshal of the United

States, and hindering him in the execution of legal process, is a

high offense against the United States, for which the perpetrator

is liable to punishment: and the same act may be also a gross

breach of the peace of the State, a riot, assault, or murder, and

subject the same person to punishment, under the State laws, for

a misdemeanor or felony. That either or both may (if they see fit)

punish such offender, cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot be truly
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averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same

offense: but only that by one act he committed two offenses, for

each of which he is justly punishable."

We have no special statute making it perjury to make a false

oath before a clerk, who administers such oaths under the authority

conferred upon him by, and for the purpose of, the Homestead

Act of Congress.

The general statute defines perjury thus :

"Perjury is the wilful and corrupt swearing, testifying or affirm-

ing falsely to any material matter in any cause, matter, or proceed-

ing before any court, tribunal, body corporate, or other officer

having by law, authority to administer oaths." Gantt's Digest,.

sec. 1415.

"The wilful and corrupt swearing, affirming, or declaring falsel3r

to any affidavit, deposition, or probate, authorized by law to be

taken before any court, tribunal, body politic, or officer, shall be

deemed perjury." lb., sec. 1416.

The oath in this case was not taken under or by virtue of any

law of the State, nor by an officer acting, in administering the

oath, under authority conferred upon him by any law of the State,

etc., and Congress has enacted similar laws and a person pa ' ing
or uttering such coin, etc., criminally, may be punished by the
proper court of either government. I/ox v. The tate of Ohio, 5
Howard, 411; United tutes v. ~Jlarigold, 9 Howard 561.
Another example may be given, in the language of fr. Justice
Grier, in Moor e \. Illinois, 1± Howard, 20. Where the ame act
may be an offen e against both overeign , and punishable by both:
"Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or
Territory. H e may be said to owe allegiance to two overeigns,
and may be liable to punishment for any infraction of the laws of
either." The same act may be an offense or transgression of the
laws of both. Thu an assault upon the Mar hal of the United
States, and hindering him in the execution of 1 gal proce , is a
high offense again t the United States, for which the perpetrator
i liable to punishment: and the same act may be also a gros
breach of the peace of the State, a riot, assault, or murder, and
subject the same person to punishment, under the State laws, for
a mi demeanor or felony . That either or both may (if they see fit)
puni h uch offender, cannot be doubted. Y ct it cannot be truly
averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same
offense: but only that by one act he committed two offenses, for
each of which he is justly punishable."
We have no pecial statute making it perjury to make a false
oath before a clerk, who admini ters such oath under the authority
conferred upon him by, and for the purpo of, the Homestead
Act of Congress.
The general statute defines perjury thus:
"Perjury is the wilful and corrupt swearing, testifying or affirming falsely to any material matter in any cause, matter, or proceed ing before any court, tribunal, body corporate or other officer
having by law, authority to administer oaths." Gantt's Digest,.
sec. 1415.
"The wilful and corrupt swearing, affirming, or declaring fal ely
to any affidavit, depo ition, or probate, authorized by law to be
taken before any court, tribunal, body politic, or officer, shall b
deemed perjury." Ib., sec. 1416.
The oath in this ca e was not taken under or by virtue of any
law of the State, nor by an officer acting, in administering th
oath, under authority conferred upon him by any law of the tate,.
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nor was the affidavit to be used in any court, tribunal or before any

officer of the State.

On the contrary, the oath was taken under the Homestead Act

of Congress, it was administered by an officer acting under author-

ity of that act, and the affidavit was taken to be used before a

United States land officer to procure a homestead entry. If the

oath was wilfully false, it was an offense not in violation of a State

law, nor against the sovereignty of the State. United States V.

Bailey, 9 Peters, 238.

In People v. Sweetman, 3 Parker's Criminal Eep., 358; held

that under the Act of Congress, the County Courts of the several

oounties of the State of New York had jurisdiction of the natu-

ralization of aliens. That the State Courts in entertaining juris-

diction of cases of naturalization, act exclusively under the laws

of the United States, and should be deemed quoad hoc, courts of

the United States. x\nd that wilful false swearing by a person

giving material testimony in a naturalization proceeding, before a

County Court, was an offense against the laws of the United States,

and punishable in the United States Courts.
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In Bump V. Commonwealih, 30 Penn. State E., 475; held that

a person who made a false oath in a naturalization proceeding

before the District Court for the City and County of Philadel-

phia, was indictable in the State Court, but this was put upon

the ground that a statute of the State, as well as the Act of

^Congress, conferred upon the courts of the State jurisdiction to

naturalize aliens. This case was approved in a similar case in

iVfiw Hampshire State v. Whittemore, 5 N". H., 246.

But the Pennsylvania case was a stronger one in favor of the

jurisdiction of the State Court, than the case now before us. There,

the oath was taken in a proceeding in which the State Court was

exercising jurisdiction; here, the affidavit was made to be used

before a Federal land officer.

In ex parte Dock Bridges, 2 Wood's E., 428; Bridges was

indicted in the Superior Court of Eandolph County, Georgia, for

perjury committed October 27th, 1874, in an examination before a

United States Commissioner, under the Improvement Act. He

was released, after conviction, on habeas corpus, by Mr. Justice

Bradley, on the ground that the crime with which he was charged

was an offense against the laws of the United States, and not

against the laws of Georgia. That it would be a manifest incon-

nor was the affidavit to be used in any court, tribunal or before any
officer of the State.
On the contrary, the oath was taken under the Homestead Act
of Congress, it was administered by an officer acting under authority of that act, and the affidavit wa taken to be used before a
united State land officer to procure a homestead entry. If the
oath was wilfully false, it wa an offense not in violation of a State
law, nor again t the overeignty of the State. United tates v.
Bailey, 9 Peter , 238.
In People v. d.veetman, 3 Parker's Criminal Rep., 358; held
-that under the Act of Congress, the County Court of the several
-counties of the State of New York had jurisdiction of the naturalization of aliens. That the State Courts in entertaining jurisdiction of ca e of naturalization, act exclusively under the laws
-0f the United States, and hould be deemed quoad hoc, courts of
the United States. And that wilful fal e swearing by a person
giving material te timony in a naturalization proceeding, before a
Count~ Court, was an offen e against the laws of the United States,
.and puni hable in the United States Court .
In R'nmp v. Comrnonwealth, 30 Penn. State R., 475; held that
a person who made a false oath in a naturalization proceeding
before the District Court for the City and County of Philadel:phia, was indictable in the State Court, but this was put upon
-the ground that a statute of the State, as well as the Act of
' Congres , conferred upon the courts of the State jurisdiction to
naturalize aliens. This case was approved in a imilar case in
New Hampshire State v. Whittemore, 5 N. H., 246.
But the Pennsylvania ca e wa a stronger one in favor of the
juri diction of the State Court, than the case now before ns. There,
the oath wa taken in a proceeding in which the State Court was
exercising jurisdiction; here, foe affidavit was made to be used
before a Federal land officer.
In ex parte Dock Bridges, 2 " ood' R., 428; Bridges was
indicted in the Superior Court of Randolph County, Georgia, for
perjury committed October 27th, 1874, in an examination before a
United State Commi ioner, under the Improvement Act. He
wa released, after conviction, on habeas corpit , by Mr. Justice
Bradley, on the ground that the crime with which he was charged
wa an offen against the laws of the United States, and not
.again t the laws of Georgia. That it would be a manifest incon-
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gruit}^ for one sovereignty to punish a person for an offense com-

mitted against the laws of another sovereignt}'.

We are of opinion that the court below had no jurisdiction of

the offense charged in the indictment in this case.

Affirmed.

Bribery.

State V. Ellis, 33 N. J. Law 102. (1868.)

On motion to quash indictment.

gruity for one sovereignty to puni h a per on for an offrn ·c com~
mitted again, t the law of another overeignty.
We are of opinion that the court below had no juri diction of
the offen_e charged in the indictment in thi ca e.
Affirmed.

An indictment for bribery was found against the defendant

in the Quarter Sessions of Hudson county, charging him with

having wickedly and corruptly offered the sum of fifty dollars

BRIBERY.

to a member of the common council of Hudson City, to vote

for a certain application to lay a railroad track along one of the

State v. Ellis, 3.63

public streets of said city.

. J. Law 102. (1868.)

The case having been removed into this court by certiorari, the

defendant moved to quash the indictment, on the ground that it

set forth no crime.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Dalrimple, J. :
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The indictment in this case was removed into this court by

certiorari to the Sessions of Hudson. It sets forth in substance,

in language sufficiently plain and intelligible, that application

having been duly made to the common council of Jersey City for

leave to lay a railroad track along one of the public streets of that

city, the defendant wickedly and corruptly offered to one of the

members of said common council the sum of fifty dollars to vote

in favor of said application. Upon return of the certiorari, a

motion was made to quash the indictment, on the ground that the

facts set forth do not constitute a crime.

It is said that the common law offence of bribery can only be

predicated of a reward given to a judge or other official concerned

On motion to quash indictment.
An indictment for bribery wa found again t the defendant
in the Quarter Sessions of Hudson county, charging him with
having wickedly and corruptly offered the um of fifty dollars
to a member of the common council of Hud on City, to vote
for a certain application to lay a railroad track along one of the
public streets of said city.
The case having been removed into this court by certiorari, the
defendant moved to quash the indictment, on the ground that it
set forth no crime.
The opinion of the court was delivered by

in the administration of justice. The earlier text writers thus

define the offence: '''Where any man in judicial place takes any

fee or pension, robe or livery, gift, reward or brocage, of any

person, that hath to do before him in any wa}^ for doing his office,

or by color of his office, but of the king only, unless it be meat and

20

J. :
The indictment in this case was removed into this court by
certiorari to the Sessions of Hudson. It sets forth in rnbstance,
in language sufficiently plain and intelligible, that application
having been duly made to the common council of Jersey City for
leave to lay a railroad track along one of the public treets of that
city, the defendant wickedly and corruptly offered to one of the
members of said common council the sum of fifty dollars to vote
in favor of said application. Upon return of the certiorari, a
motion was made to quash the indictment, on the ground that the
facts set forth do not constitute a crime.
It is said that the common law offence of bribery can only be
predicated of a reward given to a judge or other official concerned
in the admini tration of ju tice. The earlier text writers thus
define the off nee: ('Where any man in judicial place takes any
fee or pension, robe or livery, gift, reward or brocage, of any
per on, that h::tth to do before him in any way, for doing hi office,
or 1 · color of hi office, but of the king only, unle it be meat and
DALRIMPLE,

20
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drink, and that of small value." 3 Inst. 145. The definition in 4

Blackstone's Com. 139, is to the same effect. Hawkins, in his

Pleas of the Crown, Vol 1, p. 312, gives, substantially, the same

description of the offence, but adds: "Also, bribery signifies the

taking or giving of a reward for offices of a public nature." The

later commentators, supported, as I think, by the adjudged cases,

however, maintain the broader doctrine, that any attempt to in-

fluence an officer in his official conduct, whether in the executive,

legislative, or judicial department of the government, by the offer

of a reward or pecuniary consideration, is an indictable common

law misdemeanor. 3 Grecnleaf's Ev., § 71; Bishop on Criminal

Law, Vol. 1, § 95, and notes; 1 Russell on Crimes 156. The case

of Bex V. Yanghan, 4 Burr. 2491, arose upon motion for an infor-

mation for a misdemeanor against the defendant, for offering

money to the Duke of Grafton, First Lord of the Treasury, to

procure the defendant's appointment by the Crown to an office.

Lord Mansfield, in his opinion in that case says : "If these transac-

tions are believed to be frequent, it is time to put a stop to them.

A minister, trusted by the King to recommend fit persons to offices,
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would betray that trust, and disappoint that confidence, if he should

secretly take a bribe for that recommendation." The motion was

granted. In the case of Bex v. Fhjmpton, 2 Lord Raymond 1377,

the court held that it was an offence to bribe persons to vote at

elections of members of a corporation. Many other cases might

be cited in support of the general proposition laid down by the

later text writers above referred to. The cases will, however, all be

found collated in 2d Bishop's Criminal Law, in the notes to §§

76 and 77. Indeed, the authorities seem to be all one way. Neither

upon principle nor authority can the crime of bribery be confined

to acts done to corrupt officers concerned in the administration

of justice. If in the case now before us, it was no crime for the

defendant to offer, it would have been no crime for the councilman

to accept the bribe. The result would, therefore, be that votes

of members of council on all questions coming before them, could

be bought and sold like merchandise in the market. The law is

otherwise. The common law offence of bribery is indictable and

punishable in this state. Our statutes against bribery merely define

and fix the punishment for the offence, in cases of bribery of

judicial officers and members of the legislature ; they do not repeal

or abrogate, or otherwise alter the common law.

drink, and that of small value." 3 Inst. 145. The definition in 4Blackstone's Com. 139, is to the same effect. Hawkins, in his
Pleas of the Crown, Vol 1, p. 312, gives, substantially, the same
description of the offence, but adds: "Also, bribery signifies the
t aking or giving of a reward for offices of a public nature." The
later commentator , support d, as I think, by the adjudged cases,.
however, maintain the broader doctrine, that any attempt io influence an oftker in his official conduct, whether in the executive,
legislative, or judicial department of the government, by the offer
of a reward or pecuniary consideration, is an indictable common
law misdemeanor. 3 Greenleaf's Ev., § 71; Bishop on Criminal
Law, Vol. 1, § 95, and notes ; 1 Russell on Crime 156. The ca::;e
of R ex v. Vaughan, 4, Burr. 249+, arose upon motion for an information for a misdemeanor against the defendant, for offering
money t.o the Duke of Grafton, First Lord of the Treasury, to
procure the defendant's appointm nt by the Crown to an office.
Lord Mansfield, in his opinion in that case says: "If these transactions are believed to be frequent, it is time to put a stop to them.
A minister, tru ted by the King to r ecommend fit person. to offices,
would betray that trust, and disappoint that confidence, if he should
secretly take a bribe for that recommendation." The motion was
granted. In the case of R ex v. Plympton, 2 Lord Raymond 1377,
the court held that it was an offence to bribe per sons t0 vote at
elections of members of a corporation. Many other cases might
be cited in upport of the gen eral proposition laid down by the
later t ext writers above referred to. The cases will, however, all be
found collated in 2d Bishop's Criminal Law, in the notes to §§
76 and 77. Indeed, the authorities seem to be all one way. Neither
upon principle nor authority can the crime of bribery be confined
to act s done to corrupt officers concerned in the administration
of justice. If in the case now before us, it was no crime for the
defendant to offer, it would have been no crime _for the councilman
to accept the bribe. The result would, therefore, be that votes
of members of council on all questions coming before them, could
be bought and sold like merchandise in the market. The law i:S
otherwise. The common law offence of bribery is indictable and
punishable in this state. Our statutes against bribery merely clefinc
and fix the punishment for the offence, in cases of bribery of
judicial officers and members of the legislature; they do not repeal
or abrogat e, or oth erwise alter the common law.
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It is contended, in the next place, that the facts set forth in the

indictment constitute no offence, inasmuch as the common council

had not jurisdiction to grant the application for which the vote

was sought to be bought. In m}' opinion, it is entirely imma-

terial whether council had or had not jurisdiction over the subject

matter of the application. If the application was, in point of fact,

made, an attempt to procure votes for it by bribery was criminal.

The offence is complete when an offer of reward is made to in-

fluence the vote or action of the official. It need not be averred,

that the vote, if procured, would have produced the desired result,

nor that the official, or the body of which he was a member, had

authority by law to do the thing sought to be accomplished. Sup-

pose an application made to a justice of the peace, in the court

for the trial of small causes, for a summons in case of replevin,

for slander, assault and battery, or trespass, wherein title to lands

is involved; over these actions a justice of the peace has no juris-

diction, and any judgment he might render therein, would be

coram non judice and void; yet, I think, it can hardly be con-

tended, that a justice thus applied to may be offered, and with
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impunity accept a reward, to issue a summons in any case without

his jurisdiction. If the common council of Jersey City had not

authority to grant the application referred to, the act of the de-

fendant in endeavoring to procure the grant asked for was only the

more criminal, because he sought, by the corrupt use of money, to

purchase from council an easement which they had no authority to

grant. He thereby endeavored to induce them to step beyond the

line of their duty, and usurp authority not committed to them.

The gist of the offence is said to be the tendency of the bribe to

pervert justice in any of the governmental departments, executive,

legislative, or judicial. 2 Bishop's Criminal Law, § 96. Would

it not be a plain perversion of justice, to buy the votes of council-

men in favor of a surrender of the streets of the city, for the pur-

poses of a railroad, when such surrender is unauthorized by law?

The rights of the citizens of the municipality thus corruptly tam-

pered with and bargained away, might be regained after a long and

expensive litigation, or in some other mode; nevertheless, bribery

and corruption would have done, to some extent at least, their

work, and the due course of justice have been disturbed. But I

am not prepared to assent, as at present advised, to the proposi-

tion that the common council could not properly entertain the

It is contended, in the next place, that the facts set forth in the
indictment con. titute no offence, inasmuch as the common council
had not jurisdiction to grant the application for which the vote
was ought to be bought. In my opinion, it i entirely jmmaterial whether council had or had not jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the application. If the application wa , in point of fact,
made, an attempt to procure vote for it by bribery wa criminal.
The offence is complete when an offer of reward i made to influence the vote or action of the official. It need not be averred,
that the vote, if procured, would have produced the desired re ult,,
nor that the official, or the body of which he was a member, had
authority by law to do the thing sought to be accomplished. Suppo. e an application made to a justice of the peace, in the court
for the trial of mall causes, for a summon in case of replevin,,
for slander, a sault and battery, or trespas , wherein title to lands
i involved; over the. e actions a justice of the peace has no juri diction, and any judgment he might render therein, would be
·coram non judice and void; yet, I think, it can hardly be cont ended, that a justice thus applied to may be offered, and with
impunity accept a reward, to i ue a summons in any case without
his jurisdiction. If the common council of J er ey City had not
authority to grant the application referred to, the act of the defendant in endeavoring to procure the grant a ked for wa~ only the
more criminal, because he sought, by the corrupt use of money, to
purcha e from council an ea ement which they had no authority to
grant. He thereby endeavored to induce them to step beyond the
line of their duty, and usurp authority not committed to them.
The gi ... t of the offence i aid to be the tendency of the bribe to
pervert ju tice in any of the governmental department , executive,,
legi. lative) or judicial. 2 Bi hop' Criminal Law, § 96. Would
it not be a plain perv r ion of ju tice, to buy the votes of councilmen in favor of a urrender of the streets of th city, for the purpo e of a railroad, when such urrender is unauthorized by law?
The rights of the citizens of the municipality thu corruptly tamper d with an.cl bargained away, might be regain d after <l long ancl
expen ive litigation, or in some other mode; neverthele , brib ry
and corruption would have done, to ome ext nt at least, their
work~ and the due cour e of ju tice have b en di turbed. But I
~.m not prepared to a ent, a at present advi ed, to the propo ition that the common council could not prop rly entertain the
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application. They were asked by a chartered railroad company of

this state, having its terminus in Jersey City^, to consent that a

railroad track might be laid along one of the public streets of that

city. It is not pretended that any legislative authority to lay such

track had been obtained. The railroad company could not, under

these circumstances, lawfully appropriate to its use one of the

public streets of the city without the consent of the city, which has

full control over all public streets within the city limits. Laws of

1851, p. 406, § 0.

Whether or not the common council has the power, with or with-

out legislative sanction, to grant the use of a public street to a

railroad company for the uses of the railroad, it is, I think, clear

that no such use can be made of the streets, without the consent of

the city, in the absence of a legislative grant to that effect.

Nor is it material whether the railroad company which applied

for the privilege, had the power under its charter to lay the track.

Application had been duly made for that purpose, and was pend-

ing. An attempt to bribe a member of council to vote upon it,

whether such attempt was made after or before the introduction
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of an ordinance or resolution granting the privilege asked, comes

within the general law against bribery. Whether the common

council had authority to make the grant, or the railroad company

the power to avail itself of its benefits, if made, or whether the

offer of a bribe was before or after the application in due course

of proceeding, had been embodied in an ordinance or resolution

is immaterial. The offer of anything of value in corrupt payment

or reward for any official act, legislative, executive, or judicial,

to be done, is an indictable offence at the common law.

The objections taken are not tenable, and the motion to quash

must be denied. Motion denied.

Compounding Crime.

l>tale V. Carver, 09 N. H. 216. (1S97.)

Indictment, charging that the defendant, on the second day of

September, 1897, at, etc., "with force and arms, under color and

pretence that one Frank E. Fernald had committed an offence

against the statutes of this state relating to the sale of spirituous

liquors, m this, that the said Frank E. Fernald had before that time.

application. Th ey were asked by a charter ed railroad company of
this state, havin g its t erminus in J ersey City, to consent that a
railroad track might be laid along one of the public streets of that
city. It is not pretended that any legislative authority b lay such
track had been obtained. The railroad company could not, under
t hese circumstances, lawfully appropriate to its use one of the
public street of the city without the con ent of the city, which has
full control over all public streets within the city limits. Laws of
1851, p. 406, § 6.
Whether or not the common council has the power, with or without legislative ·auction, to grant the use of a public street to a
railroad company for the uses of the railroad, it is, I think, clear
that no such use can he made of the streets, without the consent of
t he city, in the absence of a legislative grant to that effect.
Nor is it material whether the railroad company which applied
for the privilege, had the power under its charter to lay the track.
Application had been duly made for that purpose, and was pending. An attempt to bribe a member of council to vote upon it,
whether such attempt was made after or before the introduction
of an ordinance or resolution granting the privilege asked, comes
within the general law against bribery. Whether the common
council had authority to make the grant, or the railroad company
the power to avail itself of its benefits, if made, or whether ·t he
offer of a bribe was before or after t he application in due course
of proceeding, had been embodied in an ordinance or resolution
is immaterial. The offer of anything of value in corrupt payment
or reward for any official act, 1 gislative, executive, or judicial,
to be done, is an indictable offence at the common law.
The objections taken are not tenable, and the motion to quash
must be denied.
Motion denied.
COMPOUNDING CRIME.
,l..' tat e v. Carner, 69 N. H. 216.

{1897.)

I NDICTMENT: charging that the defendant, on the second day of
September, 1897, at, etc., "with force and arms, under color and
pretence that one Frank E. F ernald had committed an offence
against the stat utes of this state r elating to the sale of spirituous
liquors, in this, that the said Frank E. Fernald had before that time,
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to wit, on the twenty-ninth day of March, eighteen hundred and

ninety-seven, not being an agent of any town for the purpose of sell-

ing spirit, sold to one whose name he would not reveal, one quart ci*

spirituous liquor, contrary to the form of the statutes in such

case made and provided, unlawfully and for the sake of wicked

gain, and without the order and consent of the attorney-general

of said state, did make composition with the said Frank E. Fernald,

and exact and take of him the sura of thirty dollars for forbearing

to prosecute for said supposed offence, to the great hindrance of

public Justice, and against the peace and dignity of the state."

Verdict, guilty.

The defendant moved to quash the indictment because it de-

scribed the offence for which he made composition with said

Fernald as a "supposed" offence. The motion was overruled, and

the defendant excepted.

It appeared from the evidence for the state that on August 31,

1897, the defendant went to Fernald and informed him that he

had a case against him for the illegal sale of liquor; that the de-

fendant read the law to Fernald and told him if he would settle
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it would save him a good many dollars ; that for thirty dollars he

would destroy the evidence, which was a bottle of liquor; that he

would prosecute unless thirty dollars was paid, and the fine would

be fifty dollars and the costs twenty-five dollars; that subse-

quently Fernald paid him thirty dollars as demanded, and that

thereupon the defendant turned the liquor into the sink, gave

Fernald the bottle, and wrote and delivered to him a paper as

follows : "Milton, N. H., Sept. 2, 1897. This is to certify that

I promise to withdraw all further action against Frank E. Fernald

for illegal sale of liquor March 29, 1897. F. E. Carver."

The defendant offered no evidence. His counsel admitted the

facts to be substantially as claimed by the state, and said the de-

fence was that the defendant had no intention of violating the law.

The court ruled that if the defendant knew what he was doinir

and did what he intended to do, it was immaterial what his opinion

was as to the legal effect of what he was doing, and it would be no

defence that he did not know he was violating the law. To this

ruling the defendant excepted.

Blodgett, J. :

Whatever diversity of opinion there may justly be as to the

to wit, on the twenty-ninth day of March, eighteen hundred and
ninet - even not being an agent of any town for the purpose of selling spirit, old to one who e name he would not rcYeal, one quart cf
spfrituous liquor, contrary to the form of the tatutes in uch
ca e made and provided, unlawfully and for the ake of wicked
gain, and without the order ancl con ent of the attorney-general
of said state, did make compo. ition with the aid Frank E. Fernald,
and exact and take of him the sum of thirty dollars for forbearing
to prosecute for said supposed offence, to the great hindrance of
public justice, and again t the peace and dignity of the state."
Ver di ct, guilty.
The defendant moved to qua h the indictment because it decribed the offence for which he mad composition with said
Fernald as a "supposed" offence. The motion was overruled, and
the defendant excepted.
It appeared from the evidence for the state that on Augu t 31,
1897, the defendant went to Fernald and informed him that he
had a case against him for the illegal sale of liquor; that the defendant read the law to Fernald and told him if he would settle
it would save him a good many dollars; that for thirty dollars he
would destroy the evidence, which was a bottle of liquor; that he
would pro ecute unles thirty dollars was paid, and the fine would
be :fifty dollars and the co ts twenty-five dollars; that subsequently Fernald paid him thirty dollars as demanded, and that
thereupon the defendant turned the liquor into the sink, gave
Fernald the bottle, and wrote and delivered to him a paper a
follow : '~Milton, N. H., Sept. 2, 1897. Thi i to certify that
I promise to withdraw all further action against Frank E. Fernald
for illegal sale of liquor March 29, 1897. F. E. Carver."
The defendant offered no evidence. Hi coun el admitted the
facts to be sub tantially a claimed by the tate, and aid the defence wa that the defendant had no intention of violating the law.
The court ruled that if the defendant knew what h was doing
and did what he intended to do, it was immaterial what his opinion
wa a to the legal ffect of what he wa doing, and it would be no
<lefence that he did not know he was violating the law. To thi
rnling the defendant excepted.

J.:
Whatever diver ity of opinion there may ju tly be a to the

BLODGETT,
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policy of the liquor laws of this state, it cannot be doubted that

their violation is a grave misdemeanor against public justice, nor

that its compromise with the offender bj^ a private individual is

both pernicious and illegal.

"IVIisdemeanors are either mala in se^ or penal at common law,

and such as are mala prohihita, or penal by statute. Those mala

in se are such as mischievously affect the person or property of

another, or outrage decency, disturb the peace, injure public morals,

or are breaches of public duty." 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 654.

There being in this state no statute prohibiting the composition

of misdemeanors, and the body of the common law and the English

statutes in amendment of it, so far as they were applicable to our

institutions and the circumstances of the country, having been in

force here upon the organization of the provincial government and

continued in force by the constitution, so far as they are not re-

pugnant to that instrument, until altered or repealed by the legis-

lature (State V. Rollins, 8 N. H. 550; State v. ATbee, 61 N". h.

427), the first inquiry is whether such composition was an indict-

able offence at common law.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:03 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t39z97p86
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

While decisions upon this precise point are lacking, the language

of the books is general that the taking of money or other reward

to suppress a criminal prosecution, or the evidence necessary to

support it, was an indictable offence at common law ; and although

the English cases may not all be reconcilable with this view, it

would seem that when the offence compounded was one against

public justice and dangerous to society it was indictable, while

those having largely the nature of private injuries, or of very low

grade, were not indictable. See Johnson v. Ogilhy, 3 P. Wms. 277 ;

Fallows V. Taylor, 7 T. E. 475 ; Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. 341,

348, 349 ; Rex v. Stone, 4 C. & P. 379 ; Keir v. Leeman, 6 Q. B.

308, 316-322,— S. C, on error 9 Q. B. 371, 395; Rex v. Crisp,

1 B. & Aid. 282; Edgcombe v. Rodd, 5 East 294, 303; Rex v.

Southerton, 6 East 126; Beeley v. Wingfield, 11 East 46, 48;

BaJcer v. Townsend, 7 Taun. 422, 426; Bushel v. Barrett, Ry. &

M. 434 ; Rex v. Lawley, 2 Stra. 904 ; Steph. Cr. L. *67 ; 3 Wat.

Arch. Crim. Pr. & PL 623-10, 623-11; 1 Euss. Cr. 136; 1 Ch. Cr.

L. (3d Am. ed.) 4; 1 Bish. Cr. L. (7th ed.), ss. 710, 711; Dest.

Cr. L. s. 10 b; 4 Wend. Bl. Com. 136, and note 18.

In this restricted sense, we are of opinion that the- taking of

money, or other reward or promise of reward, to forbear or stifle

policy of the liquor law of this state, it cannot be doubted that
their violation i"' a grave misdemeanor against public justice, nor
that its compromi e with the offender by a private individual is
both perniciou and illegal.
''11isdemeanors are either mala in se., or penal at common law,
and such as are mala prohibita, or penal by statute. Tho e mala
in se are such a mi. chievou ly affect the per on or property of
another, or outrage decency~ disturb the peace, injure public moral ,
or are breache of public duty." ~ Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 654.
There being in this state no statute prohibiting the composition
of misdemeanors; and the body of the common law and the Engli h
sbtutes in amendment of it, so far as they were applicable to our
institutions and the circumstances of the country, having been in
force here npon the organization of the provincial government ancl
continued in force by the constitution, o far a they are not repugnant to that instrument, until altered or repealed by the legi lature (State v. Rollins, 8 N. H. 550; State v. Albee, 61 N. H.
427), the first inquiry is whether such composition was an indict.
able offence at common law.
While decisions upon this precise point are lacking, the language
of the books is general that the taking of money or other reward
to suppress a criminal prosecution, or the evidence necessary to
upport it, was an indictable offence at common law; and although
the English cases may not all be reconcilable with this view, it
would seem that when the offence compounded wa one against
public justice and dangerous to society it was indictable, while
tho. e having largely the nature of private injuries, or of very low
grade, were not indictable. See Joh nson v. Ogilby, 3 P. Wms. 277;
Fallows v. Taylor, 7 T. R. 475; Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. 341,
3-18, 349; Rex v. Stone, 4 C. & P. 319; Keir v. Leeman, 6 Q. B.
308, 316-322,-S. C., on error 9 Q. B. 371, 395; Rex v. Crisp,
·1 B. & Ald. 282; Edgcornbe v. Rodd, 5 East 294, 303; Rex v.
Southerton, 6 East 126 ; Beeley v. Wingfield, 11 East 46, 48 ·
Baker v. Townsend, 7 Taun. 422, 426; Bushel v. Barrett, Ry. &
M. 434; Rex v. Lawley, 2 Stra. 90-±; Steph. Cr. L. *67; 3 Wat.
Arch. Crim. Pr. & PL 623-10, 623-11; 1 Ru s. Cr. 136; 1 Ch. Cr.
L. ( 3d Am. ed.) 4; 1 Bi h. Cr. L. ( th ed.) ss. 10 711; De t.
Cr. L. s. 10 b; 4 Wend. Bl. Com. 136, and note 18.
In this restricted sense, we are of opinion that the · taking of
money, or other reward or promise of reward, to forbear or tifle
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a criminal prosecution for a misdemeanor, was an indictable offence

by the common law, the same as it unquestionably was for a felony

(Partridge v. Hood, 120 Mass. 403, 405, 40G, 407), and that it

has always been so understood and received here, as well as in

other jurisdictions. Plumer v. Smith, 5 N. H. 553, 554; Binds v.

■Chamherlin, 6 N". H. 229; Severance v. KimUll, 8 N. H. 386.

387; Hineshurgh v. Sumner, 9 Vt. 23, 26; Badger v. ]Yiniams,

1 D. Chip. 137, 138, 139 ; State v. Reyes, 8 Vt. 57, 65-67 ; State

V. Carpenter, 20 Vt. 9; CommonweaWi v. Pease, 16 Mass. 91;

Jones V. Rice, 18 Pick. 440; Partridge v. Hood, supra; State v.

Dowd, 7 Conn. 384, 386.

Certainly, there is no ground to contend that the offence is any

less pernicious and reprehensible under our form of government

than under that of the mother country, or that, as a part of the

body of the common law, it was inapplicable to our institutions

and circumstances at the time of the organization of our provincial

govermnent, or in any manner repugnant to the constitution or to

our present institutions and circumstances. Indeed, the absence

of any statute upon the subject of the composition of misdemeanors
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sufficiently shows the general understanding in this state, for it

cannot reasonably be supposed that so infamous an offence would

have been permitted to go unpunished for want of statutory enact-

ment unless it had been understood generally that imder our com-

mon law none was necessary.

But not only did the defendant, in consideration of a reward,

compound a public misdemeanor, and suppress and destroy the

material evidence necessary to support it, he also defrauded the

revenue by depriving the public of that portion of the pecuniary

penalty to which they are entitled for a violation of the liquor

laws ; and this of itself is a sufficient ground on which to sustain

an indictment at common law. Bex v. Southerton, 6 East 126 ; 1

Euss. Cr. *134.

In view of these conclusions, it is unnecessary to examine the

question argued by counsel as to whether or not the case falls

within the statute of 18 Eliz., c. 5 (made perpetual by 27 Eliz.,

c. 10, and amended as to punishment by 56 Geo. Ill, c. 138), by

which it was enacted that if any person "by color or pretence of

process, or without process upon color or pretence of any matter

of offence against any penal law, make any composition, or take

any money, reward, or promise of reward," without the order or

a criminal pro e ution for a mi demeanor, wa an indictable offence
by the common law, the same a it unque tionably wa for a £elony
(Partridge v. Hood, 120 Ma . 403, 405, 406, 407), and that i~
ba always been so under tood and received here, as well a in
other juri diction . Plum er v. c mi th, 5 N. H. 553, 55-±; Hinds v.
everance v. Kimball, 8 N. H. 386;
Ohaniberli:n, 6 · . H. 229;
387; Hinesburgh v. Sumner, 9 Vt. 23, 26; Badg er v. William, ·,
1 D . Chip. 137, 138, 139; State v. Keye , 8 Vt. 57, 65-67; tate
-v. Carventer, 20 Vt. 9; Commonwealth v. P ease, 16 l\Ia ~s . 91;
Jones v. Rice, 1 Pick. 4-l:O; Partridg e v. II ood, supra; tate \.
Dowd, 7 C0nn. 384, 386.
Certainly, there i. no gronnd to contend that the offence is any
1e s perniciou and repreh n ible under our form of government
than under that of the mother country, or that, as a part of the
body of the common law, it was inapplicable to our institution"
and circumstances at the time of the organization of our proYincial
government, or in any manner rep11gnant to the constitution or to
-0ur present in titutions and circumstances. Indeed, the ab"'encc
of any statute upon the subject of the composition of misdemeanor~
sufficiently shows the general understanding in this state, for it
.cannot reasonably be supposed that so infamous an off nee would
have been permitted to go unpunished for want of statutory enactment unless it had been understood generally that under ouT com.mon law none was necessary.
But not only did the defendant, in consideration of a reward,
compound a public misdemeanor, and suppress and de troy the
material evidence necessaTy to support it, he also defraud cl the
revenue by depriving the public of that portion of the pecuniary
penalty to which they are entitled foT a violation of the liquor
laws; and this of itself is a ufficient ground on which to sustain
an indictment at common law. R ex v. Southerton, 6 East 126; 1
Russ. Cr. *134.
In view of these conclusion , it is unnecessary to examine the
que tion argued by counsel as to whether or not the ca e falls
within the statute of 18 Eliz., c. 5 (mad perpetual by 27 Eliz.,
c. 10, and amended as to punishment by 56 Geo. III, c. 138), by
which it wa enacted that if any per on "by color or pretence of
process, or without proce upon color or pr tence of any matter
of offence against any penal law, make any composition, or tak'
any money, reward, or promi e of reward, without th" order or
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consent of some court, "he shall stand two hours in the pillory, be

forever disabled to sue on any popular or penal statute, and shall

forfeit ten pounds."

The motion to quash the indictment because it describes the

offence for which composition was made as a "supposed offence,"

was properly denied. "The bargain and acceptance of the reward

makes the crime" (State v. Duliammel, 2 Harr. 532, 533) ; and

in such a case, "the party may be convicted though no offence

liable to a penalty has been committed by the person from whom

the reward is taken." Reg. v. Best, 9 C. & P. 368,-38 Eng. C. L.

220; Rex v. Gotley, Kuss. & Ey. 8-i; People v. BucUand, 13 Wend.

592; 1 Euss. Cr. *133, 134; 3 Arch. Crim. Pr. & PI. 623-11.

The ruling that "if the defendant knew what he was doing and

did what he intended to do, it was immaterial what his opinion,

was as to the legal effect of what he was doing, and it would be no

defence that he did not know he was violating the law," was mani-

festly correct. "A man's moral perceptions may be so perverted as

to imagine an act to be right and legal which the law justly pro-

nounces fraudulent and corrupt ; but he is not therefore to escape
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from the consequences of it." Bump Fr. Conv. (3d ed.) 25. "Ig-

norance of a fact may sometimes be taken as evidence of a want of

criminal intent, but not ignorance of the law" (Reynolds v. United

States, 98 U. S. 145) ; and "in no case can one enter a court of

justice to which he has been summoned in either a civil or criminal

proceeding, with the sole and naked defence that when he did the

act complained of, he did not know of the existence of the law

which he violated." 1 Bish. Cr. L. (7th ed.), s. 294.

It is elementarj', as well as indispensable to the orderly admin-

istration of justice, that every man is presumed to know the laws

of the country in which he dwells, and also to intend the necessary

and legitimate consequences of what he knowingly does. If there

are cases in which the application of these presumptions might

operate harshly, the admitted facts amply demonstrate that this

case is not such an one. Exceptions overruled.

Clark, J., did not sit: the others concurred

consent of some court, "he shall stand two hours in the pillory, be
forever disabled to sue on any popular or penal statute, and shall
forfeit ten pounds."
The motion to quash the indictment because it describes the·
offence for which composition was made as a "supposed. offence,',.
was properly denied. "The bargain and acceptance of the reward
makes the crime" (Stat e v. Duhammel, 2 Harr. 532, 533) ; ancl
in such a case, "the party may be convicted though no offence
liable to a penalty has been committed by the person from whom
the reward is taken." Reg. v. Best, 9 C. & P. 368,-38 Eng. C. L.
220; Rex v. Gatley, Rus . & Ry. 84; P eople v. Buckland, 13 1..V end~
592; 1 Russ. Cr. *133: 13-±; 3 Arch. Crim. Pr. & Pl. 623-11.
The ruling that "if the defendant knew what he was cloing and
did what he intended to do, it was immaterial what his opinion.
was as to the legal effect of what he was doing, and it would be no·
defence that he did not know he was violating the law," was manifestly correct. "A man's moral perceptions may be so perverted as
to imagine an act to be right and legal which the law justly pronounces fraudulent and corrupt; but he i not therefore to escape
from the consequences of it." Bump Fr. Conv. (3d ed.) 25. "Ignorance of a fact may sometime be taken as evidence of a want of
criminal intent, but not ignorance of the law" (Reynolds v. United.
States, 98 U. S. 145) ; and "in no case can one enter a court of
justice to which he has been summoned in either a civil or criminal
proceeding, with the sole and naked defence that when he did the
act complained of, he did not know of the existence of the law
which he violated." 1 Bish. Cr. L. (nh eel.), s. 294.
J t is elementary, as well as indispensable to the orderly administration of ju:::tice: that every man is presumed to know the laws
of the country in which he dwells, and also to intend the necessary
and legitimate consequences of what he knowingly does. If there
are cases in which the application of these presumptions might
operate harshly, the admitted facts amply demonstrate that this
case is not su"h an one.
E xceptions overruled.
CLARK, J., did not sit: the others concurred

CHAPTER XIII.

OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC PEACE.

Affray.

Hawkins v. State, 13 Ga. 322. (1853.)

Affray in Baldwin Superior Court. Tried before Judge John-

son, March Term, 1853.

Nathan Hawkins and William G. Bonner were indicted for an

CHAPTER XIII.

affray. The proof on the part of the State was, that Hawkins

was in the public street in Milledgeville, when Bonner passed

by ; Hawkins accosted him, rising at the same time, "I understand

OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC PEACE.

you said that you had made a contract with me about feeding your

horses. I have said, that if you said so, you told a d — d lie ; and

as I am not accustomed to say anything behind a man's back which

AFFRAY.

I will not say to his face, I now tell you of it." Bonner replied,

"I did not say that I had made a contract with you, but if you

Hawkins v. State, 13 Ga. 322. (1853.)

mean to say that I told a lie, I will spit in your face." Hawkins

said, "you had better try it, it will cost you nothing, God d — n

you." Bonner then spit at Hawkins, springing forward and catch-

ing him by the collar. Hawkins pushed him off, when Bonner

drew his bowie knife and cut at Hawkins. Hawkins then drew his
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knife from his pocket, but did not use it, being prevented.

Some testimony was introduced on the part of Bonner ; Hawkins

introducing none.

Counsel for Hawkins insisted that, as he had introduced no

testimony, he was entitled to the conclusion of the argument to

the Jury. The Court decided that Bonner, his co-defendant, hav-

ing introduced evidence, the State was entitled to the conclusion,

and this decision is assigned as error.

Counsel for Hawkins requested the Court to charge, that it was

not sufficient to constitute an affray, that the fighting was in a

public place — it must be proven that it was to the terror of the

citizens; which the Court declined to charge, and error is assigned.

The Jury having found defendants guilty, counsel for Hawkins

moved for a new trial, on the ground that there was no cvidencM;-

313

Affray in Baldwin Superior Court. Tried before Judge J01-1N~
SON, March Term, 1853.
Nathan Hawkins and William G. Bonner were indicted for an
affray. The proof on the part of the State was, that Hawkins
was in the public street in Milledgeville, when Bonner passed
by; Hawkins accosted him, rising at the same time, "I understand
you said that you had made a contract with me about feeding your
horse . I have said, that if you said so, you told a d-d lie; and
as I am not accustomed to say anything behind a man's back which
I will not say to his face, I now tell you of it." Bonner replied,,
"I did not say that I had made a contract with you, but if you
mean to say that I told a lie, I will spit in your face." Hawkin
said, "you had better try it, it will cost you nothing, God d-n
you." Bonner then spit at Hawkins, springing forward and catching him by the colla:::-. Hawkins pushed him off, when Bonner
drew his bowie knife and cut at Hawkins. Hawkins then drew his
knife from his pocket, but did not use it, being preventecl.
Some testimony was introduced on the part of Bonner; Hawkins
introducing none.
Counsel for Hawkins in isted that, as he had introduced no
testimony, he was entitled to the conclusion of the argument to
the Jury. The Court decided that Bonner, hi co-defendant, having introduc d evidence, the State was entitled to the conclusion,
and this deci ion i assigned as error.
Counsel for Hawkin requested the Court to charge, that it was
not sufficient to constitute an affray, that the fighting was in a
public place-it must b proven that it wa. to the terror of the
itjzens; which the Court declined to charge, and error is assign d.
The Jury having foun l defendants guilty, couns 1 for I awkin ,
mo v •<l for a new trial, on the ground that there wa no vi<len ·e·
313
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of any assault and battery on the part of Hawkins. The Court

refused the motion, and this is assigned as error.

By the Court. — Warner, J., delivering the opinion.

The defendants were indicted for an affray, which is defined by

our Code, to be "the fighting of two or more persons in some

public place, to the terror of the citizens, and disturbance of the

public tranquility." Prince, 643.

(1.) The defendants are to be tried together, and for the pur-

poses of the trial, and in making their defence, are to be considered

as having one common interest; and this view of the question

disposes of the objections made to the refusal of the Court to allow

each defendant to strike seven of the Jurors peremptorily, and

refusing to allow the counsel for one of the defendants to con-

clude the argument to the Jury, the other defendant having intro-

duced evidence in his behalf to the Jury.

Where two are indicted for an affray, the successful defence

of one will operate as an acquittal of both; as where the evidence

shows that one of the parties acted entirely in self-defence, while

the other assaulted and beat him, the aggressor may be guilty of
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an assault and battery, but neither of them guilty of an affray;

and neither can be convicted on an indictment therefor; so that

on the trial of an indictment for an affray, the aggressor is as much

interested to show that both parties did not fight, as the innocent

party is to show that fact ; the defence of one enures to the benefit

of the other.

(2.) But is is said, there is no evidence that Hawkins, one of

the defendants, fought at all, and that an affray cannot be com-

mitted by words alone. The evidence is, that an altercation took

place between the parties in a public street in Milledgeville, at the

instance of Hawkins, who first accosted Bonner. Bonner then

drew his knife, cut at Hawkins. ' Hawkins then drew his knife

from his pocket, but did not use it, being prevented by the by-

standers. The drawing his knife and attempting to use it on that

occasion, was an act quite significant of his intention, had he not

been prevented from using it. The words alone of the parties,

independent of their acts, would not have constituted an affray;

but their words, accompanied by their acts respectively, in drawing

their knives and attempting to use them, was calculated to terrify

the good citizens of Milledgeville, and disturb the public tran-

quility. 1 Russell on Crimes, 271.

of any assault and battery on the part of Hawkins. The Court
refused the motion, and this is assigned as error.
By the Court.-WARNER, J., delivering the opinion.
The defendants were indicted for an affray, which is defined by
our Code, to be "the fighting of two or more person;:; in some
public place, to the terror of the citizens, and disturbance of the
public tranquility." Prince, 643.
( 1.) The defendants are to be tried together, and for the purposes of the trial, and in making their defence, are to be considered
as having one common interest; and this view of the q11.estion
disposes of th<' objections made to the refusal of the Court to allow
each defendant to strike seven of the Jurors peremptorily, and
refusing to allow the counsel for one of the defendants to conclude the argument to the Jury, the other d fendant having introduced evidence in his behalf to the Jury.
Where two are indicted for an affray, the successful defence
of one will operate as an acquittal of both; as where the evidence
shows that one of the parties acted entirely in self-defence, while
the other assaulted and beat him, the aggressor may be guilty of
an assault and battery, but neither of them guilty of an affray;
and neither can be convicted on an indictment therefor; o that
on the trial of an indictment for an affray, the aggressor js a much
interested to show that both parties djd not fight, as the innocent
party is to show that fact; the defence of one enures to the benefit
of the other.
(2.) But is i . aid, there is no evidence that Hawbns, one of
the defendants, fought at all, and that an affray cannot be committed by words alone. The evidence is, that an altercation took
place between the parties in a public treet in MilledgeviHe, at the
instance of Hawkins, who first acco ted Bonner. Bonner then
drew hi knife, cut at Hawkins. · Hawkins then drew his knife
from his pocket: but did not use it, being prevented by the bystanders. 'rhe drawing his knife and attempting to use it on that
occa ion, was an act quite significant of his intention, had he not
been prevented from using it. 'rhe words alone of the parties,
independent of their act , would not have con tituted an affray;
but their words, accompanied by thejr act re pectively, in drawing
their knives and attempting to use them, wa calculated to terrify
the good citizens of :Milledgeville, and di turb the public tranquility. 1 Russell on Crime , 2 , 1.
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(3.) One who aids, assists, and abets an affray, is guilty as

principal. Carliii v. The State, -i Yerger's K. 143. The Court

instructed the Jury in the language of the Code, in relation to the

offence, and they have found, by their verdict, both defendants

guilty; and we cannot hold, from the facts apparent on the face

of this record, that their verdict was without evidence, as to all

the necessary elements to constitute the offence of an affray.

Let the judgment of the Court below be affirmed.

Bankus v. State, .k Ind. lU. (1858.)

Error to the Henry Circuit Court.

Perkins, J. :

Indictment for a riot. Jury trial, conviction, motion for a new

(3.) One who aid, a its, and abets an affray, is guilty a ..
-principal. Carlin v. Th e tate, 4 Yerger' R. 143. The Court
in tructed the Jury in the language of the Code, in relation to the
-0ffence, and they have found, by their verdict, both defendant
guilty; and we cannot hold, from the fact apparent on the face
-0f thi record: that their verdict wa without evidence, a to all
the necessary elements to constitute the offence of an affray.
Let the judgment of the ourt below be affirmed.

irial overruled, and judgment against the defendants.

The bill of exceptions in the case states the substance of the

evidence given as follows: "Jesse Bankus, Lewis Simpson, Wil-

liam Woods, and William McShirely, four of the defendants, were

Banlcus v. State, 4 Ind. 114.

on trial, and three witnesses were examined on the part of the

{1853.)

state (one of whom was engaged in the alleged riot with the de-

fendants), whose testimony tended to prove that on a certain
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evening, within a year before the finding of said indictment, at

Error to the Henry Circuit Court.

the county of Henry, the above-named defendants were at a certain

place in said county, called Chicago (there being no evidence to

prove that they had assembled at said place by previous concert

or arrangement, for any purpose whatever, except the facts that

they were all present without any known lousiness, and that they

lived in different parts of the neighborhood) ; that there had been

an infair at the house of one Jacob Wise, in said Chicago, whose

house was situated on or near the public highway; that the de-

fendants, with one exception, were young men, one of whom went

to a neighboring house and borrowed a horn, with which they

marcbed back and forth along the highway, sometimes blowing

said horn and singing songs, but not vulgar ones, before the house

of said Wise, and north and south of it, and hallooed so that they

could be heard near a mile distant, as certain persons, not wit-

nesses, had informed said Wise; and that they continued on the

eround, thus actinor, till one or two o'clock in the morning. But

.J.:
Indictment for a riot. Jury triai, conviction, motion for a new
-trial overruled, and judgment again t the defendanL
The bill of exception in the case state the ubstance of the
evidence given a follow : "Je e Banku , Lewi Simp on, William Woods, and William McShirely, -four of the defendants, were
on trial, and three witnesse were examined on the part of the
state (one of whom was engaged in the alleged riot with the def endants ), who e te timony tended to prove that on a certain
€vening, within a year before the finding of said indictment, at
-the county of Henry, the above-named defendants were at a certain
place in said county, called Chicago (there being no evidence to
prove that they ha l a semLled at said place by previou concert
or arrangement, for any purpo e whatever, except the fact: that
-they were all pre ent without any known bu ine , and that they
l ived in different part of the neighborhood); that there had_ been
an infair at the hou e of one Jacob Wi e, in aid Chicago, whose
house was situated on or near the public highway; that the defendant~, with one exception; were young men one of whom went
-to a neighboring hou e and borrowed a horn, with which th y
marched back and forth along the highway, .. ometime blo-wing
said horn and inging .. ong , but not vulgar one , before the hou ~ c
of aid Wise, and north and south of it, and hallooed o that they
·ould be heard n ar a mile di tant, a certain per on ~, not \'I itn e , had inform d aid \ i e; and that th y e: ntinu d on the
r und thu acting till one or two o'clock in th morning. But
PERKINS,
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said witnesses all concurred in stating that the defendants were

all in good humor, and used no violence further than above set

forth; that they had no guns or weapons of any kind, made na

threats or attempts at force of any kind; that the witnesses were

not in the least alarmed, and feared no danger of any kind, and

were in no way disturbed, except that Jacob Wise stated that he

went to bed about nine o'clock, and was awakened occasionally by

the hallooing in the road, and that a pedler, who put up at the

house of said Wise that night (it being a public house), inquired

if there were a lock and key to the stable in which his horses were

kept; and that said Wise, at the instance of said pedler, locked

the stable;" which was all the testimony given in the cause.

The question is, whether, upon the foregoing evidence, the jury

were authorized to find the defendants guilty of a riot.

The E. S. of 1843, enact, p. 973, that "if three or more persons

?hall actually do an unlawful act of violence, either with or with-

out a common cause or quarrel, or even do a lawful act in a violent

and tumultuous manner, they shall be deemed guilty of a riot.''

The R. S. of 1852, vol. 2, p. 425, thus define a riot: "If three or
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more persons shall do an act in a violent and tumultuous manner,,

they shall be deemed guilty of a riot."

A great noise in the night-time, made by the human voice or by

blowing a trumpet, is a nuisance to those near whom it is made.

The making of such a noise, therefore, in the vicinity of inhab-

itants, is an unlawful act ; and, if made by three or more persons

in concert, is, by the statute of 1843, a riot. All these facts exist

in the present case. Here was a great noise, heard a mile, in the

night-time, made with human voices and a trumpet, in the vicinity

of inhabitants. The requirements of the statute for the making

out of the offence are filled. The noise was also made tumultu-

ously. The act itself involves tumultuousness of manner in its

performance. But it is said, here was no alarm or fear. The

statute defining the offence says nothing about alarm or fear. In

this case, however, it was only the witnesses who were not alarmed.

Others within the distance of the mile in which the noise was

heard, and who were not present to observe the actual condition

of things, may have been, and doubtless were, alarmed; and the

pedler was afraid his horses would be stolen.

It is said the rioters were in good humor. Very likely, as they

"were permitted to carry on their operations without intorruplion.

aid witnesses all concurred in stating that the defendants were
all in good humor, and used no violence further than above set
forth; that they had no guns or weapons of any· kind, made no
threats or attempts at force of any kind; that the witnesses were
not in the lea t alarmed, and fea red no danger of any kincl, ancl
were in no way di turbed, except that Jacob 'Yise tated that he
went to bed about nine dclock, and was awakened occasionally by
the hallooing in the road, and that a pedler, who put up at the
house of said Wise that night (it being a public house), inquired
if there were a lock and key to the stable in which his horse3 were
kept; and that said Wise, at the instance of said pedler, locked
the stable;" which wa all the testimony given in the cause.
The question is, whether, upon the foregoing evidence, the jury
were authorized to find the defendants guilty of a riot.
The R. S. of 1843, enact, p. 973, that aif three or more persons
hall actually do an unlawful act of violence_, either with or without a common cause or quarrel, or even do a lawful act in a violent
ancl tumultuous manner, they shall be deemed guilty of a riot.''
The R. S. of 1852, vol. 2, p. 425, thus define a riot: "If three or
more per ons shall do an act in a violent and tumultuous manner,,
they shall be d "emed guilty of a riot."
A greo..t noise in the night-time, made by the human voice or by
blowing a trumpet, i.s a nuisance to those near whom it is made.
'l'he making of such a noise, therefore, in the vicinity of inhabitants, is an unlawful act; and, if made by three or more persons.
in concert, is, by the statute of 1843, a riot. All these facts exist
in the present case. H ere was a great noi e, heard a mile, in the
night-time, made with human voices and a trumpet, in the vicinity
of inhabitants. 'J.1hc requirements of the statute foT the making
out of the offence are filled. The noise was also made tumultuously. The act itself involves tumultuou ness of manner in its
performance. But it is said here was no alarm or fear The
statute defining the offence says nothing about alarm or fear . In
thi s case, however, it was only the witnes e who were not alarmed.
Others within the distance of the mile in which the noi e was
heard, and who were not present to observe the actual condition
of things, may have been, and doubtles were, alarmed; and the
pecller was afraid his horses would be stolen.
It is said the rioters were in good humor. Very likely, as they
were permitted to carry on their operation s without interruption.
r
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But with what motive were they performing these good-humored

acts ? ISTot, certainly, for the gratification of Wise and his family.

They were giving them what is called a charivari, which Webster

defines and exj^lains as follows: "A mock serenade of discordant

music, kettles, tin-pans, &c., designed to annoy and insult. It was

at first directed against widows who married a second time, at an

advanced age, but is now extended to other occasions of nocturnal

annoyance and insult.''

But with what motive w re th y performing the good-humored
act ? Not, certainly, for the gratification of Wi e and his family.
Th y were giving them what i call c1 a charivari, which Web ter
defines and explains a follow : "A mock erenade of discordant
mu ic, kettle , tin-pan , &c. de igned to annoy and insult. It wa
at fir t directed again ~ t widow who married a second time. at an
advanced age, but i now extended to other occasions of nocturnal
annoyance and. in ult.:'
Again it is urged that these defendant were but a~ting in
accordance with the custom of the country. But a custom of
violating the criminal laws will not exempt such violation frorn
punishment. In the ca e of The State of Pennsylvania v. Lewis.
et al., Add. R. 279, it appeared that on the 5th of November, 1795,
there was a wedding at the house of one John Weston. The defendants in said case were there without invitation, were civilly treated,
and, in the evening, when dancing commenced, began a disturbance
in which, during the evening, We~ton was o seriou ly injured
that, on the third day after, he died. On the trial of the indictment again t said defendants, Campbell, Penteco t, and Brackenridge, in their argument, said, "These men did nothing more than
an usual frolic, according to the custom and manners of this
country. There was no intention of hurt, no design of mischief,
in which the malice, which is a nece sary ingredient of murder,
consist..' But the argument did not prevail; and the Court said,
"If appearance of "port will exclude the presumption of malice,
port will alway be affected to cover a crime." The defendant
were convicted of murder in the second degree.
The case before us we regard as a plain, but not an aggravated
one, of riot, and the judgment below must be affirmed. The defendants were fined but 3 dollars each.
Per Curiam.-The judgment is affirmed with costs.
1

Again, it is urged that these defendants were but acting in

accordance with the custom of the country. But a custom of

violating the criminal laws will not exempt such violation from

punishment. In the case of The State of Pennsylvania v. Lewis,

et al.. Add. R. 279, it appeared that on the 5th of Xovember, 1795,

there was a wedding at the house of one John Weston. The defend-

ants in said case were there without invitation, were civilly treated,

and, in the evening, when dancing commenced, began a disturbance

in which, during the evening, Weston was so seriously injured

that, on the third day after, he died. On the trial of the indict-

ment against said defendants, Campbell, Pentecost, and Bracken-
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ridge, in their argument, said, "These men did nothing more than

an usual frolic, according to the custom and manners of this

country. There was no intention of hurt, no design of mischief,

in which the malice, which is a necessary ingredient of murder,

consists." But the argument did not prevail ; and the Court said,

"If appearance of sport will exclude the presumption of malice,

sport will always be affected to cover a crime." The defendants

were convicted of murder in the second degree.

The case before us we regard as a plain, but not an aggravated

one, of riot, and the judgment below must be affirmed. The de-

fendants were fined but 3 dollars each.

Per Curiam. — The judgment is affirmed with costs.
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Conspiracy.

State V. Burnham, 15 N. H. 396. (18U.)

Gilchrist, J. :

The allegations in the indictment in relation to which the ques-

tions arise, arc that the respondents conspired to induce sundry

CONSPIRACY.
persons, by issuing to them fraudulent policies of insurance, to

appear at the annual meeting of the company, and vote for directors

without right

State v.

Burnham~

15 N. H. 396. {1844.)

The first exception is, because the policies were legal and valid,

and binding on both parties.

From the second and third exceptions we understand the court

to have instructed the jury that the approval of the policies in

regular form by the directors, if the design of the respondents

were to impose upon the directors in procuring the policies, would

not be conclusive evidence in favor of the respondents; that if

the jury believed the respondents intended that the policies should

be treated as mere nullities, for every purpose but that of ena-

bling the holders to vote, the charge would be sustained, though

the respondents agreed that the policies should be duly approved,
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and the directors were not cognizant of any fraud, and though

the policies might be binding upon the parties. •

The fourth exception is, that the conspiracy, if any existed^

was to procure policies to be issued by the proper officers, and

not to cause them to be issued by the respondents.

An examination of all the cases on the subject of conspiracy

would be a work of considerable labor, although, excepting for

that reason, the subject is not one of much intrinsic difficulty.

General definitions of the offence are given in numerous cases,,

and they are sufficiently precise to enable us to apply the law to

the case now before us.

In the first place, we have no doubt that a conspiracy is an in-

dictable offence in this State. It is punishable at common law,

its punishment is not repugnant to our institutions, and it is an

offence productive of as much injury, and as deserving reprehen-

sion under one form of government as another. The case of the

State V. Rollins, 8 N. H. Eep. 550, settles that the body of the

J.:
The allegatjon in the indictment in relation to which the questions arise, are that the re pondents con pired to induce sundry
persons, by is~ uing to them fraudulent policie of in urance, to
appear at the annual meeting of the compan3, and vote for directors
without right
The first exception is, because the policies were legal and valid,
and binding on both partic .
From the ccond and third exception we understand the court
to have instructed the jury that the approval of the policies in
regular form by the director , if the de ign of the respondents
were to impo e upon the directors in procuring the policies, would
not be conclu ive evidence in favor of the re pondents; that if
the jury believed the re pondent intended that the policies ~hould
be treated as mere nullitie : for every purpose but that of enabling the holders to vote, the charge would be ustained, though
the respondent agreed that the policies should be duly approved,
and the director were not cognizant of any fraud, and though
the policies might be binding upon the partie .
The fourth exception is, that the conspiracy if any existed,.
wa to procure policie to be i sued by the proper officers, and
not to cause them to be i ued by the re pondent .
An examination of all the case on the subject of conspiracy
would be a work of considerable labor, although, excepting for
that reason, the subject is not one of much intrin ic difficulty.
General definitions of the offence are given in numerou ca e ,.
and they are ufficiently precise to enable u to apply the law to
the case now before us.
In the fir t place, we have no doubt that a con piracy is an indictable offence in this State. It is puni hable at common law,
it puni hment is not repugnant to our in titution , and it is an
offence productive of as much injury, and as deserving reprehension under one form of government as another. The case of the
State v. Rollins, 8 N. H. Rep. 550, settle that the body of the
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common law, and the English statutes in amendment of it, so far

as they were applicable to our institutions and the circumstances

of the country, were in force here upon the organization of the

provincial government, and have been continued in force by the

Constitution, so far as they are not repugnant to that instrument,

until altered or repealed by the legislature.

Combinations against law or against individuals are always dan-

gerous to the public' peace and to public security. To guard

against the union of individuals to effect an unlawful design, is

not easy, and to detect and punish them is often extremely diffi-

cult. The unlawful confederacy is, therefore, punished to prevent

any act in execution of it. This principle is the foundation of

the adjudged cases upon this subject. But the law by no means

intends to exclude society from the benefits of united effort for

legitimate purposes, and such as promote the well being of indi-

viduals or of the public. It uses the word conspiracy in its bad

sense. An act may be immoral without being indictable, where

the isolated acts of an individual are not so injurious to society

as to require the intervention of the law. But when immoral
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acts are committed by numbers, in furtherance of a common

object, and with the advantages and strength which determination

and union impart to them, they assume the grave importance of

a conspiracy, and the peace and order of society require their

repression. The existence, therefore, and execution of the law

against conspiracies may, in certain contingencies, be as important

as the enforcement of any other law for the punishment of offences,

and it requires but little argument to demonstrate that such a

law may be necessary under any system of government.

We do not propose to go any farther than this ease requires,

in defining the offence of conspiracy. From its nature, no com-

prehensive rule can be laid down which shall include all instances

of it, and we must rest, therefore, on the individual cases decided,

which depend generally on particular circumstances. 3 Ch. Cr.

Law 1140. But the authorities agree in stating that a conspiracy

is a confederacy to do an unlawful act, or a lawful act by un-

lawful means, whether to the prejudice of an individual, or of

the public, and that it is not necessary that its object should be

the commission of a crime. Hawk., B. 1, ch. 72 ; 3 Ch. Cr.

Law 1139; 2 Russ. on Cr. 1800; Archb. Cr. PI, 390; Com-

monwealth V. Judd, 2 Mass. 329; Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4

common law, and the English statutes in amendment of it, so far
a they were applicable to our in titutions and the circumstance
of the country, were in force here upon the organization of th
provincial government: and have been continued in force by the
Constitution, so far as they are not repugnant to that instrument,
until altered or repealed by the legislature.
Combjnations again"t law or against individuals are always dangerous to the public· peace and to public security. To guard
against the union of individuals to effect an unlawful design, i
not easy, and to detect and punish them is often extremely difficult. The unlawful confederacy is, therefore, punished to prevent
any act in execution of it. This principle is the foundation of
the adjudged cases upon this subject. But the law by no mean
intends to exclude society from the benefits of united effort for
legitimate purposes, and such as promote the well being of indi·viduals or of the public. It uses the word conspiracy in its bad
sense. An act may be immoral without being indictable, where
the i olated acts of an individual are not so injurious to society
as to require the intervention of the law. But when immoral
acts are committed by numbers, in furtherance of a common
object, and with the advantages and strength which determination
and union impart to them, they assume the grave importance of
a conspiracy, and the peace and order of society require their
repre ~ ion. The existence, therefore, and execution of the law
again t conspiracies may, in certain contingencies, be as important
as the enforcement of any other law for the punishment of offence ,
and it requires but little argument to demonstrate that such a
law may be necessary under any system of government.
We do not propose to go any farther than this case requires,
in defining the offence of con piracy. From its nature, no comprehensive rule can be laid down which shall include all instances
of it, and we must rest, therefore, on the individual cases decided,
which depend generally on particular circumstances. 3 Ch. Cr.
Law 1140. But the authorities agree in stating that a conspiracy
is a confederacy to do an unlawful act, or a lawful act by unlawful means, whether to the prejudice of an individual, or of
the public, and that it is not necessary that its object should b
the commission of a crime. Hawk., B. 1, ch. 72; 3 Ch. Cr.
Law 1139; 2 Russ. on Cr. 1800; Archb. Cr. Pl. 390; Commonwealth v. Judd, 2 Mass. 329; Commonwealth v. Ihmt 4

I
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j\Iet. 111. The same definition is given by Mr. Senator Stebbins,

in the case of Lambert v. The People, 9 Cowen 578, whose opinion

contains a very full and able exposition of the authorities. And

he pointedly remarks that the offence is one which with some

propriety may be said to consist in an artful combination and con-

trivance to produce the injuries consequent upon other crimes, in

a manner calculated to elude the provisions and restraints of

criminal law.

Whether this indictment charges the respondents with a con-

spiracy to do an unlawful act, is a question which does not arise,

and has not been made upon the argument. We assume, there-

fore, that the ultimate object which the respondents had in view

was not illegal. Their purpose was to procure the election of

certain persons as directors of the company, and thereby to cause

themselves to be employed in the service of the company; and

this end, pursued in a legitimate and open manner, and without

deceiving or attempting to deceive and defraud those who had

the power and right to employ them, or to aid them in their pur-

poses, was as unobjectionable as any pursuit whatever. But if,
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by an insatiate appetite for gain, the respondents kept exclusively

in view the object to be accomplished, lost sight of honesty and

fairness in the means used to effect it, and resorted to fraud and

falsehood, in such case they have made themselves amenable to

the law.

Assuming, then, that the purpose of the respondents was law-

ful, still, if the means used to effect it be unlawful, the offence

will be complete. The illegality of the means in such case must

be explained by proper statements, and established by proof. 2

Euss. on Crimes 569; The King v. Seward, 1 Ad. & E. 706;

The King v. Eccles, 3 Dougl. 337; Archb. Cr. PI. 390, 391.

The act of marriage is in itself lawful, but a conspiracy to pro-

cure it may amount to a crime, by the practice of undue means.

Fowler's Case, 3 East P. C. 461 ; Best's Case, 2 Lord Eaym. 1167 ;

Hawk., B. 1, ch. 72, § 3, (n.)

The authorities agree that the gist of the offence is the con-

spiracy. Best's Case, 2 Lord Eaymond 1167 ; Vertue v. Lord Clive,

4 Burr. 2475; Commonwealth v. Davis, 9 Mass. 415; Common-

wealth V. Hunt, 4 Met. 125; Gill's Case, 2 B. & Aid. 204.

When it is said in the books that the means must be unlawful,

it is not to be understood that those means must amount to in-

l\Iet. 111. The same definition is given by Mr. Senator Stebbins,
in the case of Lambert v. Th e P eople, 9 Cowen 578, whose opinion
contains a very full and able expo ition of the authorities. And
he pointedly remarks that the offence is one which with some
propriety may be said to consist in an artful combination and contrivance to produce the injuries con equent upon other crimes, in
.a manner calculated to elude the provisions and restraints of
criminal law.
Whether this indictment charges the respondents with a con-spiracy to do an unlawful act, is a question which does not arise,
.and has not heen made upon the argument. We assume, therefore, that the ultimate object which the respondents had in view
was not illegal. Their purpose was to procure the election of
certain persons as director of the company, and thereby to cause
themselves to be employed in the ervice of the company; and
ihis end, pur ued in a legitimate and open manner_, and without
deceiving or attempting to deceive and defraud those who had
the power and right to employ them, or to aid them in their pur-poses, was as unobjectionable as any pursuit whatever. But if,
by an insatiate appetite for gain, the respondents kept exclusively
in view the object to be accomplished, lost sight of honesty and
fairness in the means used to effect it, and resorted to fraud and
fal ehood, in such case they have made themselves amenable to
-the law.
As urning, then, that the purpose of the respondents was law:ful, still, if the means used to effect it be unlawful, the offence
will be complete. The illegality of the means in such case must
be explained by proper tatements, and established by proof. 2
Buss. on Crimes 569; Th e King v. Seward, 1 Ad. & E. 706;
Th e King v. Eccles, 3 Dougl. 337; Archb. Cr. PL 390, 391.
The act of marriage is in itself lawful, but a conspiracy to procure it may amount to a crime, by the practice of undue means.
Fowler's Case, 3 East P. C. 461; Best's Case, 2 Lord Raym. 1167;
Hawk., B. 1, ch. 72, § 3, ( n.)
The authorities agree that the gist of the offence is the conpiracy. Be t's Case, 2 Lord Raymond 1167; Vertue v. Lord Clive,
4 Burr. 2475; Commonwealth v. Davis, 9 Mass. 415; Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 125; Gill's Case, 2 B. & Ald. 204.
When it is said in the books that the means must be unlawful,
it i not to be understood that tho e means must amount to in-
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dictable offences, in order to make the offence of conspiracy com-

plete. It will be enough if they are corrupt, dishonest, fraudu-

lent, immoral, and in that sense illegal, and it is in the combina-

tion to make use of such practices that the dangers of this offence

consist. State v. Buchanan, 5 Har. & J. 317. Conspiracies may

he indictable where neither the object, if effected, nor the means

made use of to accomplish it, would be punishable without the

conspiracy. In the case of a conspiracy among journeymen to

raise their wages, the object of the conspiracy is lawful, and the

means by which the object is to be effected are no otherwise un-

lawful than as the conspiracy makes them so. Rex v. Tailors

of Cambridge, 8 Mod. 11. So in the case of conspiracy among

the officers of the East India Company, to resign their com-

missions, the means were lawful, but for the conspiracy. Yertue

V. Lord Clive, 4 Burr. 2472. In the case of The King v. Seward,

1 Ad. & E. 706, which was an indictment for conspiring to cause

a male pauper to marry a female pauper, Mr. Justice Taunton

says, that "merely persuading an unmarried man and woman in

poor circumstances to contract matrimony, is not an offence. If,
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indeed, it were done by unfair and undue means, it might be

unlawful, but that is not stated. There is no averment that the

parties were unwilling, or that the marriage was brought about

hy any fraud, strategem, or concealment, or by duress or threat."

So, raising or lowering the price of the public funds is not in itself

criminal, but a conspiracy to raise their price by false rumors is

indictable. The King v. De Berenger, 3 M. & S. 67. And ad-

mitting that the offence of conspiracy is one which should be pun-

ished, if a combination to do dishonest and immoral acts do not

constitute a conspiracy, even although the acts be not indictable

or even actionable, in numerous cases justice could not reach the

offenders.

But it is not necessary, in the present case, for us to aetermine

whether, if the object be lawful, the offence of conspiracy will be

committed if the means used be no otherwise unlawful or immoral

than as they are made so by the conspiracy.

The indictment alleges that the respondents conspired to induce

persons, by issuing to them fraudulent policies of insurance, to

appear at the annual meeting and vote for directors.

It appears from the fact that the respondents were found guilty,

under the instructions of the court, stated in the case, that the

21

dictable offence , in order to make the offence of con piracy complete. It will be enough if they are corrupt, di hone t fraudulent, immoral, and in that en e illegal, and it i in the combination to make u e of uch practice that the danger of thi offen c
con i t. State v. Buchanan, 5 Har. & J. 31 . Con piracie may
be indictable where neither the object if effected, nor the mean
made u e of to accompli .. h it, would be punishable without the
con piracy. In the case of a con piracy among journeymen to
rai e their wages, the object of the con pirac} i lawful, and the
m eans by which the object is to be effected are no otherwi..,,e unlawful than a the conspiracy make them o. Rex v. Tailors
-0f Cambridge, 8 l\fod. 11. So in the case of conspiracy among
the officer of the Ea t India Compan}, to resign their commis ions, the mean were lawful, but for the conspiracy. Vertue
-v. Lord Cliie, 4 Burr. 94 2. In the case of Th e King v. S eward,
1 Ad. & E. 706, which wa an indictment for con piring to cau e
a male pauper to marry a female pauper, Mr. Justice Taunton
says, that "merely persuading an unmarried man and woman in
poor circum tance to contract matrimony, i not an offence. If,
indeed, it were done by unfair and undue means, it might be
unlawful, but that i not stated. There is no averment that the
parties were unwilling, or that the marriage was brought about
by any fraud, strategem, or concealment, or by dures or threat."
So, raising or lowering the price of the public funds i not in it elf
<Criminal, but a con piracy to raise their price by false rumors i
indictable. The King v. De Berenger, 3 M. & S. 67. And admitting that the offence of con piracy is one which should be punished, if a combination to do di honest and immoral act do not
constitute a conspiracy, even although the aot be not indictabl
or even actionable, in numerou cases justice could not reach the
-0ffenders.
But it is not necessary, in the present case, for us to aetermine
whether, if the object be lawful, the offence of con piracy will be
committed if the mean used be no otherwi e unlawful or immoral
than a they are made o by the con piracy.
The indictment alleges that the respondent con pired to induce
per ons, by issuing to them fraudulent policie of in urance, to
appear at the annual meeting and vote for dir ctor .
It appear from the fact that the re pond nt w r found guilty,
und r the in truction of the court, tated in th ca , that the
21
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fraud was tins : the respondents agreed that the policies should he.

held and treated as mere nullities for every purpose except that

of authorizing the holders to vote thereon at the annual meeting.

It is argued that the allegation of the means used is not proved^

because the respondents issued no policies; that they were issued

by the directors, and the respondents merely delivered them. In

one sense the respondents did not issue the policies. They did

not issue them in the sense in which the word is ordinarily used^

when a bank or an insurance company is said to issue its bills or

its policies, for they were not a corporation. But the word issue

means "to send forth, to emit, to send out, to deliver for use,"

and the respondents, having procured the policies, issued them by

sending them out and delivering them to the insured. The alle-

gation, therefore, is strictly proved. But the respondents issued

the policies, also, by procuring the directors to issue them, who

in this matter were their unconscious agents. We do not think,

therefore, that this exception is valid.

The respondents, then, issued the policies. These were in form

legal, but in substance dishonest, because the purpose for which,
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and the consideration upon which they were issued, were corrupt.

Having a corrupt purpose in view, are they the less criminal be-

cause they prostituted the forms of law to enable them to subserve

that purpose? Is the fraud on the company any less? The

transaction, if known, certainly could have no other than an in-

jurious effect upon the standing of the company with the public.

The object of the company was to indemnify the public against

the hazards of fire, and a large number of persons had a deep

interest in its well being, and the injurious effect of such a com-

bination was of such a kind that common prudence would not

enable one to guard himself against it. If the respondents desired

to secure the election of certain persons as directors, they might

well enough have induced their friends to become members of the

company; they might have canvassed for votes; they might have

resorted to the ordinary practices of electioneering. They might

have used all those arts which the good sense and right feeling of

every disinterested man condemn, although the moral sense of

the public may not be sufficiently pure to discountenance them.

But all this might have been done without an actual fraud, or

even with no fraudulent intent. But here there was a gross fraud.

Bv whose votes were the directors to be elected? It was not by

fraud wa this : the respondents agreecl that the policie should be.
held and treated as mere nullities for every purpose except that
of authorizing the holders to vote thereon at the annual meeting_
It i argued that the allegation of the means used i not proved 7
h ecau ~c the responclents issued no policie ; that they were iss~ed
by the director , and the r e pondents merely delivered them. In
one ense the re pondent did not i ue the p0licies. They did
not i sue them in the sense in which the word i ordinarily used,.
when a bank or an in urance company is aid to is ue it bill or
its policies, for they were not a corporation. But the word issite
means "to send forth, to emit, to send out, to deliver for u e,"
and the respondents, having procured the policie , issued them by
sending them out and delivering them to the insured. The allegation, therefore, is strictly proved. But the respondent i ued
the policies, al o, by procuring the directors to issue them, who
in thi matter were their uncon<::ciou agent . We do not think,
therefore, that this exception i valid.
The respondents, then, is~ ue d the policies. These were in form
legal, but in sub tance di hone t, becau e the purpose for which,
and the consideration upon which they were issued, were corrupt.
H aving a corrupt purpose in view, are they the less criminal because they pro titutecl the forms of law to enable them to subserve
that purpo e? fa the fraud on the company any le s ? The
transaction, if known certainly could have no other than an injurious effect upon the st anding of the company with the public.
The object of the company was to indemnify the public against
the hazards of fire, and a large number of persons had a deep
interest in it well being, and the injuriou effect of such a combination was of such a kind that common prudence would not
enable one to guard himself again t it. If the r espondents desired
to secure the election of certain persons as directors, they might
well enough have induc d their friend to become members of the
company ; they might have canvassed for votes; they might have
r esorted to the ordinary practices of 'electioneering. They might
have used all tho e arts which the good sense and right feeling of
every di interested man condemn, although the moral sense of
the public may not be sufficiently pure to discountenance them .
But all this might have been done without an actual fraud, or
even with no fraudulent intent. But here there was a gross fraud.
By whose vote were the directors to be elected? It was not by
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hona fide members of the company. It was not by those whose

membership was the result of a positive contract to continue for

a definite period. It was not by those who intended to take upon

themselves certain responsibilities, in consideration of certain ben-

efits to be derived from the company. But the contracts, except

for one selfish and specific purpose, were false. In their substance

they were wrongful and fraudulent. They were honest only in

their form and outward seeming. They were to exist only as

blinds to those whose interests depended on their being honesty

upon their being any thing but what they were in fact. Tlie

choice of directors in such an association is of the last importance.

The control they exercise over the property of the company is

great. The measures they adopt in conducting the affairs of the

company are full of interest to the members. On them the in-

stitution depends for the confidence of the public, for the proper

disposition of the funds from which losses are to be paid, and for

the general integrity and skill with which its business is man-

aged. They should, of course, be elected by those only who have

a positive interest in the success of the company. But this com-
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bination intended that they should be chosen by persons to whom

its interests were immaterial; who took their policies under a

fraudulent pretence, and who were brought forward to outvote

the unsuspicious members of the association, who were ignorant

of this concerted action. Can we say that this was not a fraud

on the directors; that it was not a fraud on the other members?

Can we say that policies, legal in form, legally binding in fact

upon the insured, but which, it was agreed, should not have the

validity they imported, were not founded upon a corrupt agree-

ment; were not, in the language of the indictment, false poli-

cies? We can regard such policies only as most immoral and

fraudulent means to accomplish the object of the respondents, and

with this view our opinion is that the instructions of the court

were correct.

Judgment on the verdict.

bona fide members of the company. It wa not by those whose
membership was the result of a po itivc contract to continue for
a definite period. It was not b) those who intended to take upon
themselves certain responsibilities, in consideration of certain benefits to be derived from the company. But the contracts, except
for one selfish and specific purpo e, were fal e. In their substance
they were wrongful and fraudulent. They were honest only in
their form and outward seeming. They were to exist only a
blinds to those whose interests depended on their being honest,
upon their being any thing but what they were in fact. The
choice of directors in such an association is of the last importance.
The control they exercise over the property of the company is
great. The measures they adopt in conducting the affairs of the
company are full of interest to the members. On them the in' titution depends for the confidence of the public, for the proper
djsposition of the funds from which losses are to be paid, and for
the general integrity and skill with which its business is managed. They should, of course, be elected by those only who have
a positive interest in the success of the company. But this combination intended that they hould be cho en by person to whom
its interests were immaterial; who took their policies under a.
fraudulent pretence, and who were brought forward to outvote·
the unsuspicious members of the association, who were ignorant
of this concerted action. Can we say that this was not a fraud
on the director ; that it wa not a fraud on the other members?
Can we say that policies, legal in form, legally binding in fact
upon the insured, but which, it was agreed, should not have the·
validity they imported, were not founded upon a corrupt agreement; were not, in the language of the indictment, false policiC' ? We can regard such policies only as most immoral an cl
fraudulent means to accomplish the object of th respondents, and
with this view our opinion is that the instructions of the court
were correct.
Judgment on the

verdict~
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Forcible Entry and Detainer.

Commomvealih v. SJiattuck, Jj. Cusli. (Mass.) 11^1. (18Jf9.)

The defendants were severally indicted in the court of common

pleas, the first named for a forcible entry and detainer, and the

others for an assault and battery upon the officer by whom the

process, on a complaint of forcible entry and detainer in the first

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER.

case, was served.

The first indictment alleged, that the defendant, "with force

Commonwealth v. Shattuck, 4 Cush . (Mass.) 141.

{1849. )

and arms, and with a strong hand, unlawfully, forcibly and in-

juriously did enter into a certain messuage and parcel of land,

with the appurtenances, of one John Temple, &c., &c., with a

dwelling-house thereon standing, then and there being in the

peaceable possession of the said John Temple and that the said

Calvin W. Shattuck, then and there, with force, as aforesaid, and

with a strong hand, unlawfully, violently, forcibly and injuriously,

did expel, amove and put out the said John Temple from the

possession of the said premises with the appurtenances; and the

said John Temple, so as aforesaid expelled, amoved and put out

from the possession of the same, with force and arms, and with a
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strong hand, unlawfully, violently, forcibly and injuriously has

kept out from, &c., and still does keep out, and other wrongs &c.,

against the peace, &c., and contrary to the form of the statute in

such case made and provided."

To this indictment the defendant demurred and the district

attorney joined in demurrer. The court overruled the demurrer,

and the defendant thereupon appealed to this court.*

The indictment, in the second entitled cause, contained two

counts. The first alleged, that the defendants committed an assault

aud battery upon one Samuel Potter, a deputy sheriff, while in the

due and lawful exercise of the duties of his office, and obstructed,

liindered and opposed him therein. The second count charged the

defendants with committing an assault and battery upon Potter,

not described as an officer, with a flatiron and a billet of wood.

*It was understood, that, by the consent of the attorney for the Com-

monweahh, the defendant should be entitled to a trial on the merits, if

the demurrer should be overruled.

The defendants were severally indicted in the court of common
pleas, the :first named for a forcible entry and detainer, and the
others for an as ault and battery upon the officer by whom the
process, on a complaint of forcible entry and detainer in the first
case, was served.
The :first indictment alleged, that the defendant, "with force
and arms, and with a strong hand, unlawfully, forcibly and injuriously did enter into a certain messuage and parcel of land,
with the appurtenances, of one John Temple, &c., &c., with a
dwelling-house thereon standing, then and there being in the
peaceable posse sion of the said John Temple and that the said
Calvin W. Shattuck, then and there, with force, as aforesaid, and
with a strong hand, unlawfully, violently, forcibly and injuriously,
did expel, amove and put out the said John Temple from the
possession of the said premise with the appurtenances; and the
said John Temple, so as aforesaid expelled, amoved and put out
from the possession of the same, with force and arms, and with a
strong hand, unlawfully, violently, forcibly and injuriously has
kept out from, &c., and still does keep out, and other wrongs &c.,
against the peace, &c., and contrary to the form of the statute in
such case made and provided."
To this indictment the defendant demurred and the district
attorney joined in demurrer. The court overruled the demurrer,
and the defendant thereupon appealed to this court.*
The indictment, in the second entitled cause, contained two
counts. The :first alleged, that the defendants committed an assault
and battery upon one Samuel Potter, a deputy sheriff, while in the
due and lawful exercise of the duties of his office, and obstructed,
hindered and opposed him therein. The second count charged the
defendants with committing an assault and battery upon Potter,
not described as an officer, with a flatiron and a billet of wood.
*It was understood, that, by the consent of the attorney for the Commonwealth, the defendant should be entitled to a trial on the merits, if
the demurrer hould be overruled.
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Col\11\IONWEALTH v. SHATTUCK
COMMOX WEALTH V. ShATTUCK 3'? 5

On the trial, which was before Byington, J., the district attorney

introduced in evidence a warrant issued by a justice of the peace,

upon a complaint against the defendants and others, for a forcible

entry and detainer of the premises described in the first indict-

ment, which v.^arrant was in the hands of the deputy sheriff Pot-

ter for service, at the time of the alleged assault. This evidence

was objected to by the defendant, on the ground that the warrant

set forth no offence, and, therefore, that the officer was not required

or authorized to serve it ; but the evidence was admitted by the

court, and there being also other evidence in the case, the jury

were instructed, that if they should be satisfied, that the defend-

ants committed an assault and battery upon Potter, while he was

in the act of executing the warrant, according to the precept

thereof, as an officer, and the defendants knew it, but nevertheless

hindered and obstructed him, the defendants would be guilty of

the offence charged..

The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the defendants there-

upon alleged exceptions.

The cases were argued together.
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Dewey, J. :

The demurrer to this indictment raises the question as to the

sufficiency of the allegations it contains to constitute a charge of

an indictable offence. The indictment concluding, as it does, with

the averment contra forniam statuti, may be sustained under our

decisions as well as under our statute law, if the facts charged

constitute an offence either by statute or at the common law,

Commomvealth v. Hoxey, 16 Mass. 385; Eev. Sts. c. 137, § 14.

It is proposed, in the first place and more at large, to consider the

On the trial, whi h wa before Byington, J., the district attorney
introduced in evidence a warrant is ued by a justice of the peac ,
upon a complaint against the defendants and other , for a forcible
entry and detainer of the premises described in the first indi iment, which warrant was in the hands of the deputy sheriff Potter for service, at the time of the alleged assault. This evidence
was objecfod to by the defendant, on the ground that the warrant
set forth no offence, and, therefore, that the officer was not requireci
or .authorized to serve it; but the evidence was admitted by the
court, and there being also other evidence in the case, the jury
were instructed, that if they should be satisfied, that the defendants committed an assault and battery upon Potter, while he wa
in the act of executing the warrant, according to the precept
thereof, as an officer, and the defendants knew it, but nevertheless
hindered and obstructed him, the defendants would be guilty of
the offence charged ..
The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the defendants thereupon alleged exceptions.
The cases were argued together.

point whether an indictment will lie at common law for a forcible

entry.

The objection taken to such an indictment is, that the offence

charged is a private injury, and one more properly cognizable

under the head of civil trespass or private wrong, and not a matter

of public concern, or affecting public rights. If it were a mere

trespass, the objection must avail as it did in Eex v. Storr, 3 Burr.

1698. A merely unlawful entry upon the land of another, with

technical force and arms, but accompanied with no acts beyond

a simple trespass, is not an indictable offence. It is also \m- •

doubtedly true, that the English statutes having provided another

J.:
The demurrer to this indictment raises the question as to the
sufficiency of the allegations it contains to constitute a charge of
an indictable offence. The indictment concluding, as it does, with
the averment contra formam statuti, may be sustained under our
decisions as well as under our statute law, if the facts charged
constitute an offence either by statute or at the common law,
Commonwealth v. Hoxey, 16 Mass. 385; Rev. Sts. c. 137, § 14.
It is proposed, in the first place and more at large, to consider the
point whether an indictment will lie at common law for a forcible
DEWEY,

~~

.

The objection taken to such an indictment is, that the offence
cnarged is a private injury, and one more properly cognizable
under the head of civil trespass or private wrong, and not a matt r
of public concern, or affecting public rights. If it wer a m r
tre"pa , the objection mu t avail as it did in Rex v. Storr . 3 Burr.
1698. A merely unlawful entry upon the land of anoth r, with
technical force and arms, but accompanied with no acts beyond
·a simple trespass, is not an indictable off nc . It i al.::o nn- •
doubtedly true~ that the Engli h tatutes havin provid l1 another
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mode of redress, more -effectual as to the speedy restitution of the

land to the party from whom the same has been forcibly taken,

than the proceedings by indictment would be, the former has been

the mode of proceeding more usually resorted to in such cases;

and the same is true as to the remedies in use, and the usual mode

of redress provided in many of the states in this union.

But we apprehend that both before and since the enacting of

"the various statute provisions in England, the remedies for a forci-

ble entry unlawfully made have been twofold, one by indictment

at common law, and the other by proceedings under the statutes.

In Bex V. Bathurst, Sayer, 225, it was held, that an indictment

lies at common law for a forcible entry into a dwelling-house and

expelling the occupants. In Bex v. Bake, 3 Burr. 1731, Mr. Jus-

tice Wilmot says, "Undoubtedly an indictment will lie at common

law, for a forcible entry, though the proceedings are generally

under the acts of parliament." In Bex v. ^VUson, 8 T. E. 357,

302, lord Kenyon says, "There is no doubt that the offence of forci-

ble entry is indictable at the common law, though the statute gives

other remedies to the parties aggrieved." 3 Chit. Crim. Law, 1131 ;
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Eosc. Cr. Ev. 374, are also authorities to the same effect.

In this commonwealth, it seems to be assumed, that such an

indictment would lie at the common law, in the opinion delivered

by Mr. Justice Wilde in the case of Sampson v. Henry, 13 Pick,

36, In the report of the commissioners for revising the statute

laws, in 1835, in their note to the first section of the one hundred

and fourth chapter, in which they proposed a new section, not

copied from any former statutes, which was to this effect: "No

person shall make entry into lands except in cases where his entry

is allowed by law, and in such cases he shall not enter with force,

but in a peaceable manner;" they say they are only introducing

into the statutes a rule fully recognized as a part of our common

law, and one plainly implied from the provisions of our existing

statutes. Harding's Case, 1 Greenl. 22, is to the same point.

This must be so upon sound principles, as the preservation of the

public peace requires that the offence should be punished criminally.

Individuals are not to assert their claims to real estate, and espe-

cially to a dwelling-house, in the actual possession of another, by

force and violence, and with a strong hand. The peace of the

commonwealth forbids it. This principle does not in any degree

interfere with the making of a formal entry upon land, preparatory

mode of redress, more -effectual as to the speedy restitution of the
land to the party from whom the same has been forcibly taken
than the proceedings by indictment would be, the former has been
the mode of proceeding more usually resorted to in such ca es ;
and the same i true as to the remedie .. in use, and the usual mode
()f redress provided in many of the tate in thi union.
But we apprehend that both before and since the enacting of
i:he various statute provision in England, the remedies for a forcible entry unlawfully made have been twofold, one by indictment
at common law, and the other by proceedings under the statutes.
In Rex v. Bathitrsi, Sayer, 225, it was held, that an indictment
lies at common law for a forcible entry into a dwelling-house and
.expelling the occupants. In Rex v. Bake, 3 Burr. 1731, Mr. Justice Wilmot says, "Undoubtedly an indictment will lie at common
law, for a forcible entry, though the proceedings are generally
under the acts of parliament." In Rex v. Wilson, 8 T. R. 357 ~
3G2, lord Kenyon says, "There is no doubt that the offence of forcible entry is indictable at the common law, though the statute give
other remedies to the parties aggrieved." 3 Chit. Crim. Law, 1131;
Ro c. Cr. Ev. 374, are also authorities to the same effect.
In this commonwealth, it seems to be assumed, that such an
indictment would lie at the common law, in the opinion delivered
by Mr. Justice Wilde in the case of Sampson v. Henry, 13 Pick.
36. In the report of the commissioner for revi ing the statute
laws, in 1835, in their note to the first section of the one hundred
and fourth chapter, in which they proposed a new section, not
copied from any former statutes, which was to this effect : "No
person shall make entry into lands except in cases where his entry
is allowed by law, and in such cases he hall not enter with force,
but in a peaceable manner;" they say they are only introducing
into the statutes a rule fully recognized a a part of our common
law, and one plainly implied from the provisions of our exi ting
statutes. Harding's Case, 1 Greenl. 22, is to the same point.
This must be so upon ound principles, as the pre ervation of the
public peace require that the offence should be punished criminally.
Individuals are not to assert their claims to real estate, and especially to a dwelling-hou e, in the actual possession of another by
force and violence, and with a strong hand. The peace of the
commonwealtb forbids it. This principle doe not jn any degree
interfere wjth the making of a formal entry upon land. preparatory
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to the bringing of an action at law, and which may be necessary

to give a legal seizin to the party, but which leaves those in posses-

sion undisturbed as to the actual occupation. Nor does it embrace

the case of a mere trespass upon land, as to which the civil remedy

is alone to be resorted to. To sustain an indictment for a forcible

entry, the entry must be accompanied with circumstances tending

to excite terror in the owner, and to prevent him from maintain-

ing his right. There must at least be some apparent violence;

or some unusual weapons; or the parties attended with an unusual

number of people; some menaces, or other acts giving reasonable

cause to fear, that the party making the forcible entry will do some

bodily hurt to those in possession, if they do not give up the same.

It is the existence of such facts and circumstances, connected with

the entry, that removes it from the class of cases of civil injury,

to be redressed in actions of trespass or other civil proceedings,

and holds the party thus making an unlawful e-ntry amenable to

the public as for a public wrong.

Does the present indictment charge such an offence, as we have

above described as that of a forcible entry? Charging the entry
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to have been unlawfully made with force and arms, and with a

strong hand, is a sufficient allegation to constitute the offence a

forcible entry. The words "with a strong hand" mean something

more than a common trespass. By Lawrence, J., in Rex v. ^VUson,

8 T. E. 362, these words are said to imply that the entry was ac-

companied with that terror and violence which constitute the

offence. See Eastall's Entries, 354; Bande's Case, Cro. Jac. 41.

It seems to us, therefore, that this indictment does well charge

the offence of a forcible entry, and that such forcible entry is ar

offence at common law. We have considered it solely in the aspect

of a charge of forcible entry, which alone is sufficient to maintain

the indictment, and renders it immaterial whether it might also

be sustained as a charge of forcible detainer. So also as an offence

against our statutes, if the case required it, it might be proper to

consider whether the provision of the Eev. Sts. c. 104, § 1, already

referred to, and directly prohibiting the doing of the act com-

plained of here, would not make such act a statute offence, punish-

able under the Eev. Sts. c. 139, § 1, as a case where an act was

made criminal by a prohibitory statute, but no particular punish-

ment annexed to the offence.

If a forcible entry is thus made a statute oftoncc, ihen the prcs-

to the bringing of an action at law, and which may be nece ary
to gi-ve a legal eizin to the party, but which leave tho e in po e'"'ion undisturbed a to the actual occupation. Nor doe it embrace
the ca e of a mere tre~ pa upon land, a to which the civil r medy
i alone to he resorted t o. To u tain an indictment for a forcible::
entry, the entry mu t be accompanied with circum tances t ending
i:o excite terror in the owner, and to prevent him from maintaining his right. There must at lea t be ome apparent violence ;
or some unusual weapon. ; or the parties attended with an unu ual
number of people ; some menace , or other act giving rea on.able
-cause to fear, that the party making the forcible entry will do some
bodily hurt to tho e in po s ssion, if they do not give up the same.
It is the existence of such fact and circum tance , connected with
the entry, that removes it from the cla s of cases of civil injury,
to be redressed in actions of trespass or other civil proceeding ,
and holds the party thus making an unlawful e.ntry amenable to
the public as for a public wrong.
Does the present indictment charge such an offence, as we have
above described a that of a forcible entry? Charging the entry
to have been unlawfully made with force and arms, and with a
~trong hand, is a sufficient allegation to con ... titute the offence a
forcible entry. The words "with a strong hand" mean something
more than a common trespass. By Lawrence, J., in Rex v. WilsonJ
8 T. R. 362, these words are said to imply that the entry wa accompanied with that terror and violence which con titute the
offence. See Rastall's Entries, 354; Bande's Case, Cro. J ac. 41.
It seems to us, therefore, that this indictment does well charge
the offence of a forcible entry, and that such forcible entry i ai1
offence at common law. We have considered it solely in the aspect
of a charge of forcible entry, which alone is sufficient to maintain
the indictment, and render it immaterial whether it might al o
be ustained as a charge of forcible detainer. So also a an offence
against our statute , if the case required it, it might be proper to
con. ider whether the provision of the Rev. St . c. 104, § 1, alr ady
ref rred to, and directly prohibiting the doing of the act complained of here, would not make uch act a tatute offence, puni.: hable under the Rev. Sts. c. 139, § 1, a a case where an act was
made criminal by a prohibitory . tatute but no parti ubr puni hm ent annexed to the offen c.
If a forcible ntry i thu mad a . tatute off n , th n tl1 pr ~ -
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ent conclusion of the indictment, charging it as an offence against

the form of the statute, is correct. If, however, it is only an

otTence at common law, then the allegation just referred to may

be rejected as surplusage; and judgment may be rendered upon

the indictment, as upon an indictment for an offence at common

law. In either view of the case the demurrer must be overruled.

Demurrer overruled in the first case, and the exceptions over-
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ruled in the second.

ent conclusion of the indictment, charging it as an offence against
the form of the statute, is correct. If, however, it is only an
offence at common law, then the allegation just referred to may
be rejected as surplusage; and judgment may be rendered upon
the indictment, as upon an indictment for an offence at common
law. In either view of the case the demurrer must be overruled_
Demurrer overruled in the first case, and the exceptions overruled in the second.

CHAPTER XIV.

OFFENCES AGAINST MORALS AND RELIGION.

Adultery.

Commonwealth v. Call, 21 PicJc. (Mass.) 509. (1S39.)

The defendant was tried in the Municipal Court upon an indict-

ment for adultery committed within the county of Suffolk, and

the Jury returned the following special verdict, dated the 23d of

CHAPTER XIV.

March, 1838, and signed by the foreman : "The jury find the de-

fendant guilty of having had sexual intercourse with Eliza Foster,

the person named in the indictment, she at the same time being an

OFFENCES AGAINST MORALS AND RELIGION.

unmarried woman, and the defendant being a married man and

having a lawful wife at the time then living."

The defendant moved in arrest of judgment, and for cause

ADULTERY.

assigned, that the facts set forth in the verdict might be adjudged

not to constitute the crime of adultery, and that the prisoner

Commonwealth v. Call, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 509.

{1839.}

was not guilty in manner and form alleged in the indictment.

The court overruled the motion in arrest, and passed judgment

upon the special verdict, "that the facts set forth in said special

verdict did constitute the crime of adultery, and that by said ver-

dict the jury had found the prisoner guilty in manner and form
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alleged in the indictment." To this judgment the defendant ex-

cepted.

Dewey, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The counsel

for the prisoner contends, that upon the special matter found by

the jury on the trial of this cause, it was not competent for the

Municipal Court to enter a judgment, that the jury had found the

prisoner guilty of the crime of adultery in the manner and form

alleged in the indictment.

The matter thus found is alleged to be insufficient for two rea-

sons : —

1. That the facts of which the jury have found the prisoner

guilty, do not constitute the crime of adultery:

2. That it does not appear that the offence was committed

within the county of Suffolk.
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The defendant was tried in the Municipal Court upon an indictment for adultery committed within the county of Suffolk, and
the jury returned the following special verdict, dated the 23d of
March, 18::38, and. signed by the foreman: "The jury :find the defendant guilty of having had sexual intercourse with Eliza Foster,
the person named in the indictment, she at the same time being an
unmarried woman, and the defendant being a married man and
having a lawful wife at the time then living."
The defendant moved in arrest of judgment, and for cause
assigned, that the facts set forth in the verdict might be adjudged
not to constitute the crime of adultery, and that the pri oner
was not guilty in manner and form alleged in the indictment.
The court overruled the motion in arrest, and passed judgment
upon the pecial verdict, "that the facts set forth in said special
verdict did constitute the crime of adultery, and that by said verdict the jury had found the prisoner guilty in manner and form
alleged in the indictment." To this judgment the defendant excepted.
DEWEY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The counsel
for the prisoner contends, that upon the special matter found by
the jury on the trial of this cause, it was not competent for th
Municipal Court to enter a judgment, that the jury had found the
prisoner guilty of the crime of adultery in the manner and form
alleged in the indictment.
'The matter thus found is alleged to be insufficient for two reaons : 1. That the facts of which the jury hav found the pri oner
guilty, do not constitute the crime of adultery:
2. That it does not appear that the offence was committe
within the county of Suffolk.
329
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The statute of this Commonwealth making adultery an offence

punishable in the common law courts, has not given a definition

of this crime. Such is generally the case in our criminal code, as

to the higher crimes. They are not defined in our statute book,

but are assumed to be well known as ofilences at common law, and

under the general term denoting the offence, it is declared by

law to be a crime, and the mode of trial and measure of punish-

ment are alone prescribed by statute.

If questions arise in such cases as to what constitutes the offence,

recurrence is to be had to well-established definitions sanctioned

by books of authority and adopted by long usage, and with refer-

ence to which it may be supposed the legislature have acted in the

enactment of the law punishing the offence.

It so happens, that on the present question we derive less aid

than usual from the lights of the common law, the crime of adul-

tery not being cognizable by the temporal courts in England as a

public offence, but only as a private injury; and hence we have

not that distinct character of this crime, well defined and made

familiar to us by the books of common law, that would be found
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to exist in relation to other offences.

By the civil law, adultery could only be committed by the un-

lawful sexual intercourse of a man with a married woman. Thus,

as is stated in Wood's Institute, 272, adultery is a carnal knowl-

edge of another man's wife, and the connexion of a married man

with a single woman does not make him guilty of the crime of

adultery.

On the other, in the English ecclesiastical courts it is held that

the offence of adultery is established by showing that the husband

has had illicit intercourse with any person, and no distinction is

taken whether the alleged offence was committed with a married

or unmarried female.

Such is the general rule in cases of divorce granted for the cause

of adultery, not only in England, but also, as I suppose, through-

out the United States. Our ancient colonial statute (of 1646)

punished with death the "crime of adultery with a married woman

or espoused wife." The offence punishable by this law clearly

would not have embraced the present case. Under the provincial

statutes the punishment was much mitigated, and the offence de-

scribed under the general term adultery, without the additional

•description of the offence being committed with a married woman.

The statute of this Commonwealth making adultery an offence
puni hable in the common law courts) has not given a definition
of this crime. Such is generally the case in our criminal code) a
to the higher crimes. They are not defined in our statute book,
but are assumed to be well known a offences at common law, and
under the general term denoting the offence) it is declared by
law to be n crime, and the mode of trial and measure of punishment are alone prescribed by statute.
If questions arise in such cases as to what con titutes the offence,
recurrence is to be had to well-established definitions sanctioned
by books of authority and adopted by long usage, and with reference to which it may be upposed the }egi lature have acted in the
enactment of the law punishing the offence.
It so happens) that on the present question we derive less aicl
than usual from the lights of the common law, the crime of adultery not being cognizable by the temporal courts in England as a
public offence) but only a a private injury; and hence we have
not that distinct character of this crime, well defined and made
familiar to us by the book of common law, that would be found
to exist in relation to other offences.
By the c:ivil law, adultery could only be committed by the unlawful sexual intercourse of a man with a married woman. Thu ,
as is stated in Wood's Institute, 272) adultery i a carnal knowledge of another man's wife, and the connexion of a married man
with a single woman does not make him guilty of the crime of
adultery.
On the other, in the English ecclesiastical courts it is held that
the offence of adultery i e tablished by showing that the husband
11as had illicit intercourse with any person, and no distinction i
taken whether the alleged offence was committed with a married
-0r unmarried female.
Such is the general rule in cases of divorce granted for the cause
of adultery: not only in England, but also) as I suppose, through-Out the United State . Our ancient colonial statute (of 1646)
punished with death the "crime of adultery with a married woman
-0r e poused wife." The offence punishable by this law clearly
would not have embraced the present case. Under the provincial
tatutes the punishment was much mitigated, and the offence de, cribcd under the general term adultery, without the additional
·de cription of the offence being committed with a married woman.
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The earliest statute on the subject after the adoption of the con-

stitution, St. 1784, c. 40, contains, as was usual at that period,

a preamble setting forth the objects of the statute, among which

is stated that of enforcing "the due observance of the marriage

covenants," thus indicating its general application to both the

parties, rather than the more limited object of punishing the in-

fidelity of the wife merely. This statute also punished the offence

under the general term of adultery.

The statute of 1785, c. 69, authorized a divorce from the bonds

of matrimony for adultery in either of the parties; and it is to

be observed, that the same descriptive term is here used as in the

statute making the offence a crime punishable in the courts of

law, and the words are in no degree more extensive. The question

naturally arises, whether it may not be fairly inferred that the

legislature, using the same term, in two successsive political years,

as descriptive of an offence, did not intend that the same offence

should be indicated by it in both cases. But as to the construction

of the term adultery in the statute last cited, it has always been

lield to include the case of any unlawful intercourse by a married
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man.

Much light is also thrown upon the present question l)y the

Eevised Stat. c. 130, § 1, which is the existing law on the subject,

and wherein it is provided, in addition to the former statute pun-

ishing the crime of adultery, that "when the crime is committed

between a married woman and a man who is unmarried, the man

shall be deemed guilty of adultery." This addition to the former

statute provisions would be entirely unnecessary, if the definition

of adultery were such as is alleged by the counsel for the prisoner.

If the civil law definition of this crime had been adopted here,

the unmarried man might for such an offence well be h olden

guilty of the crime of adultery, without this additional statute

provision.

But it is well understood to have been the law of this Common-

wealth prior to the Eevised Statutes, that if the party was not a

married man, the offence of having unlawful intercourse with

a married woman would not be adultery in him. 6 Dane's Abr.

We think it will be found that the same construction has been

given to the staute of 1784, c. 40, as to that of 1785, c. C9, author-

izing divorces for adulterv. and that it h;is lucn uniformly liohlen

'The ear lie . . t ta tut on the ubject after the adoption of th contitution, St. 1784, c. 40, contain , a wa u ual at that period,
-a preamble setting forth the objects of the tatute, among which
is tated that of enforcing 'the due observance of the marriage
covenant ," thu indicating its general application to both the
parties, rather than the more limited object of puni hing the infidelity of the wife merely. Thi statute also puni hed the offence
under the general term of adultery.
The statute of 1785, c. 69, authorized a divorce from the bond
-of matrimony for adultery in either of the parties; and it i to
be observed, that the same descriptive t erm i here u ed as in the
statute making the offence a crime punishable in the courts of
law, and the word are in no degree more ext nsive. The question
naturally arises, whether it may not be fairly inferred that the
legislature, using the same term, in two successsive political years,
as descriptive of an offence, did not intend that the same offence
· hould be indicated by it in both cases. But as to the construction
-of the term adultery in the statute last cited, it has always been
l1eld to include the case of any unlawful intercourse by a married
man.
:Much light is also thrown upon the present question by the
R evised Stat. c. 130, § 1, which is the existing law on the subject,
and wherein it i provided, in addition to the former statute punishing the crime of adultery, that "when the crime is committed
between a married woman and a man who is unmarried, the man
shall be deemed guilty of adultery." This addition to the former
statute provisions would be entirely unnecessary, if the definition
of adultery were such as is alleged by the counsel for the pri. oner.
If the civil law definition of this crime had been adopted here,
the unmarried man might for uch an offence well be holden
guilty of the crime of adultery, without thi additional statute
provision.
But it i well understood to have been th law of thi Commonwealth prior to the Revised Statutes, that if the party wa not a
married man, the offence of having unlawful intercourse with
a married woman would not be adultery in him. 6 Dane' Abr.
676.
We think it will b found that the same con tru tion ha~ b en
given to the staute of 1784, . 40, a to that of l 1 v, . G9, authorjzing divorc for a(lultery, nr1 (l that it hn ~ l Hr n lll1iforn1ly hold n
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that the same offence which would subject the party to a divorce^,

would also sustain an indictment for the crime of adultery. Such

certainly has been the rule practised upon in our criminal courts

for many years, and although several convictions in such cases

are remembered, no exceptions have been taken, bringing the ques-

tion before this Court for revision.

The late Solicitor-General Davis, who was a very good criminal

lawyer, and had the benefit of thirty years' experience in the office

of public prosecutor, so understood the construction given by the

court to the statute punishing this oifence, as is apparent from the

Precedents published by him at the close of his official duties,

wherein are found forms of indictments for adultery, distinctly

adapted to the case where the offence is committed by a married

man with a single woman. Davis's Precedents, 48.

Whatever, therefore, may have been the original meaning of the

term adultery, it is very obvious that we have in this Common-

wealth adopted the definition given to it by the ecclesiastical courts,

and this not merely in relation to divorces, but also as descriptive

of a public crime. We hold the infidelity of the husband as well
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as that of the wife, the highly aggravated offence, constituting

the crime of adultery. Familiar as the legislature must be sup-

posed to have been with this construction of the statute of 1784,

c. 40, they sanctioned in the Eevised Statutes the same form of

expression, without any restriction of the extended application

given to it by the courts of law, and making no other alteration

except that already referred to, enlarging its application so as to

include within it the case of the unmarried man who should com-

mit the. offence with a married woman. The Court are satisfied

that by the proper construction of the term adultery as used in our

statutes, the offence is committed by a married man who shall

have sexual intercourse with an unmarried woman.

Applying this rule of law to the facts specially found by the

jury, they establish the crime of adultery to have been committed

by the prisoner.

This brings us to the second objection taken to the sufficiency

of this verdict, which is, that the jury have not found that the

offence charged upon the prisoner 'was committed within the

county of Suffolk.

It is a very familiar principle in the administration of the crim-

inal law, that all the circumstances essential to sustaining the

that the ::;ame offence which would subject the party to a divorce,,
would also sustain an indictment for the crime of adultery. Such
certainly has been the rule practised upon in our criminal court
for many years, and although several convictions in such ca e
are remembered, no exceptions have been taken, bringing the question before thi. Court for revision.
The late Solicitor-General Davis, who was a very good criminal
lawyer, and had the benefit of thirty years' experience in the office
of public prosecutor, so understood the construction given by the·
court to the statute punishing this offence, as is apparent from the
Precedents published by him at the close of his official duties,.
wherein are found forms of indictments for adultery, distinctly
adapted to the case where the offence is committed by a married
man with a single woman. Davis's Precedents, 48.
Whatever, therefore, may have been the original meaning of the
term adultery, it is very obvious that we have in this Commonwealth adopted the definition given to it by the ecclesiastical courts,
and this not merely in relation to divorces, but also as descriptive
of a public crime. We hold the infidelity of the husband as well
as that of the wife, the highly aggravated offence, constituting
the crime of adultery. Familiar as the legislature must be supposed to have been with this construction of the statute of 1784,
c. 40, they sanctioned in the Revised Statutes the same form of
expression, without any restriction of the extended application
given to it by the courts of law, and making no other alteration
except that already referred to, enlarging its application so as fo
include within it the case of the unmarried man who should commit the. offence with a married woman. The Court are sati fied
that by the proper conoctruction of the term adultery as used in our
statutes) the offence is committed by a married man who shall
have sexual intercourse with an unmarried woman.
Applying this rule of law to the fact specially found by the
jury, they establish the crime of adultery to have been committed
by the prisoner.
This brings us to the second objection taken to the sufficiency
of this verdict, which is, that the jury have not found that the
offence charged upon the prisoner 'wa committed within the
county of Suffolk.
Tt is a very familiar principle in the administration of the criminal law, that all the circumstances es ~ ential to . u taining the-
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indictment must be expressly foimd by the jury, and the court

cannot supply a defect in the finding of the jury by intendment

or implication. 1 Chitty's Crim. Law, 644 ; Bac. Abr. Verdict, D.

It is equally clear, that it must always appear that the jury have

found the offence was committed within the county in which the

indictment is found, or the court cannot give judgment against

the prisoner. 1 Stark. Cr. PI. 354; The King v. Hazel, 1 Leach,

406.

In the ordinary case of a general verdict of guilty, the jury, by

the very terms of their verdict, find the prisoner guilty of all the

material allegations in the indictment. Not so in a special verdict,

for the very object of this departure from the usual form, is pre-

sumed to be for the purpose of declaring the prisoner guilty of

certain facts only, with a view of submitting the question, whether

those facts authorize a general verdict of guilty, to the judgment

of the court. In such a case, if the facts thus found do not in-

clude all the essential elements of the offence charged upon the

prisoner, he cannot be convicted.

The finding of the jury in the present case shows the defendant
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guilty of acts constituting the crime of adultery, but is entirely

defective as to the fact where the crime was committed. The facts

found by the jury may all be truly found, and yet they may have

occurred in an adjacent county, or out of the Commonwealth. We

cannot judicially know that the offence was committed in the county

of Suffolk, the jury not having so said either directly, or by any

reference to the indictment in their verdict.

The Court are therefore of opinion, that it was not competent

for the Municipal Court to render a judgment upon this verdict,

that the jury had found the prisoner guilty of the offence as

charged in the indictment, and to this extent the exception taken

to the ruling of the judge must be sustained.

The only remaining inquiry is, whether this defect in the finding

of the jury entitles the prisoner to a judgment as upon a verdict

of not guilty.

The finding of the jury here was altogether an imperfect and

defective finding, and therefore not available either to the govern-

ment as a verdict of guilty, or to the prisoner as a verdict of

acquittal. It neither affirms nor denies as to the truth of any alle-

gations in the indictment, other than as to the facts specially

stated in the verdict. Had it found the prisoner not guilty except

indictment must be expre ly found by the jury, and the court
cannot supply a defect in the finding of the jury by intendment
-0r implication. 1 Chitty's Crim. Law, 644; Bae. Abr. Verdict, D.
It i equally clear, that it mu t always appear that the jury have
found the offence was committed within the county in which the
indictment is found, or the court cannot give judgment again t
the prisoner. 1 Stark. Cr. PL 35-±; The King v. Haz el, 1 Leah,
406.
In th e ordinary ca e of a general verdict of guilty, the jury, by
the very terms of their verdict, find the pri oner guilty of all the
material allegation in the indictment. Not o in a special verdict.
for the very object of this departure from the usual form, is presumed to be for the purpo e of declaring the prisoner guilty of
certain fact only, with a view of ubmitting the que tion, wheth r
those facts authorize a general verdict of guilty, to the judgment
of the court. In such a case, if the facts thus found do not include all the e. . ..,ential elements of the offence charged upon the
prisoner, he cannot be convicted.
The finding of the jury in the pre ent ca e hows the defendant
guilty of acts con tituting the crime of adultery, but is entirelv
defective as to the fact where the crime was committed. The facts
found b~ the jury may all be truly found, and yet they may have
occurred in an adjacent county, or out of the Commonwealth. We
cannot judicially know that the offence was ommitted in the county
of Suffolk, the jury not having so aid either directly, or hy any
reference to the indictment in their verdict.
The Court are therefore of opinion, that it wa not competent
for the Municipal Court to render a judgment upon this verdict,
that the jury bad found the pri oner guilty of the offence a
charged in the indictment, and to this extent the exception taken
to the ruling of the judge must be ustained.
The only remaining inquiry i , whether thi defect in the finding
of the jury entitles the pri. oner to a judgment a upon a v rdi t
of not guilty.
The finding of the jury here was altogether an imperf ct and
defective finding, and therefore not a,vailable eith r to the government as a verdict of guilty~ or to the pri oner as a verdict of
acquittal. It neither affirm nor denies a to the truth of any allegation in the indictment, other than a ' to th fact pr ially
tated in the verdj t. Had it founc1 t11 e pr i. oner n l guilty c·x pt
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as to the matter thus specially stated, it would have been effectual

to discharge the jDriscner and would be tantamount to a verdict

of acquittal; but in its present form it cannot operate as such,

and the result will be, that the prisoner must be put again on his

trial. 1 Chitty's Crim. Law, 646; Rex v. Woodfall 5 Burr. 2661;.

Ecx V. Hayes, 2 Ld. Kaym. 1522.

The bill of exceptions is sustained, and the case remanded to

the Municipal Court for a new trial.

Bigamy.

People V. Brotvn, SJ^ Midi. 339. (1876.)

COOLEY, Ch. J.:

The defendant seeks to avoid the penalties of a bigamous mar-

as to the matter thus specially stated, it would have been effectual
to discharge the prisoner and would be tantamount to a verdict
of acquittal; but in its present form it cannot operate as such,
and the result will be, that the prisoner must be put again on hie
trial. 1 Chitt.Y's Crim. Law: 646; Rex v. Woodfall, 5 Burr. 2661 ;.
Rex v. Hay es, 2 Ld. Raym. 1522.
The bill of exceptions is sustained, and the case remanded to
the Municipal Court for a new trial.

riage by showing that he is a negro, and that the other party to

the marriage was a white woman, with whom under the statute it

was impossible for him to contract marriage at all. — Comp. L.,

§ 4724. The argument is, that if the ceremony of marriage has

BIGAMY.

taken place between parties who, if single, would be incapable of

contracting marriage, the marriage ceremony is merely idle and

void, and the respondent cannot be said to have been married the
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second time at all.

People v. Brown, 34 Mich. 339.

(1876.)

The logic of the argument is not very obvious. It certainiy can-

not be based upon any idea that there must be something of binding

and obligatory force in the second marriage; for every bigamous

marriage is void, and it is the entering into the void marriage

while a valid marriage exists that the statute punishes. Nor can

we understand of what importance it can be that there are two

elements of illegality in the case instead of one, or why the party

should be relieved from the consequences of violating one statute

because the act of doing so was a violation of another also.

The authorities sanction no such doctrine. There are loose

statements in some of the cases that the second marriage must

have been one that, but for the existence of the first, would have

been valid; but these evidently relate to the acts and intent of the

parties, and not to the legal ability to unite in a valid relation. It

was decided in Rex v. Penson, 5 C. & P. 412, that bigamy was

committed in marrying a woman under an assumed name, though

J. :
The defendant seeks to avoid the penalties of a bigamous marriage by showing that he is a negro, and that the other party to
the marriage wa8 a white woman, with whom under the statute it
was impossible for him to contract marriage at all.-Comp. L.,
§ 472±. The argument i , that if the ceremony of marriage has
taken place between parties who, if single, would be incapable of
contracting marriage, the marriage ceremony is merely idle and
void, and the respondent cannot be said to have been married the
second time at all.
The logic of the argument is not very obvious. It certainiy cannot he based upon any idea that there must be something of bi,1ding
and obligatory force in the second marriage; for every bigamous
marriage is void, and it is the entering into the void marriage
while a valid marriage exi ts that the statute punishe . Nor can
we understand of what importance it can be that there are two·
elements of illegality in the case instead of one, or why the party
hould be relieved from the consequences of violating one statute
because the act of doing so was a violation of another also.
The authorities sanction no such doctrine. There are loose
statements in some of the cases that the second marriage must.
have been one that, but for the ex~stence of the first, would have
been valid; but these evidently relate to the acts and intent of the
parties, and not to the legal ability to unite in a valid relation. It.
was decided in R ex v. Penson, 5 C. & P. 412, that bigamy wa
committed in marrying a woman under an assumed name, though
COOLEY, CH.
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by law such a marriage between persons capable of contracting-

would be void. The case of Regina v. Brawn, 1 C. & K. 144, was

similar to the present in its facts, and Lord Denman. in summing

up said: "It is the appearing to contract a second marriage, and

the going through the ceremony, which constitutes the crime of

bigamy, otherwise it never could exist in ordinary cases, as a pre-

vious marriage always renders null and void a marriage that is

celebrated afterwards by either of the parties during the lifetime

of the other. Whether therefore the marriage of the two prisoners

was or was not in itself prohibited, and therefore null and void,

does not signify, for the woman, having a husband then alive, has

committed the crime of bigamy, by doing all that in her lay by

entering into marriage with another man." These cases are rec-

ognized in the case of Hayes v. People, 25 IST. Y. 390, which is

relied upon by the respondent, but which affords no countenance

for his exceptions.

The recorder's court must be advised that we find no error in

the record, and that judgment should be pronounced on the verdict.

The other Justices concurred

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:03 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t39z97p86
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

Abortion.

Mills V. Commomvealtli, 13 Pa. St. 631. (1850.)

The opinion of the Court was delivered by Coulter, J. :

The error assigned is, that the indictment charges that the de-

fendant, with intent to cause and procure the miscarriage and

abortion of the said Mary Elizabeth Lutz, instead of charging the

intent to cause and produce the miscarriage and abortion of the

child. But it is a misconception of the learned counsel, that no

abortion can be predicated of the act of untimely birth by foul

by law

uch a marriage between per . . on apable of contractin
would be void. The case of Regina '. Brawn, 1 C. & K. 14"1, wa.
imilar to the present in its facts, and Lord Denman. in summing
up said: "It is the appearing to contract a s cond marriage, and
the going through the ceremony, which con titute the crime of
bigamy, otherwi e it never could exist in ordinary cases, as a previous marriage alway renders null and void a marriage that i.
celebrated afterwards by either of the parties during the lifetim
of the other. Whether therefore the marriage of the two pri.:oner:;
was or was not in itself prohibited, and therefore null and void
does not signify, for the woman, having a husband then alive, ha
committed the crime of bigamy, by doing all that in her lay by
entering into marriage with another man." These cases are recognized in the case of Hayes v. People, 25 N. Y. 390, which is
relied upon by the respondent, but which affords no countenance
for his exceptions.
The recorder's court must be advised that we :find no error in
the record, and that judgment should be pronounced on the verdict.
The other Justices concurred

means.

Miscarriage, both in law and philology, means the bringing forth

the foetus before it is perfectly formed and capable of living; and

is rightfully predicated of the woman, because it refers to the act

of premature delivery. The word abortion is synonymous and

ABORTION.

equivalent to miscarriage, in its primary meaning. It has a sec-

ondary meaning, in which it is used to denote the offspring. But

Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. St. 631.

{1850.)

it was not used in that sense here, and ought not to have been.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by COULTER, J.:
The error assigned is, that the indictment charges that the defendant, with intent to cause and procure the miscarriage and
abortion of the said Mary Elizabeth Lutz, instead of charging th
intent to cause and produce the miscarriage and abortion of the
child. But it is a misconception of the learned counsel, that no
abortion can be predicated of the act of untimely birth by foul
means.
Miscarriage, both in law and philology, means the bringing forth
the fretus before it is perfectly formed and capable of Ii ving; ami
is rightfully predicat d of the woman, because it refers to the a t
of premature delivery. The word abortion i synonymous and
equivalent to miscarriage, in its primary meaning. It has a s ondary meaning, in which it i u ed to denote the offspring. But
it was not used in that sense here, and ought not to have b n.
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It is a flagrant crime, at common law, to attempt to procure the

miscarriage or abortion of the woman; because it interferes with

and violates the mysteries of nature, in that process by which the

human race is propagated and continued. It is a crime against

nature, which obstructs the fountain of life, and therefore it is pun-

ished.

The next error assigned is, that it ought to have been charged

in the count that the woman had become quick. But, although

it has been so held in Massachusetts and some other states, it is not,

I apprehend, the law. in Pennsylvania, and never ought to have

been the law anywhere. It is not the murder of a living child,

which constitutes the offence, but the destruction of gestation,

hy wicked means and against nature. The moment the womb is

instinct with embryo life, and gestation has begun, the crime may

be perpetrated. The allegation in this indictment was therefore

sufficient, to wit, "that she was then and there pregnant and big

with child." By the well-settled and established doctrine of the

common law, the civil rights of an infant in ventre sa mere are

fully protected at all periods after conception ; 3 Coke's Institutes.
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A count charging a wicked intent to procure miscarriage of a

woman, "then and there being pregnant," by administering po-

tions, &c., was held good on demurrer by the Supreme Court of

this state; MS. Rep. January, 1846; Whart. Crim. Law, 308.

There was, therefore, a crime at common law sufficiently set forth

and charged in the indictment.

But although we see no error in the record, the sentence must

be reformed on account of certain proceedings in this court and

dehors this record. The imprisonment for one year is made to

take effect after the termination of the sentence on another indict-

ment for the same crime on Catharine Ann Lutz, and the sentence

in that case is to take effect after the expiration of the sentence on

another indictment against the same defendant for seducing Mary

Elizabeth Lutz, under a promise to marry; which sentence was

reversed and set aside by this court.

By the 1st sec. of the act of June 16th, 1836, the Supreme Court

liave power to correct all manner of error of the courts of this com-

monwealth, as well in criminal as civil pleas or proceedings, and

therefore to reverse, modify or affirm such judgments or proceed-

ings as the law doth or shall direct. We, therefore, in pursuance

of this statute, order and direct that the sentence in this case shall

It is a flagrant crime, at common Jaw, to attempt to procure th
miscarriage or abortion of the woman; because it interferes with
and violates the mysteries of nature, in that process by which the
human race is propagated and continued. It is a crime against
nature, which obstructs the fountain of life, and therefore it is punished.
The next error assigned is, that it ought to have been charged
in the count that the woman had become quick. But, although
it has been so held in Massachusetts and some other states, it is not,
I apprehend, the law. in Pennsylvania, and never ought to have
been the law anywhere. It is not the murder of a living child,
which constitutes the offence, but the destruction of gestation,
by wicked means and against nature. The moment the womb is
instinct with embryo life, and gestation has begun, the crime may
be perpetrated. The allegation in this indictment was therefore
sufficient, to wit, "that she was then and there pregnant and big
with child." By the well-settled and established doctrine of the
common law, the civil rights of an infant in ventre sa mere are
fully protected at all periods after conception; 3 Coke's Institutes.
A count charging a wicked intent to procure miscarriage of a
woman, "then and there being pregnant," by administering potions, &c., was held good on demurrer by the Supreme Court of
this state; MS. Rep. January, 1846; Whart. Crim. Law_, 308.
There was, therefore, a crime at common law sufficiently set forth
and charged in the indictment.
But although we see no error in the record, the sentence must
be reformed on account of certain proceedings in this court and
dehors this record. The imprisonment for one year is made to
take s:ffect after the termination of the sentence on another indict.
ment for the same crime on Catharine Ann Lutz, and th~ sentence
in that case is to take effect after the expiration of the sentence on
another indictment against the same defendant for seducing Mary
Elizabeth Lutz, under a promise to marry; which sentence was
reversed and set aside by this court.
By the 1st sec. of the act of June 16th, 1836, the Supreme Court
11ave power to correct all manner of error of the courts of this commonwealth, as well in criminal as civil pleas or proceedings, and
therefore to reverse, modify or affirm such judgments or proceedings as the law doth or shall direct. We therefore, in pursuance
-0f this statute, order and direct that the sentence in this case shall

LINDENMULLER

V.

PEOPLE

33

LiNDENMULLER V. PEOPLE 337

"be so modified and reformed, as that the period of imprisonment,

to wit, one year, shall be computed immediately from and after

the expiration of the sentence, on the indictment preferred at the

instance of Catharine Ann Lutz, referred to in this opinion; as

the same sentence has been modified at this same time by this

court. The clerk of the Quarter Sessions will therefore enter on

the record that the sentence is so modified.

Judgment affirmed as modified.

Blasphemy.

. Lindenmulhr v. People, S3 Barb. (N. Y.) 5^8. (ISGl.)

Error to the court of oyer and terminer of the city and county

of New York. On the 5th day of July, 1860, the defendant was

be so modified and reformed, a that the period of impri onmcnt,
to wit, one year, shall be computed imm diately from and after
the expiration of the sentence, on the indictment preferr d at th
in tance of Catharine Ann Lutz, referred to in this opinion; a
the same sentence has been modified at thi same time by thi
.court. The clerk of the Quarter Se ion will therefor enter on
the record that the sentence i so modified.
Judgment affirmed as modifi d.

indicted in that court for an alleged misdemeanor in giving theatri-

cal exhibitions on Sunday, the 20th day of May, 1860, contrary

to the provisions of the "Act to preserve the public peace and

order on the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday,"

BLASPHEMY.

passed April 17, 1860 (Laws of 1860, p. 999). On the 17th of

November, 1860, the defendant was arraigned on said indictment,

in the court of oyer and terminer, and pleaded not guilty thereto.

. Lindenmuller v. People, 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 548. (1861.)
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The issue so joined came on to be tried on the same day, before

Hon. George Gould, a justice of the supreme court, and a jury

duly impanneled to try said issue. The prosecution gave evidence

tending to show that on the 20th day of May, 1860, the same being

a Sunday, the defendant did exhibit a dramatic performance at

the premises Nos. 199 and 201, Bowery, in the city of New York,

the said premises being used in part as a theatrical establishment

of which the defendant was the proprietor. It also appeared from

the testimony, that the defendant, on the 11th day of April, 1860,

ty indenture in writing, hired from one Edward Hamann, land-

lord, the above described premises for a term of twenty-two weeks,

commencing on the 16th day of April, 1860, at the weekly rent of

$110; and that he hired the said premises for the purpose ex-

pressly of giving dramatic entertainments therein daily, including

all the Sundays during the said term, and that the only profit

accruing to the defendant from said hiring, was derived from

dramatic representations given on the said premises on Sundays.

22

Error to the court of oyer and terminer of the city and county
of New York. On the 5th day of July, 1860, the defendant wa
indicted in that court for an alleged misdemeanor in giving theatri.cal exhibitions on Sunday; the 20th day of May, 1860_, contrary
to the provisions of the "Act to preserve the public peace and
order on the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday,''
passed April 17, 1860 (Laws of 1860, p. 999). On the 17th of
November, 1860} the defendant was arraigned on said indictment,
in the court of oyer and terminer, and pleaded not guilty thereto.
The issue so joined came on to be tried on the same day, before
Hon. GEORGE GouLD, a justice of the supreme court, and a jury
duly impanneled to try said issue. The prosecution gave evidence
tending to show that on the 20th day of May, 1860, the same being
a Sunday, the defendant did exhibit a dramatic performance at
the premises Nos. 199 and 201, Bowery, in the city of New York,
the aid premises being used in part as a theatrical establishm nt
-0f which the defendant was the proprietor. It al o appeared from
the testimony, that the defendant, on the 11th day of April, 1860,
by indenture in writing, hired from one Edward Hamann, landlord, the above described premi es for a term of twenty-two w eks,
commencing on the 16th day of April, 1860, at the weekly r nt of
$110; and that he hired the said premi e for the purpo. e expressly of giving dramatic entertainments therein daily, including
all the Sundar during the said t rm, and that the only profit
accrumg to the def ndant from said hiring, wa dcriv d from
dramati representation given on the ai] pr mi
on unday .
22
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That during the week the receipts were not sufficient to pay the

expenses, but on Sundays largely exceeded the expenses ; that the

receipts on Sundays were more than during the other six days

of the week. After the testimony on both sides was closed, the

counsel for defense and prosecution respectively summed up the

case to the jury. The counsel for the defendant asked the court

to direct the jury to acquit the defendant, on the ground that

the act under which the indictment was framed was unconstitu-

tional and void. The court refused so to direct the jury, but on

the contrary charged the jury that said act was constitutional and

valid. To which charge the counsel for the defendant excepted.

The jury rendered a verdict of "Guilty."

Bij the Court, Allen, J.:

The constitutionality of the law under which Lindenmuller was

indicted and convicted does not depend upon the question whether

or not Christianity is a part of the common law of this state. Were

that the only question involved, it would not be difficult to show

that it was so, in a qualified sense — not to the extent that would

That during the week the receipts were not sufficient to pay the
expenses, but on Sundays largely exceeded the expenses; that the
receipts on Sundays were more than during the other six day ..
of the week. After the testimony on both sides was closed, the
counsel for defense and prosecution respectively summed up the
ca e to the jury. The counsel for the defendant asked the court
to direct the jury to acquit the defendant, on the ground that
the act under which the indictment wa framed was unconstitutional and void. The court refused so to direct the jury, hut on
the contrary charged the jury that said act was constitutional ancl
valid. To which charge the counsel for the defendant excepted.
The jury rendered a verdict of "Guilty."

authorize a compulsory conformity in faith and practice, to the
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creed and formula of worship of any sect or denomination, or even

in those matters of doctrine and worship common to all denomina-

tions styling themselves christian, but to the extent that entitles

the christian religion and is ordinances to respect and protection^,

as the acknowledged religion of the people. Individual consciences

may not be enforced ; but men of every opinion and creed may be

restrained from acts which interfere with christian worship, and

which tend to revile religion and bring it into contempt. The

belief of no man can be constrained, and the proper expression of

religious belief is guarantied to all; but this right, like every

other right, must be exercised with strict regard to the equal

rights of others; and when religious belief or unbelief leads to

acts which interfere with the religious worship, and rights of con-

science of those who represent the religion of the country, as es-

tablished, not by law, but by the consent and usage of the com-

munity, and existing before the organization of the government,

their acts may be restrained by legislation, even if they are not

indictable at common law. Christianity is not the legal religion

of the state, as established by law. If it were, it would be a civil

or political institution, which it is not ; but this is not inconsistent.

By the Court, ALLEN, J.:
The con titutionality of the law under which Lindenmuller was
indicted and convicted does not depend upon the question whether
or not christianity is a part of the common law of this state. Were
that the only question involved, it would not be difficult to show
that it was so, in a qualified sense-not to the extent that would.
authorize a compulsory conformity in faith and practice, to the
creed and formula of worship of any sect or denomination, or even
in those matters of doctrine and worship common to all denominations styling themselves chri tian, but to the extent that entitles
the christian religion and i ordinances to re pect and protection,
as the acknowledged religion of the people. Individual consciences
m:.1y not be enforced; but men of every opinion and creed may be
restrained from acts which interfere with christian worship, and
which tend to revile religion and bring it into contempt. The
belief of no man can be con trained, and the proper expression of
religious belief is guarantied to all; but this right, like every
other right, must be exercised with strict regard to the equal
right of others; and when r eligious belief or unbelief lead to
acts which interfere with the religiou wor hip, and right of concience of those who represent the religion of the country, as established, not by law, but by the consent and usage of the community, and existing before the organization of the government.
their acts may be restrained by legislation, even if they are not
indictable at common law. Christianity is not the legal religion
of the state, as established by law. If it were, it would be a civil
or political in stitution, which it is not· but this i not inconsi tent
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with the idea that it is in fact, and ever has been, the religion of

the people. This fact is every where prominent in all our civil

and political history, and has been, from the first, recognized and

acted upon by the people, as well as by constitutional conventions,

by legislatures and by courts of justice.

It is not disputed that Christianity is a part of the common law

of England; and in Bex v. ^Yoolston (Str. 834), the court of

king's bench would not suffer it to be debated, whether to write

against Christianity in general was not an offence punishable in

the temporal courts at common law. The common law, as it was

in force on the 20th day of April, 1777, subject to such alterations

as have been made, from time to time, by the legislature, and

except such parts of it as are repugnant to the constitution, is,

and ever has been, a part of the law of the state. (Const, of 18-4G,

art. 1, § 17; Const, of 1821, art. 7, § 13; Const, of 1777, § 25.)

The claim is, that the constitutional guaranties for the free exer-

cise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship are incon-

sistent with and repugnant to the recognition of Christianity, as the

religion of the people entitled to, and within the protection of,
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the law. It would be strange that a people, christian in doctrine

and worship, many of whom or whose forefathers had sought these

shores for the privilege of worshipping God in simplicity and

purity of faith, and who regarded religion as the basis of their

civil liberty, and the foundation of their rights, should, in their

zeal to secure to all the freedom of conscience which they valued

so highly, solemnly repudiate and put beyond the pale of the law,

the religion which was dear to them as life, and dethrone the God

who, they openly and avowedly professed to believe, had been their

protector and guide as a people. Unless they were hypocrites,

which will hardly be charged, they would not have dared, even if

their consciences would have suffered them, to do so. Eeligious

tolerance is entirely consistent with a recognized religion. Chris-

tianity may be conceded to be the established religion, to the quali-

fied extent mentioned, while perfect civil and political cqualit}^,

with freedom of conscience and religious preference, is secured to

individuals of every other creed and profession. To a very moder-

ate and qualified extent, religious toleration was secured to the

people of the colony, by the charter of liberties and privileges,

granted by his royal highness to the inhabitants of New York and

its dependencies in 1683, (2 R. L. app. No. 2,) but was more

with the idea that it i in fact, and ever has been, the religion of
the people. Thi fact i every where prominent in all our ivil
and political hi tory, and ha been, from the fir t, recognized and
acted upon by the people, a well a by con titutional convention ,
by legi latures and by courts of ju tice.
It is not di~puted that chri tianity i a part of the common law
of England; and in R ex v. Woolston (Str. 3-!), the court of
king' bench would not uffer it to be debated, whether to write
against christianity in general was not an offence puni hable in
the temporal courts at common law. rrhe common law, a it was
in force on the 20th day of April, 1777, subject to such .':llterations
a have been made, from time to time, by the legi lature, and
except uch part of it as are repugnant to the constitution, i ,
and ever has been, a part of the law of the state. (Const. of 18-!G,
art. 1, § 17; Con. t. of 1821, art. 7, § 13; Cont. of 1717, § 25.)
The claim is, that the constitutional guaranties for the free exerci:::e and enjoyment of religiou profession and wor hip are inconistent with and repugnant to the recognition of christianity, as the
religion of the people entitled to, and within the protection of,
the law. It would be strange that a people, chri tian in doctrine
and worship, many of whom or whose forefathers had sought these
horc for the privilege of worshipping God in simplicity and
purity of faith: and who regarded religion a the ba is of their
civil liberty, and the foundation of their rights, hould, in their
zeal to secure to all the freedom of conscience which they valued
so highly, solemnly repudiate and put beyond the pale of the law,
the r eligion which was dear to them as life, and dethrone the Goel
who, they openly and avowedly professed to beli ve, had been their
protector and guide a.._ a people. Unless they were h3pocrite,
which will hardly be charged, they would not have dared, even if
their consciences would have suffered them, to do so. Religious
tolerance is entirely consistent with a recognized religion. Chrisfomit_v may be conceded to be the established religion, to the qualified :'dent mentioned, while perfect civil and political equality,.
with freedom of con cience and r eligious preference is ~ecured fo.
inc1ividual of every other creed and profe ion. To a very moderat1:: and qualified extent, religious toleration wa secured to th
people of the colony, by the charter of libertie and privil ges,
granted by his royal highnes to the inhabitants of N w York anJ
its dependencies in 1683, (i R. L. app. No. 2 ) but wa mor
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amply provided for in the constitution of 1777. It was then

placed substantially upon the same footing on which it now stands.

The constitution of 1777, § 38, ordained that the free exercise

and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without dis-

crimination or preference, should for ever thereafter be allowed,

provided that the liberty of conscience thereby guarantied should

not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify

practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state. The

same provision was incorporated in the constitution of 1821, art.

7, § 3, and in that of 1846, art. 1, § 3. The convention that framed

the constitution of 17 77 ratified and approved the declaration of

independence, and prefixed it to the constitution as a part of

the preamble; and in that instrument a direct and solemn appeal

is made "to the Supreme Judge of the world," and a "firm reliance

on the protection of Divine Providence" for the support of the

declaration is deliberately professed. The people, in adopting the

constitution of 1821, expressly acknowledged with "gratitude the

grace and beneficence of God," in permitting them to make choice

of their form of government; and in ratifying the constitution
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of 1846, declare themselves "grateful to Almighty God" for their

freedom. The first two constitutions of the state, reciting that,

"ministers of the gospel are by their profession dedicated to the

service of God and the cure of souls, and ought not to be diverted

from the great duties of their function," declared that no "min-

ister of the gospel or priest of any denomination whatsoever should

be eligible to or hold any civil or military office within the state;"

and each of the constitutions has required an oath of office from all

except some of the inferior officers taking office under it.

These provisions and recitals very clearly recognize some of the

fundamental principles of the christian religion, and are certainly

very far from ignoring God as the supreme ruler and judge of the

universe, and the christian religion as the religion of the people,

embodying the common faith of the community, with its ministers

and ordinances, existing without the aid of, or political connec-

tion with, the state, but as intimately connected with a good gov-

ernment, and the only sure basis of sound morals.

The several constitutional conventions also recognize the chris-

tian religion as the religion of the state, by opening their daily

sessions with prayer, by themselves observing the christian sabbath,

amply proYidcd for in the constitution of 1777. It wa;:; then
placed substantially upon the same footing on which it now stands.
The con titution of 1777, § 38, ordained that the free exerci c
and enjoyment of religious profe sion and wor hip, without discrimination or preference, should for ever thereafter be allowed,
provided that the liberty of conscience thereby guarantied shouhl
not be so construed a.- to excuse act of licentiou ness, or ju tify
practices incon istent with the peace or afety of the tate. The
same provision wa incorporated in the constitution of 1821, art
7_, § 3, and in that of 1846, art. 1, § 3. The convention that framed
the constitution of 1 t77 ratified and approved the declaration of
independ ence, ancl prefixed it to the con titution as a part of
the preamble; and in that instrument a direct and olemn appeal
is made "to the Supreme Judge of the world," and a "firm reliance
on the protection of Di vine ProYiclencc" for the support of the
declaration i deliberately profes -ed. The people, in adopting the
constitution of 1821, expres ly acknowledged with "gratitude the
grace and beneficence of God," in permitting them to make choice
of their form of government; and in ratifying the constitution
of 1846, declare themselves "grateful to Almighty God" for their
freedom. The first two con"titution of the state, reciting that
" mini ters of the gospel are by their profe ion dedicated to th.:
ervice of God and the cure of souls, and ought not to be diverted
from the great dutie of their function'' cl clarccl that no " mini ter of the gospel or priest of any denomination what oever should
be eligible to or hold any civil or military office within the state;"
and each of the constitution s has r quired an oath of office from all
except some of the inferior officers taking office under it.
These provisions and recitals very clearly recognize some of th8
fundamental principles of the chri tian religion, and are certainly
very far from ignoring God as the supreme ruler and judge of the
universe, and the christian religion a . the religion of the people,
embodying the common faith of the community, with its ministers
and ordinances, existing without the aid of, or political connect ion with, the state, but as intimately connected with a good government, and the only sure basis of sound moral .
The several constitutional conventions al o recognize the christian r eligion as the religion of the state, by opening their daily
~ cssio n s with prayer; by themselves observing the chri tian abbath,
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and by excepting that day from the time allowed to the governor

for returning bills to the legislature.

Different denominations of christians are recognized, but this

does not detract from the force of the recognition of God iis the

only proper object of religious worship, and the christian religion

as the religion of the people, which it was not intended to destroy,

but to maintain. The intent was to prevent the unnatural con-

nection between church and state, which had proved as corrupting

and detrimental to the cause of pure religion as it had been op-

pressive to the conscience of the individual. The founders of the

government and the framers of our constitutions believed that

Christianity would thrive better, that purity in the church would

be promoted, and the interests of religion advanced, by leaving

the individual conscience free and untrammeled, precisely in

accordance with the "benevolent principles of rational liberty,'

which guarded against "spiritual oppression and intolerance ;*' and

"wisdom is justified of her children" in the experiment, which

could hardly be said if blasphemy, sabbath-breaking, incest, poly-

gamy and the like were protected by the constitution. They did,
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therefore, prohibit the establishment of a state religion, with its

enabling and disabling statutes, its test oaths and ecclesiastical

courts, and all the pains and penalties of nonconformity, whicli

are only snares to the conscience, and every man is left free tc

worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, or

not to worship him at all, as he pleases. But they did not suppose

they had abolished the sabbath as a day of rest for all, and of

christian worship for those who were disposed to engage in it, or

had deprived themselves of the power to protect their God from

blasphemy and revilings, or their religious worship from unseemly

interruptions. Compulsory worship of God in any form is pro-

hibited, and every man's opinion on matters of religion, as in other

matters, is beyond the reach of law. No man can be compelled to

perform any act or omit any act as a duty to God ; but this liberty

of conscience in matters of faith and practice is entirely consistent

with the existence, in fact, of the christian religion, entitled to and

enjoying the protection of the law as the religion of the people of

the state, and as furnishing the best sanctions of moral and social

obligations. The public peace and public welfare are greatly de-

pendent upon the protection of the religion of the countr}', and the

preventing or punishing of offenses against it, and acts wantonly

and by excepting that day from the tim allowed to the governor
for returning bills to the legislature.
Different denomination of chri tian are recognized, but thi
does not detract from the force of the r cognition of God p. th
only proper object of religious worship, and the chri tian religion
as the religion of the people, which it wa not intended to de troy,
but to maintain. The intent was to prevent the unnatural connection between church and state, which had proved as corrupting
and detrimental to the cause of pure religion a it had been oppressive to the conscience of the individual. The founders of th~
government and the framers of our constitutions believed that
christianity would thrive better, that purity in the church would
be promoted, and the interests of religion advanced, by leaving
the individual conscience free and untrammeled, precis ly in
accordance with the "benevolent principles of rational liberty/ :
which guarded against "spiritual oppression and intolerance;:' aml
"wisdom is justified of her children" in the experiment, which
could hardly be said if blasphemy, sabbath-breaking, incest, polygamy and the like were protected by the constitution. They diJ,
therefore, prohibit the establishment of a state religion, with its
enabling and disabling statutes, its test oaths and ecclesiastical
courts, and all the pains and penalties of nonconformity, which
are only snares to the conscience, and every man is left free tc
worship God according to the dictates of bis own conscience, or
not to worship him at all, as he pleases. But they did not suppose
they had abolished the sabbath as a day of rest for all, and of
christian worship for those who were disposed to engage in it, or
had deprived themselves of the power to protect their God from
blasphemy and revilings, or their religiou, worship from unseemly
interruptions. Compul ory worship of God in any form i prohibited, and every man's opinion on matters of religion, as in other
matters, is beyond the reach of law. No man can be ompell cl to
perform any act or omit any act as a duty to God; but this lib rty
of onscience in matters of faith and practice is entir ly consi;::ten+with the exi tence, in fact, of the christian religion, entitl d to ancl
enjoying the protection of the law as the religion of th p opl f
the state, and as furni hing the best . anctions of moral and so ial
obligation . The public peace and public w lfare ar gr atly cl pendent upon the prot tion of the religion of th ountry and th
preventing or punishing of off n ~ e . again. t i( anc1 acts wantonly
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committed subversive of it. The claim of the defense, carried to

its necessary sequence, is, that the bible and religion, with all its

ordinances, including the sabbath, are as efEectually abolished as

they were in France during the revolution, and so effectually

abolished that duties may not be enforced as duties to the state,

because they have been heretofore associated with acts of religious

worship or connected with religious duties. A provision similar

to ours is found in the constitution of Pennsylvania ; and in Vidal

V. Girard's Executors, (2 How. 127,) the question was discussed

whether the christian religion was a part of the common law of

that state; and Justice Story, in giving judgment, at page 198,

after referring to the qualifications in the constitution, says: "So

that we are compelled to admit, that although Christianity be a

jjart of the common law of the state, yet it is so in this qualified

sense, that its divine origin and truth are admitted, and therefore

it is not to be maliciously and openly reviled and blasphemed

against, to the annoyance of believers or the injury of the public."

The same principle was decided by the state court in Updegraph

V. Commonwealth, (11 S. & E. 39-4). The same is held in Arkan-
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sas, {Shaw V. State, 5 Eng. 259). In our own state, in People V.

Buggies, (8 John. 291,) the court held that blasphemy against

God, and contumelious reproach and profane ridicule of Christ or

the holy scriptures, were offenses punishable at the common law in

this state as public offenses. Chief Justice Kent says that to revile

the religion professed by almost the whole community is an abuse

of the right of religious opinion and free discussion secured by the

constitution, and that the constitution does not secure the same

regard to the religion of IMahomet or of the grand lama as to that

of our Saviour, for the plain reason that we are a christian people,

and the morality of the country is deeply engrafted upon Chris-

tianity. He says, further, that the constitution "will be fully satis-

fied by a free and universal toleration, without any of the tests,

disabilities or discriminations incident to a religious establishment.

To construe it as breaking down the common law barriers against

licentious, wanton and impious attacks upon Christianity itself,

would be an enormous perversion of its meaning."

This decision gives a practical construction to the "toleration"

clause in the state constitution, and limits its effect to a prohibition

of a church establishment by the state, and of all "discrimination

or preference" among the several sects and denominations in the

committed subversive of it. The claim of the defense, carried to
its necessary sequence, i , that the bible and religion, with all its
ordinances, including the sabbath, are as effectually abolished a!';
they were in France during the revolution, and so effectually
abolished that duties may not be enforced a duties to the state,
because they have been heretofore associated with acts of r eligious
worship or connected with religious duties. A provision similar
to ours is found in the constitution of Pennsylvania; and in Vidal
v. Girard's Executor., ( 2 How. 127,) the que tion was discussed
whether the christian religion was a part of the common law of
that state; and Justice Story, in giving judgment, at page 198,
after referring to the qualifications in the constitution, says: "So
that we are compelled to admit, that although christianit) be a
part of the common law of the state, yet it i so in this qualified
sen e, that its divine origin and truth are admitted, and therefore
it is not to be maliciously and openly reviled and blasphemed
against, to the annoyance of believer or the injury of the public."
The same principle was decided by the state court in U pdegraph
v. Commonwealth, (11 S. & R. 394). The same i held in Arkansas, (Shaw v. State, 5 Eng. 259). In our own state: in P eople v.
Ruggles, (8 John. 291,) the court held that blasphemy against
God, and contumelious reproach and profane ridicule of Christ or
the holy scriptures, were offenses puniuhable at the common law in
this state as public offenses. Chief Justice Kent uays that to revile
the religion professed by almost the whole community is an abus~
of the right of religious opinion and free di cussion secured by the
constitution, and that the constitution does not secure the same
regard to the religion of Mahomet or of the grand lama as to that
of our Saviour; for the plain reason that we are a christian people,
and the morality of the country i , deeply engrafted upon christianity. He says, further, that the constitution "will be fully satisfied by a free and universal toleration, without any of the tests,
disabilities or discriminations incident to a religious establishment.
To construe it a breaking down the common law barriers against
licentious, wanton and impious attacks upon christianity itself.
would be an enormous perversion of its meaning."
This decision gives a practical construction to the "toleration"
clau e in the state con titution, and limit its effect to a prohibition
of a church establisl1ment by the state, and of all "discrimination
or preference" among the s8veral ects and denomination in the
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"free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship."

It does not, as interpreted by this decision, prohibit the courts or

the legislature from regarding the christian religion as the religion

of the people, as distinguished from the false religions of the world.

This judicial interpretation has received the sanction of the consti-

tutional convention of 1821, and of the people of the state in the

ratification of that constitution, and again in adopting the constitu-

tion of 1846.

It was conceded in the convention of 1821 that the court in

People V. Ruggles did decide that the christian religion was the

law of the land, in the sense that it was preferred over all other

religions, and entitled to the recognition and protection of the

temporal courts by the common law of the state ; and the decision

was commented on with severity by those who regarded it as a vio-

lation of the freedom of conscience and equality among religionists

secured by the constitution. Mr. Root proposed an amendment to

obviate that decision, alleged by him to be against the letter and

spirit of the constitution, to the effect that the judiciary should

not declare any particular religion to be the law of the land. The
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decision was vindicated as a just exponent of the constitution

and the relation of the christian religion to the state; and the

amendment was opposed by Chancellor Kent, Daniel D. Tompkins,

Col. Young, Mr. Van Buren, Eufus King and Chief Justice

Spencer, and rejected by a large majority, and the former provision

retained, with the judicial construction in People v. Ruggles fully

recognized. (N. Y. State Conv. of 1821, 462, 574.) It is true

that the gentlemen differed in their views as to the effect and

extent of the decision, and as to the legal status of the christian

religion in the state. One class, including Chief Justice Spencer

and Mr. King, regarded Christianity — the christian religion as dis-

tinguished from Mahomedanism, &c.— as a part of the common law

adopted by the constitution; while another class, in whicli were

included Chancellor Kent and Mr. Van Buren, were of the opinion

that the decision was right, not because Christianity was established

by law, but because Christianity was in fact the religion of the

country, the rule of our faith and practice, and the basis of public

morals. According to their views, as the recognized religion of the

country, "the duties and injunctions of the christian religion"

were interwoven with the law of the land, and were part and parcel

•of the common law, and that "maliciously to revile it is a pul)lio

"'free exerci e and enjoyment of religiou profe ~ ion and wor -hip.''
It doe not, a interpreted bj thi deci 'ion prohibit the court or
the legislature from regarding the chri"tian religion a the r eligion
Qf the people, as di tingui h d from the fal e religion <!f the wor kl .
Thi ~ judicial interpretation ha received the anction of the on titutional convention of 1821, and of the people of the state in th
ratification of that con titution, and again in adopting the con titution of 1846.
It was conceded in the convention of 1821 that th court in
P eople v. Ruggles did decide that the christian religion wa the
law of the land, in the ense that it was preferred over all other
religions, and entitled to the recognition and protection of th
temporal courts by the common law of the state; and the dcci ion
was commented on with severity by those who regarded it as a Yiolation of the freedom of conscience and equality among religionist"
'ecured by the constitution. Mr. Root proposed an amendment to
<0bviat~ that decision, alleged by him to be against the letter and
pirit of the con titution, to the effect that the judiciary houU
not declare any particular religion to be the law of the land. 'The
decision was vindicated as a just exponent of the con titution
and the relation of the christian religion to the tate; and the
amendment was opposed by Chancellor Kent, Daniel D. Tompkin ,
Col. Young, Mr. Van Buren, Rufus King and Chief J usticc
Spencer, and rejected by a large majority, and the former provision
retained, with the judicial construction in P eople v. Ruggles fully
recognized. (N. Y. State Conv. of 1821, 462, 574.) It i true
that the gentlemen differed in their views as to the effect and
extent of the decision, and as to the legal status of the cbri tian
religion in the state. One class, including Chief Justice Spene r
9.nd :Mr. King, regarded christianity-the christian religion R di i:inguished from Mahomedani m, &c.-as a part of the common law
adopted by the constitution; while another cla , in which were
included Chancellor K ent and Mr. Van Buren, were of th opinion
that the deci ion was right, not because chri tianity was e tabli h d
by law, but becau e chri tianity wa in fact the r ligion of th·
country, the rule of our faith and pracbce and the ba it:i of publi
moral . According to their view , a the re ognized r ligion of th '
country, "the dutie and injunction of the chri tian r ligion
"" ere interwoven with the law of the land, and w r part and par ·l
of the common law, and that amali iou ly to r vil it i a pnhlic
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grievance, and as much so as any other public outrage upon common

decency and decorum," (Per Ch. Kent, in debate, page 576.)

This difference in views is in no sense material, as it leads to no

difference in practical results and conclusions. All agreed that

the christian religion was engrafted upon the law, and entitled

to protection as the basis of our morals and the strength of our

government, but for reasons differing in terms and in words rather

than in substance. Within the principle of the decision of The

People V. Biuigles, as thus interpreted and approved and made a.

part of the fundamental law of the land by the rejection of the

proposed amendment, every act done maliciously, tending to bring

religion into contempt, may be punished at common law, and the

christian sabbath, as one of the institutions of that religion, may

be protected from desecration by such laws as the legislature, in

their wisdom, may deem necessary to secure to the community the

privilege of undisturbed worship, and to the day itself that out-

ward respect and observance which may be deemed essential to the

peace and good order of society, and to preserve religion and its.

ordinances from open reviling and contempt — and this not as a
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duty to God, but as a duty to society and to the state. Upon this

ground the law in question could be sustained, for the legislature

are the sole judges of the acts proper to be prohibited, with a view

to the public peace, and as obstructing religious worship, and

bringing into contempt the religious institutions of the people.

But as a civil and political institution, the establishment and

regulation of a sabbath is within the just powers of the civil gov-

ernment. With us, the sabbath, as a civil institution, is older than

the government. The framers of the first constitution found it in

existence ; they recognized it in their acts, and they did not abolish

it, or alter it, or lessen its sanctions or the obligations of the people

to observe it. But if this had not been so, the civil government

might have established it. It is a law of our nature that one day

in seven must be observed as a day of relaxation and refreshment,

if not for public worship. Experience has shown that the observ-

ance of one day in seven as a day of rest "is of admirable service

to a state, considered merely as a civil institution." (4 Bl. Com.

63.) We are so constituted, physically, that the precise portion of

time indicated by the decalogue must be observed as a day of rest

and relaxation, and nature, in the punishment inflicted for a viola-

tion of our physical laws, adds her sanction to the positive law

grievance, and as much so as any other public outrage upon commoll.
tlecency and decorum." (Per Ch. Kent, in debate, page 576.)
This difference in views is in no sense material, as it leads to no.
difference in practical results and conclusions. All agreed that
the christian religion was en.grafted upon the law, and entitled.
to protection as the basis of our morals and the strength of our
government, but for reasons differing in terms and in words rather
than in substance. Within the principle of the decision of The
P eople v. Ritygles, as thus interpreted and approved and made a.
part of the fundamental law of the land by the rejection of the
proposed amendment, every act done maliciously, tending to bring
religion into contempt, may be punished at common law, and the·
christian sabbath, as one of the institutions of that religion, may
be protected from desecration by such laws as the legislature: in
their wisdom, may deem necessary to secure to the community the
privilege of undisturbed worship, and to the day itself that outward respect and observance which may be deemed essential to the
peace and good order of society, and to preserve religion and its.
ordinances from open reviling and contempt-and this not as a
duty to God, but as a duty to society and to the state. Upon thi&
ground the law in question could be sustained, for the legislature
are the sole judges of the acts proper to be prohibited, with a view
to the public peace, and as obstructing religious worship, and
bringing into contempt the religious institutions of the people.
But as a civil and political institution, the establishment and.
regulation of a sabbath is within the just powers of the civil government. With us, the sabbath, as a civil institution, is older than
the government. The framer of the first constitution found it in
existence; they recognized it in their acts, and they did not abolish
it, or alter it, or lessen its sanctions or the obligations of the people
to observe it. But if this had not been so, the civil government
might have established it. It is a law of our nature that one day
in seven must be observed as a day of relaxation and refreshment,
if not for public worship. Experience has shown that the observance of one day in seven a a day of rest "is of admirable service
to a state: considered merely as a civil institution." ( 4 Bl. Com.
63.) We are so constituted, physically, that the precise portion of
time indicated by the decalogue must be observed as a day of rest
and relaxation, and nature, in the punishment inflicted for a violation of our physical laws, add her sanction to the po itive law
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promulgated at Sinai. The stability of government, the welfare

of the subject and the interests of society, have made it necessary

that the day of rest observed by the people of a nation should be

uniform, and that its observance should be to some extent com-

pulsory, not by way of enforcing the conscience of those upon whom

the law operates, but by way of protection to those who desire and

are entitled to the day. The necessity and value of the sabbath is

acknowledged by those not professing Christianity. In December^

1841, in the French chamber of deputies, an Israelite expressed his

respect for the institution of the Lord's day, and opposed a change

of law which would deprive a class of children of the benefit of it ;

and in 1844, the consistory general of the Israelites, at Paris, de-

cided to transfer the sabbath of the Jews to Sunday. A similar

disposition was manifested in Germany. (Bay lee's Hist, of Sab.

187.) As a civil institution, the selection of the day is at the

option of the legislature; but for a christian people, it is highly

fit and proper that the day observed should be that which is re-

garded as the christian sabbath, and it does not detract from the

moral or legal sanction of the law of the state that it conforms
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to the law of God, as that law is recognized by the great majority

of the people. In this state the sabbath exists as a day of rest by

the common law, and without the necessity of legislative action to

establish it; and all that the legislature attempt to do in the

"sabbath laws" is to regulate its observance. The body of the

constitution recognized Sunday as a day of rest, and an institution

to be respected by not counting it as a part of the time allowed ta

the governor for examining bills submitted for his approval. A

contract, the day of the performance of which falls on Sunday,

must, in the case of instruments on which days of grace are allowed,

be performed on the Saturday preceding, and in all other cases on

Monday. {Salter v. Burt, 20 Wend. 205. Avery v. Stewart, 2

Conn. E. 69.) Compulsory performance on the sabbath cannot

be required, but the law prescribes a substituted day. Eedemption

of land, the last day for which falls on Sunday, must be made the

day before. {People v. Luther, 1 Wend. 42.) No judicial act can

be performed on the sabbath, except as allowed by statute, while

ministerial acts not prohibited are not illegal. {Sayles v. Smith.

12 Wend. 57. Butler v. Kelsey, 15 John. 177. Field v. Pari-, 20

id. 140.) Work done on a Sunday cannot be recovered for, there

being no pretense that the parties keep the last day of the week,,

promulgated at Sinai. The tability of gov rnment, the welfare
of the subject and the interests of ociety, have made it nece ary
that the day of re t ob erved by the people of a nation should be
uniform, and that its ob ervance hould be to some extent o.IJlpulsory, not by way of enforcing the con cience of tho e upon whom
the law operate ) but by way of protection to tho who d sir and
are entitled to the day. The neces ity and value of the abhath i
acknowledged by those not profe ing chri tianity. In December,_
1841, in the French chamber of deputie , an I raelite expre ed hi
respect for the institution of the Lord's day, and opposed a changeof law which would deprive a class of children of the benefit of it;
and in 1844, the consistory general of the Israelites, at Pari , decided to transfer the sabbath of the Jew to unday. A similar
disposition was manifested in Germany. (Baylee's Hi t. of ab~
187.) As a civil institution, the selection of the day i at the
option of the legi. lature; but for a christian people, it is highly
fit and proper that the day observed should be that which i regarded as the christian sabbath, and it doe not detract from th~
moral or legal sanction of the law of the tate that it conform
to the law of God, as that law i recognized by the great majority
of the people. In thi state the sabbath exi ' ts a a day of re..,t by
the common law, and without the necessity of legislative action to
establish it; and all that the leg1 lature attempt to do in the
"sabbath law." is to regulate it observance. The body of the
constitution recognized Sunday a a day of rest, and an institution
to be respected by not counting it as a part of the time allowed to
the governor for examining bill submitted for his approval. A
contract, the day of the performance of which falls on Sunday,
must, in the case of jnstrument on which day of grace are allowed,
he performed on the Saturday preceding, and in all other ca e on
fonday. (Salter v. Burt, 20 \Vend. 205. Avery v. tewart, 2
Conn. R. 69.) Compulsory performance on the sabbath cannot
be required, but the law pre cribes a sub tituted day. Redemption
of land, the la t day for which falls on unday, mu t b mad the
clay before. (People v. Luther, 1 Wend. 42.)
o judi ial a t can
be performed on the sabbath, except a.., allowed by tatute, ·whil
mini terial act not prohibited are not illegal. ( ayle v. mith,
12 \Vend. 57. Butler v. K elsey, 15 John. 17 . Field v. Parli;, 0
id. 140.) Wark done on a unda y cannot b r cov r d for, th r
being no pret n. e that th parti " ke p fo la t day f th w k,
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and the work not being a work of necessity and charity. {Watts v.

Tan Ness, 1 Hill, 76. Palmer v. City of New Yorl; 2 Sand. 318.

^mith V. Wilcox, 19 Barb. 581; S. C. 25 id. 341.) The christian

sabbath is then one of the civil institutions of the state, and to

which the business and duties of life are, by the common law, made

to conform and adapt themselves. The same cannot be said of the

Jewish sabbath, or the day observed by the followers of any other

religion. The respect paid to such days, other than that volun-

tarily paid by those observing them as days of worship, is in

obedience to positive law. There is no ground of complaint in the

respect paid to the religious feeling of those who conscientiously

observe the seventh rather than the first day of the week, as a day

of rest, by the legislation upon that subject, and exempting them

from certain public duties and from the service of process on their

sabbath, and excepting them from the operation of certain other

statutes regulating the observance of the first day of the week.

(1 E. S. 675, § 70. Laws of 1847, ch. 349.) It is not an infringe-

ment of the right of conscience, or an interference with the free

religious worship of others, that Sabbatarians are exempted from

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:03 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t39z97p86
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

the service of civil process and protected in the exercise of their

religion on their sabbath. Still less is it a violation of the rights

of conscience of any that the sabbath of the people, the day set

apart by common consent and usage from the first settlement of

the land as a day of rest, and recognized by the common law of the

state as such, and expressly recognized in the constitution as an

existing institution, should be respected by the law-making power,

and provision made to prevent its desecration by interrupting the

worship or interfering with the rights of conscience, in any way,

of the public as a christian people. The existence of the sabbath

day as a civil institution being conceded, as it must be, the right

of the legislature to control and regulate it and its observance is a

necessary sequence. If precedents were necessary to establish the

right to legislate upon the subject, they could be cited from the

statutes and ordinances of every government really or nominally

christian, and from the earliest period. In England as early as

the reign of Athelstan, all merchandising on the Lord's day was

forbidden under severe penalties; and from that time very many

statutes have been passed in different reigns regulating the keeping

of the sabbath, prohibiting fairs and markets, the sale of goods,

jis^cmblies or concourse of the people for any sports and pastimes

ancl the work not being a work of nece ity and charity. (Watts v.
ran Ness, 1 Hill, 76. Palmer v. City of New York, 2 Sand. 31 .
Smith v. Wilcox, 19 Barb. 581; S. C. 25 id. 341.) The christiau
abbath is then one of the civil institution of the state, and to
which the busines and duties of life are, by the common law, macle
to conform and adapt them elves. The ame cannot be aicl of the
J ewish sabbath, or the da)' observed by the follower of any other
Tcligion. The respect paid to such day , other than that voluntarily paid by tho e observing them as days of worship, is ir:.
obedience to positive law. There is no ground of complaint in the
re pect paid to the religiou feeling of tho e who conscientiou ly
observe the seventh rather than the fir t day of the week, as a day
of rest, by the legi lation upon that subject, and exempting them
from certain public dutie and from the ervice of proces on their
abbath, and excepting them from the operation of certain oth r
tatutes regulating the observance of the fir t day of the week.
(1 R. S. 675, § 70. Law of 18-±7, ch. 3-±9.) It is not an infringement of the right of conscience, or an interference with the free
religious worship of other , that sabbatarians are exempted from
the ervice of civil pro ce~s and protected in the exerci e of their
r eligion on their abbath. Still les i it a violation of the right
-0f conscience of any that the sabbath of the people, the day set
apart by common consent and usage from the fir t ettlement of
the land as a day of r e t, and recognized by the common law of the
tate a such, and e:xpre sly recognized in the constitution as an
existing institution, should be respected by the law-making power,
and provision made to prevent its desecration by interrupting the
worship or interfering with the rights of con cience, in any way,
of the publi~ a a christian people. The exi tence of the sabbath
day a a civil in titution being conceded, as it must be, the right
of the legislature to control and regulate it and its observance is a
necessary sequence. If precedents were necessary to establish the
Tight to legislate upon the ubject, they could be cited from the
tatutes and ordinance of every government really or nominally
christian, and from the earliest period. In England as early a
the reign of Athel tan, all merchandising on the Lord's day wa
forbidden under evere penalties; and from that time very many
tatutes have been pa ed in different reign regulating the keeping
of the sabbath, prohibiting fairs and markets, the sale of goods,
.-1:-; ~embli es or concourse of the people for any sports and pastime
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whatsoever, worldly labor, the opening of a house or room for

public entertainment or amusement, tlie sale of beer, wine, spirits,

&c. and other like acts on that day. There are other acts which arc

designed to compel attendance at church and religious worship,

which would be prohibited by the constitution of this state as

infringements upon the right to the free exercise and enjoyment

of religious profession and worship. But the acts referred to do

net relate to religious profession or worship, but to the civil obli-

gations and duties of the subject. They have respect to his duties

to the state, and not to God, and as such are within the proper

limits of legislative power. There have been times in the history

of the English government, when the day was greatly profaned,

and practices tolerated at court and throughout the realm, en the

sabbath and on other days, which would meet at this time with little

public favor either there or here. But these exceptional instances

do not detract from the force of the long series of acts of the British

parliament, representing in legislation the sentiment of the British

nation, as precedents and as a testimony in favor of the necessity

and propriety of a legislative regulation of the sabbath. Our atten-
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tion is called to the fact that James I. wrote a "Book of Sports,"

in which he declared that certain games and pastimes were lawful

upon Sunday. The book was published in 1618, and by it he

permitted the "lawful recreations" named, "after the end of divine

service" on Sundays, "so as the same be had in due and convenient

iime, without impediment or neglect of divine service." The per-

mission is thus qualified : "But withall we doe here account still as

prohibited all unlawfull games to be used on Sundayes only, a?

beare and bull baitings, interludes, and at all times in the meaner

sort of people prohibited, bowling." (Bay lee's Hist. Sabbath,

157.) Lindenmuller's theatre would have been prohibited even

by King James' Book of Sports.

In most, if not all the states of the union, laws have been passed

against sabbath-breaking, and prohi])iting the prosecution of sec-

ular pursuits upon that day; and in none of the states, to my

knowledge, except in California, have such laws been held by the

courts to be repugnant to the free exercise of religious profession

and worship, or a violation of the rights of conscience, or an excess

or abuse of the legislative power, while in most states the legislation

has been upheld by the courts and sustained by well-reasoned and

able opinions. (Updegraph v. The Common-weaWi, 11 S. & R.

whatsoever, worldly labor, the opening of a hou e or rnom for
J>Ublic entertainment or amusement, the sale of beer, wine, , pirits,
&c. and other like act on that day. There are other acts whi h are
designed to compel attendance at church and religiou wor hi1,,
which would be prohibited by the constitution o.E this tate ac
infringements upon the right to the free exerci e and enjoym nt
of religious profei::: ion and wor hip. But the acts referred to do
not r elate to r eligious profes ion or worship, but to the civil obligations and duties of the subject. They have re pect to his dutie
to the state, and not to God, and as such are within the proper
1imits of legislative power. There have been time in the history
of the Engli h government, when the day was greatly profaned,
and practices tolerated at court and throughout the realm, en the
sabbath and on other days, which would meet at this time with little
pul lie favor either there or here. But the e exceptional instance.::
do not detract from the force of the long series of acts of the British
}Jarliament, representing in legislation the sentiment of the British
nation, as precedents and as a testimony in favor of the nec:essity
.and propriety of a legislative regulation of the sabbath. Our attention is called to the fact that James I. wrote a "Book of Sport ,''
in which he declared that certain games and pastimes were lawful
upon Sunday. The book was published in 1618, and by it he
_p ermitted the ''lawful recreations" named, "after the end of divine
service" on Sundays, "so a the same be had in due and convenient
time, without impediment or neglect o.E divine service." The permission is thus qualified: "But withall we doe here account still a
prohibited all unlawfull games to be used on Sundayes only, a.:beare and bull baitings, interludes, and at all times in the meaner
.sort of people prohibited, bowling." (Baylee's Hist. Sabbath,
157.) Lindenmuller's theatre would have been prohibited even
by King J arnes' Book of Sports.
In most, if not all the states of the union, laws have been pa s. . d
.against sabbath-breaking, and prohibiting the pros cution of secular pursuit upon that day; and in none of the state , to my
1mowleclge, except i.n California, have such laws been hell l y th
courts to be repugnant to the free exercise of r ligious prof sion
and worship, or a violation of the rights of con i nc , or an x e ·or abuse of the legi lative power, while in mo t state th 1 gi. lati n
has be n upheld hy the court and. n._ta in d by w 11-rca on d and.
able opjnion . ( U pdegrapl1 v. Tlt e Commonu·ealtlt, 11 . & R.
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SD-i. Show V. State of Arkansas, 5 Eng. (Ark.) 259. Bloom v,

Bichards, 2 Ohio K. 387. Warne v. Smith, 8 Conn. K. 14. John-

ston V. Com., 10 Harris, 102. State v. Amhs, 20 Mis. 214. >S'^or2/

V. Elliot, 8 Cowen, 27.)

As the sabbath is older than our state government, was a part

of the laws of the colony, and its observance regulated by colonial

laws, state legislation upon the subject of its observance was almost

coeval with the formation of the state government. If there were

any doubt about the meaning of the constitution securing freedom

in religion, the contemporan^us and continued acts of the legis-

lature under it would be very good evidence of the intent and

understanding of its framers, and of the people who adopted it as

their fundamental law. As early as 1788, traveling, work, labor

and exposing of goods to sale on that day were prohibited. (2

Greenl. 89.) In 1789 the sale of spirituous liquors was prohibited,

(Andrews, 467;) and from that time statutes have been in force

to prevent sabbath desecration, and prohibiting acts upon that day

which would be lawful on other days of the week. Early in the

history of the state government, the objections taken to the act

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:03 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t39z97p86
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

under consideration were taken before the council of revision, to

an act to amend the act entitled "An act for suppressing im-

morality," which undertook to regulate sabbath observance, be-

cause the provisions as was claimed militated against the constitu-

tion, by giving a preference to one class of christians and oppress-

ing others: because it in some manner prescribed the mode of

keeping the sabbath; and because it was inexpedient to impose

obligations on the conscience of men in matters of opinion. The

council, consisting of Governor Jay, Chief Justice Lansing, and

Judges Lewis and Benson, overruled the objections and held them

not well taken. (Street's N. Y. Council of Eev. 422.) T have not

access to the California case referred to, (-E'.r parte Newman, 9 Cal.

502,) but with all respect for the court pronouncing the decision,

as authority in this state, the opinion of the council of revision

thus constituted, and deliberately pronounced, should outweigh it.

If the court in California rest their decision upon a want of power

in tlie legislature to compel religious observances, I should not

dissent from the position, and the only question would be whether

the act did thus trench on the inviolable rights of the citizen. If

it merely restrained the people from secular pursuits and from

practices which the legislature deemed hurtful to the morals and

39-1. Show v. State of A rk ansas, 5 E ng. (Ark.) 259 . B loom v
Richards, 2 Ohio R. 387. Warn e v. Smith, 8 Conn. R. 14. Johnston v. Com., 10 Har ris, 102. State v. A mbs, 20 l\fis. 214. Story
v. Elliot, 8 Cowen, 27.)
As the sabbath is older t han our state government, was a part
of the laws of the colony, and its ob ervance regulated by colonial
laws, state legi slation upon the sub ject of it observance was almost
coeval with the formation of the state government. If ther e wer e
any doubt about the meaning of the constitution securing freedom .
in religion, the contemporan~ous and ontinued acts of t h e legislature under it would be very good evidence of the intent and
understanding of its fram er , and of the people who adopted it as
their fundamental law. A.., early as 1788, traveling, work, labor
and exposing of goods to sale on that day were prohibited. (2
Greenl. 89.) In 1189 the ale of pirituou liquors was prohibited,
(Andrews, 467 ;) and from that time statutes have been in force
to prevent sabbath desecration_, and prohibiting acts upon that day
which would be lawful on other days of the week. Early in the
history of the state government, the obj ection taken to t h e act
under consideration were taken before the council of revision, to
nn act to amend the act entitled "An act for suppressing immorality," which undertook to r egulate sabbath observance, becau e the provisions as wa claimed militated against the constitution1 by giving a prefer ence to one cb
of christians and oppressing others ; becau e it in ome m anner prescribed the mode of
keeping the sabbath; and because it wa s inexpedient to impose
obligations on the conscien ce of men in matters of opinion. The
council, consisting of Governor J aJ, Chief Justice L an ing, and
Judge L ewi and Ben son, overruled t h e obj ections and held them
n ot well taken. (Street's T. Y . Council of Rev. -122 .) 1 have not
access t o the C al1fornia case r ef erred t o, (Ex varte N ewman, 9 Cal.
502, ) but with all r e"pect fo r the court pronouncing t h e decision,
as aut h ority in this tate, the opinion of the council of revision
t hu con tituted, and deliberately pronounced, should outweigh it.
If the court in California r est their decision upon a want of power
in t he legislature to compel r eligious observance , I should not
dissent from the p o ition, and the only question would be whether
t he act J.id thus trench on th e inviolable rights of the citizen. If
it merely r estrained the p ople from secular pursuits and from
p ractice which th e legislature deemed hurtful t o the moral and
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good order of society, it would not go beyond the proper limits of

legislation. The act complained of here compels no religious ob-

servance, and offenses against it are punishable not as sins against

God, but as injurious to and having a malignant influence on

society. It rests upon the same foundation as a multitude of other

laws upon our statute book, such as those against gambling, lot-

teries, keeping disorderly houses, polygamy, horse-racing, profane

cursing and swearing, disturbance of religious meetings, selling

of intoxicating liquor on election days within a given distance

of the polls, &c. All these and many others do to some extent

restrain the citizen and deprive him of some of his natural rights ;

but the legislature have the right to prohibit acts injurious to

the public and subversive of the government, or which tend to the

destruction of the morals of the people and disturb the peace and

good order of society. It is exclusively for the legislature to deter-

mine what acts should he prohibited as dangerous to the com-

munity. The laws of every civilized state embrace a long list of

offenses which are such merely as mala prohihita, as distinguished

from those which are mala in se. If the argument in behalf of the
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plaintiff in error is sound, I see no way of saving the class of

mala proliihita. Give every one his natural rights, or what are

claimed as natural rights, and the list of civil offenses will be con-

fined to those acts which are mala in se, and a man may go naked

through the streets, establish houses of prostitution ad libitum and

keep a faro-bank on every corner. This would be repugnant to

every idea of a civilized government. It is the right of the citizen

to be protected from offenses against decency, and against acts

which tend to corrupt the morals and debase the moral sense of the

community. Eegarding the sabbath as a civil institution, well

established, it is the right of the citizen that it should be kept and

observed in a way not inconsistent with its purpose and the neces-

sity out of which it grew, as a day of rest, rather than as a day of

Tiot and disorder, which would be effectually to overthrow it, and

render it a curse rather than a blessing.

Woodward, J. in Johnston v. Com. (10 Harris, 102,) says:

*^The right to rear a family with a becoming regard to the institu-

tions of Christianity, and without compelling them to witness the

hourly infractions of one of its fundamental laws; the right to

enjx)y the peace and good order of society, and the increased securi-

ties of life and property which result from a deirnt observance oE

good order of society, it would not go beyond the proper limit of
legislation. The act complained of here compel no religiou obervance, and offenses against it are puni hable not a sin again .. t
God, but a injuriou to and having a malignant influence on
society. It re t upon the ame foundation a a multitude of other
laws upon our statute book, uch a those again t gambling lotterie , keeping disorderly hou e~, polygamy, hor e-racing, profane
·ur ing and wearing, di tmbance of religiou meeting , elli11 0 ·
-0f intoxicating liquor on election days within a given di tan
of the poll , &c. All these and many other do to ome xtent
r strain the citizen and deprive him of ome of hi natural right ;
but the legislature have the right to prohibit act injuriou to
the public :ind ubversive of the government or which tend to the
de truction of the morals of the people and disturb the peace and
good order of society. It is exclu ively for the legislature to determine what acts hould be prohibited as dangerou to the community. The laws of every civilized state embrace a long 1ist of
-0ffenses which are such merely as mala prohib·ita, as distinguished
from those which are mala in se. If the argument in behalf of the
plaintiff in error is sound, I see no way of saving the cla s of
mala prohibita. Give every one his natural rights, or what are
claimed as natural rights, and the list of civil offen es will be confined to these act which are mala in se, and a man may go naked
through the stre t , establi h houses of prostitution ad libitum and
keep a faro-bank on every corner. This would be repugnant to
every idea of a civilized government. It is the right of the citizen
to be protected from offenses against decency, and against act
which tend to corrupt the morals and debase the moral sense of the
community. Regarding the sabbath a a civil in titution, well
established, it i the right of the citizen that it should be kept and
-0bserved in a way not in on istent with it purpo e and the nece sity out of which it grew, a a day of rest, rather than as a day of
riot and di order, which would be effectually to overthrow it, and
render it a curse rather than a ble ing.
Woodward, J. in Johnston v. Com. (10 Harri, 102,) ay :
"The right to rear a family with a becoming regard to th in titutions of christianity, and without compelling them to witn s the
hourly infraction of one of its fundamental law ; the right t
enjoy the peac and good order of ociety and th in r a d ecuritics of lif ancl property which r . ult from n clcr nt ol . crvan oE
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tlie sabbath; the right of the poor to rest from labor without dimi-

nution of wages ;" the right of beasts to the rest which nature call&

for — are real, substantial rights, and as much the subject of gov-

ernmental protection as any other right of person or property. But

it is urged that it is the right of the citizen to regard the sabbath

as a day of recreation and amusement, rather than as a day of rest

and religious worship, and that he has a right to act upon that

belief and engage in innocent amusements and recreations. This

position it is not necessary to gainsay. But who is to judge and

decide what amusements and pastimes are innocent, as having no

direct or indirect baneful influence upon community, as not in any

way disturbing the peace and quiet of the public, as not unneces-

sarily interfering with the equally sacred rights of conscience of

others? May not the legislature, following the example of James

I., which was cited to us as a precedent, declare what recreations are

lawful, and what are not lawful as tending to a breach of the

peace or a corruption of the morals of the people? That is not

innocent which may operate injuriously upon the morals of the old

or young, which tends to interrupt the peaceable and quiet wor-
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ship of the sabbath, and which grievously offends the moral sense

of the community, and thus tends to a breach of the peace. It

may well be that the legislature, in its wisdom, thought that a

theater was eminently calculated to attract all classes, and the

young especially, on a day when they were released from the con-

finement incident to the duties of the other days of the week, away

from the house of worship and other places of proper rest, relaxa-

tion and instruction, and bring them under influence not tending

to elevate their morals and to subject them to temptation to other

vices entirely inconsistent with the safety of society. The gather-

ing of a crowd on a Sunday at a theater, with its drinking saloons,

and its usual, if not necessary, facilities for and inducements to

licentiousness and other kindred vices, the legislature might well

sav was not consistent with the peace, good order and safety of

the city. They might well be of the opinion that such a place

would be "a nursery of vice, a school of preparation to qualify

young men for the gallows and young women for the brothel."

But whatever the reasons may have been, it was a matter within

the legislative discretion and power, and their will must stand as

the reason of the law.

We could not, if we would, review their discretion and sit in

the sabbath; the right of the poor to rest from labor without dimi-nution of wage .. ;' the right of beast to the rest which nature calln
for-are real, substantial rights, and as much the subject of governmental prot ction a any other right of person or property. But
it is urged that it i the right of the citizen to regard the sabbath
as a day of recreation and amusement, rather than a a day of re t
and religious wor hip, and that he ha a right to act upon that
belief and engage in innocent amusement and recreations. Thi
position it is not necessary to gainsay. But who is to judge and
decide what amu emenL and pastimes are innocent, a having no
direct or indirect baneful influence upon community, a not in any
way di turbing the peace and quiet of the public, as not unnecesarily interfering with the equally sacred rights of conscience of
other ? May not the legi lature, following the example of James
I., which was cited to us as a precedent, declare what recreations are
lawful, and what are not lawful as t ending to a breach of the
peace or a corruption of the morals of the people? That is not
innocent which may operate injuriously upon the morals of the old
or young, which tend to interrupt the peaceable and quiet wor._hip of the abbath, and which grievou ly offends the moral en e
of the community, and thu tends to a breach of the peace. It
may well be that the legislature, in its wi dom, thought that a
theater was eminently calculated to attract all clas es, and the
young especially, on a day when they were relea ed from the confinement inci lent to the duties of the other day of the week, away
from the hou e of worship and other places of proper rest, r elaxation and in truction, and bring them under influence not tending
to elevate their morals and to subject them to temptation to other
Yices entirely incon i tent with the afety of society. The gathering of a crowd on a Sunday at a theater, with its drinking saloons,
and its usual, if not nece ary, facilities for and inducements to
licentiousne and other kindred vices, the legi lature might well
ay was not con i tent with the peace, good order and safety of
the city. They might well be of the opinion that uch a place
would be "a nursery of vice, a school of preparation to qualify
young men for the gallow and young women for the brothel."
But whatever the reason may have been, it was a matter within
the legi lative discretion and power, and their will mu t stand a~
the reason of the law.
We could not, if we would, review their discretion and sit in
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jiulgment upon the exisediency of their acts. We cannot declare

that innocent which they have adjudged baneful and have pro-

hibited as such. The act in substance declares a Sunday theatre

to be a nuisance, and deals with it as such. The constitution makes

provision for this case by providing that the liberty of consciencs

secured by it "shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licen-

tiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace and

safety of the state." The legislature have declared that Sunday

theaters are of this character, and come within the description

of acts and practices which are not protected by the constitution,

and they are the sole judges. The act is clearly constitutional, as

dealing with and having respect to the sabbath as a civil and

political institution, and not affecting to interfere with religious

belief or worship, faith or practice.

It was conceded upon the argument that the legislature could

entirely suppress theaters and prohibit theatrical exhibitions. This,

I think, yields the whole argument, for as the whole includes all

its parts and the greater includes the lesser, the power of total

suppression includes the power of regulation and partial suppres-
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sion. If they can determine what circumstances justify a total

prohibition, they can determine under what circumstances the

exhibitions may be innocuous, and under what circumstances and

at what times they may be baneful, so as to justify a prohibition.

The other points made and argued are of less general importance,

as they only aifect this particular case, and notwithstanding they

were ably and ingeniously argued, I have been unable to appreciate

the views taken by the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error.

The law does not touch private property or impair its value.

The possession and use of it, except for a single purpose and

upon a given day, and the right to the possession and use, is as

absolute to the plaintiff in error as it was the day before the pas-

sage of the law. The restraint upon the use of the property is

incidental to the exercise of a power vested in the legislature to

legislate for the whole state. The ownership and enjoyment of

property cannot be absolute in the sense that incidentally the right

may not be controlled or affected by public legislation. Public

safety requires that powder magazines should not be kept in a

populous neighborhood; public health requires that certain trades

and manufactures should not be carried on in crowded localities;

puljlic interest requires that certain callings should be exercised

j udgment upon the expediency of th ir a ·ts. '\\ e cannot c1cclar
that inno ent which thev have adjudged 1 an ful and hav prohibited a such. The a ·t in ub tanc d clare a unday theatr
to be a nuisance, and deal with it a "uch. Tb con titution mak ~
provision for thi ca e: by providing that he liberty of con . . ci ncs
ecured b it ' hall not be o con trued a to excu e act of licentiou ne s, or justify practice incon istent with the peace ancl
safety of the state.' The legislature have declared that Sunda'
theaters are of this character, and come within the description
of acts and practices whieh are not protected by the constitution,
and they are the sole judges. The act is clearly con titutional, a '
dealing with and having respect to the sabbath a a civil and
political institution, and not affecting to interfere with religiou ...
belief or wor hip: faith or practice.
It was conceded upon the argument that the legi lature could
entirely suppres theaters and prohibit theatrical exhibition . Thi
I think, yields the whole argument, for a the whole includ all
its part and the greater includes the les er, the power of total
suppre . ion include'" the power of regulation and partial uppre ion. If they can determine what circum .. tance justify a total
prohibition, the} can det rmine under what circum tance. . the
exhibition may be innocuou , and under what circum tan.cf' and
at what time they may be baneful, so a to ju tify a prohibition.
The other points made and argued are of les general importance
a they only affect thi ~ particular ca e, and notwithstanding they
were ably and ingeniou. ly argued, I have been unable to appreciate
the view taken by the learned counsel for the plain tiff in error.
The law does not touch private propertv or impair it value.
The po e. ~ion and u e of it, except for a single purpo e and
upon a given day, and the right to the po se ion and use; i a
ab olute to the plaintiff in error a it was the day before the pa age of the law. The re traint upon the u e of the property i
incidental to the exercise of a power vested in the legi lature to
legi late for the whole state. The owner hip and enjoym nt of
property cannot be ab olute in the .. en e that in cic1 ntally the right.
may not be controlled or affected by public legi lation. Publi
af ty require'" that powder magazines hould not b k pt in a
populou neighborhood; public health require that crtain trad ~
an l manufacture ·hould not b carried on in crowd d lo aliti
public interest r equire that ertain calling hould b
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by a limited number of 2)ersons and at a limited number of places;

the legislative promotion of these objects necessarily qualifies the

al;)solute ownership of property to the extent that it prohibits

the use of it in the manner and for the purpose deemed inconsistent

with the public good, but that deprives no man of his property or

impairs its legal value. The fact that the plaintiff in error leased

the property with a view to its occupancy for the purposes of a

Sunday theater does not vary the question. He might have bought

it for the same purpose, but that would by no means lessen the

power of the legislature, or give him an indefeasible right to use

it for the purpose intended, or to establish or perpetuate a public

nuisance. The power of the legislature cannot thus be crippled

or taken from them. As lessee he is pro liac vice the owner. He

took his lease as every man takes any estate, subject to the right of

the legislature to control the use of it so far as the public safety

requires.

The contract with the performers, if one exists, for their services

on the sabbath, stands upon the same footing, and is also subject

to another answer, to wit, that the contract for sabbath work was
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void without the law of 1860. {Smith v. Wilcox, ^Yatts v. Van

Ness, Palmer v. Neiv Yorlc, supra.) The sovereign power must,

in many cases, prescribe the manner of exercising individual rights

over property. The general good requires it, and to this extent

the natural rights of individuals are surrendered. Every public

regulation in a city does in some sense limit and restrict the abso-

lute right of the individual owner of property. But this is not a

legal injury. If compensation were wanted, it is found in the

protection which the owner derives from the government, and

perhaps from some other restraint upon his neighbor in the use of

his property. It is not a destruction or an appropriation of the

property, and is not within any constitutional inhibition. ( Vander-

hilt V. Adams, 7 Cowen, 349. People v. Walhridge, 6 id. 512.

Mayor &c. of Neiv Yorl' v. Miln, 11 Peters, 102. 3 Story's Const.

Law, 163.)

The conviction was right and the judgment must be affirmed.

[New York General Term, February 4, 1861. Gierke, Suther-

land and Allen, Justices,]

by a limited number of per::;ons and at a limited number of place
the legi3lative promotion of these object nece arily quali:fie ... th
absolute owncrahip of property to the extent that it prohibiL
the use of it in the manner and for the purpose deemed inconsi tent
with the public good, but that deprive no man of his property or
impairs its legal value. The fact that the plaintiff in error lease 1
the property with a Yiew to it occupancy for the purpo e of a
unday theater does not vary the que ... tion. He might have bought
it for the same purpose, but that would b.Y no means le sen the
power of the legislature, or give him an indefeasible right to use
it for the purpose intended, or to e tablish or perpetuate a public
nuisance. The power of the legislature cannot thu be crippled
-0r taken from them. A les ee he is pro hac vice the owner. He
took his lease as every man take any estate, subj ect to the right of
the legislature to control the u e of it o far as the public safety
requires.
The contract with the performers, if one exist , for their service
on the sabbath, tands upon the same footing, and is also subject
to another answer to wit, that the contract for sabbath work was
void without the law of 1860. ( Sm1'.th v. Wil cox, Watt Y. Van
Nf?ss, Palmer v. New Tork, supra.) The overeign power must
in many cases, pre. . cribe the manner of exer ci ing individual right~
oYer property. The general good requires it, and to thi extent
the natural right of individuals are urrendered. Every public
r egulation in a city docs in ome sen e limit and r estrict the absolute right of the indi viclua 1 owner of property. But this i not a
legal injury. If rornpensation were wanted, it is found in the
protection which the owner derive from the government, ancl
perhaps from some other restraint upon hi._, neighbor in the u e of
hi property. It i not a de truction or an appropriation of the
property, ancl is not within any constitutional inhibition. ( Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 owen, 349. P eople v. TV albridge, 6 id. 512.
Mayor &c. of New York v. M iln, 11 Peters, 102. 3 Story's Const.
Law, 163.)
The conviction wa right and the judgment must be affirmed.
[New York General T erm, F ebruary 4, 1861. Clerke, Sutherland and Allen, Justices.]

CHAPTER XV.

Jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction of the Federal Government.

United States v. Eodgers, 150 U. S. 2Jf9. (1893.)

In February, 1888, the defendant, Eobert S. Eodgers and others,

-were indicted in the District Court of the United States for the

CHAPTER XV.

Eastern District of Michigan for assaulting, in August, 1887, with

a dangerous weapon, one James Downs, on board of the steamer

Alaska, a vessel belonging to citizens of the United States, and

JURISDICTION.
then being within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States,

and not within the jurisdiction of any particular State of the

Jurisdiction of the Federal Government.

United States, viz., within the territorial limits of the Dominion

of Canada.

United

Mb. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court.

tate v. Rodger , 150 U. S . 249.

{1893.)

Several questions of interest arise upon the construction of sec-

tion 5346 of the Eevised Statutes, upon which the indictment in

this case was found. The principal one is whether the term "high

seas," as there used, is applicable to the open, unenclosed waters

of the Great Lakes, between which the Detroit Eiver is a connect-

ing stream. The term was formerly used, particularly by writers
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on public law, and generally in official commimications between

different governments, to designate the open, unenclosed waters

of the ocean, or of the British seas, outside of their ports and

havens. At one time it was claimed that the ocean, or portions

of it, were subject to the exclusive use of particular nations. The

Spaniards, in the 16th century, asserted the right to exclude all

others from the Pacific Ocean. The Portuguese claimed, with the

Spaniards, under the grant of Pope Alexander VI., the exclusive

In February~ 1888, the defendant, Robert S. Rodgers and other ,
'were indicted in the District Court of the nited States for the
Eastern District of Michigan for as aulting, in August, 1887, with
a dangerou weapon, one Jame Down , on board of the . . teamer
Ala. ka, a ve sel belonging to citizens of the United States, and
then being within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States,
.a nd not within the jurisdiction of any particular State of the
United States, viz., within the territorial limits of the Dominion
of Canada.

use of the Atlantic Ocean west and south of a designated line.

And the English, in the 17th century, claimed the exclusive right

to navigate the seas surrounding Great Britain. Woolsey on In-

ternational Law, § 55.

In the discussions which took jdacc in support of and against

these extravagant pretensions the term "high seas" was applied,

23 353

FIELD delivered the opinion of the court.
Several questions of interest arise upon the con truction of section 5346 of the Revised Statutes, upon which the indictment in
thi case was found. The principal one is whether the term ''high
seas," as there used, i applicable to the open, unenclosed water
-0f the Great Lakes, between which the Detroit River is a connecting stream. The term was formerly used, particularly by writerc;..
on public law, and generally in official communications between
different governmenL to design:ite the open, unenclosed water~
of the ocean, or of the Briti h eas, outside of their port and
haven . At one time it was claimed that the ocean, or portion
of it, were subject to the exclusive use of particular nations. The
Spaniards, in the 16th century, a erted the right to exclude all
-0ther from the Pacific Ocean. The Portuguese claimed, with th
Spaniards; under the grant of Pope Alexan<l r VI. th xclu iv
u e of the Atlantic Ocean west and outh of a de ignated lin .
And the Engli h, in the 17th c ntury, claimed the xclu ive right
to navigate the ea urrounding reat Britain. Wool ey on International Law, 5 .
In the di cu ...ion whi ·h took plac in upporl of an 1 ao-ain. t
the
xtravagant pr t n ~ ion i.h . i rm ('high a ' w ::: appli d,
MR. JusTICE
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in the sense stated. It was also used in that sense by English

courts and law writers. There was no discussion with them as to

the waters of other seas. The public discussions were generally

limited to the consideration of the question whether the high seas,

that is, the open, unenclosed seas, as above defined, or any portion

thereof, could be the property or under the exclusive jurisdiction of

anv nation, or whether they were open and free to the navigation of

all nations. The inquiry in the English courts was generally limited

to the question whether the jurisdiction of the admiralty extended

to the waters of bays and harbors, such extension depending upon

the fact whether they constituted a part of the high seas.

In his treatise on the rights of the sea. Sir ]\Iatthew Hale says :

"The sea is either that which lies within the body of a county, or

without. That arm or branch of the sea which lies within the

fauces terrce, where a man may reasonably discern between shore

and shore, is, or at least may be, within the body of a county, and,

therefore, within the jurisdiction of the sherifE or coroner. That

part of the sea which lies not within the body of a county is called

the main sea or ocean." De Jure Maris, c. iv. By the "main sea"'
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Hale here means the same thing expressed by the term "high

sea" — "mare altum," or "le liaut meer."

In Waring v. Clarl-e, 5 How. 440, 453, this court said that it

had been frequently adjudicated in the English common law courts

since the restraining statutes of Eichard II. and Henry IV., "that

high seas mean that portion of the sea which washes the open,

coast." In Uniied States v. Grusli, 5 Mason, 290, it was held by

Mr. Justice Story, in the United States Circuit Court, that the

term 'liigh seas," in its usual sense, expresses the unenclosed ocean

or that portion of the sea which is without the fauces terrce on the

sea coast, in contradistinction to that which is surrounded or en-

closed between narrow headlands or promontories. It was the open,

unenclosed waters of the ocean, or the open, unenclosed waters of

the sea, which constituted the "high seas" in his judgment. There

was no distinction made by him between the ocean and the sea,

and there was no occasion for any such distinction. The questioii

in issue was whether the alleged offences were committed within

a county of Massachusetts on the sea coast, or without it, for in

the latter case they were committed upon the high seas and within

the statute. It was held that they were committed in the county

of Suffolk, and thus were not covered by the statute.

in the sen e tated. It was also used in that sense by Engli h
courts and law writerR. There was no discussion with them a to
the waters of other seas. The public discussions were generally
limited to the con. ideration of the question whether the high seas,
that is, the open> unenclosed seas, as above defined, or any portion
thereof, could be the property or under the exclusive juri diction of"
any nation, or whether they were open and free to the navigation of
::i.ll nation s. The inquiry in the English courts was generally limited
to the question whether the juri diction of the admiralty extended
to the waters of bays and harbors, such extension depending upon
the fa ct whether they constituted a part of the high seas.
In his treatise on the rights of the sea, Sir Matthew Hale says:.
"The sea is either that whi ch lies within the body of a county, or
without. That arm or branch of the sea which lies within the
f mlcrs t errce, where a man may reasonably discern between shore
and shore, is, or at least may be, within the body of a county, and,.
therefore, within th e juri diction of the sheriff or coroner. That
part of the sea which lies not within the body of a county is called
the main sea or ocean." De Jure :Mari , c. iv. By the "main sea';
Hale here means the same thing expres ed by the term "high
sea"- "rnare alturn," or " le hcmt 1neer."
I n Warring v. Clark e, 5 How. 44-0, 453 thi court said that it
had been frequently adjudicated in the English common law courts
since the restraining tatute of Richard II. and H enry IV.: "that
high seas mean that portion of the sea which washes the open
coast." In United S tates v. Grush, 5 Mason, 290, it was held by
Mr. Ju tice Story, in the U nited States Circuit Court, that the
term ''high seas," in its usual sense, expresses the unenclosed ocean
or that portion of the sea which is without the fa .uces t errr.B on the.
sea coast. in contradistinction to that which is surrounded or enclosed behYeen narrow headlands or promontories. It was the open_,
unenclosed waters of the o ean, or the open, unenclosed waters of
the sea, which constituted the ''high seas" in his judgment. There
was no distinction made by him between the ocean and the sea,
and there was no occasion for any such distinction. The question
in issue was whether the alleged offence were committed within
a county of Ma ssachusetts on the sea coast, or without it, for in
the latter case they were committed upon the high seas and within
the statute. It was held that they were committed in the county
of Suffolk, and thus were not covered by the tatute.

U.L
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If there were no seas other than the ocean, the term '"liigh seas"

would be limited to the open, unenclosed waters of the ocean.

But as there are other seas besides the ocean, there must be hish

seas other than those of the ocean. A large commerce is con-

ducted on seas other than the ocean and the English seas, and it is

equally necessary to distinguish between their open waters and

their ports and havens, and to provide for offences on vessels navi-

gating those waters and for collisions between them. The term

^'high seas" does not, in either case, indicate any separate and

distinct body of water; but only the open waters of the sea or

ocean, as distinguished from ports and havens and Avaters within

narrow headlands on the coast. This distinction was observed by

Latin writers between the ports and havens of the Mediterranean

and its open waters — the latter being termed the high seas. In

that sense the term may also be properly used in reference to the

open waters of the Baltic and the Black Sea, both of which are

inland seas, finding their way to the ocean by a narrow and distant

channel. Indeed, wherever there are seas in fact, free to the navi-

gation of all nations and people on their borders, their open waters
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outside of the portion "surrounded or enclosed between narrow

headlands or promontories," on the coast, as stated by Mr. Justice

Story, or "without the body of a county," as declared by Sir

Matthew Hale, are properly characterized as high seas, by whatever

name the bodies of water of which they are a part may be desig-

nated. Their names do not determine their character. There are,

as said above, high seas on the Mediterranean (meaning outside oi

the enclosed waters along its coast), upon which the principal

commerce of the ancient world was conducted and its great naval

battles fought. To hold that on such seas there are no high seas,

within the true meaning of that term, that is, no open, unenclosed

waters, free to the navigation of all nations and people on their

borders, would be to place upon that term a narrrow and contracted

meaning. We prefer to use it in its true sense, as applicable to the

open, unenclosed waters of all seas, than to adhere to the common

meaning of the term two centuries ago, when it was generally

limited to the open waters of the ocean and of seas surrounding

Great Britain, the freedom of which was then the principal subject

of discussion. If it be conceded, as we think it must be, that the

open, unenclosed waters of the Mediterranean are high seas, that

ITED

TATE

Y. RODGER

3o5

Ii there were no ea..., other than the oc an, th term 'high a ~
would be limited to the op n unenclo ed water of the
an.
But as there are other sea be ide the ocean, there mu t b hi o-h
eas other than tho e of the ocean. A large commer e i. onducted on seas other than the ocean and the Engli h ea , and it i
equally necessary to di tinguish between their op n water and
their ports and havens, and to provide for offence on ve eln navigating those waters and for collision between them. The term
''high seas" does not_, in either ca e, indicate any eparate and
distinct body of water; but only the open water of the ea or
ocean, as disbnguished from ports and haven and water within
narrow headland on the coast. This distinction wa observed by
Latin writers between the ports and havens of the :Mediterranean
and its open waters-the latter being termed the high sea . In
that sense the term may also be properly used in reference to the
open waters of the Baltic and the Black Sea, both of which are
inland seas, :finding their way to the ocean by a narrow and di tant
channel. Indeed, wherev r there are eas in fact, free to the navigation of all nations and people on their borders, their open water
out ide of the portion " urrounded or enclo .. ed between narrow
headlands or promontorie~," on the coast, a tated by Mr. Justice
Story, or "without the body of a county," as declared by ir
Matthew Hale, are properly characterized as high seas, by whatever
name the bodie, cf water of which they are a part may be de ignated. Their nam s do not determine their character. There arc,
a said above, high sea on the Mediterranean (meaning ouLide of
the enclosed waters along its coast), upon which the principal
commerce of the ancient world wa.., conducted and its great naval
battles fo ught. To hold that on such eas there are no high ea .•
within the true meaning of that term, that is, no open, unenclosel
water , free to the navigation of all nations and people on th ir
borders, would be to place upon that term a narrrow and contracteLl
meaning. We prefer to u e it in its true sen e, a applicable to the
open, unenclosed water . . of all seas, than to adhere to the ommon
meaning of the t erm two centurie,_ ago, when it wa gen rally
limited to the open waters of the ocean and of ea urroundin5
Great Britain, the freedom of which was then the principal subj ct
of di cu ion. If it be conceded, a w think it mu t b , that th
open, unenclosed waters of the Mediterranean ar high a , that
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concession is a sufficient answer to tiie claim that the high seas

always denote the open waters of the ocean.

Whether the term is applied to the open waters of the ocean or

of a particular sea, in any case, will depend upon the context or

circumstances attending its use, which in all cases affect, more or

less, the meaning of language. It may be conceded that if a state-

ment is made that a vessel is on the high seas, without any qualifica-

tion by language or circumstance, it will be generally understood

as meaning that the vessel is upon the open waters of one of the

oceans of the world. It is true, also, that the ocean is often spoken

of by writers on public law as the sea, and characteristics are then

ascribed to the sea generally which are properly applicable to the

ocean alone; as, for instance, that its open waters are the high-

way of al] nations. Still the fact remains that there are other

seas than the ocean whose open waters constitute a free highway

for navigation to the nations and people residing on their borders,

and are not a free highway to other nations and people, except

there be free access to those seas by open waters or by conven-

tional arrangements.
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As thus defined, the term would seem to be as applicable to the

open waters of the great Northern lakes as it is to the open waters

of those bodies usually designated as seas. The Great Lakes pos-

sess every essential characteristic of seas. They are of large extent

in length and breadth; they are navigable the whole distance in

either direction by the largest vessels known to commerce; objects

are not distinguishable from the opposite shores; they separate,

in many instances. States, and in some instances constitute the

boundary between independent nations; and their waters, after

passing long distances, debouch into the ocean. The fact that their

waters are fresh and not subject to the tides, does not affect their

essential character as seas. Many seas are tideless, and the waters

of some are saline only in a very slight degree.

The waters of Lake Superior, tlie most northern of these lakes,

after traversing nearly 400 miles, with an average breadth of over

100 miles, and those of Lake Michigan, which extend over 350

miles, with an average breadth of 65 miles, join Lake Huron, and,

after flowing about 250 miles, with an average breadth of 70 miles,

pass into the river St. Clair ; thence through the small lake of St.

Clair into the Detroit Eiver; thence into Lake Erie and, by the

Niagara Eiver, into Lake Ontario; whence they pass, by the river

JURISDICTION

concession is a ufficient answer to the claim that the high sea
always denote the open waters of the ocean.
Whether the term is applied to the open waters of the ocean or
of a particular sea, in any case, will depend upon the context or
circumstances flttending its use, which in all cases affect_, more or
less, the meaning of language. It may be conceded that if a statement is made that a vessel is on the high seas, without any qualification by language or circumstance, it will be generally understood
as meaning that the vessel is upon the open waters of one of the
oceans of the world. It is true, also, that the ocean is often spoken
-0f by writers on public law as the seaJ and characteristics are then
ascribed to the sea generally which are properly applicable to the
-0cean alone; as, for instance, that its open waters are the highway of al1 nations. Still the fact remains that there are other
seas than the ocean whose open waters constitute a free highway
for navigation to the nations and people residing on their borders,
and are not a free highway to other nations and people, except
there be free access to those seas by open waters or by conventional arrangements.
As thus defined, the term would seem to be as applicable to the
open waters of the great Northern lakes as it is to the open waters
of those bodies usually designated as seas. The Great Lakes possess every essential characteristic of seas. They are of large extent
in length and breadth; they are naYigable the whole distance in
either direction 'by the largest vessels known to commerce; object
are not distinguishable from the opposite shores; they separate,
in many instances, States, and in some instances constitute the
boundary between independent nations; and their waters, after
passing long distances, debouch into the ocean. The fact tha l their
waters are fresh and not subject to the tides, does not affect their
essential character as seas. Many seas are tideless, and the waters
of some are saline only in a very sljght degree.
The waters of Lake Superior, the most northern of these lake ,
after traversing nearly 400 miles, with an average breadth of over
100 miles, and those of Lake Michigan, which extend over 350
miles, with an average breadth of 65 miles, join Lake Huron, and,
after flowing about 250 miles, with an average breadth of 70 mile ,
pass into the river St. Clair; thence through the small lake of St.
Clair into the Detroit River; thence into Lake Erie and, by the
Niagara River, into Lake Ontario; whence they pass, by the river
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St. Lawrence, to the oeeau, making a total dijr^tanee of over 2,000
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miles. Ency. Britannica, vol. 21, p. 178. The area of the Great

Lakes, in round numbers, is 100,000 square miles. Ibid. vol. 14,

p. 217. They are of larger dimensions than many inland seas

which are at an equal or greater distance from the ocean. The

waters of the Black Sea travel a like distance before they come

into contact with the ocean. Their first outlet is through the Bos-

phorus, which is about 20 miles long and for the greater part of

its way less than a mile in width, into the sea of Marmora, and

through that to the Dardanelles, which is about 40 miles in length

and* less than four miles in width, and then they find their way

through the islands of the Greek Archipelago, up to the Mediter-

ranean Sea, past the Straits of Gibraltar to the ocean, a distance,

also, of over 2,000 miles.

In the Genesee Chief case, 12 How. 443, this court, in consider-

ing whether the 'admiralty jurisdiction of the United States ex-

tended to the Great Lakes, and speaking, through Chief Justice

Taney, of the general character of those lakes, said: "These lakes

are, in truth, inland seas. Different States border on them on one
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side, and a foreign nation on the other. A great and growing

commerce is carried on upon them between different States and a

foreign nation, which is subject to all the incidents and hazards

that attend commerce on the ocean. Hostile fleets have encoun-

tered on them, and prizes been made; and every reason which

existed for the grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the general

government on the Atlantic seas applies with equal force to the

lakes. There is an equal necessity for the instance and for the

prize power of the admiralty court to administer international

law, and if the one cannot be established, neither can the other."

(p. 453.)

After using this language, the Chief Justice commented upon

the inequality which would exist, in the administration of justice,

between the citizens of the States on the lakes, if, on account of

the absence of tide water in those lakes, they were not entitled

to the remedies afforded by the grant of admiralty jurisdiction

of the Constitution, and the citizens of the States bordering on

the ocean or upon navigable waters affected by the tides. The

court, perceiving that the reason for the exercise of the jurisdic-

tion did not in fact depend upon the tidal character of the waters,

but upon their practical navigability for the purposes of commerce.

St. Lawrence, to the ocean, making a total 1i ·tance of o er ·), 00
mil . Ency. Britannica, vol. 9 1, p. 1 . The ar a of the Gr at
Lakes, in round number , i .. 100,000 quare mile . Ibid. ol. 1-±,
p. 217. They are of larger c1imen ion than rnanv inland ea
which are at an equal or greater distance from th; ocean. The
waters of the Black Sea travel a like di tance befor they ome
into contact with the ocean. Their first outlet i through the Bo phorus, which is about 20 miles long and for the greater part of
its way less than a mile in width, into the sea of Marmora, and
through that to the Dardanelles, which is about 40 miles in length
and. less than four miles in width, and then they find their way
through the islands of the Greek Archipelago, up to the Mediterranean Sea, pa t the Straits of Gibraltar to the ocean, a di::tance,
also, of over 2,000 miles.
In the Genesee Chief case, 12 How. 443, this court, in considering whether the 'admiralty jurisdiction of the United States extended to the Great Lakes, and speaking, through Chief Ju tice
Taney, of the general character of those lake , said: "The e lakes
are, in truth, inland seas. Different States border on them on one
ide, and a foreign nation on the other. A great and growing
commerce is carried on upon them between different States and a
foreign nation, which is subject to all the incidents and hazards
that attend commerce on the ocean. Hostile fleets have encountered on them, and prizes been made; and every reason which
existed for the grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the general
government on the Atlantic seas applies with equal force to the
lakes. There is an equal necessity for the instance and for the
prize power of the admiralty court to administer international
law, and if the one cannot be established, neither can the other."
(p. 453.)
After using thi language, the Chief Ju tice commented upon
the inequality which would e_ ist, in the administration of justic ,
between the citizen of the States on the lake , if, on account of
the absence of tide water in those lakes, they were not ntitl cl
to the remedie afforded by the grant of admiralty juri c1i ti n
of the Constitution, and the citizens of the tat bord ring on
the ocean or upon navigable waters affect d by the tide . Th
ourt, perceiving that the reason for the x r i of th juri 31 tion did not in fact depend upon the tidal hara t r f th waic-1':,
but upon their pra tical na igability for th purpo. of mm r ,
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disregarded the test of tide water prevailing in England as in-
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applicable to our country with its vast extent of inland waters.

Acting upon like considerations in the application of the term

"high seas" to the waters of the Great Lakes, which are equally

navigable, for the j^urposes of commerce, in all respects, with the

bodies of water usually designated as seas, and are in no respect

affected by the tidal or saline character of their waters, we disre-

gard the distinctions made between salt and fresh water seas,

which are not essential, and hold that the reason of the statute,

in providing for protection against violent assaults on vessels in

tidal waters, is no greater but identical with the reason for»pro-

viding against similar assaults on vessels in navigable waters that

are neither tidal nor saline. The statute was intended to extend

protection to persons on vessels belonging to citizens of the United

States, not only upon the high seas, but in all navigable waters of

every kind out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, whether

moved by the tides or free from their influence.

The character of these lakes as seas was recognized by this court

in the recent Chicago Lake Front case, where we said: "These
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lakes possess all the general characteristics of open seas, except

in the freshness of their waters, and in the absence of the ebb and

flow of the tide." "In other respects," we added, "they are inland

seas, and there is no reason or principle for the assertion of do-

minion and sovereignty over and ownership by the State of lands

covered by tide waters that is not equally applicable to its owner-

ship of and dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by the

fresh waters of these lakes." Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois,

146 U. S. 387, 435.

It is to be observed also that the term "high" in one of its sig-

nifications is used to denote that which is common, open, and

public. Thus every road or way or navigable river which is used

freely by the public is a "high" way. So a large body of navigable

water other than a river, which is of an extent beyond the measure-

ment of one's unaided vision, and is open and unconfined, and not

under the exclusive control of any one nation or people, but is the

free highway of adjoining nations or people, must fall under

the definition of "high seas" within the meaning of the statute.

We may as appropriately designate the open, unenclosed waters

of the lakes as the high seas of the lakes, as to designate similar

disregarded the te t of tide water prevailing in England a inapplicable to our country with its va t extent of inland water .
Acting upon like consideration in the application of the term
"high seas" to the water of the Great Lakes) which are equally
navigable, for the purpose of commerce, in all respect ) with the
bodies of water usually designated a sea ) and are in no respect
affected by the tidal or alinc charader of their waters, we di regard the distinction. mad between salt and fresh water seas,
which are not essential, and hold that the reason of the statute,
in providing for protection again t violent as aults on ves"'el in
tidal waters) is no greater but identical with the rea on for providing against similar a aults on ves els in navigable waters that
are neither tidal nor saline. The tatute was intended to extend
protection to persons on ve"' els belonging to citizens of the United
States, not only upon the high ea , but in all navigable water of
every kind out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, whether
moved by the tides or free from their infi uence.
The character of these lakes a ea wa recognized by this court
in the recent Chicago Lake Front case, where we said : " These
lakes possess all the general characteristic of open seas, f!xcept
in the freshness of their water , and in the ab ence of the ebb and
flow of the tide." "In other respects," we added, "they are inland
seas, and there is no reason or principle for the assertion of dominion and sovereignty over and ownership by the State of lands
covered by tide water that i not equally applicable to its ownership of and dominion and overeignty over lands covered by the
fresh waters of these lakes." Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois,
146 u. s. 387, -135.
It is to be observed al o that the term "high" in one of its ig-

nifications is used to denote that which is common, open, and
public. Thus every road or way or navigable river which is used
freely by the public is a ''high" way. So a large body of navigable
water other than a river, which is of an extent beyond the measurement of one's unaided vision: and is open and unconfined, and not
under the exclusive control of any one nation or people, but is the
free highway of adjoining nations or people, mu t fall under
the definition of "high seas" within the meaning of the statute.
We may as appropriately designate the open, unenclosed water
of the lakes as the high seas of the lakes, a"' to designate similar
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waters of the ocean as the high seas of the ocean, or siniihir waters

of the Mediterranean as the high seas of the Mediterranean.

The language of section oo^G, immediately following the term

"high seas'' declaring the penalty for violent assaults when com-

mitted on board of a vessel in any arm of the sea or in any river,

haven, creek, basin, or bay, within the admiralty jurisdiction of

the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular

State, equally as when committed on board of a vessel on the high

seas, lends force to the construction given to that term. The

language used must be read in conjunction with that term, and as

referring to navigable waters out of the jurisdiction of any particu-

lar State, but connecting with the high seas mentioned. The

Detroit River, upon which was the steamer Alaska at the time the

assault was committed, connects the waters of Lake Huron (with

which, as stated above, the waters of Lake Superior and Lake

Michigan join) with the waters of Lake Erie, and separates the

Dominion of Canada from the United States, constituting the

boundary between them, the dividing line running nearly midway

between its banks, as established by commissioners, pursuant to
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the treaty between the two countries. 8 Stat. 274, 376. The river

is about 22 miles in length and from one to three miles in width,

and is navigable at all seasons of the year by vessels of the largest

size. The number of vessels passing through it each year is im-

mense. Between the 3'ears 1880 and 1892, inclusive, they averaged

from thirty-one to forty thousand a year, having a tonnage vary-

ing from sixteen to twenty-four millions. In traversing the river

they are constantly passing from the territorial jurisdiction of the

one nation to that of the other. All of them, however, so far as

transactions had on board are concerned, are deemed to be within

the country of their owners. Constructively they constitute a part

of the territory of the nation to which the owners belong. Whilst

they are on the navigable waters of the river they are within the

admiralty jurisdiction of that country. This jurisdiction is not

changed by the fact that each of the neighboring nations may in

some cases assert its own authority over persons on such vessels

in relation to acts committed by them within its territorial limits.

In what cases jurisdiction by each country will be thus asserted

and to what extent, it is not necessary to inquire, for no question on

that point is presented for our consideration. The general rule is

that the country to which the ves'^el belongs will exercise jurisdie-

water of the ocean a the high ca of the o ·ean, or imilar wati:r
of the Mediterranean a the high ea of the U clit rran an.
The language of . . ection 53-±6, immediately following th term
'" high seas" declaring the penalty for viol nt a .. ault when committed on board of a vessel in any arm of the ea or in an ri'I' r,
11aven, creek, basin, or bay, within the admiralty juri di tion of
the United State , and out of the jurisdiction of any particular
State, equally as when committed on board of a ye el on the high
seas, lends force to the construction given to that term. The
language used must be read in conjunction with that t erm, and a
referring to navigable waters out of the juri diction of any particu1ar State, but connecting with the high seas mentioned. The
Detroit River, upon which wa the steamer Ala ka at the time th
assault was committed, connects the waters of Lake Huron (with
which, as stated above, the waters of Lake Superior and Lake
Michigan join) with the waters of Lake Erie, and eparate the
Dominion of Canada from the United States, constituting the
boundary between them, the dividing line running nearly midway
between its banks, as established by commissioners, pur uant to
the treaty between the two countrie . 8 Stat. 274, 276. The river
is about 22 mile in length and from one to three miles in width
and is navjgable at all seasons of the year by vessels of the large t
-size. The number of vessels passing through it each year is immense. Between the years 1880 and 1892, inclusive, they averaged
from thirty-one to forty thousand a year, having a tonnage varying from sixteen to twenty-four millions. In traver sing the river
they are constantly passing from the territorial juri diction of the
one nation to that of the other. All of them, however, so far as
transactions had on board are concerned, are deemed to be within
the country of their owners. Constructively they con titute a part
of the territory of the nation to which the owners belong. Whil t
they are on the navigable water of the river they are within the
admiralty juri diction of that country. This juri diction is not
changed by the fact that each of the neighboring nation may in
ome cases as ert its own authority over per ons on uch vc cl
in relation to acts committed by them within it territorial limit .
In what ca es jurisdiction by ea h country will b thu a ~ rt 1
and to what ext ent, it is not nece .. ary to inquir for no que tion on
that point i presented for our on i1 ration. Th · n ral rul i~
-that the ountry to which the vc cl b 1 nas will e.' r i c juri: di ..
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tion over all matters affecting the vessel or those belonging to her,

without reference of the local government, unless they involve its

peace, dignity, or tranquillity, in which case it may assert its

authority. Wildenhus's case, 120 U. S. 1, 12; Halleck on Inter-

national Law, c. vii, § 26, p. 172. The admiralty jurisdiction of

the country of the owners of the steamer upon which the offence

charged was committed is not denied. They being citizens of the

United States, and the steamer being upon navigable waters, it is

deemed to be within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States.

It was, therefore, perfectly competent for Congress to enact that

parties on board committing an assault with a dangerous weapon

should be punished when l)rought within the jurisdiction of the

District Court of the United States. But it will hardly be claimed

that Congress by the legislation in question intended that violent

assaults committed upon persons on vessels owned by citizens of

the United States in the Detroit River, without the jurisdiction

of any particular State, should be punished, and that similar

offences upon persons on vessels of like owners upon the adjoining

lakes should be unprovided for. If the law can be deemed applica-
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ble to offences committed on vessels in any navigable river, haven,

creek, basin, or bay, connecting with the lakes, out of the juris-

diction of any particular State, it would not be reasonable to sup-

pose that Congress intended that no remedy should be afforded

for similar offences committed on vessels upon the lakes, to which

the vessels on the river, in almost all instances, are directed, and

upon whose waters they are to be chiefly engaged. The more rea-

sonable inference is that Congress intended to include the open,

unenclosed waters of the lakes under the designation of high seas.

The term, in the eye of reason, is applicable to the open, unenclosed

portion of all large bodies of navigable waters, whose extent can-

not be measured by one's vision, and the navigation of which is

free to all nations and people on their borders, by whatever names

those bodies may be locally designated. In some countries small

lakes are called seas, as in the case of the Sea of Galilee, in Pales-

tine. In other countries large bodies of water, greater than many

bodies denominated seas, are called lakes, gulfs, or basins. The

nomenclature, however, does not change the real character of either,

nor should it affect our construction of terms properly applicable

to the waters of either. By giving to the term "high seas" the con-

struction indicated, there is consistencv and sense in the whole

tion over all matters affecting the vessel or those belonging to her,.
without reference of the local government, unless they involve iL
peace, dignity, or tranquillity, in which case it may assert its
authority. Wildenhus's case, 120 U. S. 1, 12; Halleck on I:oternational Law, c. vii: § 26, p. 172. The admiralty jurisdiction of
the ctluntry of the owners of the steamer upon which the offence·
charged was committed is not denied. They being citizens of the
United States, and the steamer being upon navigable waters, it is
deemed to be within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States.
It was, therefore_, perfectly competent for Congress to enact that
parties on board committing an assault with a dangerous weapon
should be punished when brought within the jurisdiction of the·
Di.-.trict Court of the United States. But it will hardly be claimed
that Congres · by the legi lation in question intended that _violent
assaults committed upon persons on ves els owned by citizens of
the V'niied States in the Detroit River, without the jurisdiction
of any particular State: should be punished, and that similar
offences upon person on ves els of like owner upon the adjoining
lakes should be unprovided for. If the law can be deemed applicable to offences committed on vessel in any navigable river, haven,
creek, basin, or bay, connecting with the lakes, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, it would not be reasonable to suppose that Congress intended that no remedy should be afforded
for similar offences committed on vessels upon the lakes, to which
the vessels on the river, in almo t all in tances, are directed, and
upon whose waters they are to be chiefly ngaged. The more reasonable infe rence is that Congress intended to include the open,.
unenclosed waters of the lakes und -r i.he designation of high seas.
The term, jn the eye of rea on, is applicable to the open, unenclosed
portion of all large bodie of navigable waters, whose extent cannot be measured by one's vision, and the navigation of which is
free to all nations and people on their borders, by whatever names
those bodies may be locally designated. In some countries small
lakes are called seas; as in the case of the Sea of Galilee, in Palestine. In other countries large bodies of water, greater than many
bodies denominated eas, are called lake , gulfs, or basins. The
nomenclature, however, does not change the real character of either,,
nor houlrl it affect our construction of terms properly applicabli=~
to the waters of either. By giving to the term "high seas" the construction indicated, there is con i!=;tency and . en e in the whole
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statute, but there is neither if it be disregarded. If the term

applies to the open, unenclosed waters of the lakes, the application

of the legislation to the case under indictment cannot be ques-

tioned, for the Detroit Eiver is a water connectiner such hio-h seas,

and all that portion which is north of the boundary line between

the United States and Canada is without the jurisdiction of any

State of the Union. But if they be considered as not thus apply-

ing, it is difficult to give any force to the rest of the statute without

supposing that Congress intended to provide against violence on

board of vessels in navigable rivers, havens, creeks, basins, and

bays, without the jurisdiction of any particular State, and inten-

tionally omitted the much more important provision for like

violence and disturbances on vessels upon the Great Lakes. All

vessels in any navigable river, haven, creek, basin, or bay of the

lakes, whether within or without the jurisdiction of any particular

State, would some time find their way upon the waters of the lakes ;

and it is not a reasonable inference that Congress intended that

the law should apply to offences only on a limited portion of the

route over which the vessels were expected to pass, and that no

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:03 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t39z97p86
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

provision should be made for such offences over a much greater

distance on the lakes.

Congress in thus designating the open, unenclosed portion of

large bodies of water, extending beyond one's vision, naturally

used the same term to indicate it as was used with reference to

similar portions of the ocean or of bodies which had been desig-

nated as seas. When Congress, in 1790, first used that term the

existence of the Great Lakes was known; they had been visited

by great numbers of persons in trading with the neighboring In-

dians, and their immense extent and character were generally

understood. Much more accurate was this knowledge when the

act of March 3, 1825, was passed, 4 Stat. 115, c. 65, and when the

provisions of section 5346 were reenacted in the Kevised Statutes

in 1874. In all these cases, when Congress provided for the pun-

ishment of violence on board of vessels, it must have intended that

the provision should extend to vessels on those waters the same

as to vessels on seas, technically so called. There were no Ijodies

of water in the United States to any portion of which the term

"high seas" was applicable if not to the open, unenclosed waters

of the Great Lakes. It does not seem reasonable to suppose that

Congress intended to confine its legislation to the high seas of the

tatute, but there is neither if it be di r aarded. If th · t rm
applie to the open, unenclo ed water of the lake , the application
of the legi lation to the ca e under indi tment cannot be qu tioned, for the Detroit River i a water connecting uch high ea :
:rnd all that portion which i north of the boundary line between
the United tate and Canada i without the juri diction of an}
State of the Union. But if they be con idered a not thu applying, it is difficult to give any force to the re t of the statute without
upposing that Congre. s intended to provide again t violence on
board of vessel in navigable rivers, haven , creeks, ba in , and
bay , without the jurisdiction of any particular State, and intentionally omitted the much more important provi ion for like
'iolence and disturbances on ves el upon the Great Lakes. All
Yes el in any navigable river, haven, creek, ba in, or bay of the
lakes, whether within or without the jurisdiction of any particular
State, would some time find their way upon the water of the lake ·
and it is not a reasonable inference that Congre s intende<l that
the law should apply to offences only on a limited portion of the
route over which the ves els were expected to pass, and that no
provision should be made for such offences over a much greater
distance on the lakes.
Congre s in thus de ignating the open, unenclo ed portion of
large bodies of water, extending beyond one' vi ion, naturally
u ed the ame t er.m to indicate it as wa used with reference to
. irnilar portion of the ocean or of bodie which had been de ignated as seas. ·w hen Congress, in 1790, first used that term the
existence of the Great Lakes was known; they had been vi ited
by great number of person in trading with the neighboring Indians, and their immen e extent and character were generally
understood. Much more accurate wa thi knowledge when the
act of March 3, 1825, was pa ed, 4 tat. 115, c. 65, and wh n the
provisions of ection 5346 wer reenacted in the Revised tatut
in 1874. Jn all the e ca ~e , when Congre provided for th puni hment of violence on board of ve sels, it must hav intended that
the provi ion ~ hould ext nd to v s el on tho water thr am
a to vc el on sea , technically so called. Th r w r n 1 odi
nited tate to any portion of whi h th term
of water in th
'high _ea " wa applicable if not to the op n, unen lo ed wat r
of th Areat Lake . It do not e m r a onabl to . uppo t1 at
ongr . intended to confin it lcgi. lation to th hi gh ca f th
0
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ocean, and to its navigable rivers, havens, creeks, basins, and bays,

without the jurisdiction of an}^ State, and to make no provision

for offences on those vast bodies of inland waters of the United

States. There are vessels of ever}^ description on those inland

seas now carrying on a commerce greater than the commerce on

any other inland seas of the world. And we cannot believe that

the Congress of the United States purposely left for a century

those who navigated and those who were conveyed in vessels upon

those seas without any protection.

The statute under consideration provides that every person who,

upon the high seas or in any river connecting with them, as we

construe the language, within the admiralty jurisdiction of the

United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State,

commits, on board of any vessel belonging in whole or in part to

the United States, or any citizen thereof, an assault on another

with a dangerous weapon or with intent to perpetrate a felony,

shall be punished, etc. The Detroit Eiver, from shore to shore,

is within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and

connects with the open waters of the lakes — high seas, as we hold
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them to be, within the meaning of the statute. From the boimdary

line, near its centre, to the Canadian shore it is out of the jurisdic-

tion of the State of Michigan, The case presented is therefore

directly within its provisions. The act of Congress of September

4, 1890, 26 Stat. 424, c. 874 (1 Sup. to the Rev, Stat. chap. 874,

p. 799), providing for the punishment of crimes subsequently

committed on the Great Lakes, does not, of course, affect the con-

struction of the law previously existing.

We are not unmindful of the fact that it was held by the Su-

preme Court of Michigan in People v. Tyler, 7 Michigan, 161, that

the criminal jurisdiction of the Federal courts did not extend to

offences committed upon vessels on the lakes. The judges who

rendered that decision were able and distinguished; but that fact,

whilst it justly calls for a careful consideration of their reasoning,

does not render their conclusion binding or authoritative upon this

court. Their opinions show that they did not accept the doctrine

•extending the admiralty jurisdiction to cases on the lakes and

navigable rivers, which is now generally, we might say almost uni-

versally, received as sound by the judicial tribunals of the country.

It is true, as there stated, that, as a general principle, the criminal

laws of a nation do not operate beyond its territorial limits, and

·ocean, and to its navigable river , haven , creek , ba in , and bay...,,
·without the jurisdiction of any State, and to make no provision
for offences on those va t bodie" of inland waters of the 1 nited
States. There are vessel of every de . . cription on those inland
eas now carrying on a commerce greater than the commerce on
any other inland seas of the world. And we cannot believe that
the Congre s of the United States purposely left for a century
those who navigated and those who were conveyed in vessels upon
those seas without any protection.
The statute under consideration provides that every person who~
upon the high "ea or in any river connecting with them, as we
·construe the langm1ge, within the admiralty jurisdiction of the
United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State,
commits, on board of any vessel belonging in whole or in part to
the United States, or any citizen thereof, an assault on another
with a dangerous weapon or with intent to perpetrate a felony,
shall be punishecl, etc. The Detroit River, from shore to shore,
is within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and
connects with the open waters of the lakes-high seas, a we hold
them to be, within the meaning of the statute. From the boundary
line, near its centre, to the Canadian shore it is out of the j~uisdic
tion of the State of Michigan. The case presented i therefore
·directly within its provi ions. The act of Congress of September
4, 1890, 26 Stat. 424, c. 874 (1 Sup. to the Rev. Stat. chap. 874,
p. 799), providing for the punishment of crimes subsequently
committed on the Great Lakes, does not, of course, affect the construction of the law previously existing.
We are not unmindful of the fact that it was held by the Supreme Court of :Michigan in People v. Tyler, 7 Michigan, 161, that
the criminal jurisdiction of the Federal courts did not extend to
offences committed upon vessels on the lakes. The judges who
rendered that decision were able and distinguished; but that fact,
whilst it justly calls for a careful consideration of their reasoning,
does not render their conclusion binding or authoritative upon this
court. Their opinion how that they did not accept the doctrine
extending the admiralty jurisdiction to cases on the ·lakes and
navigable rivers, which is now generally, we might say almost universally; received as sound by the judicial tribunals of the country.
It is true, as there stated, that, as a general principle, the criminal
laws of a nation do not operate beyond it territorial limits, and
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that to give any government, or its judicial tribunals, the right

UNITED ST TE

~

\. RODGER

63

to punish any act or transaction as a crime, it must have occurred

within those limits. We accept this doctrine as a general rule, but

there are exceptions to it as fully recognized as the doctrine itself.

One of those exceptions is that offences committed upon vessels

belonging to citizens of the United States, within their admiralt}

jurisdiction (that is, within navigable waters), though out of the

territorial limits of the United States, may be judicially considered

when the vessel and parties are brought within their territorial

jurisdiction. As we have before stated, a vessel is deemed part

■of the territory of the country to which she belongs. Upon that

subject we quote the language of Mr, Webster, while Secretary of

State, in his letter to Lord Ashburton of August, 1842. Speaking

for the government of the United States, he stated with great

clearness and force the doctrine which is now recognized by all

countries. He said: "It is natural to consider the vessels of a

nation as parts of its territory, though at sea, as the State retains

its jurisdiction over them; and, according to the commonly re-

ceived custom, this jurisdiction is preserved over the vessels even
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in parts of the sea subject to a foreign dominion. This is the doc-

trine of the law of nations, clearly laid down by writers of received

authority, and entirely conformable, as it is supposed, with the

practice of modern nations. If a m.urder be committed on board

oi an American vessel by one of the crew upon another or upon a

passenger, or bv a passenger on one of the crew or another pas-

senger, while such vessel is lying in a port within the jurisdiction

of a foreign State or sovereignty, the offence is cognizable and

punishable by the proper court of the United States in the same

manner as if such offence had been committed on board the vessel

on the high seas. The law of England is supposed to be the same.

It is true that the jurisdiction of a nation over a vessel belonging

to it, while lying in the port of another, is not necessarily wholly

exclusive. We do not so consider or so assert it. For any unlawful

acts done by her while thus lying in port, and for all contracts

entered into while there, by her master or owners, she and they

must, doubtless, be answerable to the laws of the place. Nor, if

Tier master or crew, while on board in such port, break the peace

of the community by the commission of crimes, can exemption be

claimed for them. But, nevertheless, the law of nations, as I have

stated it, and the statutes of governmenis founded on tluii law.

that to give any govemm nt, or it judicial tribunal , th right
to puni h any act or tran action a a crim , it mu t hav oc urr <1
within those limit . We accept thi doctrin a a o-eneral rule bu ..
there are exception to it as fully recognized a the doctrin it elf.
One of tho . . e exception i that offence committed upon ve ~ ;; l ·
belonging to citizens of the United State , within their admira lt)
jurisdiction (that is, within navjgable waters), though out of the
territorial limit of the United State , may b judicially con idcred
when the vessel and parties are brought within their territorial
jurisdiction. As we have before stated, a ve sel i deemec.1 part
-0f the territory of the country to which sh belongs. Upon that
subject we quote the language of M:r. Web ter, while Secretary of
State, in hjs letter to Lord A hburton of Augu t, 1 42.
peaking
for the government of the United State , he tated with great
.clearnes and force the doctrine which i now r cognized by all
countrie.. He said: "It is natural to consid r the vessels of ::i.
nation as parts of its territory, though at ea, as the State retain
it~ jurisdiction over them; and, according to the commonly re.ceived custom~ this jurisdiction is preserved over the ves els even
in parts of the sea subject to a foreign dominion. Thi i the doctrine of the law of nations, clearly laid down by writers of rec ived
authority, and entirely conformable, a it is uppo d, with the
practice of modern nation . If a murder be committed on board
'Of an American vessel by one of the crew upon another or upon a
passenger, or by a passenger on one of the crew or another pa enger, while such vessel i lying in a port within the juri diction
of a foreign State or sovereignty, the offence is cognizable and
punishable by the proper court of the United tate in the am
manner as if such offence had been committed on board the ve 1
.on the high seas. The law of England is uppo d to be the am .
It is true that the juri ~ diction of a nation over a ve el b 1 nging
to it, while lyjng in the port of another, i not ne e arily wholly
€xclusive. We do not so con ider or so as ert it. For any unlawful
acts done by her while thu lying in port, and for all ontra t '
entered into while there, by her ma"ter or own r , he and th y
mu t, doubtle "' be an~ w ruble to the law of th place.
r if
bcr ma ter or crew, while on board in u h port br ak th p a
of the ·ommunity by the commi ion of crirn , an x mption b'
dnime 1 for them. But, neverthel , th law f nati n , a 1 hav{'
.s tat cl it, anc1 th tatute>< of rrov mm nt. found cl n th, t law,
f
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as I have referred to them, show that enlightened nations, in
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modern times, do clearl}' hold that the jurisdiction and laws of a

jtiation accompany her ships not only over the high seas, but into

ports and harbors, or wheresoever else they may be water-borne,

for the general purpose of governing and regulating the rights,

duties, and obligations of those on board thereof, and that, to the

extent of the exercise of this jurisdiction, they are considered as

parts of the territory of the nation herself." 6 Webster's Works,

306, 307.

We do not accept the doctrine that, because by the treaty between

the United States and Great Britain the l)oundary line between the

two countries is run through the centre of the lakes, their character

as seas is changed, or that the jurisdiction of the United States

to regulate vessels belonging to their citizens navigating those

waters and to punish offences committed upon such vessels, is in

any respect impaired. Whatever effect may be given to the boun-

dary line between the two countries, the jurisdiction of the United

States over the vessels of their citizens navigating those waters

and the persons on board remains unaffected. The limitation
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to the jurisdiction by the qualification that the offences punishable

are committed on vessels in any arm of the sea, or in any river,

haven, creek, basin or bay "without the jurisdiction of any par-

ticular State,'"' which means without the jurisdiction of any State

of the Union, does not apply to vessels on the "liigh seas" of the

lakes, but only to vessels on the waters designated as connecting

with them. So far as vessels on those seas are concerned, there is

no limitation named to the authority of the United States. It

is true that lakes, properly so called, that is, bodies of water whose

dimensions are capable of measurement by the unaided vision,

within the limits of a State, are part of its territory and subject

to its jurisdiction, but bodies of water of an extent which cannot

be measured by the unaided vision, and which are navigable at all

times in all directions, and border on different nations or States

or people, and find their outlet in the ocean as in the present case,

are seas in fact, however they may be designated. And seas in

fact do not cease to be such, and become lakes, because by local

custom they may be so called.

In our judgment the District Court of the Eastern District of

Michigan had jurisdiction to try the defendant upon the indict-

ment found, and it having been transferred to the Circuit Court,

a , l ha Ye referred to them, show that enlightened nations, in
modern times, do clearly hold that the jurisdiction and laws of a
:µation accompany her ships not only over the high seas, but into
ports and harbors, or wheresoever else they may be water-borne,
for the general purpose of governing and regulating the rights:duties, and obligations of those on board thereof, and that, to the
extent of the exercise of this jurisdiction, they are considered as
parts of the territory of the nation herself." 6 Webster's Works,
306, 307.
We do not accept the doctrine that, because by the treaty between
the United States and Great Britain the boundary line between the
two countries is run through the centre of the lakes, their character
as seas is changed, or that the jurisdiction of the United State'
to regulate vessels belonging to their citizen navigating those
water and to punish offences committed upon such ves.els, is in
any re pect irupaireJ. \\11atever effect may be given to the boundary line between the two countries, the jurisdiction of the United
State over the ve eL of their citizen navigating tho e water
and the person on board r emains unaffected. The limitation
to the jurisdiction by the qualification that the offence punishable
are committed on vessel in any arm of the sea, or in any river,
haven, creek, basin or bay "without the juri diction of any particular State/' which mean. without the juri diction of any State
of the nion, doe not appl.) to Ye el on the ''high eas" of the
lake , but only to vessels on the water de ignated a connecting
with them. So far as ves els on tho e seas are concerned, tbere is
no limitation named to the authority of the nited States. It
is true that lakes, properly o called, that is, bodie of water who e
dimen ions are capable of mea urement by the unaided vision.
within the limits of a State, are part of its territory and subject
to it juri diction, but bodie of water of an extent which cannot
be measured by the unaided vi ion, and which are navigable at all
time in all directions, and border on different nation or States
or people, and find their outlet in the ocean a in the present case,
are seas in fact, however they · may be de ignated. And ~ ea in
fact do not cea e to be uch, and become lakes, because by local
cu tom they may be o called.
In our judgment the Di trict Court of the Eastern District of
Michigan had jurisdiction to try the defendant upon the Indictment found, and it having been tran ferred to the Circuit Court,.
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that court had jurisdiction to proceed with the trial, and the de-

murrer to its jurisdiction should have been overruled. Our opin-

ion, in answer to the certificate, is that

The courts of the United States have jurisdiction, under section

that court had juri diction to proceed with th trial and th demurrer to it juri diction hould have b en ov rruled.
ur opmion, in answer to the certificate, i that

5346 of the Revised Statutes, to try a person for an assault,

with a dangerous weapon, committed on a vessel belonging to

a citizen of the United States, when such vessel is in the De-

troit River, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State,

and within the territorial limits of the Dominion of Canada;

and it tvill he returned to the Circuit Court of the United

States for the Sixth Circuit and Eastern District of Michigan,

and it is so ordered.

State Jurisdiction.

State V. Carter, 27 N. J. L. Jt99. (1859.)

This cause was tried at the Hudson Oyer and Terminer, and

was brought before this court on questions reserved upon the trial.

The facts in the case and the points presented to the court appear

in the opinion delivered in this court.

The co·u rts of the United tate. have juri diction, under ection
5346 of the R ev·ised tatutes, to try a per on fo1· an a ault_.
with a dange1'0·us weapon, committed on aves el belonging to
a citizen of the United State , when such ve el i in the Detroit River, out of the jurisdiction of any particular tate.
and within the territorial limits of the Dominion of Canada;
and it u:al be returned to the Circuit Court of the United
Btates for the Sixth Circuit and Eastern District of Michigan,
and it is so ordered.

Argued at February Term, 1859, before the Chief Justice
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and Justices Ogdex, Vredenburgh and Whelpley.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Vredenburgh, J. :

The indictment charges that the defendant, on the 29th of De-

State Jurisdiction.

cember, 1858, in the city of New York, gave one Brushingham

several mortal bruises, of which, until the 31st of December, 1858,

as well in Xew York as in Hudson county, in this state, he lan-

State v. Garter, 27 N. J. L. 499.

(1859.)

guished, and of which, in said Hudson county, he then died. To

this indictment the defendant pleaded that the court had not juris-

diction of the cause. The defendant, we must assume, was a citizen

of the State of Xew York. Nothing was done by the defendant in

this state. When the blow was given, loth parties were out of its

jurisdiction, and within the jurisdiction of the State of New York.

The only fact connected with the offence, alleged to have taken

place within our jurisdiction, is that after the injury, the deceased

came into, and died in this state. This is not the case where a

man stands on the New York side of the line, and shooting across

the border, kills one in New Jersey. When that is so, the blow is

This cau e was tried at the Hudson Oyer and Terminer, and
was brought before this court on question re erved upon the trial.
The facts in the case and the points presented to the court appear
in the opinion delivered in thi court.
Argued at February rrerm~ 1859, before the CHIEF Ju TI E
and Justices OGDEN, VREDENBURGH and WHELPLEY.
The opinion of the court wa delivered by VREDENBURGH, J.:
The indictment charge that the defendant, on the 29th of December, 1858, in the citv of New York, gave one Bru hingham
everal mortal brui ,e , of which, until the 31st of December~ 1 5 ,
as well in New York as in Rud on county, in this state, h languished, and of which, in . aid Hud on county, he then die<l. To
thi indictment the defendant pleaded that the court had not juri. diction of the cau e. The defendant, we mu ta<:: ume, wa a citizen
Qf the State of New York. Nothing wa done by the defendant in
thi state. When the blow wa given, both partie were out of it
juri diction and within the juri diction of the tat of N w York.
The only fact connected with the o:ffen e, all gecl to have tak n
place within our juri diction, i that after tho injury, th de a d
came into and died in thi tate. Thi i not th a wh r n
man tand'"' on the New York . i l of th lin , an] h otin · a ro.:
th border, kill on in r w J er y. ·when thal i. "o th blow i:;;
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in fact struck in New Jersey. It is the defendant's act in this

state. The passage of the ball, after it crosses the boundary, and

its actual striking, is the continuous act of the defendant. In all

cases the criminal act is the impinging of the weapon, whatever

it may be, on the person of the party injured, and that must neces-

sarily be where the impingement happens. And whether the sword,,

the ball, or any other missile, passes over a boundary in the act o£

striking, is a matter of no consequence. The act is where it strikes^

as much where the party who strikes stands out of the state, as

where he stands in it.

Here no act is done in this state by the defendant. He sent no

missile, or letter, or message, that operated as an act within this

state. The coming of the party injured into this state afterwards

was his own voluntary act, and in no way the act of the defendant.

If the defendant is liable here at all, it must be solely because the

deceased came and died here after he was injured. Can that, in

the nature of things, make the defendant guilty of murder or man-

slaughter here ? If it can, then for a year after an injury is in-

flicted, murder, as to its jurisdiction, is ambulatory at the option
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of the party injured, and l^ecomes punishable, as such, wherever

he may see fit to die. It may be manslaughter, in its various de-

grees, in one place, murder, in its various degrees, in another. Its

punishment may be fine in one country, imprisonment, whipping,

beheading, strangling, quartering, hanging, or torture in another,,

and all for no act done by the defendant in any of these jurisdic-

tions, but only because the party injured found it convenient to

travel.

This is not like the case of stolen goods, carried from one state

to another, or of leaving the state for any purpose whatever, like

that for fighting a duel, or of sending a letter or messenger, or

message, for any purpose, into another state ; for in all these cases

the cognizance is taken for an act done within the jurisdiction.

If the acts charged in this indictment be criminal in New Jer-

sey, it must be either by force of some statute or upon general

principles. There is no statute, unless it be the act to be found

in Nix. Dig. 184, § 3. But this evidently relates to murder only,

and not to manslaughter.

But I cannot make myself believe that the legislature, in that

act, intended to embrace cases where the injury was inflicted

within a foreign jurisdiction, without any act done by the defend-

in fact struck in New J er ey. It i the defendant' act in thi
state. The pa._ age of the ball, after it crosses the boundary, and
its actual striking, is the continuous act of the defendant. In all
ca e the criminal act is the impinging of the weapon, whatever
it may be, on the person of the party injured, and that must necesarily be where the impingement happens. And whether the sword,.
the ball, or any other mi sile, passes over a boundary in the act of
striking, is a matter of no consequence. The act i where it strikes,.
as much where the party who strikes stands out of the state, as
where he stands in it.
Here no act is done in this state by the defendant. He sent n<Y
mis ile, or letter, or message, that operated as an act within thi
state. The coming of the party injured into this state afterward ~.
was his own voluntary act, and in no way the act of the defendant.
If the defendant is liable here at all, it must be solely because the
decea ed came and died here after he wa injured. Can that, in
the nature of things, make the defendant guilty of murder or manlaughter here? If it can, then for a year after an injury is inflicted, murder, as to its jurisdiction, i ambulatory at foe option
of the party injured, and becomes puni hable, a uch, wherever
he may see fit to die. It may be man laughter, in it various degree , in one place, murder, in it variou degree , in another. Its
punishment may be :fine in one country, imprisonment, whipping,
beheading, strangling, quartering, hanging, or torture in another,.
and all for no act done by the defendant in any of the e jurisdictions, but only because the party injured found it convenient to
travel.
This is not like the case of stolen goods, carried from one state
to another, or of leav]ng the tate for any purpose whatever, like
that for :fighting a duel, or of sending a letter or messenger, or
me. age, for any purpose, into another state; for in all these case .
the cognizance i taken for an act clone within the jurisdiction.
If the acts charged in thi indictment be criminal in New J er,_ ey, it must be either by force of ome statute or upon general
principles. There is no statute, unless it be the act to be found
in Nix. Dig. 184, § 3. But this evidently relates to murder only,
and not to manslaughter.
But I cannot make myself believe that the legislature, in that
act, intended to embrace ca es where the injury was · inflicted
within a foreign jurisdiction, without any act done by the defena-
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ant witliiu our own. Such an enactment, upon general principles,

would necessarily be void; it would give the courts of this state

jurisdiction over all the subjects of all the governments of the

earth, with power to try and punish them, if they could by force

or fraud get possession of their persons in all cases where personal

injuries are followed by death.

An act, to be criminal, must be alleged to be an offence against

the sovereignty of tlie government. This is of the very essence of

crime punishable by human ]aw. How can an act done in one

jurisdiction, be an offence against the sovereignty of another? All

the cases turn upon the question where the act was done. The

person who does it may, when he does it, be within or without the

jurisdiction, as by shooting or sending a letter across the border;

but the act is not the less done within the jurisdiction because the

person who does it stands without. This case is not at all like

those where the defendant is tried in England for a crime com-

mitted in one of the dependencies of the British empire. There

the act is done, and the crime is in fact committed against the

sovereignty of the British crown, and only the place of trial is
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changed.

If our government takes jurisdiction of this case, it must be not

by virtue of any statute, but because it assumes general power to

punish acts mala in se wherever perpetrated in the world. The

fact of the party injured can give no additional jurisdiction.

Such crimes may be committed on the high seas, in lands where

there are, or where there are not regular governments established.

When done upon the high seas, they may be either upon our ves-

sels or upon vessels belonging to other governments. When done

upon our vessels, in whatever solitary corner of the ocean, from

the necessity of the case, and by universal acceptance, the vessel

and all it contains is still within our jurisdiction, and when the

vessel comes to port the criminal is still tried for an act done

within our jurisdiction. But we have never treated acts done

upon the vessels of other governments as within our jurisdiction,

nor has such ever been done by any civilized government.

When an act malum in se is done in solitudes, upon land where

there has not yet been formally extended any supreme liuman

power, it may be that any regular government may feel, as it were,

a divine commission to try and punish. It may, as in cases of

crime committed in the solitudes of the ocean, upon and by vessel:?-

ant within our own.
uch an enactment upon g n ral princ.:i11 ~would nece~ arily be oic1 · it would give th ourt of thi - tat
juri diction over all he subject. of all th o·oy rnm nt of th
arth, with power to try and puni . . h them if th y ould by for
wh r I r onal
or fraud get po e ion of their peruon in all ca
injurie. are followed by death.
An act, to be criminal, mu t be alleged to be an offence again t
the sovereignty of the government. Thi" i of the v ry e enc of
crime puni hable by human Jaw. How can an act done in on
jurisdiction, be an offence again t the overeignty of another ?
11
the cases turn upon the que tion where the act wa don . Th
per on who does it may, when he does it, be within or without th
jurisdiction, au by shooting or ending a letter aero the border .
but the act i not the leus done within the juri diction becau e th
per on who doe it tands without. Thi ca e i not at all like
tho e where the defendant is tri d in England for a crime ommitted in one of the dependencie of the British empire. Ther
the act is done, and th e crime is in fact committed again t the
sovereignty of the Briti h crown, and only the place of trial i
changed.
If our government takes juri diction of thi ca e it mu t b not
by virtue of any tatute, but because it as umes general power to
puni h act niala in ·e wherever perpetrated in the world. ThP
fact of the party injured can give no additional juri diction.
Such crime may be committed on the high seas, in lands wh r
there are, or where there are not regular government establi hed.
When done upon the high sea , they may be either upon our v uels or upon vess ls belonging to other governments. When don
upon our vc el,, in whatever olitary corner of the ocean, from
the nece. j ty of the case, and by universal acceptance, the ve 1
and all it contains is till within our juri diction, and wh n th
vessel comes to port the criminal is still tri d for an act done
within our jurisdiction. But we have never tr ated a L lon
upon the ves els of other government a within our juri di tion
nor has such ever be n done by any civilized governm nt.
When an act malum in se i done in olitude , upon land wh r
there has not yet been formally extend d any upr m human
power, it may be that any regular governm nt may f 1 a it w r
a divine commis ion to try and puni h. It may a in a . f
crime committed in the olitude of the ocean, up n and by v · l~
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belonging to no government, pro liac vice arrogate to itself the pre-

rogative of omnipotence, and hang the pirate of the land as well

as of the water. Further than this it could not have been intended

that our statute should apply. But here the act was done in the

State of New York, a regularly organized and acknowledged

siipreme government. The act was a crime against their sov-

ereignty. That was supreme within its territorial limits and in

its ver}^ nature, and in fact is exclusive. There cannot be two

sovereignties supreme over the same place at the same time over

the same subject matter. The existence of theirs is exclusive of

ours. We may exercise acts of sovereignty over the wastes of

ocean or of land, but we must necessarily stop at the boundary of

another. The allegation of an act done in another sovereignty, to

he a violation of our own, is simply alleging an impossibility, and

all laws to punish such acts are necessarily void.

It is said that if we do not take jurisdiction, the defendant will

go unpunished, inasmuch as the party injured not dying in New

York, he could not be guilty of murder there. But New York

may provide by law for such cases, and if she does not, it is their
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fault, and not ours. The act done is against their sovereignty,

and if she does not choose to avenge it, it is not for us to step in

and do it for them.

I think that the Oyer and Terminer should be advised that no

crime against this state is charged in the indictment.

Cited in State v. Wychoff, 2 Vr. 68.

Locality of Crime.

Stout V. State, 76 Md. SIT. (1892.)

Alvey, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal, taken under the Act of 1892, ch. 506, enacted as

section 77 of Article 5 of the Code, is from the final judgment of

the Court below, sentencing the appellant to death, on a verdict

of murder in the first degree.

There are two questions raised. The first is on a demurrer to

the indictment, in respect to the jurisdiction of the Court to try

the prisoner, because of supposed defect of venue as to the com-

mission of the crime; and the second is presented by bill of ex-

belonging to no government, pro hac vice arrogate to it elf the prerogative of omnipotence, and hang the pirate of the land a .. well
as of the water. Further than this it could not have been intended
that our statute shou1d apply. But here the act was done in the
State of New York, a regularly organized and acknowledged
upreme government. The act was a crime against their sovereignty. That wa supreme within its territorial limit and in
it very nature, and in fact is exclusive. Th re cannot be two
sovereignties supreme over the ame place at the same time over
the same subject matter. The existence of theirs is excluaive of
our. . We may exercise acts of sovereignty over the wastes of
ocean or of land, but we must necessarily stop at the boundary of
another. The allegation of an act done in another sovereignty, to
be a violation of our own, is simply alleging an impossibility, and
all laws to punish uch acts are necessarily void.
It is said that if we do not take jurisdiction, the defendant will
go unpunished, inasmuch as the party injured not dying in New
York, he could not be guilty of murde.r there. But New York
may provide by law for such cases, and if she does not, it is their
fault, and not ours. The act done is against their sovereignty,
and jf she does not choose to avenge it, it is not for us to step in
and ilo it for them.
I think that the Oyer and Terminer hould be advised that no
crime against thi ~ tate is charged in the indictment.
Cited in State v. Wyckoff, 2 Vr. 68.

Locality of Crime.
Stout v. State, 76 Md. 317.

(1892.)

ALVEY, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal, taken under the Act of 1892, ch. 506, enacted as
section 77 of Article 5 of the Cocle, is from the final judgment of
the Court below~ sentencing the appellant to death, on a verdict
of murder in the first degree.
There are two questions raised. The first is on a demurrer to
the indictment, in respect to the jurisdiction of the Court to try
the prisoner, because of supposed defect of venue as to the commission of the crime; and the econd i presented by bill of ex-
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ception, as to the supposed illegal separation of the jury during

the progress of the trial.

1. As to the demurrer to the indictment.

The indictment contains four counts. There is no question

made upon either the iirst or second count; but the third and

fourth counts are supposed to be obnoxious to the objection taken

to them by demurrer. The demurrer was overruled, and the pris-

oner then pleaded not guilty, upon which he was tried and con-

victed.

The third count of the indictment charges that the mortal blow

was inflicted by the prisoner on the deceased in Cecil County,

Maryland, but that death, in consequence of the wound, subse-

quently ensued in the City of Philadelphia, in the State of Penn-

sylvania. In the language of the indictment, it is charged that

the accused, "on the first day of February, 1891, with force and

arms, at Cecil County aforesaid, in and upon one George Dittmar,

in, &c., then and there being, feloniously, wilfully, and his malice

aforethought, did make an assault, &c., and, with a certain stick,

&c., him, the said Dittmar, did then and there strike, giving him,
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the said Dittmar, then and there, one mortal wound; and of which

said mortal wound the said Dittmar, on and from the said first

day of February, in the year aforesaid, until and upon the fourth

day of March, in the year aforesaid, at the County and City of

Philadelphia, in the State of Pennsylvania, then and there did

languish, and languishing did live; on which said fourth day of

March, in the year aforesaid, at the county and city last aforesaid,

he, the said Dittmar, of the mortal wound aforesaid, died."

The fourth count, charging the felonious assault and wounding

as in the third, differs from that count in this, that in the fourth

count it is charged that the mortal blow was inflicted on the de-

ceased by the accused, "at Cecil County, Maryland, with a club,

and that of this mortal wound said Dittmar, on and from the said

first of February, in the year aforesaid, to the fourth day of March,

in the year aforesaid, languished, and languishing did live, as well

at and in the county aforesaid, as at and in the County and City

of Philadelphia, in the State of Pennsylvania, then and there did

languish, and languishing did live; on which said fourth day of

March, in the year aforesaid, at and in the County and City of

Philadelphia, aforesaid, to wit, at and in Cecil County aforesaid,

the said Dittmar, of the mortal wound aforesaid, died."

24

ception, a to the rnppo ed illegal eparation of the jury durincr
the progre of the trial.
1. A to the demurrer to the indictment.
The indictment contain four c ount ~ . There i no qu ~ tion
made upon either the fir._ t or econd count; but the thinl and
fourth count are uppo ed to be obno:xiou to the objection tak n
to them by demurrer. The r1emurrer wa overruled, and the pri . . oner then pleaded not guilty, upon which he wa tried and onvicted.
The third count of the indictment charge that the mortal blow
wa inflicted by the prisoner on the decea ed in Cecil oun y,
Maryland, but that death, in con eguence of the wound, ub equently ensued in the City of Philadelphia, in the tate of P nnylvania. In the language of the indictment it i charged tha!:
the accu ed, "on the fir t day of February 1 91 with force and
arms, at Cecil County afore aid, in and upon one George Dittmar
in, &c., then and there being, feloniously, wilfully and hi malice
aforethought, did make an a sault, &c., and, with a certain tick
&c., him: the said Dittmar, did then and there trike, giving him~
the said Dittmar, then and there, one mortal wound; and of which
said mortal wound the ~aid Dittmar, on and from th aid fir t
day of February, in the year afore aid, until and upon the fourth
day of March, in the ) ear afore"aid, at the County and it) of
.Philadelphia, in the State of Pennsylvania, then and there did
languish, and languishing did live; on which aid fourth day of
March, in the year aforesaid, at the county and city la t afore aid,
he, the said Dittmar, of the mortal wound afore aid, di d.
The fourth count, charging the feloniou a ault and wounding
a in the third, differ from that count in thi , that in the fourth
count it is charged that the mortal blow wa inflicted on the d .ceased by the accused, "at C cil County, 1aryland, with ::i lub,
.and that of thi~ mortal wound said Dittmar, on and from th aid
first of February, in the year afore aid, to the fourth day of far h
in the year afore aid, langui hed, and langui bing did liv a w 11
at and in the county afore aid, a" at and in th
ounty and it}
of Philadelphia, in the Stat of Pennsylvania, th n and th r did
langui h, and languishing did live; on which aid fourth day of
March, in the year afore aid, at and in th
ounty and ity of
il
unty afor . aid
Philadelphia, afor aid, to wit, at and in
the . aid Dittmar, of the mortal w un 1 ·afor . aid diC'(1.
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The death occurring in Philadelphia as the result of the mortal

wound inflicted in Maryland; the question presented on demurrer

to the third and fourth counts of the indictment is one in regard

to which some doubts, it would appear, were entertained in the

early days of the English common law. These doubts seem to have

had their foundation in certain maxims and practice that origi-

nally obtained in respect to the venue for the trial of facts, the

reason for which has long since ceased to exist ; it being supposed,

in the early periods of the English law, that it was necessary that

the jury should come from the vicinage where the matters of fact

occurred, and therefore be better qualified to investigate and dis-

cover the truth of the transaction than persons living at a distance

from the scene could be. Hence the venue was always regarded

as a matter of substance ; and where, at the common law, the com-

mission of an ojffence was commenced in one county and consum-

mated in another, the venue could be laid in neither, and the

offender went altogether unpunished. And even in the case of

murder, if the mortal wound was inflicted or poison administered,,

in one county, and the party died in consequence of the wound
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or poison in another, it was doubted by some whether the mur-

derer could be punished in either county; for it was supposed

that a jury of the first could not take cognizance of the death in.

the second, and a jury of the second could not inquire of the

wounding or poisoning in the first ; and so the felon would escape

punishment altogether. 1 Chit. Cr. Law, 177. This doubt was

foanded in a mere technicality, and savored so much of a senseless

nicety, that it was deemed a reproach to the law; and to remove

all doubt, and to fix a certain venue for the trial of the crime, the

Statute of 2 and 3 Edward VI was passed ; and after reciting in

a long preamble the great failures of justice which arose from

such extreme nicety, that Statute enacted that in cases of striking

or poisoning in one county, and death ensuing in another, the

offender could be indicted, tried and punished in the district or

county where the death happened, as if the whole crime had been

perpetrated within the boundary of such district or county. And

by the subsequent Statute of 2 Geo. II, ch. 21, it was enacted that,

where any person feloniously stricken or poisoned, at any place

out of England, shall die of the same in England, or being felo-

niously stricken or poisoned in England, shall die of such stroke

or poisoning out of England, an indictment thereof, found by the

The death occurring in Philadelphia a the result of the mortal
wound inflicted in Mary land; the question presented on demurrer
to the third and fourth counts of the indictment is one in regard
to which some doubts, it would appear, were entertained in theearly days of the English common law. The e doubts seem to have
had their foundation in certain maxim and practice that originally obtained in respect to the venue for the trial of facts, thcreason for which has long since ceased to exist; it being supposed:in the early period of the English law, that it was necessary that
the jury should come from the vicinage where the matters of fact
occurred, and therefore be better qualified to investigate and discover the truth of the transaction than persons living at a distance
from the scene could be. Hence the venue was always regarded
as a matter of substance; and where, at the common law, the commis ion of an offence was commenced in one county and consummated in another, the venue could be laid in neither, and the
offender went altogether unpunished. And even in the case of
murder, if the mortal wound was inflicted or poison administered,,
in one county, and the party died in con equence of the wound
or poison in another, it was doubted by ome whether the murderer could be punished in either county; for it was supposed
that a jury of the first could not take cognizance of the death in
the second, and a jury of the second could not inquire of the
wounding or poisoning in the first; and o the felon would escape
punishment altogether. 1 Chit. Cr. Law, 177. This doubt was
founded in a mere technicality, and savored so much of a en eless.
nicety, that it was deemed a reproach to the law; and to remove
all doubt, and to fix a certain venue for the trial of the crime, the
tatute of 2 and 3 Edward VI was passed; and after reciting in
a long preamble the great failure of justice which arose from
uch extreme nicety, that Statute enacted that in cases of triking
or poisoning in one county, and death ensuing in another, the
offender could be indicted, tried and puni hed in the district or
county where the death happened, as if the whole crime had beer..
perpetrated within the boundary of such di trict or county. And
by the subsequent Statute of 2 Geo. II, ch. 21, it was enacted that,
where any per on feloniously stricken or poisoned, at any place
out of England, shall die of the same in England, or being feloniou ly stricken or poi oned in England, ~hall die of uch stroke
or poi oning out of England, an indictment thereof, found by the
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jurors of the county in which either the death or the cause of death;,

shall respectively happen, shall be as good and effectual in law,

as well against principals as accessories, as if the offence had been

committed in the county where such indictment may be found.

The principles or provisions of these two English statutes are

not exactly consistent, the one with the other, but the Statute of

2 and 3 Edward VI, ch. 24, is not now applicable or in force in

this State, whatever may have been the case prior to our own Act

of 1809, ch. 138, sec. 17 ; and the Statute of 2 George II, ch. 21,

was never applicable here, as found by Chancellor Kilty, in his

Keport on the English Statutes, published in 1811.

By section 278 of Art. 27 of the Code, codified from section 17"

of the Act of 1809, ch. 138, it is provided that "if any person be

feloniously stricken or poisoned in one county, and die of the

same stroke or poison in another county, within one year there-

after, the offender shall be tried in the Court within whose juris-

diction such county lies where the stroke or poison was given;

and in like manner, an accessory to murder or felony committed,

shall be tried by the Court within whose jurisdiction such person
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became accessory." This statute, as will be observed, conforms

neither to the Statute 2 & 3 Edward VI, nor to that of 2 George

II; but it is, as we think is manifest, simply in confirmation or

declaratory of the common law. This, we think, is made clear

upon examination of text writers of high authority, and by judicial

decisions of Courts entitled to great weight in the determination

of such a question. And if this provision of our Code be simply

declaratory of the common law, as we suppose it to be, the same

reason and principle equally apply to the case where the mortal

blow or poison is given in any county in this State, and the party

so stricken or poisoned shall, in consequence of the blow or poison,

die out of the State, within the year and a day after the blow

given or poison administered, as to the case provided for by the

terms of the statute. In such case it is the law of Maryland that is

violated, and not the law of the State where death may liappen to

occur. By the felonious act of the accused, not only is there a great

personal wrong inflicted upon the party assaulted or mortally

wounded, while under the protection of the law of the State, but

the peace and dignity of the State where the act is perpetrated is

outraged; and though death may not immediately follow, yet if it

does follow as a consequence of the felonious act within the year.

jurors 0£ the county in which ither the death or the au of l atb,
hall respectively happen, hall be a good and ff tual in law,
a well against principal a . . acces orie , a if the off nc had b en
c:ommitted in the county where . . uch indictment ma3 be found.
The principles or provi ion of the e two Engli h tatute are
not exactly consistent, the one with the other, but the tatut of
2 and 3 Edward VI, ch. 24, is not now applicabl or in for e in
thi State, whatever may have been the ca e prior to our own Act
of 1809, ch. 138; sec. 17; and the Statute of 2 George II, h. 1,
was never applicable here, as found by Chancellor KILTY, in his
Report on the English Statutes, published in 1811.
By section 278 of Art. 27 of the Code, codified from ection 17
of the Act of 1809, ch. 138, it is provided that "if any p r. on be
feloniou ly stricken or poi oned in one county, and die of the
ame stroke or poison in another county, within one year thereafter, the offender shall be tried in the Court within who e juri diction such county lies where the stroke or poison was given;
and in like manner, an accessory to murder or felony committed,
hall be tried by the Court within whose juri diction uch per on
became acces ory." This statute, as will be observetl, conform
neither to the Statute 2 & 3 Edward VI, nor to that of 9 George
II ; but it is, as we think is manifest, simply in confirmation or
declaratory of the common law. This, we think, i made lear
upon examination of text writer of high authority, and by judicial
deci ions of Courts entitled to great weight in the determination
of such a question. And if this provision of our Code be simply
declaratory of the common law, as we suppose it to be, the ame
rea on and principle equally apply to the case where the mortal
blow or poi on i given in any county in this State, and the party
so tricken or poisoned shall, in consequence of the blow or poi on,
die out of the State, within the year and a day after th blow
given or poi on administered, as to the ca e provided for by th
terms of the statute. In uch case it is the law of Maryland that is
violated, and not the law of the State where death may happ n to
occur. By the felonious act of the accused, not only i th r ::i gr at
per onal wrong inflicted upon the party a aulted or mortally
wound d, while under the protection of th law of the tate but
the peace and dignity of the tate wher the a t i p rpetrat 1 i
outraged; and though d ath may not imm diat ly follow yrt if it
doe follow as a con equence of the feloniou a t within th • y ar,
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the crime of murder is complete. In inflicting the mortal wound

then and there, the accused expends his active agency in pro-

ducing the crime, no matter where the injured party may languish,

or where he may die, if death ensues within the time, and as a

consequence of the stroke or poison given. The grade and char-

acteristics of the crime are determined immediately that death

ensues, and that result relates back to the original felonious wound-

ing or poisoning. The giving the blow that caused the death con-

stitutes the crime.

Lord Coke seems to have been responsible, to a considerable

extent, for the maintenance of the dou])t that was formerly enter-

tained upon this subject. In 3 Inst., at page 48, founding his text

on the preamble to the Statute of 2 & 3 Edward VI, he says : "And

before the making of the Statute 2 Edward VI, if a man had been

feloniously stricken or poisoned in one county, and after had died

in another county, no sufficient indictment could thereof have been

taken in either of said counties, because, by the law of the realm,

the jurors of one county could not inquire of that which was done

in another county. It is provided in that Act that the indictment
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may be taken in that county where the death doth happen." The-

reason assigned for this passage from the Institutes can hardly be

accepted as sound at this day — that is, that the jurors of one

county cannot inquire of that which is done in another county.

But we have the authority of the great Sir Matthew Hale

to the contrary of this doctrine of Coke. In 1 Hale P. Cr., 426,

the author says: "At common law, if a man had been stricken

in one county and died in another, it ivas doubtful whether he were

indictable or triable in either, hut the common opinion was, that

he might be indicted where the stroke was given, for the death is

hut a consequent, and might he found in another county f and

he cites for this the Year Books, 9 Edw. IV, p. 48, and 7 Hen.

VII, p. 8. And he then proceeds to say, that "if the party died in

another county, the body was removed into the county where the

stroke was given, for the coroner to take an inquest super visum

corporis." But now, says the author, "hy the Statute of 2 & 3

Edw. VI, ch. 24, the justices or coroner of the county where the

party died shall inquire and proceed, as if the stroke had been in

the same county where the party died." Thus showing that the

common law was changed by the Statute of 2 and 3 Edw. VI;

but that our statute of 1809, ch. 138, sec. 17, is simply declaratory

the crime of murder i complete. In inflicting the mortal wound
then and there, the accuLecl e:s:pends his active agency in producing the crime, no matter where the injured party may langui h,
or where he may die, if death en ue within the time, and a .. a
consequence of the stroke or poi on given. The grade and characteristics of the crime are determined immediately that death
ensues, and that re ult relates back to the original feloniou wound~
ing or poisoning. The giving the blow that cau eel the death contitutes the crime.
Lord COKE eems to have been responsible, to a con iderable
extent, for the maintenance of the doubt that was formerly ent ertained upon this ubject. In 3 Inst., at page 48, founding bis text
on the preamble to the Statute of 2 & 3 Edward VI, he say : "And
before the making of the Statute 2 Edward VI, if a man had been
feloniously tricken or poisoned in one county, and after had died
in another county, no sufficient indictment could thereof have been
taken in either of said countie , becau e, by the law of the realm,
the jurors of one county could not inquire of that which was done
in another county. It i provided in that Act that the indictment
may be taken in that county where the death cloth happen." The ·
reason assigned for thi pa sage from the In titutes can hardly be
accepted as ound at thi day-that is, that the juror of one
county cannot inquire of that which is done in another county.
But we have the authority of the great Sir 7\LiTTHEW HALE
to the contrary of this doctrine of COKE. In 1 Hale P. Cr., 426,
the author says: "At common law, if a man had been stricken
in one county and died in another, it iras do'llbtful whether he were
iudictable or triable in either, but the common opinion was, that
11e might be indicted where the stroke wa given, for the death is
but a consequent; and 1night be found in another county;" and
he cites for this the Year Book , 9 Edw. IV p. 48 and 7 Hen.
VII, p. 8. And he then proceeds to ay, that "if the party died in
another county, the body was removed into the county where the
troke was given, for the coroner to take an inquest super visurn
corpori ." But now, ay the author, "by the Statute of 2 & 3
Eclw. VI, ch. 24, the ju tice or coroner of the county where the
party died shall inquire and proceed, a if the troke had been in
the same county where the party died." Thu showing that the
common law wa changed hy the Statute of 2 and 3 Edw. VI;
but that our tatute of 1809, ch. 138 Lee. 1 , is imply declaratory
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of the common law, and, according to that hiw, and to what was

plainly Sir Matthew Hale's conclusion from the history of the

law, the crime in this case was committed where the fatal stroke

was given, and that the place of the consequent death was quite

immaterial.

The authority of the opinion of Lord Hale, so plainly indicated

in the passage from his work just quoted, has been fully recog-

nized by subsequent writers of high repute. Thus, in 2 Hawkins

P. Cr., p. 120, sec. 13, the author says : "It is said by some that the

death of one who died in one county of the wound given in an-

other, was not indictable at all at common law, because the offence

was not complete in either county, and the jury could enquire only

of what happened in their own county. But it hath been hohlen by

others, that if the corpse were carried into the county where the

stroke was given, the whole might be inquired of by a jury of the

same county." And so in 1 East Cr. Law, page 361^ that very

learned and accurate writer says: "Where the stroke and death

are in different counties, it was doubtful at common law whether

the offender could be tried at all, the offence not being complete in
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either, though the more common opinion ivas that he might he

indicted where the stroTce was given, for that alone is the act of

the party, and the death is but a consequence, and might be found,

though in another county, and the body was removed into the

county where the stroke was given."

It is not necessary that we should cite other text writers upon

this subject; those that we have cited sufficiently indicating the

state of the English common law in regard to the question here

involved, though expressed with the doubts formerly entertained

by some.

The question, however, does not rest on the authority of text

writers alone; judicial decisions are not wanting upon the sul)-

ject.

In the case of Bex v. Ilargrave, 5 Carr. & P., 170, tried before

Mr. Justice Patteson in 1831, an indictment for manslaughter

charged that A. gave the deceased divers mortal blows at P., in

the County of M., and that the deceased languished and died at

D., in the county of K. : and that the prisoner was then and there

aiding in the commission of the felony. L^pon objection to the

sufficiency of the indictment, the learned Justice, in overruling

the objection, said : "The giving of Hie hloivs tvhich caused the

of the common law) and) a ·cording to that law) and to wha wa
plainly Sir :MA.TTHEW HALE conclu ion from th hi tor of th
Jaw) the crime in thi ca e wa committed where th fatal trokr
wa given) and that the place of the con equent d ath a quite
immaterial.
'rhe authority of the opinion of Lord HALE, o plainly indi at cl
in the passage from hi work ju t quoted) ha been fully re oa- _
nized by ubsequent writers of high repute. Thu ) in 2 Hawkin ~
P. Cr., p. 120, sec. 13, the author ay : 'It i aid by ome that tht•
death of one who died in one county of the wound gi en in another, was not indictable at all at common law, becau e the off n
was not complete in either county, and the jury could enquire only
of what happened in their own count) . But it hath been holden by
others, that if the corpse were carried into the county where th
troke was given, the whole might be inquired of by a jury of the
ame county." And o in 1 Ea t Cr. Law, page 361i that v r
learned and accurate writer ays: "Where the troke and d ath
are in different countie , it was doubtful at common law whether
the offender could be tried at all, the offence not being complete in
either, thmtgh the more common opinion was that he might be
indict ed where the stroke was given, for that alone i the act of
the party, and the death is but a consequence, and might be found~
though in another county: and the body wa removed into th
county where the troke wa given."
It is not n ecessary that we hould cite other text writer upon
this subject; tho e that we have cited ufficiently indicating th0
tate of the Engli"h common law in regard to the que~ tion her
involved, though expres ed with the doubt formerly entertain d
by ome.
The question, however, doe not re t on the authority of t xt
writer alone; judicial deci ions are not wanting upon the ubj ect.
In the ca e of R ex v. Hargrave, 5 arr. & P., 1 O, tri cl h for '
Mr. Ju tice P .A.TTESO in 1 31, an inclictm nt for man laught 'r
charged that A. gave the decea ed diver mortal blow at . m
the County of :M:., and that the decea d langui h cl an 1 cli <1 nt
D., in the county of K . ; and that the pri on r wa then ancl there
aiding in the commi ion of the felony.
pon obj ction t th '
·ufficiency of th indictment, the learn d Ju tic in
rrulinrr
the objection_, said : "'The giving of t;he blow whi ·h au ed tli r
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death constituted the felony. The languishing alone, which is not

an}' part of the offence, is laid in Kent; the indictment states that

the prisoner was then and there present, aiding and abetting in the

commission of the felon}' ; that must, of course, apply to the Parish

of All Saints, where the blows, which constitute the felony, were

given," And there are many cases in this country which hold that,

upon the definition of murder, and the elements that enter into

and constitute the crime, the place of the death is wholly imma-

terial, in the prosecution of the offender, except in those cases

specially provided for by positive statute. In other words, that

the giving of the mortal blow that caused the death constitutes the

felony; and the removal of the corpse to the county in which the

mortal stroke was inflicted is not required for any purpose con-

nected with the jurisdiction of the Court over the crime or the

offender. And without stating the facts of each case, wherein

these principles have been considered and maintained, we may refer

to the cases of Riley v. State, 9 Hump., 646 ; People v. Gill, 6 Cab,

637; State of Minnesota v. Gessert, 21 Minn., 639; State v.

Bowen, 16 Kans., 476; Green v. State, 66 Ala., 40.
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In the very celebrated case of the United States v. Giteau, tried

in the District of Columbia in 1881-2, and reported in 1 Mackey,

498, this question of jurisdiction was extensively discussed by

counsel and elaborately considered by the Court. The accused wav^

indicted under section 5339 of the Eevised Statutes of the United

States, for the murder, by shooting, in the District of Columbia,

of the then President of the United States, James A. Garfield,

who, after receiving the mortal wound, languished for more than

two months, and died in the State of New Jersey, where he had

been taken in the hope of relief. The contention there was, on the

part of the prisoner, that the murder was committed only partly

within the District of Columbia, and partly within the State of

New Jersey, and therefore there was no jurisdiction in the Court

in the District of Columbia to try and convict the prisoner for

his crime. But this contention was overruled. It was first con-

sidered and overruled in the Criminal Court, in a very learned

and able opinion by Mr. Justice Cox, before whom the case was

tried, and after conviction the case was taken to a session in Gen-

eral Term of the Supreme Court of the District, where the decision

of the trial Court was fully reviewed, and the conclusion of Mr.

Justice Cox concurred in, though for reasons somewhat variant

death constituted the felony. The languishing alone, which i not
part of the offence, is laid in K ent; the indictment states that
the prisoner was then and there present, aiding and abetting in the
commission of the felony; that must, of course, apply to the Parish
-0f All Saints, where the blows, which con titute the felony, were
given." And there are many cases in thi country which hold that,
upon the definition of murder, and the element that enter into
and constitute the crime, the place of the death is wholly immat erial, in the prosecution of the offender, except in those cases
pecially proviclecl for by po itive statute. In other word , that
the giving of the mortal blow that caused the death con titutes the
felony; and the removal of the corp e to the county in which the
mortal stroke wa inflicted i not r equired for any purpo e connected with the jurisdiction of the Court over the crime or the
offender. And without stating the fact of each case, wherein
these principles have been considered and maintained, we may refer
to the cases of Riley v. State, 9 Hump., 646; People v. Gill, 6 Cal.,
637' ; State of Minn esota v. Gessert, 21 1inn., 639; State v.
Bowen, 16 Kans., 476; Green v. State, 66 Ala., 40.
In the very celebrated case of the United States v. Giteau, tried
in the District of Columbia in 1881-2, and reported in 1 :Mackey,
498, this question of jurisdiction wa extensively discussed by
counsel and elaborately considered by the Court. The accused was
indicted under section 5339 of the Revised Statute of the United
States, for the murder, by shooting, in the District of Columbia,
of the then President of the United State , James A. Garfield,
who, after receiving the mortal wound langui heel for more than
two months, and died in the State of New J er ey, where he had
been taken in the hope of relief. The contention there was, on the
part of the prisoner, that the murder wa committed only partly
within the District of Columbia, and partly within the State or
New Jersey, and therefore there wa no jurisdiction in the Court
in the District of Columbia to try and convict the pri oner for
his crime. But this contention was overruled. It was first considered and overruled in the Criminal Court in a very learned
and able opinion by Ur. Ju tice Cox, before whom the ca e wa
tried, and after convidion the case was taken to a e ion in General Term of the Supreme Court of the District, where the decision
of the trial Court was fully reviewed, and the conclusion of Mr .
.J 11 tice Cox concurrrd in, though for rea on omewhat 'ariant
~my
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from those employed by the trial Judge. In the opinion of Judge

Cox, the common law authorities sustained the jurisdiction, but

lie was further of opinion that the Statute of 2 Geo. II, eh. 21,

was in force in Maryland at the date of the cession of the District

by this State, and consequently was still in force in the District,

and that that Statute fully applied to the case. And while the

Court of review, sitting in General Term, agreed in the conclusion

arrived at by Judge Cox, and also in the proposition that the com-

mon law was sufficient for the case, it held that, by the terms of

the statute of the United States, applicable to the District of

Columbia, which provides that in all places or districts, under the

sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, if a party shall

commit the crime of murder, such person, on being convicted, shall

suffer death, the party inflicting the mortal wound in the District

is guilty of murder, though the death of the victim subsequently

occurs, in consequence of the wound, in any of the States of the

Union; that, in such case, the crime of murder becomes complete

in the District where the mortal wound was given, in the con-

templation of the statute, irrespective of the place of the death.
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Thus holding that the mortal stroke which caused the death con-

stituted the felony, and that the place of death was immaterial to

the jurisdiction of the Court to try and convict the offender.

But that was not all that occurred. After the conviction and

review had at the General Term, an application was made to the

late Mr. Justice Bradley, of the Supreme Court of the United

States, for a habeas corpus, on the ground that the Criminal Court

of the District of Columbia had no jurisdiction of the offence, and

therefore the conviction was void. But that learned Justice, upon

consideration of the case, concurred with the Courts of the District

of Columbia, in holding that there was jurisdiction of the offence,

and that the party had been properly tried, and therefore dis-

missed the petition. And thus ended that memorable case.

Both upon reason and authority, therefore, this Court is of

opinion that the Court below was entirely correct in overruling

the demurrer to each and all of the counts of the indictment ; and

as there is no cause assigned in support of the motion in arrest of

judgment, that could be considered on such motion, the Court was

also correct in overruling that motion.

2. The second question presented is one of practice. It arose

upon a motion by the prisoner to discharge tbe jury, during the

from tho .. e em ployed by the trial Judge. In the opinion of J ult ~
o:s:J the common law authoritie u tained the juri ~ die ion: but
be wa further of opinion that the tatut of '
o. II h. · 1
wa in force in faryland at the date of th e ion of he
by thi State, and con"equently wa.. till in force in the i ~tri ·l
and that that Statute fully applied to the ca c. And whil the
Court of revie", itting in General Term, agr ed in the conclu ion
.arrived at by Judge Cox, and al ~ o in the propo ition that the ommon law was ~ufficient for the ca e, it held that, b · h t erm I
-the statute of the nited tate , applicable to the Di trict f
Columbia, which provides that in all place or di"tri t , under th
sole and exclu. ive juri diction of the nited tateu, if a part · hall
.commit the crime of rnurclerJ uch person, on being convict d, hall
. uffer death, the party inflicting the mortal wound in the Di tri t
is guilty of murder, though the death of the victim ub equentl:
occurs, in consequence of the wound, in an3 of the tat of th
1Jnion; that, in uch ca e, the crime of murder become com pl te
in the District where the mortal wound wa given, in the ontemplation of the statute, irre .. pective of the place of the death.
Thus holding that the mortal stroke which cau ed the death onstituted the felon3, and that the place of death wa immaterial to
the jurisdiction of the Court to try and convict the offender.
But that was not all that occurred. After the conviction and
review had at the General T·erm, an application wa made to the
late Mr. Justice BnADLEYJ of the Supreme Court of the nit d
States, for a hab eas corp'llS, on the ground that the Criminal ourt
-0f the District of Columbia had no jurisdiction of the offence, and
therefore the conviction was void. But that learned Ju tice up n
con ideration of the ca e, concurred with the Court of the i tri t
-0f olumbia> in holding that there wa ~ juri diction of the off n ,
and that the party had been properly tried, and therefore di mi sed the petition. And thus ended that memorable a e.
Both upon rea on and authority, therefore, thi
ourt i of
opinion that the Court below wa entirely corre t in ' rruling
the demurrer to each and all of the count of the indictm nt; and
a there is no cau e a ..,igned in upport of th motion in arr L f
judgment, that could 1e con .. ider d on u h motion the ourt wa ·
al o correct in overruling that motion.
2. The econd que tion pre ent. d i on of pra ·ti
upon a motion 1 y th pri on r to 1i ·harO' lh jury lurincr th
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course of the trial, because of alleged separation of the jury in the

recess of the Court. It appears that the entire panel of twelve

were placed in charge of the sheriff, during a recess of the Court

from 4.30 P. M. to 7.30 P. M., and were taken to quarters provided

at a hotel in the town. Upon reaching the hotel, one of the jurors

was suffering so much from illness, that he had to be allowed to go

to bed, but he was alone, and was locked in the room b}' the sheriffs

At the hour of reassembling of the Court, the other eleven jurors

were taken into Court, but in consequence of the inability of the

sick juror to be present, the Court adjourned until 10 o'clock A.

M. the next day, at which time the whole panel attended. It is not

pretended or suggested that the sick juror was approached by any

one, or tampered with in any manner. The motion to discharge

the panel was founded upon the simple fact that the sick juror

had been separated from his fellow jurors before verdict ren-

dered.

In overruling this motion, the Court below certainly committed

no error. In the trial of capital cases, even, there are many occa-

sions when in reason, and a proper regard to the needs of hu-
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manity, it may become necessary to allow a temporary separation

of the jury, without necessarily breaking up the trial, and that

even after the jury have retired to consider of their verdict,

otherwise protracted trials could seldom be brought to a final con-

clusion. Of course, the separation should only be allowed when

attended with those precautions and safeguards necessary to secure

entire freedom from approach or external influence of any kind.

Ned V. State, 64 Ga., 272; State v. Payton, 90 Mo., 220; Cole-

man V. State, 59 Miss., 484; State v. O'Brien, 7 E. I., 337;

Goerson v. Comm., lOG Penn. St., 477 ; People v. Bonney, 19 Cal.,

426; 1 Bish. Crim. Pro., sees. 993-4; 12 Am. & Eng. Enc. of

Law, 371. But each case rests upon its own peculiar circum-

stances, and is within the sound discretion of the trial court ; and

is therefore not the subject of appellate review, except where it is

affirmatively shown that the party has been prejudiced by the

action of the Court.

It follows that the judgment below must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

(Decided 17th November, 1892.)

cour e of the trial, because of alleged paration of the jury in the
recess of the Court. It appears that the entire panel of twelve
were placed in charge of the sheriff, during a rece s of the Court
from 4.30 P. M. to 7.30 P. M., and were taken to quarter;; provided
at a hotel in the town. Upon reaching the hotel, one of the juror
wa suffering so much from illness, that he had to be allowed to go
to bed, but he was alone, and was locked in the room by the sheriff.
At the hour of reassembling of the Court, the other eleven jurors
were taken into Court, but in consequence of the inability of the
sick juror to be present, the Court adjourned until 10 o'clock A.
M. the next day, at which time the whole panel attended. It is not
pretended or suggested that the sick juror was approached by any
one, or tampered with in any manner. The motion to discharge
the panel was founded upon the simple fact that the sick juror
hc1d been separated from his fellow jurors before verdict rendered.
In overruling this motion, the Court below certainly committed
no error. In the trial of capital cases, even, there are many occaions when in reason, and a proper regard to the needs of humanity, it may become neces ary to allow a temporary separation
of the jury, without neces arily breaking up the trial, and that
even after the jury have retired to consider of their verdict,
otherwise protracted trials could seldom be brought to a final conclusion. Of course, the eparation should only be allowed when
attended with those precautions and safeguards necessary to secure
entire freedom from approach or external influence of any kind.
Neal v. State, 64 Ga., 272; State v. Payton, 90 Mo., 220; Coleman v. State, 59 i[iss., 484; State v. O'Brien, 7 R. I.j 337;
Goerson v. Comm., lOG Penn. St., 477; People v. Bonney, 19 Cal.,
426; 1 Bish. Crim. Pro., secs. 993-4; 12 Am. & Eng. Enc. of
Law, 371. But each case rest~ upon its own peculiar circumstances, and is within the sound discretion of the trial court; and
is therefore not the subject of appellate review, except where it is
affirmatively shown that the party has been prejudiced by the
action of the Court.
It follow that the judgment below mu t be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
(Decided 17th November, 1892. )
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State V. Hall, llJf N. C. 909. (lS9Jt.)

Indictment for murder, tried at Spring Term, 1893, of Chero-

kee Superior Court, before Graves, J., and a jury.

The defendants (Hall as principal and Dockery as accessory

before the fact) were charged with the killing of Andrew Bryson

State v. Hall, 114 N. 0 . 909. (1894.)

on the 11th July, 1892, in Cherokee county. The testimony tended

to show that when the shooting occurred, by which deceased was

killed, the defendants were in North Carolina and the deceased in

Tennessee.

The defendants asked for the following instructions (among

others

"1. That it devolves upon the State to satisfy the jury beyond

a reasonable doubt that the killing took place in the State of

Xorth Carolina; and if the State has failed to satisfy the jury

beyond a reasonable doubt that the deceased received the wound

from which he died whilst he was in the State of North Carolina,

the defendants are not guilty.

"2. That if the j)risoners were in North Carolina and tlic de-

ceased was in Tennessee, and the prisoners, or either of them, shot
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the deceased whilst he, the deceased, was in the State of Tennessee,

and the deceased died from the effects of the wounds so received,

the defendants are not guilty."

The instructions were refused, and after a verdict of guilty the

defendants appealed from the judgment rendered thereon.

Shepherd, C. J. :

There was testimony tending to show that the deceased was

wounded and died in the State of Tennessee, and that the fatal

wounds were inflicted by the prisoners by shooting at the de-

ceased while they were standing within the boundaries of the State

of North Carolina. The prisoners have been convicted of murder,

and the question presented is whether they committed that offence

within the jurisdiction of this State.

It is a general principle of universal acceptation that one State

or sovereignty cannot enforce the penal or criminal laws of an-

other, or punish crimes or offences committed in and against

Indictment for murder, tried at Spring Term 1 93, of IIEROKEE Superior
ourt, before GRAVES, J., and a jury.
The defendants (Hall as principal and Docker3 a a ce ory
before the fact) were charged with the killing of Andrew Bn~on
on the 11th July, 1892, in Cherokee county. The te timon ' tend d
to show that when the shooting occurred, by which dee a ed wa
killed, the defendants were in North Carolina and the decea ed in
Tennessee.
The def end ants asked for the following in truction (among
othen
"1. That it devolves upon the State to satisfy th jury beyond
a reasonable doubt that the killing took place in the Stat of
North Carolina; and if the State has failed to ati fy the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt that the decea ed received the wound
from which he died whilst he was in the State of North arolina
the defendants are not guilty.
"2. That if the prisoners were in North Carolina and the d ceased was in Tenne see, and the prisoners, or either of them hot
the decea ed whilst he, the deceased, wa in the State of Tenne
and the deceased died from the effect of the wound so re ei ed.
the defendant are not guilty."
The instruction were refused, and after a verdict of guilty the
defendants appealed from the judgment rendered thereon.
SHEPHEilD,

c. J.:

There was te timony tending to how that the decea ed wa
wounded and died in the State of Tenne ee, and that th fatal
wounds were inflicted by the pri oner bv hooting at th c1 ceased while the3 were tanding within the boundarie of th fa i
of North Carolina. The pri oner have b en onvict d of murd 'r
and the que tion pre ented i whether they committ d that off n
within the juri diction of thi.. tate.
It i a general principle of univer al ace ptation that on
lat
or overeignty cannot enforce th penal r ·riminal law f another, or puni h crime or off nc . ommitt 1 in ancl ngain "l
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another State or sovereignty. Eorer's Interstate Law, 308 ; Story's

Conflict Laws, 620-623 ; The Antelope, 10 Wheaton, 66-123 ; State

V. Knight, Taylor's Rep., 65; State v. Brown, 1 Haywood, 100;

State V. Cutshall, 110 X. C. 538.

There may, by reason of "a statute or the nature of a particular

case," be apparent exceiDtions to the rule, as if "one personally out

of the country puts in motion a force which takes effect in it, he is

answerable where the evil is done, though his presence was else-

where. So where a man, standing beyond the outer line of a ter-

ritor}', by discharging a ball over the line kills another within it;

or himself, being abroad, circulates libel here, or in like manner

obtains here goods by false pretenses; or does any other crime

in our own locality against our laws, he is punishable, though

absent, the same as if he were present." 1 Bishop Cr, Law, 109-

110; State v. Cutshall, supra.

These cases, however, are but instances of crimes which arc

considered by the law to have been committed within our territory,

and in nowise conflict with the general principle to which we

have referred. Starting, then, with this fundamental principle
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-and avoiding a general discussion of the subject of extra-terri-

torial crime, we will at once proceed to an examination of the

interesting question which has been submitted for our determina-

tion.

It seems to have been a matter of doubt in ancient times whether,

if a blow were struck in one county and death ensued in another,

the offender could be prosecuted in either, though according to

Lord Hale (Picas of the Crown, 426) "the more common opinion

was that he might be indicted where the stroke was given." This

difficulty, as stated by Mr. Starkie, was sought to be avoided by

the legal device "of carrying the dead body back into the county

where the blow was struck, and the jury might there," he adds,

"inquire both of the stroke and death." 1 Starkie Cr. PL, 2 Ed.,

304; 1 Hawks, PL of Crown, ch. 13; 1 East, 361. But to remove

all doubt in respect to a matter of such grave importance, it was

•enacted by the statute 2 and 3 Edward VI. that the murderer

might be tried in the county where the death occurred. This

statute, either as a part of the common law or by re-enactment, is

in force in many of the States of the Union, and as applicable to

counties within the same State its validity has never been ques-

iioned (see Acts 1891, ch. 68, and also The Code of Tennessee,

another State or sovereignty. Rorer's Interstate Law, 30 ; Story's
Conflict Laws, 620-623; The Antelope, 10 Wheaton, 66-123; Slate
v. K night, Taylor's Rep., 65 ; S tate v. Brown, 1 Haywood, 100;
State v. Cutshall; 110 N . C. 538.
There may_, by reason of "a statute or the nature of a particular
case," be apparent exception to the rule, a if "one personally out
of the country put in motion a force which takes effect in it, he is
answerable where the evil i done, though his presence was elsewhere. So where a man, tanding beyond the outer line of a territory, by discharging a ball over the line kills another within it;
or himsel( being abroad, circulates libel here, or in like manner
obtains here goods by false pretenses ; or does any other crime
in our own locality again t our laws, he is punishable, though
absent, the same as if he were present." 1 Bishop Cr. Law, 109110 ; S tate v. Cutshall, supra.
The e cases, however, are but instances of crimes whie:h arc
considered by the law to have been committed within our territory,
and in nowise conflict with the general principle to which we
have referred. Starting,, then, with this fundamental principle
~nd avoiding a general discussion of the subj ect of extra-territorial crime, we will at once proceed to an examination of the
interesting question which has been submitted for our determina·
tion.
It seems to have been a matter of doubt in ancient times whether,
if a blow were struck in one county and death ensued in another,
the 'offender could be prosecuted in either, though according to
Lord Hale (Pleas of the Crown, 426) "the more common opinion
was that he might be indicted where the stroke was given." Thi
difficulty, as stated by Mr. Starkie, was sought to be avoided by
the legal device "of carrying the dead body ba ck into the county
where the blow was struck, and the jury might there," he adds,
"inquire both of the stroke and death." 1 Starkie Cr. P l., 2 Ed.,
304 ; 1 Hawks, Pl. of Crown, ch. 13 ; 1 E a t, 361. But to remove
all doubt in respect t o a matter of such grave importance, it was
·enacted bv the statute 2 and 3 Edward VI. that the murderer
might be tried in the county where the death occurred. This
tatute, either as a part of the common law or by re-enactment, is
in force in many of the States of the Union, and as applicable to
counties within the same State its validity has never been ques-tioncd (see Acts 1891, ch. 68, and also The Code of T'ennessee,
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§ 5801), but where its provisions have been extended so as to affect

the jurisdiction of the different States its constitutionality has

been vigorously assailed. Such legislation, however, has been very

generally, if not indeed uniformly, sustained. Simpson v. State,

4 Hump. (Tenn.), 461; Green v. State, 66 Ala., 40; Common-

wealth V. MacJoon, 101 Mass., 1; Tyler v. People, 8 Mich., 326;

Hemmaker v. State, 12 Mo., 453; People v. Burke, 11 ^Yend.,

129; Eunter v. State, 40 X. J., 495.

Statutes of this character "are founded upon the general power

of the Legislature, except so far as restrained by the Constitution

of the Commonwealth and the Tnited States, to declare any will-

ful or negligent act, which causes an injury to person or property

within its territory, to be a crime." Kerr on Homicide, 47. See,

also, remarks of Justice Bradley in the habeas corpus proceedings

of Guiteau, reported in the notes to the case of United States v.

Guiteau, 47 Am. Eep., 247; 1 INIackey, 498. In many of the

States there are also statutes substantially providing that where

the death occurs outside of one State, by reason of a stroke given

in another, the latter State may have jurisdiction. See our act,
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The Code, § 1197. The validity of these statutes seems to be undis-

puted, and, indeed, it has been held in many jurisdictions that

such legislation is but in affirmance of the common law. This

view is taken by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia

in Guiteau's case, supra, in which the authorities are collected

and their principle stated with much force by Justice James. It

is manifest that statutes of this nature are only applicable to cases

where the stroke and the death occur in different jurisdictions,

and it is equally clear that where the stroke and the death occur

in the same State the offence of murder at common law is there

complete, and the Courts of that State can alone try the offender

for that specific common law crime.

The turning point, therefore, in this case is whether the stroke

was, in legal contemplation, given in Tennessee, the alleged place

of death ; and upon this question the authorities all seem to point

in one direction.

In the early case of Bex v. Coombs, 1 Leach Crown Cases, 388,

it was held that "if a loaded pistol be fired from the land at a

distance of one hundred yards from the sea, and a man is ma-

liciously killed in the water one hundred yards from the shore,

the offender shall be tried by the Admiralty Jurisdiction; for the

v801), but where its provi ion have been extended o a to a:ffe ·t
the jurisdiction of the different tate its con titutionality ha
been vigorou 13 a ailed.
uch legi lation however, ha been very
generally, if not indeed uniforml3· u tained.
imp on v. tate,
4 Hump. (Tenn.), ±61; Green '. tate, 66 Ala., 40; Com11ionwealth Y. 1.lacloon, 101 :Jfa ., 1; Tyl er v. P eople, 8 fich. 326;
Hemmaker v. tate, 12 Uo., ±53; P eople v. Burke, 11 Wend.
129; Hunter v. State, 40 N. J., -±95.
Statutes of thi character "are found cl upon the general power
-0f the Legislature, except "'o far a r e trained by the on titution
-0f the Commonwealth and the United State~, to declare any willful or negligent act, which cau e an injury to per on or property
within it t erritor3 to be a crime.' Kerr on Homicide, 4 . See,
.al. o, remarks of Justice BRADLEY in the hab eas corpus proceeding
of Guiteau, reported in the note to the ca e of Unit ed States v.
Guiteau, 47 Am. Rep., 24 ; 1 facke3 498. In many of the
States there are al o tatute sub tantially providing that where
-the death occur outside of one State, b) reason of a stroke given
in another, the latter tate may have juri diction. See our act,
The Code, § 1197. The validity of the e tatutes eem to be undi puted, and, indeed, it ha been h eJd in many juri diction that
such legi~lation i but in affirmance of the common law. Thi
-view i taken by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
in Guitea.u's ca e, supra, in which the authorities are collected
and their principle stated with much force by Justice JAME . It
i manife..,t that tatutes of thi nature are only applicable to ca e
where the stroke and the death occur in different juri diction ,
and it is equally clear that where the stroke and the death occur
in the ame tate the offence of murder at common law is there
complete, and the Court of that tate can alone try the offender
-for that pecific common law crime.
The turning point, therefore, in thi case i whether the stroke
was, in legal contemplation, given in Tenne ee, the alleged place
of death; and upon thi ~ question the authoritie all seem to point
in one direction.
In the early ca e of Rex v. Coombs, 1 Leach Crown Ca e , 388,
it wa held that "if a loaded pi ~ tol b fired from the land at a
di~ tan cc of one hundred yard from the
a, an 1 a man i maliciou. ly kill d in the water one hunc1r d yard from th hor
the off nd r ..,hall be tri d by the Admiralty .Tnri di ·tion; f r the
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offence is committed where the death happened and not at the

place whence the cause of the death proceeds." See also, 1 East^

367, and 1 Chitty Cr. Law, 154.

In the case of United States v. Davis, 2 Sumner, 482, a gun was

fired from an American ship lying in the harbor of Eaiatea, one

of the Society Isles and a foreign government, by which a person

on board a schooner, belonging to the natives and lying in the

same harbor, was killed — Mr. Justice Story, in the course of his

opinion, said: "What we found ourselves upon in this case is

that the offence, if any, was committed on board of a foreign

schooner belonging to inhabitants of the Society Islands, and of

course under the territorial government of the Society Islands,,

with which kingdom we have trade and friendly intercourse, and

which our Government may be presumed (since we have a Consul

there) to recognize as entitled to the rights and sovereignty of an

independent nation, and of course entitled to try offences com-

mitted within its territorial Jurisdiction. I say the offence was

committed on board of the schooner; for, although the gun was

fired from the ship Eose, the shot took effect and the death hap-
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pened on board of the schooner, and the act was, in contemplation

of law, done where the shot took effect. * * * -^yg j^y j^q stress-

on the fact that the deceased was a foreigner. Our judgment

would be the same if he had been an American citizen."

In Simpson v. State, 17 S. E. Rep., 984, it was held by the

Supreme Court of Georgia that one who, in the State of South.

Carolina, aims and fires a pistol at another who at the time is in

the State of Georgia, is guilty of the offence of "shooting at

another" although the ball did not take effect, but struck the

water in the latter State. The Court said: "Of course the pres-

ence of the accused within this State is essential to make his act

one which is done in this State, but the presence need not be

actual; it may be constructive. The well-established theory of

the law is that where one puts in force an agency for the com-

mission of crime, he in legal contemplation accompanies the same

to the point where it becomes effectual. * * * go, if a man in

the State of South Carolina criminally fires a ball into the State

of Georgia the law regards him as accompanying the ball and as

being represented by it up to the point where it strikes. If an

unlawful shooting occurred while both the parties were in this

State the mere fact of missing would not render the person who-

offence is committed where the death happened and not at the
place whence the cause of the death proceeds." See also, 1 East,.
367, and 1 Chitty Cr. Law, 154.
In the case of United States v. Davis, 2 Sumner, 482, a gun was
fired from an American ship lying in the harbor of Raiatea, one
of the Society Isles and a foreign government, by which a person
on board a schooner, belonging to the natives and lying in the
same harbor, was kmed-Mr. Justice STORY, in the course of his
opinion, said: "What we found ourselves upon in this case js
that the offence, if any, was committed on board of a foreign
schooner belonging to inhabitants of the Society Islands, and of
course under the territorial government of the Society Islands,.
with which kingdom we have trade and friendly intercourse, and
which our Government may be presumed (since we have a Consul
there) to recognize as entitled to the rights and sovereignty of an
independent nation, and of course entitled to try offences committed within its territorial jurisdiction. I say the offence was
committed on board of the schooner; for, although the gun wa&
fired from the ship Rose, the shot took effect and the death happened on board of the schooner, and the act was, in contemplation
of law, done where the shot took effect. * * * We lay no stress.
on the fact that the deceased was a foreigner. Our judgment
would be the same if he had been an American citizen."
In Simpson v. S tate, 17 S. E. Rep., 984, it was held by the
Supreme Court of Georgia that one who, in the State of South
Carolina, aims and fires a pistol at another who at the time is in
the State of Georgia, is guilty of the offence of "shooting at
another" although the ball did not take effect, but struck the
water in the latter State. The Court said: "Of course the presence of the accused within this State is essential to make his act
one which is done in this State, but the presence need not be
actual; it may be constructive. The well-established theory of
the law i that where one puts in force an agency for the commission of crime, he in legal contemplation accompanies the same
to the point where it becomes effectual. * * * So, if a man in
the State of South Carolina criminally fires a ball into the State
of Georgia the law regards him as accompanying the ball and as
being represented by it up to the point where it strikes. If an
unlawful shooting occurred while both the parties were in this
State the mere fact of missing would not render the person who
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sliot any the less guilty; consequently, if one shooting from an-

other State goes, in a legal sense, where his bullet goes, the fact

of his missing the object at which he aims cannot alter the legal

principle."

The Court approved of the language of Campbell^ J., in Tyler

V. People, 8 Mich., 320, that "a wounding must of course be done

where there is a person wounded, and the criminal act is the force

against his person. That is the immediate act of the assailant,

whether he strikes with a sword or shoots with a gun, and he may

very reasonably be held present where his forcible act becomes

directly operative."

In speaking of crime committed by one out of the State, through

an innocent agent. Judge Rorer says : "In such case the innocent

person in the State is the means used to perpetrate the crime

therein, just as if a person who shoots out of a State across the

line into another State and therein intentionally kills another per-

son is in such case guilty of committing the criminal act within

the State without himself being at the time therein." Interstate

Law, 326.
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In Commonwealth v. Macloon, supra. Justice Gray says that if

one's "unlawful act is the efficient cause of the mortal injury, his

personal presence at the time of its beginning, its continuance, or

its result, is not essential. He may be held guilty of homicide by

shooting, even if he stands afar off, out of sight, or in another

jurisdiction."

In State v. Carter, 3 Butcher, 499, the Supreme Court of New

Jersey, in discussing a kindred question, said: "This is not the

case where a man stands on the New York side of the line, and

shooting across the border kills one in New Jersey. When that is

so the blow is in fact struck in New Jersey. It is the defendant's

act in this State. The passage of the ball, after it crosses the

boundary, and its actual striking, is the continuous act of the

defendant. In all cases the criminal act is the impinging of the

weapon, whatever it may be, on the person of the party injured,

and that must necessarily be where the impingement happens.

And whether the sword, the ball, or any other missile passes over

a boundary in the act of striking is a matter of no consequence.

The act is where it strikes, as much where the party who strikes

stands out of the State as where he stands in it."

In State v. Chapin, 17 Ark., 560. the Court said: "For ex-

h0t any the le s guilty; con equently, if one hooting from another State goe , in a legal en e, .where hi bullet goe , the fact
of hi mi ing the object at which he aim annot alter the legal
principle."
The Court approved of the language of CAl\iPBELL, J., in Tyl er
v. People, 8 Mich., 320, that "a wounding mu t of course be done
where there is a per on wounded, and the criminal act i the fore
again t hi person. That is the immediate act of the assailant,
whether he strike with a word or shoots with a gun, and he may
very reasonably be held pre ent where his forcible act become
directly operative."
In speaking of crime committed by one out of the State, through
an innocent agent, Judge RoRER ays: "In uch ca e the innocent
person in the State i the means used to perpetrate the crime
therein, just as if a person who hoots out of a State across the
line into another State and therein intentionally kills another person i .. in such ca e guilty of committing the criminal act within
the State without him elf being at the time therein." Interstate
Law, 326.
In Commonwealth v. Macloon, supra_, Justice GRAY says that if
one' "unlawful act is the efficient cause of the mortal injury, hi
personal presence at the time of it beginning its continuance, or
its result, is not essential. He may be held guilty of homicide by
shooting, even if he stand afar off, out of ight, or in another
jurisdiction."
In State v . Carter, 3 Dutcher, 499, the Supreme Court or New
3 ersey, in discussing a kindred question, said: "This is not the
ca e where a man stand on the New York side of the line, and
hooting aero s the border kills one in New Jersey. When that i
"o the blow i~ in fact truck in New Jersey. It is the defendants
act in this State. The pas age of the ball, after it crosses the
boundary, and its actual triking, is the continuous act of the
defendant. In all cases the criminal act i the impinging of the
weapon, whatever it may be_, on the person of the party injured,
and that mu t neces arily be where the impingement happen .
And whether the word, the ball, or any other mi sil pa e over
a boundary in the act of triking i a matter of no consequ nee.
Th act i wh re it trike , a much wl1ere the party who trike
stand out of the tate a where he tand in it."
In 1 tate v. Chapin, 17 Ark., 60; tl e ourt aid: "For x-

382

Lo

ALlTY OF CRIME

3S2 Locality of Chime

ample, if a man standing beyond our boundary line, in Texas, were,

by firing a gun or propelling any other implement of death, to kill

a person in Arkansas, he would be guilty of murder here, and

answerable to our laws, because the crime is regarded as being

committed where the shot or other implement propelled takes

effect/' See also. People v. Adams, 3 Denio, 207.

In StiUman v. Manufacturing Co., 3 Woodb. & M. (U. S.), 538,

Woodbury, J., said: "I can conceive of crimes, likewise, like

civil injuries, which may be prosecuted in two States, though

sometimes in different forms as here. * * * go, if one fires

a gun in one State, which kills an individual in another State, there

may be the offence of using a deadly weapon in the first State

(that is, we suppose, by statute) and committing murder by killing

in the second State."

In speaking of the validity of acts similar to that of Edward

VI., supra, Mr. Black, in an article in the Central Law Journal

(Vol. XXXVIII, p. 318), remarks: "There is less difficulty in

cases where the means of death employed, though set in motion in

one Jurisdiction, reach and operate upon their object in another
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territory. For, of course, the act can amount to nothing more than

an attempt, until the fatal agency comes in contact with the body

of the victim." See, also, upon this subject American Law Ee-

view. Vol. XX, p. 918.

In view of the foregoing authorities it cannot be doubted that

the place of the assault or stroke in the present case was in Ten-

nessee, and it is also clear that the offence of murder at common

law was committed within the jurisdiction of that State. If this

be so it must follow that unless we have some statute expressly

conferring jurisdiction upon the Courts of this State, or making

the act of shooting under the circumstances a substantive murder,

the offence with which the prisoners are charged can only be tried

by the tribunals of Tennessee.

It is true that in Wharton's Criminal Law, 288, it is said in a

general way that "a concurrent jurisdiction exists in the place of

starting the offence," but by a reference to the cases cited in sup-

port of the proposition it will be readily seen that they have no

application to the question under consideration. These and like

authorities are where libels are uttered in one State to take effect

in another (JJ. S. v. We^raU, 2 Dall., 383), or where, either by

common law or by statute, the place of the stroke has concurrent

ample, if a man ~tanding beyond our boundary lin , in Texas, were,.
by firing a gun or propelling any other implement of death, to kill
a person in Arkansas, he would be guilty of murder here, and
answerable to our laws, because the crime is regarded as being
committed where the shot or other implement propelled takes
effect." See also, People v. Adams, 3 Denio, 207.
In Stillman v. Manufacturing Co., 3 Woodb. & M. (U. S.), 538,
WooDBURY, J., said: "I can conceive of crimes, likewise, like
civil injuries, which may be prosecuted in two States, though
sometimes in different forms as here. * * * So, if one fires
a gun in one State, which kills an individual in another State, there
may be the offence of using a deadly weapon in the first State
(that is, we suppose, by statute) and committing murder by killing
in the second State."
In speaking of the validity of acts similar to that of Edward
VI., supra, Mr. Black, in an article in the Central Law Journal
(Vol. XXXVIII, p. 318), remarks: "There is less difficulty in
ca.es where the means of death employed, though set in motion in
one jurisdiction, reach and operate upon their object in another
territory. For, of course, the act can amount to nothing more than
an attempt, until the fatal agency comes in contact with the body
of the victim." See, also, upon this subject American Law Review, Vol. XX, p. 918.
In view of the foregoing authoritie it cannot be doubted that
the place of the assault or stroke in the present case was in Tennes ee, and it is also clear that the offence of murder at common
law was committed within the jurisdiction of that State. If this
be so it must follow that unless we have some statute expressly
conferring jurisdiction upon the Courts of this State, or making
the act of shooting under the circumstances a ubstantive murder,
the offence with which the prisoners are charged can only be tried
by the tribunals of Tenne see.
It is true that in Wharton's Criminal Law, 288, it is said in a
general way that "a concurrent juri diction exists in the place of
starting the offence," but by a reference to the cases cited in support of the proposition it will be readily seen that they have no
application to the question under consideration. These and like
authorities are where libels are uttered in one State to take effect
in another (U. 8. v. w~Tall, 2 Dall., 383), or where, either by
common law or by statute, the place of the stroke has concurrent
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jurisdiction {Green v. State, supra), or where an accessory before

the fact in one State to a felony committed in another was held

to be indictable in the State where he became accessory {State v.

Cliapin, supra), or in certain cases of false pretenses, or in con-

spiracies where an overt act is committed at the place of the trial,

or where by statute a particular '^section" of an offence committed

in one jurisdiction is there made indictable; as, for instance, the

act of shooting or unlawfully using a deadly weapon within the

State, as in the present case. In some instances there may be

concurrent jurisdiction of the whole offence, and in others there

may exist the jurisdiction of an attempt in one State and of the

consummated offence in another. In a note to the preceding sec-

tion the author thus explains: "The place of such residence (that

is, where the offence is started) has jurisdiction over the attempt

or conspiracy as the case may be. The place of the consumma-

tion has jurisdiction of the offence consummated on its soil." In

respect to this very matter the learned author has made his meaning

entirely clear in his article on the conflict of laws. 1 Criminal

Law Magazine, 695. In putting the case of A in New York
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shooting B in Connecticut, he says that the place of the consum-

mation of the crime should be regarded as its locality. "Until such

consummation a crime, so far as jurisdiction is concerned, is simply

an attempt and only punishable as such. It may be indictable for

A merely to discharge a gun. It may be said, 'This is a dan-

gerous act, punishable as such'; or it may be said, 'From all the

circumstances of the case we infer that you are attempting B's life,

and you are to be indicted for this attempt.' But it is not until

we see before us a man wounded by such a shot that the crime in

its completeness exhibits itself."

There being, then, no concurrent jurisdiction at common law,

we will now consider whether it has been conferred by statute;

for it is well settled that "whenever a homicide is committed partly

in and partly out of the jurisdiction where the charge is made, the

power to punish it depends upon the question whether so much

of the act as operates in the county or State in which the offender

is indicted and tried has been declared to be punishable by the law

of that jurisdiction." Kerr on Homicide, 226; Commonwealth v.

Macloon, supra. It is not very seriously insisted on the part of tlie

State that our statute (The Code, § 1197) applies to this case.

juri diction ( Gree.n v. tate, upra) or wher an accessory before
the fact in one State to a felony committed in another wa~ held
to be indictable in the State where h became accessory (State v.
Chapin, supra), or in certain case of false pretenses, or in conspiracies where an overt act i committed at the place of the trial,
or where by tatute a particular " ection" of an offence committ d
in one jurisdiction i there made indictable; as, for instance, the
act of shooting or unlawfully using a deadly weapon within the
State, as in the present case. In some instances there may be·
concurrent jurisdiction of the whole offence, and in others there
may exist the jurisdiction of an attempt in one State and of the
consummated offence in another. In a note to the preceding section the author thu explain : "The place of such residence (that
is, where the offence is started) has jurisdiction over the attempt
or conspiracy a the case may be. rrhe place of the consummation has jurisdiction of the offence consummated on its soil." In
respect to this very matter the learned author has made his meaning
entirely clear in his article on the conflict of laws. 1 Criminal
Law Magazine, 695. In putting the case of A in New York
shooting B in Connecticut, he says that the place of the consummation of the crime should be regarded as its locality. "Until such
consummation a crime, so far as jurisdiction is concerned, is simply
an attempt and only punishable as such. It may be indictable for
A merely to di charge a gun. It may be said, 'This is a dangerous act, punishable as such'; or it may be said, 'From all the
circumstances of the case we infer that you are attempting B's life,
and you are to be indicted for this attempt.' But it is not until
we see before us a man wounded by such a shot that the crime in
its completeness exhibits itself."
There being, then, no concurrent jurisdiction at common law,
we will now consider whether it has been conferred by statute;
for it is well settled that "whenever a homicide is committed partly
in and partly out of the jurisdiction where the charge is made, the
power to puni h it depends upon the question whether so much
of the act as operates in the county or State in which the off nder
is indicted and tried has been declared to be punishable by the law
of that jurisdiction." Kerr on Homicide, 226; Commonwealth v.
Macloon, supra. It is not very seriously insisted on the part of th
State that our statute (The Code, § 1197) applie to thi"' ca e,
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but inasmuch as it was referred to ou the argument it is proper

that we should briefly examine into its provisions. It provides :

"In all cases of felonious homicide, when the assault shall have

been made within this State and the person assaulted shall dii_

without the limits thereof, the ofi'ender shall be indicted and pun-

ished for the crime in the county where the assault was made,

in the same manner, to all intents and purposes as if the person

assaulted had died within the limits of this State."

This statute has received a judicial construction by this Court

in State v. DunJcley, 3 Ired., 116, and it was held that it did not

create any new offence, but merely removed a difficulty which

existed as to the place of the trial. In view of the authorities cited

it can hardly be contended that the assault in the present case was

committed in this State, and especially is this so when the assault

mentioned in the statute evidently means not a mere attempt, but

such an injury inflicted in this State which results in death in

another State. This would seem manifest from the history of the

legislation as well as the language of the act, which plainly con-

templates that every part of the offence, except the death, must
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have occurred in this State. It was a subject of doubt, as we have

seen, whether the accused could be tried in the place of the stroke,

the death having occurred without the jurisdiction, and it was to

remove this doubt alone that this and similar legislation was re-

sorted to. It was, of course, never questioned that the place where

both the stroke and the death occurred was the place where the

crime was committed. We are relieved, however, from all doubt,

if any existed, upon this point by the opinion of Chief Justice

EuFFiN in Dunkley's case, supra. He says that the act "does not

profess to define 'felonious homicide,' or to constitute the crime

by any particular acts, but merely says that, in certain cases of

felonious homicide, the offender may be indicted and of course tried

and punished in the county where the stroVe was given — meaning,

though it does not (like the statute 2 and 3 Edward VI.) expressly

say so, 'in the same manner as if the death had happened in the

same county where the stroJce was given/ " As it is plain that in

contemplation of law the stroke was given in Tennessee, we are of

the opinion that there was error in refusing to give the instructions

prayed for by the prisoners.

The fact that the prisoners and the deceased were citizens of

the State of North Carolina cannot affect the conclusion we have

•

but ina much a it wa referr cl to on the argument it i proper
that we should briefly examine into its provision . It provides :
"In all cases of felonious homicide, when the as ault hall have
been made within thi State and the person assaulted shall die
without the limits thereof, the offender shall be indicted and puni hed for the crime in the county where the a ault was made,
in the same manner, to all intent and purposes a .if the person
assaulted had died within the limits of thi State."
This statute has received a judicial construction by this Court
in State v. Dunkley, 3 Ired., 116, and it was held that it did not
create any new offence, but merely removed a difficulty which
exi ted as to the place of the trial. In view of the authorities cited
it can hardly be contended that the assault in the present case was
committed in this State, and e pecially is thi so when the assault
mentioned in the tatute evidently means not a mere attempt, but
such an injury inflicted in this State which results in death in
another State. This would seem manifest from the history of the
legislation as well as the language of the act, which plainly contemplates that every part of the offence, except the death, must
have occurred in this State. It was a subject of doubt, as we have
seen, whether the accu ed could be tried in the place of the stroke,
the death having occurred without the jurisdiction, and it was to
remove this doubt alone that this and similar legislation was resorted to. It was, of course, never questioned that the place where
both the stroke and the death occurred was the place where the
crime was committed. We are relieved, however, from all doubt,
if any existed, upon this point by the opinion of Chief Justice
RUFFIN in Dunkley's case, supra. He says that the act "does not
profess to define 'felonious homicide,' or to constitute the crime
by any particular act , but merely ays that, in certain case of
felonious homicide, the offender may be indicted and of course tried
and puni. bed in the county where the stroke was given-meaning,
though it does not (like the statute 2 and 3 Edward VI.) expressly
say so, 'in the same manner a if the death had happened in the
same county where the stroke was given.',, As it is plain that in
contemplation of law the stroke was given in Tennessee, we are of
the opinion that there wa error in refu ing to give the instruction
prayed for by the pri oners.
The fact that the prisoner and the decea ed were citizen of
the State of North Carolina cannot affect the conclusion we have

TATE \ . HALL

•)

~

.

u u

State v. Hall 385

reached. If, as we have seen, the offence was committed in Ten-

nessee, the personal jurisdiction generally claimed by nations over

their subjects who have committed offences abroad or on the high

seas cannot be asserted by this State. Such jurisdiction does not

exist as between the States of the Union under their peculiar rela-

tion to each other (Eorer's Interstate Law, 308), and even if it

could be rightfully claimed it could not in a case like the present

be enforced in the absence of a statute providing that the offence

should be tried in Xorth Carolina. Even in England, where it

seems the broadest claim to such jurisdiction is asserted, a statute

(33 Hen. YIII.) appears to have been necessary in order that the

Courts of that country could try a murder committed in Lisl)on

by one British subject upon another. Rex v. Saivijer, Eussell &

Eyan Cr. Cases, 294, cited and commented upon in Dunkley's

case, supra. In People v. Merrill, 2 Parker's Cr. Cases, 600, it is

said that by the common law offences were local and the jurisdic-

tion in such cases depends upon statutory provisions. See also,

Wheaton International Law, 115; 1 Wharton Cr. L., 271; 1

Bishop Cr. Law, 121. Granting, however, that in some instances
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the jurisdiction may exist without statute, it is not exercised in all

cases. Dr. Wharton says : "It has already been stated that as to

crimes committed by subjects in foreign civilized States, with the

single exception in England of homicides, the Anglo-American

practice is to take cognizance only of offences directed against the

sovereignty of the prosecuting State; perjury before Consuls and

forgery of Government documents being included in this head."

To the same effect is 3 Am. and Eng. Enc, 539, in which it is

said: "As to offences committed in foreign civilized lands the

country of arrest has jurisdiction only of offences distinctively

against its sovereignty." See, also. Dr. Wharton's article upon the

subject in 1 Criminal Law Magazine, 715. As between the States

the question is so clear to us that we forbear a general discussion

of the subject. We may further remark that, while it is true that

the criminal laws of a State can have no extra-territorial force,

we are of the opinion that it is competent for the Legislature to

determine what acts within the limits of the State shall l)e deemed

criminal, and to provide for their punishment. Certainly, there

could be no complaint where all the parties concerned in tlu' homi-

cide are citizens of Xorth Carolina. It may also l)c' ol)served that
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in addition to its common law jurisdiction the State of Tennessee

has provided by statute for the trial of an offender under the cir-

cumstances of this case.

■ For the reasons given we are constrained to say that the prison-

ers are entitled to a New Trial.

Finis.

in addition to iis common law jurisdiction the State of Tennessee
has provided by statute for the trial of an offender under the circumstances of this case.
For the reasons given we are constrained to say that the prisoners are entitled to a
New Trial.
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of the criminal act, 29-33.
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liability of, 12, 15.
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what constitutes, 335-337.

ACCESSORIES:

INDEX.

before and after the fact, 90-100.

in what crimes we have, 100-102.

trial of, 102-105.

liability of, in cases of suicide, 170-176.

ACCOMPLICE: (See Accessories.)

ACT:

consent as determining character of, 9, 10.

must be declared a crime by law, 24, 25.

repentance or withdrawal from, 29-33.

necessity of, in crime, 80-88.

ACTION:
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civil or criminal, time of bringing for same wrong, 18-24.

ADULTERY:

what constitutes, 329-334.

development of the law of, 329-334.

AFFRAY:

defined, and elements of, 313-315.

AGE:

as determining criminal responsibility, 34-37.

AGENCY:

as affecting criminal responsibility, 90-97.

AGENT:

liability for crime, 90-97.

AIDERS AND ABETTORS:

who are such, 90-105.

ALIENS:

criminal liability of, 353-365.

ARREST:

when officer excused for killing in making, 188-190.

distinction between civil and criminal proceedings in making, 189.
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AROGN:

the burning in, 229-232.

cliaracter of premises in, 232-234.

ownership in cases of, 234-238.

the intent in, 238-240.

ASPORTATION:
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ownership in cases of, 234-238.
the intent in, 238-240.

in larceny, 258-264.

ASSAULTS AND ASSAULT AND BATTERY:

what constitutes, 207-216.

ASPORTATION :

in larceny, 258-264.

ASSISTANCE:

liability of those who give, 89-108.

liability of those who give to a suicide, 170-176.

ATTEMPTS:

to commit crime, what are, 80-85.

BIGAMY:

what constitutes, 334-335.

BLASPHEMY:

what is treated as, 337-352.
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law against, as a part of the common law, 337-352.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:04 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t39z97p86
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

BOUNDARIES:

offenses committed across, 365-386.

BRIBERY:

BIGAMY :

what constitutes, 334-335.
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what amounts to. 305-308.

BURGLARY:

the breaking in, 241-243.

entry in, 243-246.

character of premises in, 247-249.
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when nighttime in cases of, 249-250

the intent in. 251.

BURNING:

BRIBERY:

what amounts to, 305-308.

what is sufficient, in arson, 229-232.

CAPACITY:

to commit crime, 34-79.

CHEATING:

liability for, at common law, 3, 4.

CHILD:

liability of, for crime, 34-37.

CHILDREN:

criminal liability of, 34-37.

CHRISTIANITY:
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the breaking in, 241-243.
entry in, 243-246.
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when nighttime in cases of, 249-250
the intent in, 251.
BURNING:

what is sufficient, in arson, 229-232.

as a part of our law, 337-352.

CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS:

distinction between, 14, 15.

effect of wrong of person injured on, 17, 18.
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as a defense to crime, 37-44.

COMMAND:

COERCION:
as a defense to crime, 37-44.

as an excuse for crime, 37-44.

COMMON LAW:

no common law criminal jurisdiction for the U. S., 25-27,

as to suicide, 170-176.

sources of; for this country, 219-228.

Christianity as a part of, 337-352.

COMPOUNDING CRIME:

what constitutes, 308-312.

COMPULSION:

COMMAND:
as an excuse for crime, 37-44.
COMMON LAW:
no common law criminal jurisdiction for the U. S., 25-27.
as to suicide, 170-176.
sources of; for this country, 219-228.
Christianity as a part of, 337-352.

as a defense to crime, 37-44.

CONDITIONS OF CRIMINALITY:

enumerated, 34-79.

COMPOUNDING CRIME:
what constitutes, 308-312.

CONCURRENCE:

of act and intention, 47-50.

CONDONATION:

COMPULSION:
as a defense to crime, 37-44.

as affecting criminal responsibility. 7-10.
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CONGRESS:

power to punish crimes, 25-27.

CONSENT:

as affecting crime, 8-10.

of person injured, 8-10.

as affecting crime of larceny, 10-12.

CONSPIRACY:

CONDITIONS OF CRIMINALITY:
enumerated , 34-79.
CONCURRENCE:
of act and intention, 47-50.
CONDONATION:
as affecting criminal responsibility, 7-10.

overt act in, 80-88,^ 318-323.

what amounts to, 318-323.

CONSTRUCTIVE INTENT:

example of, 50-51.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE:

effect of, in civil and criminal proceedings, 14, 15.

CORPORATIONS:

criminal responsibility of, 105-108.

CORPUS DELICTI:

proof of, in case of homicide, 124-140.

COVERTURE:

as a defense to crime, 37-44.

CRIME:

defined, 2.

distinguished from tort, 3-7.

must be declared by law, 24-25.

liability of children for, 34-37.

without criminal intent, 51, 52, 53, 54.
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CRIME:
defined, 2.
distinguished from tort, 3-7.
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CRIMES— Continued.

attempts to commit, 80-88.

solicitations to commit, 80-88.

committed in foreign port, 353-365.

committed on liigh seas, 353-365.

wliere considered to have been committed, 365-386.

CRIMINAL INTENTION:

necessity of to constitute crime, 45-57.

in burglary, 45-47.

in general, 45-47.

concurrence of act and, 47-50.

CRIMINAL LAW:

sources of, 26-27, 219-228.

CRIMINAL LIBEL:

what constitutes, 219-228.

DELIRIUM TREMENS:

as an excuse for crime, 77-79.

DELUSIONS:

as a defense to crime, 58-77.
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DEMENTIA:

as a defense to crime, 58-77.

DETECTIVES:

to what extent permitted to entrap criminals, 10-12.

DRUNKENNESS:

as a defense to crime, 77-79.

DURESS:

when an excuse for crime, 37-44.

DUTY:

result of omission of, 2, 3.

ELECTIONS:

liability for illegal voting at, 51-54.

EMBEZZLEMENT:

nature of the offense, 270-273.

distinguished from larceny, 273-275.

the intent in. 276-277.

ENTRAPMENT:

into crime, 10-12.

ESCAPE:

when officer excused for killing in preventing, 188-190.

EXCUSABLE HOMICIDE:

elements of, 191-198.

how it differs from justifiable, 194.

EXPRESS MALICE:

what is, and distinguished from implied, 117-187.
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FACT:

mistake or ignorance of, 56-58.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT:

what constitutes the crime of, 203-207.

ingredients of, 205-207.

FALSE PRETENSES:

FACT:
mistake or ignorance of, 56-5 .
FALSE IMPRISONMENT:
what constitutes the crime of, 203-207.
ingredients of, 205-207.

what constitutes, 277-285.

ingredients of, 280.

FEDERAL COURTS:

jurisdiction of, depends upon act of Congress, 25-27.

FELONIES:

solicitations to commit, 85-88.

merger of, 109-115.

FELONIOUS HOMICIDE:

defined, and elements of, 140-187.

FIGHTING:

by agreement, 9, 10.

FORCE:

what sufficient in rape, 199-203.
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necessary to constitute robbery, 285-292.

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER-

nature and ingredients of, 324-328.

FORGERY:

what amounts to, 294-297.

essentials of, 294-297.

FREE AGENCY:

as an element of crime, 37-45.

GENERAL INTENT:
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considered as high seas, 353-365.

HABITATION:
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what amounts to, 294-297.
essentials of, 294-297.

offenses against, 229-251.
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effect of, in cases of homicide, 177-184.
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what is included within the term, 353-365.
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in general, 117-140.

proof of, 124-140.

FREE AGENCY:
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GENERAL INTENT:
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GREAT LAKES:
considered as high seas, 353-365.

cause and time of, 121-124.

must be the death of a human being, 117-120.
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HUMAN BEING:

in homicide, must be the death of, 117-120.

cause and time of death of, 121-124.

proof of death of, 124-140.

HUSBAND:

liability of, for wife's crime, 37-44.

HUSBAND AND WIFE:

as to criminal liability, 37-44.

IDIOCY:

as a defense to crime, 58-79.
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IGNORANCE OR MISTAKE OF LAW:
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ILLEGAL VOTING:

may be a crime without criminal intent, 51-54.

IMPLIED MALICE:

what is, 140-187.

INCITING UNLAWFUL ACTS:
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liability for, 12-15.

INFANCY:

as a defense to crime, 34-37.

INSANE DELUSIONS:
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law of, 188-198.

KIDNAPPING:

what constitutes, at common law, 203-207.

ingredients of, 205-207.

KILLING:

when excusable, 191-198.

LARCENY:

what constitutes, 10, 11, 12.
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the asportation in, 258-264.

the intent in, 264-270.

the purpose, 264-270.
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mistake or ignorance of, 54-56.
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offenses against, 116.

jurisdiction of, 353-365.

LIBEL:

criminal, defined, 219-228.

LIMITS:

of national jurisdiction, 353-365.
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MAYHEM:
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tests of, 58-79.
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as an ingredient of crime, 58-79.
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MOTIVE:

as an element of crime, 140-161.
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MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES:

liability for violating, 28, 29.

MURDER:

what constitutes, 140-161.

degrees of, 166-169.

distinguished from manslaughter, 140-161, 176, 177.

MUTUAL COMBAT:

criminal responsibility, in cases of, 8-10.

NATIONS:

MISTAKE:
when liable for, 28, 29.
of law, effect of, 54-56.
of fact, effect of, 56-58.
MOTIVE:
as an element of crime, 140-161.
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES:
liability for violating, 2 , 29.

law of, 353-365.

NECESSITY AND COMPULSION:

as a defense to crime, 37-44.

NEGLIGENCE OR WRONG:

may supply criminal intent, 2.

in homicide, 2, 3.

of the person injured, 12-18.

NONFEASANCE:

as a criminal act, 1-3.

OFFENSES:

merger of, 109-115.

against the government, 116.

against law of nations, 116.

against the person, 117-229.

MURDER:
what constitutes, 140-161.
degrees of, 166-169.
distinguished from manslaughter, 140-161, 176, 177.
MUTUAL COMBAT:
criminal responsibility, in cases of,
NATIONS:
law of, 353-363.
NECESSITY AND COMPULSION:
as a defense to crime, 37-44.

against the habitation, 229-251.

NEGLIGENCE OR WRONG:
may supply criminal intent, 2.
in homicide, 2, 3.
of the person in j ured, 12-18.
NONFEASANCE:
as a criminal act, 1-3.
OFFENSES:
merger
against
aga inst
against
against

of, 109-115.
the government, 116.
law of nations, 116.
the person, 117-229.
the habitation, 229-251.
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OFFENSES— Continued.

against property, 252-299.

against public justice, 300-312.

against public peace, 313-328.

against morals and religion, 329-352.

OMISSION OR ACT:

must be declared a crime by law, 24, 25.

ORDINANCE:

liability for violating, 28, 29.

OVERT ACT:

necessity of in crime, 80-88.

PARENT AND CHILD:

crimes, as affected by the relation of, 37-44.

PARTIAL INSANITY:

as a defense to crime, 58-79.

PARTIES TO CRIMES:

discussed in general, 89-108.

how classified, 89-108.

PASSION:
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distinguished from insanity, 58-79.

PERJURY:

what amounts to, 300-305.

PERSON:

consent of, as affecting criminal responsibility, 8-10.

wrong of, as affecting his remedy, 15-18.

PERSONAL PROPERTY:

subject of larceny, 252-258.

PIRACY:

for a full discussion of, 116.

PRESUMPTION:

of mental capacity, 34-37.

as to age, 34-37.

PRESSING NECESSITY:

as a defense to crime, 37-44.

PREVENTION OF CRIME:

when one may kill to prevent, 191-198.

PRINCIPALS:

degrees of, 12-15, 89, 90.

PRINCIPALS AND ACCESSORIES:

classification of, 89-108.

who are, 89-108.

how classified, 89-lOC.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT:

the relation of, as affecting criminal responsibility, 90-97.
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how classified, 9-10 .
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PIRACY:
for a full discussion of, 116.
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PRIVATE WRONGS:

what amounts to, 6, 7.

PROFANITY:

as an offense against our law, 337-352.

PROPERTY:

when one may kill to protect, 191-198.

offenses against, 252-299.

PROVOCATION:

what sufficient to make a crime manslaughter, 177-184.

PUBLIC:

duty to, 2, 3.

PUBLIC JUSTICE:

offenses against, 300-312.

PUBLIC MORALS:

offenses against, 329-352.

PUBLIC PEACE:

offenses against, 313-328,

RAPE:

defined, 199.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:04 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t39z97p86
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

history of this crime, 199-203.

means used in accomplishing, 199-203.

effect of consent in, 199-203.

RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS:

what constitutes, 292-294.

RELIGION:

as a part of our law, 337-352.

REPEAL:

of repealing statute, effect of, 24, 25.

REPENTANCE:

of the act, effect of. 29-33.

RIOT:

what constitutes, 315-317.

ROBBERY:

discussion of, 285-292.

defined, 287.

force required to constitute, 287-292.

SELF-DEFENSE:

when one may kill in, 191-198.

elements of, 191-198.

SERVANT:

liability of, for crime, 90-97.

SETTLEMENT:

with the person injured, 7-10.

SOLICITATION:

how far allowable to catch criminal, 10-12.

PRIVATE WRONGS:

what amounts to, 6, 7.
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PUBLIC: ·
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SPECIFIC INTENT:

when necessary, 45-47.

STATES:

sources of the law of, 219-228.

STATUTES:

repeal of repealing, 24, 25.

SUICIDE:

nature of the offense and punishment, 170-176.

liability of parties to the, 170-176.

TORTS:

distinguished from crimes, 3-7.

TRAP:

to catch criminal, how far allowable, 10-12.

TREASON:

what constitutes, 116.

TRESPASS:

what constitutes, 6, 7.

to constitute larceny, 10-12.

in larceny, 258-264.
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UNITED STATES:

jurisdiction of courts of, 25-27.

UTTERING:

forged paper, what constitutes, 297-299.

VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER:

defined and discussed, 177-184.

WIFE:

liability of, for crime, 37-44.

WRONG:

of the person injured, 15-18.
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